

THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST

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HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON **S. J. Res. 19 and H. J. Res. 117** **JOINT RESOLUTIONS**

TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO UNDERTAKE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN THE STRENGTHENING AND DEFENSE OF THEIR

INDEPENDENCE

PART I

JANUARY 14, 15, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30; FEBRUARY 1 AND 4, 1957

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THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST

MONDAY, JANUARY 14, 1957

**UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,**

Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Theodore Francis Green (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations) presiding.

Present: Senators Green (chairman, presiding), Fulbright, Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Kennedy, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Langer, Knowland, Aiken, Capehart, of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senators Richard B. Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Byrd, Johnson, Kefauver, Stennis, Jackson, Ervin, Saltonstall, Smith (Maine), Case, Bush, and Barrett, of the Committee on Armed Services.

Also present: Hon. Milton R. Young, United States Senator from the State of North Dakota.

Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State; John B. Hollister, Director, International Cooperation Administration; Robert C. Hill, Assistant Secretary of State; and Carl W. McCordle, Assistant Secretary of State.

Senator RUSSELL. The joint committee will come to order. The guests of the committee in the chamber will come to order.

As the chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, I move that the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee be selected to preside over these joint meetings. All of you who favor that motion will say "Aye."

(Chorus of "Ayes.")

Senator RUSSELL. Opposed "No."

(No response.)

Senator RUSSELL. The "Ayes" have it unanimously.

The distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Green, will preside over these joint meetings.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Russell, I thank you and my colleagues for this honor you have bestowed on me.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services are meeting jointly this morning, pursuant to an order of the Senate, to begin consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 19, which embodies the text of the President's proposed resolution in regard to the Middle East.

This resolution raises many important and far-reaching questions about American foreign policy. The committees meeting here this

morning have a responsibility, not only to the Senate but also to all the American people, to examine these questions in the most minute detail and to exercise the best independent judgment which we can bring to bear upon them. Our only concern must be the national interest of the United States.

The discussion of these very serious matters, which vitally affect all the American people, should be conducted in public to the greatest extent possible. It is recognized, however, that, in the interests of national security, some aspects will have to be reserved until the committees go into executive session.

By order of the Senate, these two committees have permission to sit while the Senate is in session during their consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 19. It is my purpose, therefore, if it meets with general approval, to ask the committees to sit morning and afternoon, today and tomorrow. Prior commitments make it impractical to sit the balance of this week, and I therefore suggest that after tomorrow afternoon's meeting we recess until after the inauguration.

To begin the presentation of the administration's case, we have with us this morning the Secretary of State. I understand the Secretary has an introductory statement to make, after which there will be an opportunity for questions by members of the two committees. I suggest, therefore, that he be allowed to conclude his statement without interruption.

QUESTIONING PROCEDURE

It should be kept in mind that there are 30 Senators on the 2 committees. There is no desire to cut anyone off from questioning—indeed, these hearings should not be concluded so long as any Senator has questions in his mind remaining unanswered—but the chairman does take the liberty to suggest that in the initial round of questioning, at least, Senators exercise some restraint so that everyone may have an opportunity to ask some questions if he wishes. After the first round, we can return to any Senator who has additional questions.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 19

I believe we might insert in the record at this point a copy of Senate Joint Resolution 19.

(S. J. Res. 19 is as follows:)

[S. J. Res. 19, 85th Cong., 1st sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION To authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Whereas a primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and

Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls seek by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent; and

Whereas such danger now exists in the general area of the Middle East: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President be and hereby is author-

ized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

Sec. 2. ~~The President is authorized to undertake~~, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, he is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism: *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations; and, as specified in article 51 of the United Nations Charter, measures pursuant thereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Sec. 3. The President is hereby authorized, when he determines that such use is important to the security of the United States, to use for the purposes of this joint resolution, without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation, not to exceed \$200,000,000 from any appropriations now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations.

Sec. 4. The President shall within the month of January of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder.

Sec. 5. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise.

QUESTIONING PROCEDURE

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important that the committee understand this matter of procedure on the round of questioning so that we will all be operating on the same basis as to whether each Senator would have one question or whether he will have an unlimited number of questions.

Chairman GREEN. I have given thought to that, and without laying down any specific rule, it seems to me that it would be well to outline an order of seniority, between the two committees and within each committee, so that everyone's name might be called before we conclude.

I don't think it practicable to limit each Senator to one question. The one question might necessarily involve a second. I hope, insofar as possible, Senators will limit themselves to one question each so that those who follow may not be cut off.

Also, it is not feasible to put a time limit on questioning, though I trust that no Senator will take longer than 5 minutes. That in itself, for 30 members, would require considerable time.

Let us see how it works, and any time the Senators wish, they may present some suggestion limiting debate either on the time of questioning or the number of questions.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, this problem has arisen before. I respectfully submit that questioning ought to be limited, the first time around, to about 5 minutes. Then we will have our second round of questioning. Otherwise we will never get through.

I think everyone is entitled to at least that much.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, perhaps this is not the time to pursue this matter, but I think the procedure on the combined Mac-

Arthur hearings was to alternate between the two committees, and that they did proceed with some limitation.

My recollection is not quite clear as to whether the limitation was in the number of questions or in the time element, but I think there was some reasonable limitation, not on what the Senator could ultimately pursue, but what he could pursue on each time around. If we do not have that, I think some of the members at the lower end of both of these tables may not have an opportunity to participate.

Chairman GREEN. Suppose we proceed as I suggest, and then at any time the meeting will be open to a motion as to the number of questions or as to time or as to both.

Is that satisfactory?

However, I will be glad to consider a motion of the combined committees.

MOTION TO LIMIT QUESTIONING

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to move that the first time around each one be limited to 5 minutes. Then from there on we can each have as long as we like. I do not wish to cut off the questioning, but I do think that everyone should have an opportunity in the initial round to have at least 5 minutes.

As I recall it, that was the procedure in the MacArthur hearings. The chairman of the Armed Service Committee presided then.

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, in the hearings to which reference has been made, we proceeded for 2 or 3 days with each Senator in the order of his seniority being permitted to ask all the questions that he wished. That apparently was denying some of the Senators the right of free cross-examination, though not freedom of debate, and so a rule was adopted, I think on a motion of Mr. Morse, to limit the time of each Senator to 20 minutes.

That was the rule that applied then. Of course, the answer that comes to the question has a great deal to do with it. A man could ask 1 question and the Secretary might take 4 or 5 minutes to reply to the question, and the Senator might have another question that would be cut off.

I think the Chair made a very wise suggestion, that we proceed in this matter without any limitation to start with. If it becomes necessary later to impose limitations, the committee, of course, can do it.

I am sure that all Senators respect their colleagues and that no Senator will consume more than his time.

It will be amazing how many questions you have in your mind that will be asked by other Senators, if we do exercise a little restraint.

Chairman GREEN. I hear no second to the motion, so we will proceed according to that plan, with the understanding that any time any Senator feels that it would be well to change the rule and have an arbitrary limitation in any way, he is at liberty to make that motion and it will be put to the combined committees.

Now, Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you with us, as always.

Please proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I appear before these two committees in support of President Eisenhower's urgent request that the Congress and the President, acting in unison through a joint resolu-

tion, should promptly take certain steps to prevent international communism taking over the Middle East.

We all, I know, realize that the Middle East is a vital part of the free world. The people there have aspirations for liberty such as have always struck a responsive chord in the hearts of the American people. Much of the world's livelihood depends on the natural resources and avenues of trade of the Middle East. And there are to be found the holy places of three great religions.

It would be abhorrent and dangerous if that area were ruled by international communism. Yet that is the present danger.

The Middle East has always been coveted by the rulers of Russia. That was true in the days of the czars. It is more than ever true of Soviet communism. Also, today it seems to Communist rulers that events have played into their hands, and that a great victory is almost within their grasp. And indeed their confidence is not without basis.

POTENTIAL SOVIET MILITARY THREAT

Soviet ground, naval, and air forces are stationed in the areas adjacent to the Middle East—Bulgaria, the Black Sea, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and central Asia. These Soviet forces are of a size, and are so located, that they could be employed at any time with a minimum of warning. This fact is nothing new. But today it takes on new implications.

There has been a change in the possible deterrent role of certain Western European nations. Until recently they provided a serious deterrent to Communist aggression against the Middle East. But for a variety of reasons—psychological, financial, and political—this no longer meets the needs.

Another new factor is evidence that the Communist rulers may now be thinking in terms of possible "volunteer" operations in the Middle East, such as the Chinese Communists perpetrated in Korea.

No one can reliably predict whether, and if so, when, there would be Communist armed aggression, but three things are known: (1) the Communist capability, (2) the temptation, (3) the lack of any moral restraints.

The existence of such a threat, unless it be effectively deterred, creates fear, uncertainty, and greater opportunity for subversion to succeed. We saw open armed aggression against the Republic of Korea. We have recently seen it again against Hungary. And in 1948 we saw the Communists take over Czechoslovakia from within, an operation aided by the presence of Red armies without, against which there was no deterrent.

Such dangers reemerge today in relation to the Middle East.

ECONOMIC CRISIS

Superimposed on the latent military threat is a new and dangerous economic blow to the Middle East. The closing of the Suez Canal and of pipelines deprives oil-producing and oil-transiting countries of revenues upon which their governments depend. The impact of this loss is only now beginning to be felt because tax and royalty payments usually lag behind the actual production and movement of oil.

In addition, there are important losses due to the sharp decline in travel expenditures and dislocation of commerce. This development is of a magnitude which could endanger orderly government and create conditions ripe for the type of takeover at which international communism is most adept.

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

Communist propaganda is vigorously at work. Its Arab-language radio bombards the area. The output has recently gone up by 50 percent. Communist sentiments find their way into the Arab press and radio of certain countries.

The Soviet Union is portrayed as the "savior" of the area as against Western imperialism and as against Israel's alleged expansionist ambitions. Nothing is said about Hungary.

There is ample evidence of Communist infiltration into certain areas, particularly organized labor, and there are plottings of assassinations and sabotage to gain Communist ends. Local Communists have recently obtained small arms where such arms were made available for what it was thought might be house-to-house fighting. Arab refugees, nearly 1 million in number, are a special target for Communist propaganda.

Thus the Middle East area is at once endangered by potential military threats against which there is now no adequate deterrent; by a rapidly mounting financial and economic crisis; and by subversive efforts which seek advantage from exceptional opportunities arising out of recent events. This adds up to a new and grave danger.

MEASURES TO MEET THE DANGERS

It behooves us as a nation to marshal all appropriate assets to meet the danger.

I say "all" because halfway measures will not suffice. We dare not risk doing less than all we properly can.

I say "appropriate" because obviously the measures we take must not recall colonialism or imply any hostility to the aspirations of the peoples of the area.

They must be measures which we take only as they are desired by the nations of the Middle East, to help them be free and strong. Furthermore, our policies must accord with the principles and purposes of the United Nations, and we should welcome and reinforce United Nations action wherever it can suffice.

President Truman, in his Greece-Turkey message to the Congress on March 12, 1947, laid down a basic proposition. He said—

totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

We have ever since proceeded on that premise.

The Vandenberg resolution of June 11, 1948, outlined, in general terms, acceptable procedures. It called for the "progressive" development of collective defense arrangements; the association of the United States with them where its national security was affected, and "making clear" United States—

determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 (of the United Nations Charter) should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

The principle laid down by President Truman and the procedure indicated by the Vandenberg resolution have in fact been used. Collective defense arrangements have been "progressively" applied, and our determination to act for collective self-defense has been "made clear" by joint action of the President and the Congress in many specific situations.

Thus, in 1948, the President and the Senate joined to make the North Atlantic Treaty. In 1951 we joined to extend the North Atlantic Treaty area to include Greece and Turkey. In 1954 we joined to extend the treaty to the Federal Republic of Germany.

In 1955 we joined to make the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty to protect that part of the world against Communist aggression.

In 1955, through a joint resolution passed by the Congress and signed by the President, we made clear our determination to exercise, with the Republic of China, the right of collective self-defense as regards Taiwan, Penghu, and related areas.

Between 1951 and 1955, the Senate and the President made other multilateral and bilateral defense arrangements covering the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand; Japan, Korea, and the Republic of China.

Thus, when danger from international communism became acute, the President and the Congress, or the Senate, have acted together to meet the danger.

Also, it may be observed, when that has happened, the danger has subsided and peace has prevailed.

NECESSITY OF PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ACTING JOINTLY

The time has now come when, in accordance with past practice, the President and the Congress should act together in relation to the Middle East.

President Eisenhower has asked the Congress of the United States now to authorize the use of Armed Forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of the nations of the Middle East which request such aid. Thereby we will have taken the first indispensable step to preserve the area, both against such attack, and also from the dire consequences of the nations of the Middle East feeling exposed to the danger of such an attack.

The President has, in the second place, asked the Congress to reaffirm our willingness to assist the nations of the area, so desiring, to build up appropriate security forces of their own. Limited local forces, well-equipped and loyal, are an essential ingredient of defense, particularly as against subversion. This can be achieved without an arms race between the Arab States and Israel. We remain opposed to that, as declared by the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950.

By assisting, where desired, the maintenance of security forces to maintain internal order and to provide some initial resistance to attack from without where that is a danger, the United States will have taken the second indispensable step to assist the nations of the area to maintain their independence and to combat subversion.

Finally, the President has asked the Congress for greater facilities to provide financial assistance in the area. This is perhaps most important of all. The assistance may have to be along lines somewhat different than was contemplated when the mutual security program was presented to the Congress a year ago.

We are not yet in a position to say just what the new needs are. These will be ascertained by a mission to be headed by former Congressman Richards. But it can now be said with certainty that the needs are far more urgent, and probably will be quite different from what was foreseen a year ago.

We do not ask the Congress for more money for the current fiscal year. Let me emphasize that fact, which seems not yet fully understood. We do not now ask Congress for one dollar more of authorization or appropriation. The problem of funds for 1958 will be dealt with independently of this pending legislation. But we do need more flexibility in the use of what has already been authorized and appropriated for 1957. If the Congress agrees to that, it and the President will have taken together the third indispensable step to enable the United States to help the nations of the Middle East maintain their freedom.

There are, of course, many important problems of the area which are not dealt with by the proposals which the President has laid before you. There are problems relating to the Suez Canal, and problems arising out of unstable and unfriendly Arab-Israel relations.

All these matters are receiving urgent consideration, but they do not seem to require legislative action at this time.

RESPONSIBILITY ASSUMED BY UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has now assumed primary responsibility for solving certain of these problems, and the able Secretary-General of the United Nations is actively working on them. We are giving these United Nations efforts our full support. We are encouraged to believe that certain of the problems to which I have alluded will thus be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Already the orderly withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces has been effected, and Israeli withdrawal from Egypt is under way.

The Suez Canal is being efficiently cleared. The Secretary-General is seeking to bring about an early resumption of talks about the future status of the canal, in accordance with the six principles which were unanimously adopted by the Security Council last October and agreed to by Egypt. He is also well aware of the problems of transit through the Gulf of Aqaba and the status of the Gaza strip.

Since last spring he has been working actively on stabilizing the armistice lines, pursuant to a United States sponsored resolution.

ARAB-ISRAEL RELATIONS

There are also the more basic problems of Arab-Israel relations. These include the establishment of permanent boundaries, the settlement of refugees, and the undertaking of major water and irrigation developments. The United States has made clear its willingness to make a large contribution to the settlement of these matters, preferably through the United Nations.

The United States position was expressed in my address of August 26, 1955, and as indicated by President Eisenhower in his special message of January 5, 1957, the United States adheres to those proposals. When such a program becomes practical of accomplishment, that would require asking for Senate treaty action and congressional appropriations. But, unhappily, the time for that is not yet here.

There is, of course, interconnection between present unsettlements in the area and Communist opportunities in the area. The Communists foment unsettlement and so long as unsettlements exist, Communist opportunities exist. The United States believes that no effort should be spared to solve the problems of the area. But we do not take the pessimistic view that unless and until these problems can be solved, nothing can usefully be done to prevent the area being taken over by international communism.

On November 1, 1956, in introducing the United States cease-fire resolution in the United Nations General Assembly, I recalled the problems and the provocations of the area, and I said:

All of us, I think, would hope that out of this tragedy there should come something better than merely a restoration of the conditions out of which this tragedy came about. * * * Surely this organization has a duty to strive to bring about that betterment.

I can say to you today that the United Nations Organization is indeed striving to bring about that betterment—and so is the United States.

PROPOSALS NOT A REPLACEMENT FOR UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS

The proposals now before you in no way cut across or replace these efforts being made by the United Nations and by our own Government to solve the problems of the Middle East. On the contrary, these proposals, if adopted, will help to eradicate malignant influences which are striving, with some success, to make these problems insoluble.

Mr. Chairman, when the President laid before the Congress the situation, he laid before it the aspect of the situation with which the United Nations cannot adequately deal, and with which the President cannot adequately deal without help from the Congress.

Experience indicates that a nation rarely, if ever, loses its independence (1) if that nation is not exposed to open armed attack by overwhelming force; (2) if it has loyal and adequately equipped forces for at least internal security; and (3) if the economic situation does not seem hopeless.

The United Nations cannot itself adequately insure those conditions. For example, the Soviet Union exercises veto power in the Security Council and it defies General Assembly recommendations. That is a gap that the United Nations itself cannot close.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEED FOR CONCURRENCE OF CONGRESS

But just as the United Nations cannot dependably create these conditions, so the President cannot adequately do so without the concurrence of the Congress.

Whatever may be the correct constitutional view of the authority of the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States, the fact is that the Soviet rulers feel more deterred if the Congress has

spoken. Also the fact is that the peoples who are subjected to threat feel more secure if the Congress or, in the case of treaties, the Senate, has spoken.

We are dealing here not with a theory but with a fact. The fact is that we are in a situation where we need to use all the assets we possess, and there is an asset which the Congress of the United States can contribute, if it will. That asset may prove decisive in the result.

It is also the fact that the Mutual Security Act and relative appropriation acts create a maze of conditions which are no doubt useful and which can be complied with in the ordinary case. But we are not dealing with an ordinary case. We are dealing with an emergency situation created by a sudden stoppage of vital revenues upon which orderly government depends. There needs to be greater discretion in the President to get things done. Here again Congress can make a contribution which may be vital, and this without its costing the American taxpayer a single cent more.

Finally, there is need that there be joint action by the President and the Congress which will deal as a rounded whole with the three vital aspects of the situation; namely, military deterrents against armed aggression from without; military assistance to maintain security within; and economic assistance to prevent the breakdown of orderly government.

It has been said that the desired results can partially be achieved without new legislation and that the President's proposals involve some duplication. That may be so. But even so, there will be immense practical gain if the Congress will join with the President to express, in a new single act, the purpose of our Nation in relation to the new situation which has come about since the Congress was last in session.

GRAVITY OF PRESENT SITUATION

Let me repeat and reemphasize the gravity of the present situation.

In many respects the last year has seen a weakening of international communism on several fronts. But this is a situation where he who wins the last test wins all. I do not predict that this is the last test, although it could well be the decisive test in the struggle between communism and freedom.

Certainly if the Middle East loses its freedom, the result will be to nullify a great part of the efforts and sacrifices which have been made by the free peoples in recent years, and international communism will have gained a great and perhaps decisive victory.

On the other hand, if the Middle East stays free, we can reasonably look forward to gains for freedom throughout all the world. And when I say "all" I include the present Soviet and Chinese Communist parts of the world.

I can assure you that the leaders of international communism will take every risk that they dare to take in order to win the Middle East. Already they have made that clear.

When the stakes are so great, I do not believe the Congress of the United States should play, or wants to play, merely the role of an observer. It possesses assets, perhaps decisive assets, to throw into the struggle. That is what the President has pointed out in his special message to the Congress, and I do not doubt that the Congress will respond.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

As I understand it, you have offered to submit yourself to questioning by members of these two committees.

DEFINITION OF "MIDDLE EAST"

If I may begin, I know that you have already stated how difficult it is to define the term "Middle East," but may I ask your particular answer to the three separate countries: (1) Afghanistan; (2) Libya; and (3) Algeria.

Are they included in your term "Middle East"?

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say on that point what I said before the Foreign Affairs Committee: that I adopt generally speaking the definition of the Middle East made by Mr. Jernegan, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, when speaking on March 6, 1955, and I quote:

There is no officially or generally recognized definition of the term "Middle East," so it is necessary to be somewhat arbitrary. However, I think it is safe to say that when the American Government thinks in terms of the Middle East, it is thinking about the area lying between and including Libya on the west and Pakistan on the east and Turkey on the north and the Arabian Peninsula to the south.

When I was before the Foreign Affairs Committee, I added that I think it should also include Ethiopia and the Sudan, which lie in Africa but of which considerable parts lie north of the southern portion of the Arabian Peninsula.

I would prefer not to be more specific at this time than that.

RESOLUTION'S RELATIONSHIP TO UNITED NATIONS

Chairman GREEN. How is it contemplated to relate actions under this resolution to the United Nations?

If aggression occurs in the Middle East, will the President act first and then go to the U. N., or will he go to the U. N. first and then act in accordance with its recommendations?

Secretary DULLES. That would depend, Mr. Chairman, I think upon the nature of the aggression and the urgency of the case. The preferable procedure would of course be to go in the first instance to the United Nations and to lay the matter before the Security Council. That would certainly be done, and would be done with the greatest possible rapidity.

Whether the situation would permit United States action to be deferred until there was a decision in the Security Council, and presumably a Soviet veto, would as I say depend upon the facts of the particular case.

Article 51 contemplates that there may be action taken by nations in pursuance of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, without awaiting Security Council action.

It goes on to say, however, that if and when the Security Council is able to maintain international peace and security, that then any such individual or collective self-defense action shall be brought to a close.

PROPOSED ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM

Chairman GREEN. May I ask one more question?

What sort of economic aid program does the administration contemplate for the Middle East under this resolution?

How does this contemplated program differ from the program now being carried out?

The language of section 3 of the resolution grants the authority for long-term commitments which Congress rejected last year.

Secretary DULLES. Section 3, Mr. Chairman, is designed to apply, as I indicated, only to funds that are already appropriated. It does not involve any new authorization. It would to the extent of not to exceed \$200 million relieve the President from certain of the limiting requirements of the present act giving him greater discretion.

Now the projects that were laid before the Congress, by way of illustration, when this matter was discussed a year ago or thereabouts, were primarily long-range development projects.

It is possible that the situation existing in the area today, or which will soon exist, will require a different approach, because, as I say, the economic aspects of the matter are only now beginning to assume drastic importance because of the fact that in the main the oil royalties and other revenues have been paid up to within a few days ago.

It may be that some more immediate and prompt financial aid is required of a character different from long-range economic projects, such as building a powerplant, water development, irrigation projects, and the like. That whole aspect of the matter would, we contemplate, be studied very closely by a mission which we have asked former Congressman Richards to undertake, and which he has agreed to undertake. He is studying the problems now in the State Department, and as soon as this legislation is passed, he would immediately proceed to the area and ascertain then what are the new problems that have arisen.

Inevitably the problems, as we saw them last year, did not contemplate at all the very abrupt and serious cutoff of the normal revenues of the governments of this area which has occurred as a result of the stoppage of the Suez Canal and the stoppage of the important pipeline of the Iraq Petroleum Co. from Iraq.

The consequences of that are only now beginning to be felt, are not yet fully felt, because as I say there is a lag between the payment of the oil royalties, taxes and the like, so that the stoppage of revenue is only beginning really, generally speaking, this month.

So the situation is not yet fully developed, and I am sorry to say that I cannot tell you what the needs will be, except to say that almost certainly they will be quite different and far more urgent than anything we contemplated last year.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I will not ask any more questions now in the interests of time.

Senator Russell, have you a question?

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could have an understanding so that we may make our arrangements accordingly, that the committee would take a recess say at 12 o'clock when the

Senate convenes and have some understanding on what time you plan to come back this afternoon so we could get leave if we need to at say 2 o'clock or 2:30.

Chairman GREEN. Would it be convenient, Mr. Secretary, to adjourn this meeting at 12 and then reconvene at half past 2?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; I will meet whatever the desires of the committee are in that respect.

Senator JOHNSON. I so move, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KNOWLAND. Second the motion.

Chairman GREEN. Those in favor say "Aye."

(Chorus of "Ayes.")

Chairman GREEN. Opposed "No."

(No response.)

Chairman GREEN. It is so ordered.

Mr. Russell?

EXTENT OF AID NEEDED

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I think I am keenly aware of the importance of the Middle East in the security of the United States.

My work on the Committee on Armed Services has brought that to my attention time and time again. I am perfectly willing to support a resolution that would authorize the President to employ all the military might of the United States as he deemed necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations in that area requesting such aid against any overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.

The President has been condemned by some for seeking this power on the grounds that he already has it under his constitutional authority. I do not condemn him; I commend him for recognizing the division of powers and the rights of the Congress of the United States in international relations. The declaration of policy committing us to military and economic aid is another matter.

You state here that you are not in a position to say just what these needs are. You have to wait for the report of a mission headed by Mr. Richards, in whom we have great confidence, and you refer in general terms to major water irrigation developments and other programs.

You do not deal with the immediate emergency by passing the simple resolution similar to the language you have on page 2 of this resolution starting on line 11—incidentally, that portion of it seems to be rather obscured by the provisions for economic and military assistance—and then give the Congress an opportunity to study this new aid program where we will have some idea as to its extent and length.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, that would be, I think, an appropriate procedure with respect to the fiscal year 1958 and 1959, if that is touched upon at this time, as the President indicated in his message that it might be.

I do think that it is quite vital that with respect to already appropriated funds which would normally be spent during the balance of the fiscal year—that is, ending June 30—there be a present indication of the Congress that it is willing that those already appropriated funds should be spent with some greater latitude and with greater urgency.

I believe that it will probably prove quite vital that there be some fairly substantial commitments made out of those already appropriated funds during the next few months. Now, there are some limitations upon that. I think frankly that it is possible perhaps to clarify the language of section 3 somewhat in that respect.

For instance, there are provisions which limit the ability to commit moneys after the 30th of April.

Well, it may be that it will be quite important to commit moneys, a fairly substantial amount of money in this area, out of what is already appropriated during, let us say, the months of May and June. That may be the critical period.

There are also provisions that money has to be used on a loan basis to the extent of approximately 80 percent, I think it is.

Well, that may not be possible to work out with respect to this year's funds. Oftentimes these loan arrangements are difficult to negotiate, and the requirements may call for parliamentary action by governments which do not have their parliaments in session.

Furthermore, these governments are at the present time unexpectedly so close to bankruptcy that the loan aspect of this thing has very little practical possibility.

Now, there are 3 or 4 restrictions of that sort, which were quite appropriately imposed under the conditions that existed a year ago. We think it is extremely important that these be eliminated at the present time.

Certainly a resolution dealing with the military aspects of the matter would have some very significant importance. But there is, as I pointed out here, grave danger that vital parts of this area may all of a sudden fall into a state almost of anarchy, due to the breakdown of orderly government through their being suddenly deprived of a very large percentage of their normal revenues.

The ability to pay their own security forces may have evaporated, and if you cannot pay your own security forces, then you really are headed for very serious trouble. And we may have to act on an emergency basis to help out in some of those situations.

NO ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUESTED

Now, as I point out, Senator, we are not asking for any more money. Anybody who is constitutionally inhibited from voting any foreign aid funds will have ample opportunity to express his views with relation to the funds to be requested by the administration for 1958.

As far as the money is concerned, this is already over the dam. The only question is, are you going to keep that money tied around with restrictions which require it to be spent in the least advantageous ways, ways which are less advantageous because of developments which we could not foresee a year ago?

LOANS VERSUS GRANTS

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I cannot say that I am profoundly impressed by your argument about the dangers of cutting off the revenue of these states and the necessity of eliminating the loan provisions of the act to enable you to make grants to those nations.

Certainly it seems to me that they should have enormous resources—if one would not think I was punning I would say unlimited liquid resources—and that they ought to be dealt with on a loan basis rather than on the basis of an outright grant.

Another thing I think the Congress should examine is that aspect of the program.

Some of these nations, I think, are amply able to borrow money. I doubt if the International Bank would find better loans than to lend these oil-rich countries money on the security that they have.

You indicate you are going to move into that on a grant basis. To that I would be very much opposed, for those nations are more able to provide the funds to take care of their internal security, as much as any nation on the earth with unlimited resources.

Now what are these limitations? I have before me the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, title 4, section 401 (a).

Of the funds made available under this Act, not to exceed \$150 million, in addition to the funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (b) hereof—

which is \$100 million—

may be used in any fiscal year, without regard to the requirements of this Act or any other Act for which funds are authorized by this Act, in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Act, when the President determines that such use is important to the security of the United States.

I find no limitation whatever, no requirement under this act or any other act, that interferes with the President's use of those funds, and it seems to me that it would be wise for us to give the President support from a military angle and defer present action on an aid program.

I had always assumed that we would fight before we would see Soviet Russia take over in that area with military might. After reassuring these people as to their protection, let the Congress exercise a little discretion as to whether a loan should be made, whether there is adequate security, rather than adopting as a matter of national policy on broad basis, as this resolution proposes, a program of undetermined amount, in length of time, in both the economic and military fields.

Do you see any limitation in this Mutual Security Act on these funds that I have read to you?

I see no limitation as to the loan features or as to the time features which shall apply to these budgeted funds as granted by the President.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, the only trouble with that is that those funds have virtually all been used up, and the whole purpose is to replenish that fund.

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, sir; I have looked into that somewhat. I know that your remarks are classified as to the additional requirements that you have under consideration; but, if the emergency is as great as you indicate, it would not hurt anything to take the money away from those requirements under consideration and apply it in this area, because the Congress will be here, and in the normal course we will be dealing with the military program, we will be dealing with the economic aid program, and some of us would like to know just exactly what we are committed to when we support something

on such a broad basis as this, making it a declaration of national policy.

Some of us want to do anything that is necessary to keep the Soviet Union out of there but we do not want to do a great deal that is not necessary, at the expense of the American taxpayer, such as making grants to nations that are amply able to borrow money.

They have ample collateral for loans. What great harm would ensue if we were to pass the resolution as to military aid and then await the Richards' mission and other facts that may develop to give us some idea as to the extent of this program?

ESTIMATED COST

I do not suppose you have been able as yet to make even an estimate of any kind as to the overall cost of the program to its completion, have you, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES. We estimate a top limit of \$200 million.

Senator RUSSELL. Two hundred million dollars?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator RUSSELL. For each year?

Secretary DULLES. No, no; I am only talking about the present fiscal year; not a word said relates to any other year.

Senator RUSSELL. I cannot agree with you there. It may not be a word and I am not going to split hairs on the verbiage of it. But when we meet and declare that the President is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence, you might construe that as a 1-year program, but those people down there are not. They will be getting their programs on a 20-year basis if I am not mistaken.

We will have some of them that will probably last that long a period of time.

That is what disturbs me, the sweeping declaration of policy that this resolution makes.

Secretary DULLES. I think you will find, sir, as far as the declaration of policy is concerned, that that general policy has been declared many times by the Congress in mutual security acts and similar acts over a period of years. As far as the appropriation and use of moneys is concerned, the appropriations have already been made, and we are only talking about money which is already appropriated.

Now you suggest that you would be willing to see a discretionary fund. You refer to the President's fund of \$100 million or \$150 million?

Senator RUSSELL. Not on as broad a basis as this, Mr. Secretary. I did not say I would be willing to support a discretionary fund as unlimited and on as broad a basis as I construe this resolution.

Secretary DULLES. No, you read from a section of the present Mutual Security Act.

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Secretary DULLES. What we want, Senator, is in effect the replenishing of that fund. That fund has been subjected to several unexpected drains, of which perhaps the most urgent and in some ways the least expected was the drain in respect to Hungary, the whole problem

of Hungarian refugees, taking care of them, bringing them to this country, providing them with equipment and supplies.

All of that is being taken care of out of this fund.

Now that is also a very urgent matter. You see, that was not a matter where we had any program to lay before the Congress a year ago. That is the type of thing which is met by these emergency powers. And there is not enough discretionary power left.

There is the power left, but there is not enough money left out of what was already appropriated to deal with this situation with the flexibility that is required.

MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC PLIGHT

And I am quite certain of this, Senator: that if this act that Congress passes is barren of any recognition of the economic plight of this area and of the new needs that have arisen, it will fail, in a very important effect, to serve the purpose that we have in mind.

Senator RUSSELL. Am I to assume from that that you propose to make grants for ordinary expenses of government from this fund to these nations who have these vast reserves of oil?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. There are some of these countries that are well off and some of the countries that are not well off.

Senator RUSSELL. You referred specifically to those whose revenues from oil are depleted by the closing of the Suez Canal?

Secretary DULLES. That is quite true, and we hope that those revenues will come back.

To some extent those countries are already borrowing, I believe, as you suggested that they might.

But the political situation there is such that the bankable qualities of these loans are not nearly as good as they were.

If the Soviet Union is going to take over this area, a lot of these loans would go bad. And unless there is effective United States support there, the ability of these countries to raise money, even on a borrowing basis, is bad. And if you borrow, of course, you have got to pay it back some day presumably. At least the lender thinks you are going to do it. So that you are just postponing the evil day.

There has been a loss which will never be made up, which runs into a very large amount indeed for this area. We are well aware of the situation as it affects Western Europe, and we have taken considerable measures to help out Western Europe. But that is one side of the coin.

The other side of the coin is that this thing has also hit the Middle East area very, very badly. We are not as conscious of that because it is a bit further away and because the effect of it is a bit further delayed because you do not normally pay your taxes and your royalties until after the goods have moved.

Therefore there has been a time lag between the stoppage of the Suez Canal, the stoppage of the pipelines and so forth, and the flow of revenue.

That is only starting at present. I would think, sir—I realize that there may be very honest differences of opinion about this matter, but I would think this—that if there is at least a respectable opinion, and I think that the judgment of the President and the executive branch of the Government certainly qualifies as being such, the dif-

ference between losing and saving this area may depend upon whether or not money which it already appropriated is made available more freely, that it is not asking a great deal of the Congress to do that, when, as I say, we are not asking for one plugged nickel more of money.

SENATOR RUSSELL. I assume then that the State Department would not be opposed to an amendment that would eliminate those broader assurances and would confine itself to the language of section 2 with respect to the use of the military and section 3, which authorizes the use without provisions of any other law to \$200 million, if that is the case.

FUTURE COMMITMENTS

SECRETARY DULLES. Well, I think that if it is the feeling of the Congress that there is an undesirable implication for the future in that provision about cooperating in the development of economic strength, that certainly we could find language to make clear that that was no more than the kind of a general expression which has been found acceptable to the Congress in the past, and not intended to authorize the President to make any future commitments.

You suggested that this might imply an authority to the President to carry out what was referred to, I think, as a long-range plan of commitments. That is not at all our purpose, Senator, and anything necessary to eliminate that interpretation of it would be quite acceptable.

SENATOR RUSSELL. I thank you.

I have used more time, Mr. Chairman, than I had planned. I must say, however, the Secretary took a little more time to answer my questions than I expected.

I will pass my next question period, if I may be permitted to ask just 1 other question on one other matter, briefly.

QUESTION OF FORMATION OF VOLUNTEER FORCES

MR. SECRETARY, we are constantly confronted with the threat of the use of Russian volunteers in this area or that area. What would be the position of the State Department, if you are prepared to say, on United Nations or perhaps with NATO organizing a volunteer force from the young refugees who escaped from behind the Iron Curtain at the present time, in order that we might have available volunteers that could be used to counterbalance the threat of the use of the Russian volunteers?

We are told that a great many of them are young men, that they are very anxious to secure their rights at home to right the wrongs that have been perpetrated upon them.

They are anxious to fight. It seems to me that we could develop quite a sizable military force by the use of this power that would be a tremendous deterrent to Communist aggression, because it would have the effect of arraying brother against brother, against those that are already in the armies of the Iron Curtain countries, the satellites, and would eliminate any argument about colonialism.

These men would be from states that they wanted to get back into—Hungarians, Bulgarians, Poles—and not looking for colonies to conquer.

Has the State Department given any consideration to a matter of that kind?

Secretary DULLES. We have given thought to it, Senator. We have not yet come to any conclusions which I feel that I could give at the present time. There are serious problems involved and, of course, we do not want to encourage the idea—I do not know that this plan would, but we do not want to encourage the idea—that so-called volunteers can be used by the Soviet and Chinese bloc countries under circumstances which would not involve a responsibility by the Governments themselves.

Now we know perfectly well that under the conditions which prevail in that part of the world, there are not any so-called volunteers. People are not allowed to volunteer. There were some volunteers in Hungary, but they were suppressed in the most brutal possible way. There is not allowed the freedom of action which is implied by the term "volunteers."

The word "volunteer" assumes that a person does a thing voluntarily. We know they are not allowed to do the thing voluntarily, and we do not accept the concept that so-called volunteers, which are carrying out the national purpose or policy of international communism and of the Communist government of Russia or China, can function without entailing the direct responsibility of the Governments themselves.

The possibility of using some of the elements that you speak of as a kind of a foreign legion or something of that—

Senator RUSSELL. It would be an international organization?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; it raises problems which I know you are well aware of. I do not feel I can give you any conclusion on that topic at the present time.

Senator RUSSELL. I won't pursue that matter any further; and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to take more time than I had contemplated.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Wiley, any questions?

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, I want to congratulate you on a very clear statement. I want to congratulate Senator Russell on bringing out many matters that I was interested in, and also I want to thank him for coming out for the authority which I believe two Presidents favor. I wonder if you know how former President Hoover feels on the subject.

Secretary DULLES. His son is here and possibly could speak for him better than I can.

LIMITATIONS IN MUTUAL SECURITY ACTS

Senator WILEY. There is one subject that Senator Russell brought out which seems to me might be made clearer; that is, if we were told the sections in the law that particularly limit—

Secretary DULLES. Could I ask Mr. Hoover to answer that question?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Mr. HOOVER. It is my understanding, Senator, that he said anything in this regard which he felt President Eisenhower thought was necessary in order to meet this challenge, that he thought we should have.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

I will go back. I understood from Senator Russell, when he read from the statute, that it provided none of these limitations or restrictions which you spoke of. However, I understand there are restrictions. Could you give us the particular sections and the restrictions you mentioned?

Secretary Dulles. I would say, Senator, to be a little bit more concrete, that what we request and think indispensable is that we think the money should be available under the authority granted by section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, which is, I think, the section Senator Russell just recently read to us. In addition, the money should not be subject to the limitation of not more than \$30 million to any country which is now contained in section 401, and not subject to the limitations of section 103 of the Mutual Security Act of 1957, which applies to the percentage which must be obligated before the 30th of April.

Senator Warner. From your statement I got the impression that there were certain funds which were limited, as far as transferability is concerned, and that you wanted to get the authority to transfer those funds to make them available for this project.

Secretary Dulles. Well, I think there is sufficient transfer authority and, indeed, I am not sure that much transfer will be required. There are pretty substantial funds which are already earmarked, at least illustratively, for this area, and they may very well suffice.

I am not sure that it is going to be necessary to dip into funds which were initially allocated for other areas. That is possible to a slight extent, but I think that the transfer authority we have is sufficient.

The point is that funds which perhaps are now allocated for this area would, for instance, have to be used up by the 30th of April or obligated by the 30th of April. I am not sure that we can use them to best advantage if we have to obligate them by the 30th of April.

It may be that it would be better to study this situation a little more closely. It is a new situation, quite different from that which we had in contemplation a year ago when these programs were worked out, and of course these programs themselves went back again a further 6 months, because, in order to get ready for the presentation to the Congress, we had to start on making up these plans 6 months before they were presented. So virtually these plans which were presented last year are a year and a half old.

The situation has been totally revolutionized since that time, and we believe that it may be necessary to take a little more time to allocate some of these funds to the best advantage, and that the allocation, the full 80 percent now called for, may not be done to best advantage if we have to do it by the 30th of April.

If Congress should insist upon the 30th of April clause as applicable to a situation which really only arose in its full vigor a few weeks ago, there would not be nearly as effective an allocation of funds, I think, as though we had somewhat more time in which to allocate them.

That is one of the principal provisions which we want to deal with, but it is that kind of a problem rather than the problem of transferring funds from one account to another. That authority we have, I think, in sufficient measure.

THE EFFECT OF A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Senator WILLEY. What do you believe would be the effect if, as proposed in some quarters, the resolution comes out in the form of a concurrent resolution which would not be signed by the President, and would not have the force of law, as against the administration's draft which would be signed and would have the force of law?

Secretary DULLES. Well, a concurrent resolution is an expression of opinion, and while the Executive and I guess the peoples of all the world are greatly interested in and impressed by an expression of the opinion of the Senate, I believe that at the present juncture the situation is too critical to be dealt with adequately merely by an expression of opinion. I think we have got to act.

DOES PRESIDENT ALREADY HAVE AUTHORITY?

Senator WILLEY. One other question. There is a great deal of discussion, pro and con, to the effect that if this resolution or no resolution were passed, that the President would have the specific grant of power anyway. Do you agree with that?

Secretary DULLES. Well, frankly, Senator, I don't know whether I agree with it or not, but I do not think it has a particle of importance whether I agree with it or not. The important thing is what, in fact, is going to impress the peoples of this part of the world that we mean business, and my opinion does not weigh a particle in the scales when that is the issue.

The issue is: Are these people really convinced that we mean business? And I mean, what do the Russians think, do we mean business? And what do the people in the area who are endangered think, do we mean business?

I could give a legal opinion on that point, if I had time and were still practicing law, but I don't think that that would weigh in the scales at all. We have got to get some practical results here.

The Soviet are moving in and moving in strongly. They think there is a situation where there is no effective defense. Many of the people think there is no effective defense. And I believe we have got to do, as I said in my statement, we have got to do everything we reasonably can.

I think in that situation, a mere expression of opinion by me or somebody else is quite irrelevant to the purpose we want to accomplish.

Senator WILLEY. You have covered pretty well your opinion regarding the effect of failure to pass the resolution, so I will not query you further on this point.

I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Bridges is not here, so I will call on Mr. Fulbright next.

ECONOMIC CONDITION IN SPECIFIC COUNTRIES IN MIDDLE EAST

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Secretary, just for a moment I would like to pursue the question Senator Russell asked.

You said certain countries are near bankruptcy in the Middle East. Which countries do you have in mind?

Secretary DULLES. Well, most of them are in a pretty bad way, and I think by our standards we would be very much concerned.

The financial situation in Turkey is extremely strained at the present time. The same applies to Iran, where the causes are not primarily the stoppage of the oil and oil revenues, but the efforts which they are making to meet what they regard as the mounting Communist threat to their areas.

Iraq has been very badly hit by the oil situation, and Iran to an appreciable extent. I think in the case of Iran, if I remember rightly, it has lost about 20 percent of its oil revenues. So its already somewhat difficult financial position has been made considerably worse by recent events.

Iraq has been heavily dependent upon, for most of its revenues, the royalties on oil going out through the pipeline through Syria which has been cut.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, the cut has been very substantial. In the case of Syria—

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Secretary, I prefer not to repeat what you just said about the general situation, but is it not a fact that a country like Iran has credit with the Monetary Fund or the International Bank, and there is no real emergency requiring money from us at all? Is it not a fact that the major part of Iran's oil did not go through the canal? It goes to the Far East.

Do you seriously feel Iran is in bad shape? Has she applied for any grant from this country?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; and I do think she is in serious shape.

Senator FULBRIGHT. When did she apply for a grant?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it has been discussed over recent weeks.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Does Iran have an application pending now for a grant from this country?

Secretary DULLES. Well, if you are asking for a formal written application, I am not sure that she has. These things are not done that way, Senator.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, take Iraq. Is it not a fact that Iraq had a loan with the International Bank and prepaid it by 15 years, only, I think, last year, because she was so well off she did not need the loan? Is that not a fact?

Secretary DULLES. It may have been, Senator?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Iraq, in other words, has very good credit with both the International Bank and the Fund, if she needs it. The Fund is specifically designed to correct these temporary imbalances into annual payments. That is why we created it.

And with the vast resources of these countries, every one of them except two, I think, can appeal to the Fund if they need it over a short period.

OPENING OF SUEZ CANAL

We are told that the 25-foot channel will be open in March, that is, according to the press. Do you think it will be open in March?

Secretary DULLES. I think it will probably be open in March for tankers of medium draft; yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. A 25-foot channel will take 10,000 tons?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

NEED OF FUNDS BY OTHER THAN EGYPT AND JORDAN QUESTIONED

Senator FULBRIGHT. But I submit there is no evidence that I know of, except in the case of Egypt and Jordan, where there is a critical need of funds. Lebanon has good credit. Lebanon can get a loan from the Bank today if it wishes.

Syria, as long ago as 1955, made an application to the Bank. The Bank indicated it was willing to proceed with her loan, and Syria has never come back to accept that offer. It is still pending.

Now, Syria has indicated that she will not take money from us, has she not?

Secretary DULLES. No; we have not made any offers to Syria.

REPORT OF JORDAN REJECTION OF UNITED STATES AID

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, did Jordan not indicate that, too?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I do not understand the press. In yesterday's paper, the Washington Post, there was a Reuters statement from Cairo which reads:

Jordan, seeking financial aid to replace British grants, rejected today any possible United States subsidy and claimed "we are getting Arab money, not American money."

And the article continues.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to put that whole article in the record.

Chairman GREEN. It will be placed in the record.

(The article referred to is as follows:)

[Washington Post, January 18, 1957]

JORDAN ASKS EGYPT'S AID, SPURNS UNITED STATES

Reuters

CAIRO, January 12.—Jordan, seeking financial aid to replace British grants, rejected today any possible United States subsidy and claimed "we are getting Arab money, not American money."

Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdulla Rimawi made the statement as Jordan and Egypt officially opened talks on financial assistance to replace Britain's annual subsidy.

Rimawi earlier labeled the Eisenhower doctrine aimed at stemming Communist penetration in the Middle East as "part of an imperialistic policy designed to justify aggressive intentions and to subdue Arab liberal nationalistic movements."

He also said that Jordan had neither requested nor been offered United States financial backing. He added that Jordan "always wanted to get rid of her treaty with Britain" and as a step toward that aim was getting Arab money to replace British financial support for her army.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is not the first story to this effect that I have seen. Do you think these are completely erroneous?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What evidence do you have that they are in error?

Secretary DULLES. The discussions which have taken place with the American Ambassador at Aman lead us to believe that there has been no decision yet taken by the Government of Jordan with respect to financial assistance.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, this says:

Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdulla Rimawi made the statement as Jordan and Egypt officially opened talks on financial assistance to replace Britain's annual subsidy.

I agree the press is not always correct, but there have been several stories to this effect.

I think it ought to be corrected, and Jordan ought to correct it, if it is not so.

The truth is, I believe, that Jordan is in bad shape. The country is a financial and political monstrosity, apparently, and I doubt if it can survive. And if it cannot, I think it would be a mistake for us artificially to maintain it, if the facts are as I understand them. But that is another matter.

ARE SUBSTANTIAL GRANTS TO EGYPT CONTEMPLATED?

I do not see any need for this money outside of Jordan and Egypt. Would you expect to make substantial grants to Egypt out of this fund?

Secretary DULLES. We have no present intention of doing so, no.

FUNDS ALREADY APPROPRIATED FOR MIDDLE EAST

Could I make an observation, Senator, which is that you suggest there is no need of funds for this area. Well, that question has already been answered by the Congress, which appropriated funds for this area, and we are not talking about any new funds for this area. What we are talking about is an adaptation in the use of funds already appropriated, in order to meet a new situation.

Now, if there was no need of funds for this area, we would not have asked for funds for this area a year ago, and the Congress would not have granted them. That bridge has already been crossed, and I do not know whether the point is that we should cut off funds which have already been appropriated for the area, or whether we should be required to spend them in ways which, in the light of new developments, are not as fruitful as the new possibilities to meet the new situation.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I misunderstood, then, the significance of your resolution. I thought it was asking us to abolish restrictions which require some of these funds to be spent in other ways, in countries other than those involved.

POSSIBILITY OF BORROWING FUNDS ELSEWHERE

I realize there are some projects in this area, but coming to these specific countries which you mention, the oil-rich countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran, I submit they have excellent credit; there is no difficulty in their borrowing money from two different sources.

As a matter of fact, I think the Arab League is in the process of creating its own Development Bank, a movement which I very much favor. I think we should have more specific evidence as to the need, and who needs the money, before we should be asked to give such authority.

And the matter of Jordan being willing to take our money certainly ought to be cleared up, as I have seen the contrary in the paper several times.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, a year ago there was evidence presented to Congress which persuaded the Congress that, under the then conditions, there was need for funds for this area, and they were appropriated.

Now, does anybody think or suggest that if the funds were needed a year ago and Congress appropriated them, that the recent developments have made them less necessary? That does not seem to me to be logical.

What we are saying is that in relation to funds already appropriated for certain purposes which then seemed the most useful, we want to use them for other purposes which, in the light of the catastrophic events of the last 6 months are more appropriate.

But if they needed the money a year ago, and Congress appropriated the money a year ago, surely the need has not diminished in the last year.

Senator FULBRIGHT. All I suggest, Mr. Secretary, is that we have cogent reasons why this is needed and in which countries the money is needed; that is all I would suggest. You are asking us to take this action. I think we ought to have some reason for it.

IS THERE EVIDENCE OF PLANNED AGGRESSION?

Mr. Secretary, is there any significant new evidence that the Soviet Union is planning a direct aggression in the general area of the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. There is no evidence that we are aware of. I would just say this: If there ever were such an aggression, I doubt very much that we would have any advance notice of it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is there any significant evidence that some state or states in the Middle East are about to fall under the domination of international communism, and are planning aggression against other states in the region?

Secretary DULLES. That is a possibility.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, do you wish to give the committee any evidence justifying that?

Secretary DULLES. I would prefer not to do so at this time. I will be glad to go into that further in executive session.

AUTHORITY TO EXTEND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it not a fact that the President already has authority to extend military assistance to the nations of the Middle East under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, I believe he has.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Does this resolution give the President any additional authority to extend military assistance to the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. Primarily it would lift some of the present restrictions as to the conditions under which he could give such aid.

The principle of giving a certain amount of aid, military aid, has already been approved by the Congress. As I point out, what we are

seeking here at the present time is not primarily new funds. It is a simple recognition by the Congress that programs which seemed the best a year ago are not necessarily the programs which seem best today in view of the fact that there has been a very radical alteration in the situation, and that, therefore, a little more leeway, a little more time, would lead to a much more fruitful utilization of existing authority and existing funds than would be the case if we operate in accordance with the conceptions which were quite sound and approved by the Congress a year ago.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Could you supply the committee in executive session information with regard to proposed changes in military assistance, as distinguished from economic assistance?

Secretary DULLES. Well, that would be a matter where I would want to consult with Admiral Radford.

MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES NOW RECEIVING AID

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are we at the present time extending economic or technical aid, in one form or another, to all of the countries in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. All of the countries?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. No, we are not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. To which countries are we not extending technical aid and economic aid?

Secretary DULLES. We are not extending economic or technical aid at the present time, I know, in the case of Egypt, and also in the case of Israel or Jordan.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But you have authority to do so, is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Because of the hostilities there, we evacuated all of our personnel from that area, and that automatically interrupted the technical assistance programs.

AUTHORITY TO EXTEND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Senator FULBRIGHT. The President, under the Mutual Security Act, already has authority to extend economic assistance to these countries, even though at the moment it is suspended, is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In the President's statement to the Congress, he said:

I shall, however, seek in subsequent legislation the authorization of \$200 million to be available during each of the fiscal years 1958 and 1959 for discretionary use in the area, in addition to the other mutual security programs for the area hereafter provided for by the Congress.

Would you not regard the fact that we should authorize the present use of this \$200 million in a discretionary manner as a precedent for this request?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. In my opinion, no member of the Congress who votes for this legislation is in any way committed morally or otherwise to support what may be the subsequent requests of the President for the area, which will have to be justified by evidence to be presented at that time to the Congress.

LIMITING THREAT OF ACTION TO REPELLING "OVERT ARMED AGGRESSION"

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Secretary, in limiting our threat of action under this resolution to repel; and I quote, "overt armed aggression," are we not saying to the Communists, "So long as you don't march across the border with flags flying and the band playing, we will not use our armed forces to resist you"?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we are saying that we are going to live up to our obligation in the Charter of the United Nations and in all, I think, of our mutual security treaties, that we only act militarily for defense in case an armed attack occurs.

That is the language of the Charter of the United Nations, which, of course, we are committed to, and the Senate has ratified.

Now we are meeting, and would expect to meet effectively, the other type of threat in the ways which I have suggested. I do not know whether you wish that repeated or not. I think I made it sufficiently clear, perhaps, in my opening statement.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Secretary, you are, of course, a very famous lawyer. I know you are familiar with a well-known principle of law inclusio unius est exclusio alterius which, if I am correctly informed, means "the inclusion of one is the exclusion of another."

You do not undertake in this resolution to state specifically all the broad power which the President as Commander in Chief has under the Constitution to resist anything which he would deem to be a threat to our vital interests.

Now you pick out this one particular set of circumstances, that is, overt armed aggression, and you say, "We will use our forces."

It is not quite logical to conclude under this principle, which is a reasonable principle, that having picked that out, you are now saying, "We won't use it under any other circumstances"?

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER LIMITATION

Secretary DULLES. Well, that argument could be made. I do not know whether it was made at the time when we approved the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations binds us not to use armed force against any country unless first an armed attack occurs.

Now, if the ratification of the United Nations Charter had those consequences, that was a matter which should properly have been considered when the Charter was before the Senate. But I do not think that the executive branch of Government can be criticized for adhering in this respect to the provisions of the Charter which have been ratified by the Senate.

THREATS OF INTERNAL SUBVERSION

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Secretary, I am perfectly willing to go all the way on that illustration. Supposing Russia should subvert Mexico and take over control of that country, and was in the process of doing it. You are saying then that we should stand by so long as she did not attack us and permit anything that she wants to do to take place in that country?

Secretary DULLES. The idea that we would stand by and do nothing is, of course, grotesque, because we would not do that, and we already

have the provisions of the Caracas Declaration which were adopted in March 1954, I think, calling for a meeting of the nations of this hemisphere to deal with such a threat.

But the idea that the only way to deal with these problems is by military invasion of a country is, I think, a false and an obsolete idea. There are many, many ways of dealing with that kind of a threat other than by resort to open armed force which we have renounced by the Charter of the United Nations. And if you open up the door to saying that any country which feels that it is being threatened by subversive activities in another country is free to use armed force against that country, you are opening the door to a series of wars all over the world, and I am confident that it would lead to a third world war.

WISDOM OF SPECIFYING CERTAIN CONDITIONS

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Secretary, I am not opening up anything. I am not proposing any change in the constitutional powers of our President. I think he has the power to use his powers, all his powers, as the Commander in Chief, to defend the vital interests of this country.

What I am questioning is the wisdom of now beginning to specify certain conditions under which he shall exercise them. This is the second resolution of this general character which this administration has brought to the Congress. We passed the Formosa Resolution. I may say, I have grave misgivings about the wisdom of it.

Now this is a second one. If this continues, will we not establish a tradition, a constitutional principle, that unless the Congress has passed a specific resolution, the Preident should never use the armed forces to defend our vital interests? Is that not the way constitutional principles sometimes develop, by usage? And would it not have the danger that foreign countries would assume that in the absence, in the future, of a congressional declaration similar to this, then they would have nothing to fear from the President using his powers, as Commander in Chief, to protect our interests?

I am not trying to change any existing principles. You are seeking to change them. I am only pleading, perhaps, that the status quo has served us well for 167 years, and I am not sure we should change it under this atmosphere of urgency and emergency, and be asked again to take a very drastic step which may establish a principle we may not like. That is the question I am submitting to you.

Secretary DULLES. Well, I understood you to suggest that the provision in the proposed joint resolution that we should act only if an armed attack occurs constituted, by implication, a limitation upon the powers of the President.

I pointed out that this limitation occurs in the Charter of the United Nations. It occurs in the North Atlantic Treaty. It occurs in the Southeast Asia Treaty. It occurs in our bilateral treaties with Korea, and with the Republic of China, and with the Philippines. And I do not think that to do it once more is going to hurt the United States very much, because it is a principle deeply imbedded in the Charter of the United Nations and in every defensive treaty that we have made: that we do not use armed force except as the other fellow uses it first.

And if you change that principle and say that it is permissible to use armed force except for defense, then I think that you are setting the clock back in a way which is very, very dangerous, indeed.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I protest the statement about my trying to change anything. I am only trying to examine what the effect of this resolution is. I am not trying to establish a new principle.

Secretary DULLES. I understand that, Senator. All I am pointing out is that I think the point you referred to is already a point which is covered by a whole series of actions.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I submit that what the United Nations says, and even our acceptance of that charter, does not take precedence over the relations between the Congress and our Executive under our own Constitution. That is of first and primary importance, and there are many qualifications, as you know, necessarily so, with regard to action under the United Nations.

DETERMINATION OF COMMUNIST DOMINATION

There are one or two other aspects of this same question. Who determines whether or not a country is Communist-dominated, and what are the criteria of determining that under this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. That determination would be made by the President. I have no doubt that in making it he would consult with and obtain the views of congressional leaders. That phrase "a government dominated by international communism" was picked because it is a phrase which has a legislative history, it has already been used by the Congress of the United States in past legislation, and we thought that the best thing we could do would be to pick up a description which Congress in the past has thought was adequate, and which, as I say, has a legislative history.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Does that history—I am not familiar with the legislative history—set down any criteria by which you could judge whether a particular country is Communist-dominated? I do not mean one like Russia. I mean borderline cases, such as Syria. Does it give you a guide as to whether or not Syria today is Communist-dominated?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think it lays down any precise formula, Senator, and I do not think any precise formula is possible. The determination of whether a country is dominated by international communism is a close question in some cases, and the answer to it is to be found, I think, not by any mathematical rule of thumb. It is determined by a whole complex of actions or lack of action which the government takes in its international and in its domestic affairs.

But I do not myself see, after much thought, any way of improving upon that formula which, as I say, the Congress has already adopted.

USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

Senator FULBRIGHT. Does this resolution, if we pass it, authorize the President to use atomic weapons in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the question of the use of atomic weapons, if we get into war, is a matter which is of general import, and has no particular relationship to the Middle East.

The question of the use of atomic weapons has been dealt with by the Congress in relation to any hostilities of the United States, and whatever that policy is would be applicable here.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You misunderstood my question. I did not wish to ask you whether or not you would use atomic weapons; but in your judgment, does this resolution authorize the use of them? Is that your interpretation of the authority of the words of this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir, the resolution does not authorize it. If there is authority, it derives from other acts of the Congress.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Therefore, this resolution, in your opinion, would not affect, whatever, the situation with regard to the use of atomic weapons?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

SUBMISSION OF LIST OF QUESTIONS

Senator FULBRIGHT. I have a number of other questions which I will save for later, but I would like, Mr. Secretary, to submit to you or your staff, a list of questions which pertain particularly to factual information about the Middle East, which I am sure you have available. These questions cover such points as the production of oil and the use of the canal.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I respectfully ask that you have the answers prepared and returned to me for insertion in the record, because I think this will be information which we will want before we conclude these hearings.

Secretary DULLES. I would be very happy to make the information available.

Chairman GREEN. Are you asking that the questions be put into the record now?

Senator FULBRIGHT. No; both the questions and answers later. I am going to submit a series of questions to the Department of State.

And with that I shall desist, Mr. Chairman.

(Subsequently, the Department of State submitted answers to Senator Fulbright's questions, as follows:)

Question 1

Is the Middle East a potential staging area for direct attacks on the United States by any potential enemy? If the answer to this question is generally in the affirmative, it would be helpful if the potentiality of the area could be explained.

Answer

The Middle East is not considered as a potential staging area for direct attacks on the continental United States, but it could be used as a staging area for attack on United States forces and installations in the Middle East area as well as those of our allies.

The Soviet Union aspires to control the Middle East, not because it needs or is dependent upon the resources or the transportation and communications channels of the area, but because it sees control of the area as a major step toward eventually undermining the strength of the whole free world. Africa might well be the first major objective. Control of the oil of the Middle East would almost insure control of Europe.

Question 2

Is the Middle East a major avenue of retaliation in the event of an act of aggression against us or allied countries? Again, if the answer is in the affirmative some elaboration would be helpful.

(The answer was of a classified nature.)

Question 3

Is it correct to say that a principal security interest of the United States in the Middle East lies in the denial of its resources—particularly petroleum—to a potential enemy in time of war?

(The answer was of a classified nature.)

Question 4

Is it correct to say that a principal security interest of the United States lies in assuring that its (Middle East) petroleum resources are available to the United States in time of war?

Answer

A principal security interest of the United States lies in assuring that the petroleum resources are available to her allies in time of war. The United States, itself, is not dependent upon the petroleum resources of the Middle East to wage war; however, the United States and her allies could not carry on a prolonged war without Middle East oil.

Question 5

Is it correct to say that a principal indirect security interest of the United States lies in assuring that the petroleum resources of the Middle East are available to friendly nations (notably those of Western Europe) in the event of war?

Answer

It is correct to say that a principal security interest of the United States lies in assuring that the petroleum resources of the Middle East are available to friendly nations for the reason stated in answer 4 above, i. e., the United States and her allies could not pursue a prolonged war without Middle East oil.

Question 6

Is the Middle East a potential staging area for attacks on Western Europe or allied countries by any potential enemy?

Answer

The Middle East could be used as a staging area directly against the allied countries of Greece and Italy. The acquisition of Turkey and Iran by an enemy would imperil the western flank of NATO, and probably result in the loss of allied control of the eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and contiguous areas.

Question 7

Is the Middle East a potential avenue for aggression against Asian countries? What countries? What are the avenues of potential aggression

Answer

The Middle East offers an avenue for aggression against India, West Pakistan, and the Asian countries which lie to the east of them. Successful Soviet aggression in the Middle East could flow to the eastward as gains were consolidated.

Question 8

Is the Middle East an avenue for potential aggression against Africa? What are the avenues for potential aggression?

Answer

The Middle East area is an avenue for potential aggression against Africa via the numerous air facilities existing throughout Turkey, Iran, and the Arab States; via the sealanes of the area; and via the Sinai Peninsula.

Question 9

Are there any other security interests of the United States in the Middle East which have not been covered by the questions already asked?

Answer

The preceding questions have dealt with the Middle East as a staging area for aggression by or retaliation against a potential enemy and as a source of resources, particularly petroleum, in time of war. The United States has a peacetime security interest in assuring continued free-world access to the area's petroleum resources. The economies and military establishments of our Western

European allies are heavily dependent on petroleum supplies from the Middle East. It should be emphasized that the security of the right flank of NATO is in a great measure dependent upon the establishment of a peaceful Middle East well disposed toward the West.

The United States, both in peace and in war, has a security interest in another aspect of the Middle East—its position as a world crossroads. The most direct land, sea, and air routes between Europe and Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa, and Asia and Africa run through the Middle East and adjacent seas. Should a potential enemy gain control of this area and deny, or impose onerous restrictions upon, the right of passage by the United States and its friends, they would have to resort to indirect routes requiring additional transportation facilities, particularly oceangoing vessels, and involving increased costs. Middle East countries friendly to the United States can with our help and guidance contribute to their own security and to the defense of the whole area.

Question 10

What is the extent of the oil reserves in the Middle Eastern countries?

Answer

Proved oil reserves in the Middle East totaled 144,405 million barrels at the end of 1956. The distribution by countries is as follows:

| | <i>In barrels</i> |
|--------------|------------------------|
| Bahrein | 205, 000, 000 |
| Iran | 30, 000, 000, 000 |
| Iraq | 22, 000, 000, 000 |
| Israel | 50, 000, 000 |
| Kuwait | 50, 000, 000, 000 |
| Neutral Zone | 650, 000, 000 |
| Qatar | 1, 500, 000, 000 |
| Saudi Arabia | 40, 000, 000, 000 |
| Total | 144, 405, 000, 000 |

These Middle East reserves accounted for 70 percent of total world proved reserves.

Question 11

In what countries in the Middle East is oil produced in significant amounts?

Answer

Middle East production averaged about 3,500,000 barrels daily prior to the Suez crisis. Four countries produced nearly 94 percent of the area's output, as follows:

| | <i>In barrels daily</i> |
|--------------|-------------------------|
| Saudi Arabia | 1, 005, 000 |
| Kuwait | 1, 095, 000 |
| Iraq | 725, 000 |
| Iran | 510, 000 |
| Total | 3, 335, 000 |

Question 12

What is the income of each country from oil?

Answer

Prior to the closure of the Suez Canal and IPC pipelines in early November, it was estimated that the governments of the Middle East Oil producing and transit countries would earn from royalties, taxes and transit fees about \$1,040 million during 1956 (a monthly average of \$87 million). Of this amount, over half was earned by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

The closure of these transportation routes has brought about cutbacks in Middle East oil production which will result in an estimated revenue loss of \$109 million during the 3 months November through January. The average monthly loss amounts to about \$36 million, a 42 percent decline in the pre-closure monthly average estimated oil revenues.

These losses represent a somewhat smaller percentage decline—roughly 20 percent—when applied against the estimated preclosure total foreign exchange revenues of these countries. This results from the fact, that taken as a whole, these countries obtain considerable foreign exchange from resources and activities

other than oil production and transit—e. g., foreign trade, excluding oil; commercial and financial services, tourism and private donations.

However, it should be noted that external revenues, excluding oil, have also been significantly reduced by the disruption of trade and investment in general, the almost complete shutdown of the tourist trade, capital flight, etc.

Attached are country by country estimates of the financial impact of the closure of the Suez Canal and IPC pipelines on oil revenues of the governments of the Middle East.

Estimated impact of closure Suez Canal and IPC pipelines on oil revenues of Middle East governments

[In millions of dollars]

| | Preclosure oil revenues | | Postclosure losses oil revenues | | | Percentage decline in estimated total foreign exchange revenues ¹ |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|---|-----------------|--------------------|--|
| | Estimate for year 1956 | Monthly average | Estimate for period November 1956 to January 1957 | Monthly average | Percentage decline | |
| Producing countries: | | | | | | |
| Saudi Arabia..... | 288.0 | 24.0 | 24.5 | 8.2 | 34 | 27 |
| Kuwait..... | 300.0 | 25.0 | 32.0 | 10.7 | 43 | 41 |
| Iraq..... | 216.0 | 18.0 | 40.5 | 13.5 | 75 | 50 |
| Iran..... | 156.0 | 13.0 | 1.6 | .5 | 4 | 2 |
| Qatar..... | 36.0 | 3.0 | 2.3 | .8 | 26 | 25 |
| Bahrein..... | 9.6 | .8 | 1.3 | .4 | 64 | 9 |
| Total..... | 1,005.6 | 83.8 | 102.2 | 34.1 | 40 | 30 |
| Transit countries: | | | | | | |
| Syria..... | 21.6 | 1.8 | 4.5 | 1.5 | 83 | 11 |
| Lebanon..... | 2.4 | .2 | .3 | .1 | 50 | .5 |
| Egypt ² | 8.4 | .7 | 2.1 | .7 | 100 | 2 |
| Total..... | 32.4 | 2.7 | 6.9 | 2.3 | 83 | 3 |
| Grand total..... | 1,038.0 | 86.5 | 109.1 | 36.3 | 42 | 20 |

¹ Based on rough estimates of total foreign exchange revenues prior to closure of the canal and IPC pipelines.

² Represents Egyptian Government loss of foreign exchange revenue derived from oil movements through the canal.

NOTE.—Since the tax and royalty payments to the Middle East governments lag from 2 to 3 months behind production and export of oil, the impact of the closure of the canal and IPC pipelines on oil revenues will just begin to be felt in January and February.

Question 13

How much oil was being exported from the Middle East countries prior to the recent Suez difficulty? How is this oil exported from the producing countries, i. e., what is the nationality of tankers principally engaged in carrying Middle Eastern oil? What are the shipping routes? Where are the pipelines?

Answers

Prior to the recent hostilities Middle East oil experts had reached a level of 3.2 million barrels per day. Of this total about 2.4 million barrels per day (73 percent) moved to areas north and west of the Suez Canal and 860,000 barrels per day moved to areas to the east and south. (See attached table for country details.)

Of the north and west movement 1.5 million barrels per day (almost 65 percent) moved through the Suez Canal. The remaining 850,000 barrels per day of exports to the north and west moved through pipelines to the eastern Mediterranean. The IPC pipelines from the northern oilfields in Iraq to the Lebanese port of Tripoli and the Syrian port of Banias accounted for 530,000 barrels per day (62 percent) of the pipelines movement. The other pipeline is TAPLINE which runs from Saudi Arabia to the Lebanese port of Sidon. Closure of the Suez Canal and the IPC pipelines cuts off the normal routes of transport for about 63 percent of the Middle East's total oil exports.

Tankers flying the flags of Britain, Norway, Liberia, Italy, France, Panama, and Sweden transported almost 90 percent of the oil moving through the Canal. Tankers flying Liberian and Panamanian flags are largely American owned. It

is expected that tankers flying the above flags handled the predominant portions of oil movements from the eastern Mediterranean pipeline terminals and from the Persian Gulf oil ports to destinations east and south of Suez.

Estimated pre-Suez crisis exports of Middle East oil

[In thousands of barrels per day]

| | Exports to north and west ¹ | | | Exports to east and south ² | Grand total exports |
|---------------------------------|--|-----------|-------|--|---------------------|
| | Tanker via Suez Canal | Pipelines | Total | | |
| Saudi Arabia ³ | 160 | 320 | 480 | 310 | 700 |
| Bahrain ³ | 40 | ----- | 40 | 120 | 160 |
| Kuwait..... | 870 | ----- | 870 | 140 | 1,010 |
| Iraq..... | 70 | 530 | 600 | 80 | 680 |
| Iran..... | 270 | ----- | 270 | 140 | 410 |
| Qatar..... | 90 | ----- | 90 | 40 | 130 |
| Neutral zone..... | ----- | ----- | ----- | 30 | 30 |
| Total..... | 1,500 | 850 | 2,350 | 860 | 3,210 |

¹ To Europe, North Africa, United States east coast, Canada.

² To south and Southeast Asia, Far East, Australia, United States west coast, south and east Africa.

³ Estimated 135,000 barrels per day of Bahrain exports of petroleum products arise from crude imported via undersea pipeline from Saudi Arabia. Thus Saudi Arabia exported 925,000 barrels per day rather than 700,000 barrels per day.

Question 14

Can you provide some perspective on the importance of Middle Eastern oil for peacetime uses to this country, Western Europe, and the rest of the world, say over the next 10 years, 20 years?

Answer

Total free-world petroleum demand in 1965 has been forecast at nearly 25 million barrels daily of which the Middle East may supply about one-third. This compares with free world use of nearly 15 million barrels daily during 1956 with the Middle East supplying about one-fifth of the total. The contribution of Middle East oil to particular areas or countries during the next 10 or 20 years cannot be readily estimated. However, as long as Middle East petroleum is freely available, indigenous production in most other areas is unlikely to keep pace with growing oil requirements. In this situation the Middle East can be expected to supply a constantly increasing proportion of the oil supplies of most areas, particularly the United States, Western Europe, Asia, and the Far East.

Question 15

Are developments in atomic energy likely to alter the worldwide need for petroleum?

Answer

This is a question upon which there exists a wide variation of opinion, and the views of the AEC should be sought.

It is generally accepted that the worldwide demand for energy (more clearly predictable for the developed nations) will continue to grow at about 5 to 6 percent rate each year. This leads to the conclusion that even under optimistic assumptions regarding atomic energy, nuclear power will not supplant fossil fuels, but will more likely tend to absorb some of the incremental demand and also moderate to some extent the tendency for conventional fuel prices to rise due to the rapidly mounting demand for conventional fuels. Furthermore, through offering an alternative source of energy, nuclear power development may place the consumer who lacks adequate indigenous resources of fossil fuels in a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis the oil producer.

During the next 10 years atomic energy will still be in the early development phase, with nuclear power stations serving the important purposes of gaining necessary economic, technological, and operating experience. Installed kilowatts of nuclear power are not apt to be large in terms of present and prospective energy needs during this period or to affect materially the demand for oil. While

over the 20-year period it may be anticipated that atomic energy will make a major contribution to the energy requirements of the world, this contribution is still apt to be confined to covering some of the world's growing energy needs.

Question 16

What United States companies conduct significant producing operations in Middle Eastern oil?

Answer

United States oil companies involved in significant oil producing operations in the Middle East and their percentage participation in each producing country are as follows:

| United States oil company | Middle East oil producing country | Percentage participation in production |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| 1. Standard Oil, New Jersey..... | Saudi Arabia..... | 30.00 |
| | Iraq..... | 11.87 |
| | Iran..... | 7.00 |
| | Qatar..... | 11.87 |
| | Saudi Arabia..... | 30.00 |
| | Iran..... | 7.00 |
| | Bahrein..... | 50.00 |
| | Saudi Arabia..... | 30.00 |
| | Iran..... | 7.00 |
| | Bahrein..... | 50.00 |
| | Saudi Arabia..... | 10.00 |
| | Iraq..... | 11.87 |
| | Iran..... | 7.00 |
| | Qatar..... | 11.87 |
| | Kuwait..... | 50.00 |
| 5. Gulf Oil..... | Iran..... | 7.00 |

In addition to the above companies there are a number of smaller United States oil interests participating in oil operations in Kuwait-Saudi Arabia neutral zone and in Iran. The companies operating in the neutral zone are the American Independent Oil Co. and the Getty Oil Co. The following 9 United States oil companies share in 5 percent of the Iranian operations: American Independent Oil Co., Getty Oil Co., Atlantic Refining, Hancock Oil, Richfield Oil, San Jacinto Petroleum, Signal Oil & Gas, Standard of Ohio, and Tidewater Oil. In Egypt the Sahara Oil Co. is engaged in exploration of the western desert area and Socony Mobile is engaged in production in the Sinai-Red Sea area.

Question 17

What is the value, in general magnitude, of the American investment in Middle Eastern oil? In what countries is it centered?

Answer

The book value of American investments in Middle Eastern oil is estimated at slightly over \$1 billion.

While investment figures by separate Middle Eastern countries are not available, the concentration of American interests in the individual countries is indicated by the ownership pattern of operating companies as covered by the preceding question.

A study just published by the Chase Manhattan Bank (Investment Patterns in the World Petroleum Industry) gives an estimate of \$1,290 million as the gross investment of American oil companies in fixed assets in the Middle East as of December 31, 1955. This represents 47 percent of the total investment of \$2,750 million in Middle Eastern oil. The other than American interests are almost entirely British, French, and Dutch.

Question 18

How significant were oil imports from the Middle East to United States oil consumption prior to the recent Suez difficulty? To what extent have these imports been cut as a result of that difficulty? How are the cuts being made up? Are these sources adequate to meet the deficit for the next 2 or 3 years, if necessary?

Answer

Prior to the Suez crisis, the United States was importing approximately 300,000 barrels per day of crude oil from the Middle East (Iran 23,000; Iraq 30,000; Kuwait 150,000; Neutral Zone 8,000; Qatar 15,000; Saudi Arabia 85,000) which constituted less than 4 percent of United States crude oil demand of some 8.4 million barrels per day. Since the crisis these imports of Middle East crude have been cut back to approximately 100,000 barrels per day. If MEEO scheduling become fully effective these imports will be eliminated entirely during the emergency. These cuts in Middle East imports were most immediately compensated for by withdrawals from United States crude stocks on hand, which were unusually large as we entered the winter season. United States production has been increased in the past 2 months to the point where it more than offsets these cuts. United States sources are adequate to supplant Middle East oil imports for the next 2 or 3 years if necessary.

Question 19

Do we have any significant economic interests in the Middle East other than petroleum?

Answer

While United States investments in petroleum in the Middle East dwarf investments in shipping, aviation, and other enterprises, United States economic interest in the area does extend beyond petroleum.

On the average, the United States supplies about 18 percent of the total imports of the Middle East and purchases about 10 percent of Middle East exports (including oil). From this area the United States obtains basic raw materials such as chrome ore, manganese ore, hides, skins, wool, long staple cotton, and gum arabic. Moreover, prospects for expansion of export trade appear promising in view of the increasing economic development efforts of the countries of the area. Port and harbor projects, highway programs, and river control and irrigation projects all provide opportunities for American contractors and manufacturers. As standards of living increase, new markets are developing for American consumer goods.

The Middle East is also of great importance to the United States for significant lines of communication and trade serve the area. Approximately a half dozen American shipping companies and several aviation companies operate into and through the Middle East.

Question 20

What foreign companies hold significant investments in Middle Eastern oil? What is their nationality? In what countries do they conduct their producing operations?

Answer

Foreign companies holding significant investments in Middle East oil and their percentage participation in the individual producing countries are as follows:

| Foreign oil company | Middle East oil-producing country | Percentage participation in production |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| 1. British Petroleum Co..... | Kuwait..... | 50 |
| | Iraq..... | 23.75 |
| | Iran..... | 40 |
| | Qatar..... | 23.75 |
| | Iraq..... | 23.75 |
| | Iran..... | 14 |
| | Qatar..... | 23.75 |
| | Iraq..... | 23.75 |
| | Iran..... | 6 |
| | Qatar..... | 23.75 |
| | Iraq..... | 5 |
| | Qatar..... | 5 |

¹ Ownership of this oil complex is Royal Dutch 60 percent and Shell (British) 40 percent.

Question 21

What was the rate of petroleum imports into Western Europe prior to the Suez dispute? What part of the imports came from the Middle East?

Answer

Western Europe was importing about 2,800,000 barrels per day of crude petroleum and petroleum products from all sources during 1956 prior to the closure of the Suez Canal and sabotage of the Iraq Petroleum Co. pipelines. The Middle East was supplying about 2,100,000 barrels per day, or 75 percent of total imports.

Question 22

What is the present rate of petroleum imports into Western Europe? What part of these imports now come from the Middle East?

Answer

Loadings at free world oil ports of crude and products destined to Western Europe totaled about 2,800,000 barrels per day during December 1956. (The Middle East shipped about 1,250,000 barrels per day or 46 percent of this total.) At this time data on the amounts arriving in Western Europe during December is not available. However, it is known that arrivals in Western Europe of crude and products were somewhat below the loadings largely due to the long tanker haul around the Cape of Good Hope. Current estimates for the first quarter of 1957 indicate an average shortfall of about 15 percent normal oil requirements due to this transportation problem. It should be noted, however, that in the case of residual fuel oil, of which Western Europe is a heavy consumer, the shortfall may be close to 25 percent of requirements.

Question 23

What emergency sources have been tapped to meet the petroleum needs of Western Europe? How long can Western Europe be sustained from these sources?

Answer

No "emergency" sources have been tapped to meet the petroleum needs of Western Europe, but regular existing sources that were not the prime suppliers to Europe prior to the Suez crisis have been turned to and availed of. These are:

1. The United States gulf coast, and
2. The Caribbean area comprising the north coast of South America.

Participation of the United States gulf coast has been identified primarily by maritime transportation rearrangements and the drawing down of existing stocks of crude oil and petroleum products together with some increase in production. In regard to transportation rearrangements, these have been facilitated through the instrumentality of the Middle East Emergency Committee (MEEC) which tends to maximize efficient use of tankers.

Current planning for meeting the petroleum needs of Western Europe is based to a large extent on that area maintaining cutbacks in petroleum consumption of up to 25 percent. On this basis and without regard to the economic and financial consequences to Western Europe, it is expected that the added Western Hemisphere supplies combined with amounts remaining available from the Middle East and production available within Western Europe, are capable of sustaining Western Europe indefinitely.

Attached is a table setting forth oil movements from the United States gulf coast and the Caribbean to northwest Europe and the Mediterranean.

Exports of oil from United States gulf coast and the Caribbean to northwest Europe and the Mediterranean

[In thousands of barrels per day]

| | 4th quarter 1956 | Estimated January 1957 |
|--|---------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. From the United States gulf coast: | | |
| To northwestern Europe..... | 40 | 345 |
| To Mediterranean..... | 10 | 91 |
| Total..... | 50 | 436 |
| 2. From the Caribbean: | | |
| To Northwestern Europe..... | 535 | 619 |
| To Mediterranean, Canary Isles, and West Africa..... | 142 | 82 |
| Total..... | 677 | 701 |

Question 24

Do the countries of Western Europe have any significant economic interests in the Middle East, other than oil?

Answer

Western Europe, particularly Britain and France, have substantial economic interests in the Middle East, in addition to their investments in the oil industry.

On the average, Western Europe supplies about 58 percent of the total imports of the Middle East and purchases about 57 percent of Middle East exports (including oil). The area is important to the free world as a source of foodstuffs (namely cereals and fruits), tobacco, cotton, wool, jute, manganese, chrome, and copper. The free world in turn finds the area an important market for all types of industrial and consumer goods.

Western Europe also derives sizable benefits (which cannot be quantitatively estimated) from such services as maritime and air transport, construction contracts, the profits of trading firms established by their nationals in the Middle East, several concessionary companies, insurance, and especially banking.

Many of the Western European banks have a key position in the financial and commercial life of Middle East countries.

Question 25

How important were oil exports from the Middle East to countries other than those of Western Europe or the Western Hemisphere? (What countries?) Have these exports been adversely affected? (If so, have we been asked to do anything to alleviate the difficulties of the receiving countries?)

Answers

Prior to the recent hostilities 800,000 barrels per day or 27 percent of total Middle East oil exports moved to countries east and south of Suez. This Middle East oil accounted for about 80 percent of the requirements of the area comprising East and South Africa, South Asia, the Far East and Australasia. Since the hostilities, shipments to these areas have declined about 15 percent. Assuming that Middle East oil shipments are not disrupted for an extended period of time, this decline is not expected to impose serious hardships on the countries of the above areas since their stock positions appear adequate to cover the resulting short falls in deliveries.

Question 26

What percentage of world trade moved through the Suez Canal prior to the recent difficulties? Would it be accurate to say that virtually every industrial country and many underdeveloped countries had an important stake in the waterway, and that interest of all would be adversely effected by difficulties in the Suez region?

Answer

The cargo carried through the Suez Canal amounted to about 122 million metric tons annually (based on experience first 9 months 1956). This amounts to about 15 percent of the total ocean traffic moving in international trade.

It is correct to say that virtually every industrial country and many underdeveloped countries have an important stake in the Suez Canal. Ships of more than 30 nations have used the canal annually. In addition there are many countries which do not possess a merchant fleet but whose cargoes move regularly on vessels transiting the canal; these would include such countries as the Sudan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Iran, and others, whose dependence on the canal cannot be measured strictly in terms of flag movements.

Question 27

Do we have any significant cultural or religious interests in the Middle East which we are seeking to preserve or extend as a matter of policy? Are such interests shared, for the most part, by the peoples of many other countries?

Answer

The United States has long-established cultural and religious interests in the Middle East. American educators and missionaries began to be active in the area in the early part of the last century. Significant American educational institutions, such as the American University at Beirut (1955-56 enrollment approximately 3,500), Robert College and the Girls' College in Istanbul (enrollment has averaged around 1,500), the American University at Cairo, and Aleppo College, have for many years exerted an important and constructive influence in

the fields of education, medical care, and social welfare. American medical missionaries in the Middle East have performed outstanding work in the fields of health and sanitation.

Despite the considerable cultural difference between the people of the United States and those of the Middle East many of the latter feel an affinity for and understanding of this country which arises in no small measure from the efforts and activities of American cultural, educational, and philanthropic leaders in the area in the past and those being carried on in the present. This aspect of the relationship between this country and those in the area is an important element of mutual benefit in the world of today, which we seek to continue and strengthen.

The Middle East is, of course, the cradle of three great world religions. American Christians share with Christians of other countries a deep interest in the area in which Christ was born, lived, and was crucified. Large numbers of Americans, both lay and clergy, visit the Holy Land every year. Christian missionary groups from the United States are established in all parts of the Middle East, living and working with the people. The significant American religious interest in the area has been clearly demonstrated by the continuing attention given by the people of this country to the question of the future status of Jerusalem.

The United States has the largest Jewish population of any country. The religious significance of the Holy Land is as great to the Jews as it is to the Christians, and the number of our Jewish citizens who visit religious sites in Israel each year is convincing evidence of the importance of this area to Americans of the Jewish faith.

There are also many Americans of Middle Eastern descent who maintain strong ties with their relatives and communities in the area. This is especially true of Lebanon and Syria.

The cultural interests we possess in the Middle East derive their strength from past and present activities of American scholars, teachers, doctors, ministers of religion, and philanthropists, and from the principles which we have established and fostered in the course of our national history. These interests are not shared by the peoples of many other countries.

Our religious interests in the area are, of course, shared by Christians, Muslims, and Jews in other countries, but in our case the importance and vigor of these interests are especially great because of the size of our country and the number of our citizens professing the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish faiths.

Question 28

What are the avenues of possible direct Soviet aggression in the Middle East (land, sea, air routes) ?

Answer

The easiest land approach into the Middle East is across the rolling plain of European Turkey toward the Turkish Straits. Eastward from the straits, the best natural route crosses the dry central plateau of Turkey and penetrates the Taurus Mountains. The route crosses the Cilician plain to the narrow coastal plain at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Other land approaches include the routes through the passes of the Elburz and Zagros Mountains of Iran into the oil-producing areas of the Persian Gulf.

In addition to the route set forth above, other possible land approaches into the Middle East available to the Soviets are: Through the Caucasus and the Levant into Africa or through the Caucasus or Elburz Mountains into Iran to the Persian Gulf; through Turkistan into Iraq or Afghanistan and west Pakistan; and from Sinkiang into west Pakistan.

The Turkish Straits, which include three water bodies, the Dardanelles on the south, the Sea of Marmara in the center, and the Bosphorus on the north, are the passage between the Black and Mediterranean Sea. As such, this passage is important both to the Western Powers and to the Soviet Union. The straits are a natural obstacle to any invasion of Asiatic Turkey through European Turkey, although the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus are such narrow gaps as to minimize this barrier effect. The winding Bosphorus is less than a half-mile wide at its narrowest point, but is navigable throughout its entire length by even large vessels. By treaty, Russia has freedom of passage through the straits. The Black and Caspian Seas offer direct routes for amphibious operations.

The Soviets could use the direct air routes from their airbases on the northern periphery of the Middle East area to any of the Middle East countries.

Question 29

What types of military aid activity is the Soviet Union engaged in in the Middle East? In what countries? How extensive is this aid? Is it giveaway aid or military material sold, or what? How does the aid get to the Middle East? What is the nationality of the bottoms which are carrying it? Is this activity increasing or decreasing of late?

Answer

Arab States.—In the Arab world, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen have received military supplies from the U. S. S. R. Egypt has been the largest recipient. It has received MIG-15's and IL-28 light bombers, as well as a large number of tanks, artillery, and some naval craft. Syria has publicly announced a deal to purchase \$22 million worth of arms in May 1956 and has already received MIG-15's and 17's (the latter estimated to be 10 in number) and a number of tanks and other vehicles. The Yemen has received about \$0 million worth of materiel. The kind of arms involved has not been specified.

The arms were delivered either on the basis of straight purchase or barter deals.

Generally the materiel has arrived by sea carried in Soviet, Soviet bloc, or Egyptian bottoms.

There was a hiatus in deliveries during the British-French and Israeli engagement with Egyptian forces, but deliveries have since been resumed.

(The remainder of the answer to this question was of a classified nature.)

Afghanistan.—In October 1955, the Afghan Government announced the acceptance of a Czech invitation to send a military mission to Prague, presumably to discuss the purchase of Czech arms, and on August 25, 1956, Prime Minister Daud announced that the Afghan Government had concluded contracts with the U. S. S. R. and Czechoslovakia for the purchase of arms and ammunition. Payments, in the form of credits, will be spread over 8 years. An AP report from New Delhi claimed that Afghanistan would receive 20 to 23 million dollars worth of arms from the bloc; \$13 million worth of orders had been placed with the Czechs and 7 to 10 million dollars with the Soviets. The credits for arms are reportedly separate from the \$100 million Soviet credit advance to Afghanistan in December 1955 for economic development.

Delivery of guns, ammunition, and airplanes has apparently begun. On October 29, 1956, the New York Times reported the delivery of at least 11 MIG jet fighters to Afghanistan. The planes, according to "eye-witness reports," bore Afghan Air Force markings and were landed at the Mazar-i-Sharif airfield in northern Afghanistan—only 5 minutes' flying time from the Soviet jet base at Termez in Uzbekistan. It is believed that Termez will be the servicing center for the jets. A new airstrip was reportedly built at Mazar-i-Sharif to accommodate the jets. The Russians will presumably train Afghan pilots to fly the jets.

Afghanistan and Libya.—(Information submitted under these headings was of a classified nature.)

Question 30

Is there evidence of Soviet military "volunteers" present in any of the Middle Eastern countries? (If so, in what countries and in what numbers? Are their numbers increasing?)

Answer

These is no evidence of Soviet military "volunteers" in any of the Arab States, or Afghanistan. Soviet and bloc military technicians are present in Egypt, Syria, the Yemen, and Afghanistan.

[Additional information submitted was of a classified nature.]

Question 31

Is there penetration, other than military and economic, being undertaken by the Soviet Union in the Middle East? How extensive is it? In what countries? What form does it take? What success has it had? (If successful to what is the Soviet success attributable?)

Answer

(The answer is of a classified nature.)

Question 32

Are the governments of any of the countries of the Middle East under the domination of International communism at the present time?

Answer

None of the governments of any of the countries of the Middle East is in our opinion at the present under the domination of International communism. There is no doubt that such domination is a goal of International communism. In the light of Communist ambitions and activities in the area we seek to establish conditions which will assist the countries there to maintain their independence. Thus we can help to frustrate Communist efforts to dominate the governments.

[The remainder of the answer was of a classified nature.]

Question 33

Is there imminent danger of subversion by Communist coup in any of the countries in the Middle East? (If so, what countries?)

Answer

Although at the present time we do not have evidence that there is imminent danger of subversion by Communist coup in any of the countries of the Middle East, Communist ambitions and activities in the area are such that an attempt at a coup at some future date is a possibility that definitely should not be excluded. We hope to be helpful in creating conditions which will assist the countries in the Middle East to maintain their independence and thus reduce the likelihood of success of such an attempt.

[Remainder of the answer was of a classified nature.]

Question 34

Are any countries in the Middle East in imminent danger of going Communist by choice? (If so, what countries? And to what is their choice attributed?)

Answer

No countries of the Middle East are believed to be in imminent danger of going Communist by choice. Past history has shown, however, that the establishment of Communist regimes in countries has rarely taken place as the result of the choice of the population.

Question 35

Can you conceive of any breakdown of peace in the Middle East which does not increase the likelihood of direct or indirect Soviet aggression in the region? (If so, cite example.)

Answer

It might well best serve the purposes of the Soviet Union to remain entirely aloof in the case of a conflict between states in the area. Clearly in the case of aggression against a Middle Eastern state by another Middle Eastern state controlled by International communism indirect Soviet aggression would be involved. There are many tensions in the area which might result in hostilities, but we do not believe it would be useful to cite hypothetical examples. The United States is striving in the United Nations, in cooperation with other like-minded nations and the Secretary General, and through diplomatic channels to assist in devising interim arrangements and long term solutions for the complex of issues—e. g., Palestine, Suez, Buraimi, Aden-Yemen—that jeopardize the peace and security of the area.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Byrd, you are next on the list, but since it is now 5 minutes of 12, and as we wanted to adjourn at 12 o'clock and come back at 2:30, would you prefer to start now, or wait until 2:30?

Senator BYRD. I do not have very many questions, but I do not think I can ask them in 5 minutes.

Chairman GREEN. Then the meeting stands adjourned until 2:30, in this room.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Green (chairman) presiding, Wiley, Fulbright, Smith (New Jersey), Sparkman, Hickenlooper, Humphrey, Mansfield, Aiken, Knowland, Capehart, and Kennedy.

Senators Russell, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson, Kefauver, Smith (Maine), Stennis, Case, Bush, Jackson, Barrett, and Ervin.

Also present: Hon. Albert Gore, United States Senator from the State of Tennessee, and Hon. Edward J. Thye, United States Senator from the State of Minnesota.

Chairman GREEN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, with your consent may we proceed?

I call on Mr. Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Russell and Senator Fulbright covered most of the questions that I had in mind so I will try not to go over the same field.

UNEXPENDED BALANCES

Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you a question on section 3.

As I understand it, it is proposed to take \$200 million from the existing appropriations of unexpended balances.

Is that taken from the economic appropriations or the military?

Secretary DULLES. It would be taken in part from one and in part from the other. That would be a total for all.

Senator BYRD. You want the right to take it from either one if you choose to do it?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Would you mind telling the committee the unexpended balances as of the latest date that you can for both the military and the economic?

Secretary DULLES. The nearest figure that I can give you now is that the total of the unexpended or unobligated balances in those military and economic accounts is somewhere around 6 to 7 billion dollars. I can make that more precise later on.

Senator BYRD. I asked you for the unexpended balances. I did not ask for the unobligated but for the unexpended balances.

Secretary DULLES. The figure I gave you is I understand the figure for what is in part obligated but unexpended.

Senator BYRD. How much was the figure?

Secretary DULLES. Between 6 and 7 billion.

Senator BYRD. Now in the last estimate of the Budget Bureau, it was \$8.6 billion. That is as of June 30, 1957, so the present unexpended balance is between 6 and 7 billion.

Secretary DULLES. That is what I understand, yes.

Senator BYRD. Let me ask this. Is this expenditure coming out of the economic fund or the military fund after this present year?

Secretary DULLES. It could come out of either. There is approximately, as I understand it, about \$700 million of funds appropriated for the current fiscal year, that is, 1957, for this area, economic and military.

The suggestion which is made is that of this \$700 million or thereabouts, \$200 million or not to exceed \$200 million can be used without regard to some of these existing restrictions.

The other \$500 million would remain subject to all of the restrictions.

Senator BYRD. I understood this was an economic program in section 3 of the pending resolution.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. It is either economic or military.

Senator BYRD. You mean that the \$200 million then covers all the needs of the military and the economic under this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. We believe that the needs of the area can be met to best advantage if out of the \$700 million or thereabouts now appropriated, about \$200 million is released from some of the present restrictions.

We think we can get along with the other \$500 million remaining subject to the present restrictions.

PROPOSED USE OF \$200 MILLION

Senator BYRD. What are these expenditures going to be for, this \$200 million?

Secretary DULLES. Well, they will be in part for economic and in part for military assistance in the area.

Senator BYRD. It has been the practice to keep separate the economic expenditures and the military, or are you changing that custom we have had in the past?

Secretary DULLES. No, no, but this would give a discretion as to whether or not the exemption from the present restrictions that is requested would be applicable to military funds or to economic funds or in what degree as between the two.

Senator BYRD. Wouldn't it be more businesslike to state how much you want for economic and how much you want for military, because they come from two different appropriations?

Secretary DULLES. It is not a question, sir, of how much we want for military or how much we want for economic.

The funds have been appropriated for military and for economic.

The question is that we need to get a certain amount of greater elasticity in spending about \$200 million of that \$700 million than we now have.

ALLOCATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID

I do not think we can very wisely at the moment allocate that \$200 million as between the military and the economic, although, if it were felt important, an effort could be made to give some estimate on that subject.

It might, for instance, be that of the \$200 million sought to be released from some of the present restrictions, about \$100 million would be for military and \$100 million for economic. That is a pure figure I picked out of the air. I do not today know what the most useful—

Senator BYRD. You can't give the committee information as to whether this \$200 million is to be spent for economic or military or what part for each?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator BYRD. Don't you think that such information should be presented?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think it is—

Senator BYRD. Some members of the committee are willing to spend for military but have great doubts about spending for economic. It has been customary to separate these appropriations.

Secretary DULLES. There is no intention, Senator, to confuse the appropriations. The appropriations will be spent for economic and for military precisely as the Congress has already determined.

Senator BYRD. In other words, if you take \$100 million of the unexpended appropriations for the military, then you will spend \$100 million for military?

Secretary DULLES. The only question is as to the release of some of these funds from the requirements, for example, that 80 percent must be obligated before April 30. A question of that sort I do not think can be answered very accurately or to best advantage until after we have made a new on-the-spot survey of the area, but this is not a request to the Congress to be able to mix up funds that are appropriated for military purposes and allocated for economic or vice versa.

Senator BYRD. Aren't you setting up another restriction which you appear to be trying to get rid of, because, if you take a part of this from the military, then you must spend it on the military for military purposes; isn't that correct?

Secretary DULLES. The money would be spent for military purposes.

AID ESTIMATES

Senator BYRD. Weren't there some estimates made?

This figure was not just picked out of the air, was it?

The estimates should have been made as to why this was needed, and for what purpose?

Secretary DULLES. The rough estimate was made that in the balance of the year that we would need perhaps as much as \$200 million, and I do not see it would be as much as \$200 million, of the existing appropriations for military and for economic to be spent free of some of the limitations of the act.

That takes into account the extent to which, for example, programming has already gone forward of a kind which we think should be continued.

Now obviously that is a very rough estimate, and I am sorry we have to deal with it in this rough way, but there are some rough things that have been happening out there which have dislocated a great many of the plans that we have. We do know that it is quite impossible to allocate to best advantage all of the money that is now appropriated, or 80 percent of it, by the 30th of April.

Now if Congress should insist that it has to be done by the 30th of April, of course we will allocate it. But I can tell you that those dollars will not serve the needs of the present emergency as well if we are pressed into allocating it so fast. We have not yet been able to take full account of this new situation as to what adjustments it would best require.

Senator BYRD. Would there be any objection to stating in this section 3 how much of this fund would go to the military and how much to the economic?

Secretary DULLES. I am sorry, I do not seem to be able to make my point clear.

The question of how much money will go to economic and how much money will go for military has already been decided, and it is not

requested that there be a change in any respect of that allocation between military and economic. So it is not a question of saying how much of it will go to military and how much will go to economic, because that has already been decided, and we do not ask that that should be altered.

Now perhaps I did not make it sufficiently clear by the draft before you, and if so we would be very glad to clarify it in that respect.

Senator BYRD. Section 3 says "without regard to the provisions of any other law."

It would seem to me unless there is some objection to it, that if it was taken from the military then it should go back to the military?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. If it is taken from the economic fund it ought to go back to the economic fund because we have a system of bookkeeping here whereby those funds are kept separate.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator BYRD. I would not like to see that disturbed.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator BYRD. Is there any objection to making it clear in this section that such funds as you take from the military will go back for military purposes?

Secretary DULLES. No objection whatsoever, and I think perhaps the statement which I made in answer to some inquiry this morning indicated a possible phrasing of the section which would I think cover the point that you have in mind, which is a very sound point.

Senator BYRD. This resolution does not cover it now because it says "without regard to any other law."

Secretary DULLES. Yes, I think that is broader than it needs to be.

FUTURE AID REQUESTS

Senator BYRD. Could you tell the committee what increase, if any, the administration expects to ask in economic or military aid in the next fiscal year—that is, increase above the present fiscal year?

Secretary DULLES. No, I could not make any estimate there at the present time. Estimates are being prepared for presentation in due course to the Congress, but I would not be able to make myself any estimate at this time.

Senator BYRD. Naturally if there is an increase in the appropriations for the next fiscal year, then this \$200 million and more would be added as a regular expense throughout the years to come as long as the program continues, which I predict will be many years.

In other words, I know you do not want to give the impression that this \$200 million is the only expenditure that is going to be made for these purposes.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. As I pointed out, under the present laws we have appropriated by the Congress around \$750 million or thereabouts for this area, and all we are talking about here is not any more money at all.

It is merely the degree to which that money should be freed from certain restrictions which do not seem to be appropriate to meet the present emergency.

Senator BYRD. I know that is what you told the committee but some of us are thinking beyond this year as to the costs of this program after this \$200 million is expended. There would still be continuing requests, would there not?

Secretary DULLES. There will be continuing requests for this area.

Senator BYRD. Appropriations, I mean.

Secretary DULLES. And the President is indicating that, of those requests, he would hope that about \$200 million should be appropriated as a discretionary fund, not as a specifically allocated fund for next year. But that is not a request that the amount should necessarily be increased.

It is merely a statement that the discretionary aspect of it should be increased, in view of the quite altered and still not yet stabilized status of the area.

Senator BYRD. You have no objection to modifying section 3?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator BYRD. In examination by Senator Russell, he referred to section 1—

that the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

As I recall it, you stated that that was not to be regarded as an authorization for any expenditures beyond what is contemplated by section 3, is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. And I would say it is not an authorization for any expenditures other than have already been appropriated by the Congress.

Senator BYRD. Do you have any objection to eliminating that clause?

Secretary DULLES. I think it is desirable, Senator, to have a clause of a general character indicating our interest in the economic condition of the area, and I think there have been clauses of that character in legislation of the Congress which has met with general approval.

QUESTION OF LONG-TERM AID COMMITTAL

I believe that it would be quite possible to find language there which would make it perfectly clear that there is no committal of any kind for authorization or otherwise or for long-term aid, as I said to Senator Russell.

Senator BYRD. You mean a legal committal or a moral committal?

Secretary DULLES. Or a moral committal either.

Senator BYRD. It is pretty strong language here—

that the President is authorized—

and so forth and so on—

in the development of the economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

If you intend that the only authorization for expenditures is in section 3, it would occur to me that section 1 should be eliminated.

Do you have any objection to that?

Let me explain further that it indicates to me at least a moral obligation on the part of this country to continue this program.

Secretary DULLES. I would not want to agree now to its elimination, although I would be quite prepared to agree that the language should be such as not to leave any possible doubt in anybody's mind that it is sought in that way to gain an authorization which is not otherwise provided for by law.

Senator BYRD. Section 1 is certainly a statement of policy approved by the Congress. That is about all of the questions I have at this time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Smith of New Jersey?

WORDING OF RESOLUTION

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Secretary, you recall on Saturday or Sunday, I forget which it was, I called you on the phone and asked you questions with regard to the wording of this resolution which had been presented to us and whether you would be willing to consider suggested changes.

I gather from your answers to Senator Byrd that you do not feel there is any special sanctity about these words if you can get words that would better express your intent.

One of the things brought to my attention is objection to the word "authorized" in section 2, which states that the President "is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States."

It might be desirable to change that to make it mean more clearly what we have in mind.

For example, if it is desired to avoid the use of the word "authorize" in the resolution and instead adopt the concept that the Congress is approving action which the President under his own power could take, the following formula might be employed. That is, assuming that the President has the power and we are just approving the power he already has, I suggest this language and ask if it appears to you to be a reasonable change.

Instead of saying, "he is authorized to employ the Armed Forces," the suggested change would read:

The Congress approves the use of the Armed Forces of the United States by the President to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence—

and so forth.

This would be in place of saying that the President is "authorized" to do it.

Secretary DULLES. The language to which you direct yourself is language which was used by the Congress in the resolution in relation to Taiwan, Formosa, and it was voted by the Congress with only 3 votes in opposition in the House, 3 votes in opposition in the Senate.

It seemed to us, in view of that, that that was good language to continue, and could not perhaps arouse any serious objection in view of the very unanimous approval of that type of language in a prior resolution.

If it is the desire to try to find new language, I would be very glad to study that. My initial reaction is that it would be very much the same, but in these legal and constitutional matters, I do not like to rely upon just an initial reaction.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I think you are quite right on that. I would support the language you have used, but I had that question.

Now there is another contingency and possibility, and again I make a suggestion for a possible change.

If it is desired to leave completely open the constitutional question as to the scope of the respective powers of the President and the Congress, the following language might be used:

The Congress approves the use of a full constitutional power of the President in protecting the territorial integrity, political independence—

and so forth.

My feeling was that if we did not wish to determine the constitutional question, we could simply approve the use of the President's "full constitutional power" and yet have the Congress make a positive statement endorsing the use of that power in the Middle East.

I would like to throw those alternatives in the hopper, in the record, so that we can consider them in case there are those who believe the word "authorize" is unfortunate constitutionally.

We might use these alternatives. I just raise the question for your comment.

Secretary DULLES. I point out, sir, that the language we now have used has been approved by all but three of the Senators already. Whether you can find other language which will win that same degree of approval I am not sure.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I think your point is well taken. If the language you have is approved, that is all right, but I wanted your opinion on these alternative approaches.

INTERNAL SUBVERSION

Now another question that I have been asked, which has given me some concern, is this: "What measures could be taken under this resolution to combat internal subversion of both an overt Communist revolutionary nature or a more subtle subversion by Communist powers by nonviolent means?"

If there is no attack but there is subversion, what means do you have in mind for protecting ourselves?

I have in mind, sir, Syria and Egypt. Suppose the Communists fly weapons of various kinds, including jet planes, into Syria and Egypt; and suppose they build bases within those countries.

Is that the kind of activity that so puts them under Communist control that we would act under this resolution, or do we have to wait for an attack?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I am not quite sure what you mean by the word "act." If you mean to invade them with armed forces, I would say no, because as I say and I said earlier, we are bound by the Charter of the United Nations and by our mutual defense treaties not to use armed force against the political independence or territorial integrity of any country.

And the authority under the Charter to use Armed Forces without the approval of the Security Council of the United Nations exists only where an armed attack occurs.

Therefore we would not, in my opinion, be entitled consistently with our existing treaty obligations to invade a country with armed force which itself had not engaged in an armed attack.

But when you say would we act, there are of course a great many things that can be done short of invading a country with armed force.

I do not believe myself that if the conditions that are outlined in this legislation prevail, that international communism will get control, or if it should get control, be able to maintain control for any appreciable period of any state in this area.

The people in this area are basically anti-Communist. They are in the main highly religious people. They do not like communism with its atheistic, materialistic approach to human affairs. And as I indicated in my earlier statement, if the people are not cowed by fear that they will be attacked from outside, if they are able to maintain an adequate and loyal security force of their own, and if economic conditions are respectable, I do not think that any country will go Communist.

I believe that that kind of a threat of subversion can be met, must be met, by means other than our being the ones that start attacking some country with armed force.

If we believed that it was permissible to attack countries with armed force which are Communist I do not see where we would stop, nor do I see how we could ask others to stop.

I do not suppose we want, for instance in the case of divided countries, to have the governments that are free use armed force against the portions that are under Communist control. And yet, if we establish the principle that we can do it, how can we urge them not to do it?

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That might be an argument for putting this economic aid in section 1, because that is the other approach, rather than the armed forces in section 2, which might help to deter certain countries.

In other words, they would not be likely to succumb to the Russian blandishments if they felt they were getting sufficient economic help from us to secure their economic health.

Is that a fair statement as to why you put the economic in as well as the other?

ELEMENTS TO PREVENT COMMUNIST TAKEOVERS

Secretary DULLES. The economic factor is one of the three essential ingredients in my opinion to prevent a country being taken over by international communism. There are three elements which can lead to that.

One, as I say, is a country being cowed by fear that they may be invaded. Czechoslovakia is the best illustration of that. There were no actual Red Army forces in Czechoslovakia or sent into Czechoslovakia at the time of that takeover. But they did have Red armies massed near the border of Czechoslovakia, and the Communist people within Czechoslovakia said, "If you do not turn over the Government to us the Red armies will come in."

And there was no deterrent, there was no western power or free world power of any military strength which had said that they would act if the Red armies marched into Czechoslovakia.

So they did not have to march in because the very imminence of that threat itself did the job.

Now there must be a deterrent to that. Secondly, it is important in these countries to have an adequate force of their own, primarily for internal security, also to provide some capacity for initial resistance if there should be attack from without. That is the second job you have got to do.

The third job is you have got to try to see that economic conditions are such that the people are not in such despair that they will say, "Well, anything is better than this; let's try communism."

Those are the three things. With those three things I am satisfied that the area can be helped. But I think all three elements are essential.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I remember in 1947 I was in Czechoslovakia when it was just on the verge of going over, and we were asked by people there, "Why can't you do for us what you did for Greece and Turkey? Why can't you give us some assurance of action?" Well, it was not forthcoming, and as you say, they were afraid of the Russians on the border.

BAGHDAD PACT

Now, Mr. Secretary, there is another matter that I am constantly asked about. I think I know the answer. The question is this: Why don't we join the Baghdad Pact, and why don't we try to induce other countries in the area to come into the Baghdad Pact? And what would we do in that case with the Israel problem?

I think it would be well for the record to have a statement of our policy on that. As I say, I think I know it, but I would like to have you give it to us.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, the Baghdad Pact has received a very considerable measure of support from the United States. We have supported it and we will continue to support it. We belong to the economic committee of the Baghdad Pact. We have sent military people to confer with their military people, and we have indicated our great sympathy with the pact insofar as it stands as a collective obstacle to Soviet aggression from the north.

Now the fact is, however, that the Baghdad Pact is not a unifying force as among the Arab countries. There are problems of a somewhat complicated character to us perhaps relating to dynastic situations, the Hashemite dynasty and so forth, as a result of which there is a very large degree of question about the pact within the Arab world.

If the Baghdad Pact were generally acceptable to the Arab world, I think that we would certainly give very serious consideration to joining the pact, and I do not exclude the possibility that we might join the pact.

There has been no final decision taken not to join the Baghdad Pact, but at the present time it does not seem to us that the results which we want in the area can best be achieved by joining the Baghdad Pact.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Thank you for that explanation. I will just ask a further question: If we did join the pact, I suppose we would have to make a separate arrangement to protect Israel because she would be one of the countries left out there; and I understand it would be difficult for Israel to be voted into the Baghdad Pact with some of the other members.

Is that a fair statement?

Secretary DULLES. I think it is a fair statement.

It would be difficult for Israel to be brought into the Baghdad Pact, yes.

DURATION OF RESOLUTION

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Now, going to the matter of how action under this resolution can be terminated, the very last section, section 5, reads as follows:

This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations—

and so forth—

are reasonably assured.

Would there be any objection—I speak now from the standpoint of Congress—to saying, "This joint resolution shall expire when the Congress by joint resolution shall determine"?

That would imply the approval by the President of a joint resolution, so it would be a joint congressional-presidential action.

Secretary DULLES. I would think there would be no objection to that, Senator.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. You would not object to that?

Secretary DULLES. No.

ARMS RACE QUESTION

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Is it contemplated from the first sentence of section 2 that military assistance will be given to all nations in the area requesting it, including Israel? The question struck me at once. Here we have felt that we did not want to start an arms race, but if we give aid to Israel and the Arabs under section 2, aren't we going to start something that we do not contemplate?

Certainly we would have to give Israel the opportunity if we gave military assistance to these other areas.

Is that what is contemplated by section 2?

Secretary DULLES. Section 2 gives an authority to the President in this respect which is comparable to authority which he now has, but he has indicated, and I have again indicated here, that it is not the purpose of the President under existing authority or new authority to initiate what would be called an arms race in the area.

We adhere in that respect to the provisions of the Tripartite Declaration, which state explicitly opposition to an arms race between the Arab States and Israel.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I hoped to get that clarified.

TYPES OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE CONTEMPLATED

Now what types of military assistance is it contemplated we would furnish under the resolution?

Do we contemplate military hardware?

I have been asked that question a number of times, what are we going to do, give jet planes or just furnish our own military aid with our own Army controlling the weapons and so forth used?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think anything different in general character would be done than has in the main been contemplated, although undoubtedly there will need to be some stepup, some change there. I would think that that question had better be answered perhaps in executive session by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I will be very glad to hold it then. Now, Mr. Secretary, I have been asked this question and I ask it of you.

CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION

How much consultation with Members of Congress was there before the President's decision to request the resolution was made?

In other words, did Members of Congress have any preliminary talks?

Some people say they had no preliminary talk at all until they read about it in the newspaper.

I think it would be helpful for the record if we knew just how much talk back and forth there was before this resolution was presented.

Secretary DULLES. Well, there were discussions with several Members of Congress during the formative period. Of course Congress was not in session at that time, and not many Congressmen were here that were available.

Of course you are aware of the fact I think that we had the meeting at the White House, the bipartisan leadership meeting, and that was quickly followed by meetings which I had here with the members of the Foreign Relations Committee and certain members of the Armed Services Committees, and which I had at the House, at which this was discussed.

As a result of that, the proposed resolution was finally submitted and the final address of the President was quite materially altered to take account of what we found to be the congressional sentiment with reference to this matter.

CONSULTATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. A similar question is what other governments have been consulted in the preparation of this resolution. Did you get joint approval from any of our NATO people?

As I recall it, the so-called Three Wise Men recommended consultation.

Secretary DULLES. The matter was presented to the NATO Council, the permanent Council, I think the same day or about the same time just shortly following the informal presentations to the Congress to which I have referred.

We did not think it appropriate to consult with any foreign governments until the Congress had been consulted. After Congress was back and brought into our informal consultations, the matter was promptly laid before the NATO Council by our permanent representative there, Ambassador Perkins, and I discussed the matter here in Washington with the representatives of some foreign governments.

However, that did not occur until after the congressional talks to which I have alluded.

Now of course that does not mean that we did not take into account the views of foreign governments because they are part of a total international situation, and we are in intimate touch with foreign governments about a great many matters, and we take into our calculations, into our policy determinations, what we know to be their points of view about various of these matters, so that that does not mean that their point of view was excluded, because obviously the point of view of Arab countries, the point of view of European coun-

tries, all is part of the total picture which led us to make this recommendation.

But there was no specific consultation with any foreign government until after there had been the first consultations on a fairly large scale with the Congress of the United States.

UNITED NATIONS CONSULTATION

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Was there consultation with the U. N. people, in light of their intimacy with the whole area?

Secretary DULLES. I had a talk with Mr. Hammarskjold which I think was on the last day of December, the 31st of December, at which I primarily reviewed with Mr. Hammarskjold some of these problems that are referred to as being primarily within the scope of the United Nations.

I also told him that we were thinking of action along these general lines, but there was no detailed discussion of it with him.

ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEMS AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Am I correct in my impression that we consider that these interior problems, such as the Arab-Israel problem which is not covered by this resolution, are in the hands of the United Nations, and that we are supporting and encouraging the United Nations to get those problems finally settled?

Many people feel that entirely aside from the Russian menace, we must deal with those internal questions in the area, questions that seem really to be more important to some of the local governments there, the Arab or Israel Governments, than the Russian side of it.

Do you feel that the U. N. should deal with those problems and that we should have this larger operation in case there is a movement in the area by Communist Russia?

Secretary DULLES. Most of the problems of the area which you might call intra-area problems are being dealt with by the United Nations, and we believe that the United Nations provides the best forum for solving those problems.

Of course the whole matter of Palestine was initially a responsibility of the United Nations. It was the United Nations which created the State of Israel. It was the United Nations which negotiated the armistice. It was the United Nations which has the observation teams which are supposed to supervise the carrying out of the armistice.

It is the United Nations which is taking care of the refugees. It is the United Nations which is negotiating the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops. It is the United Nations which is negotiating the Suez problem, both the clearance of the Suez and the future status of the Suez.

Now these matters are all being dealt with actively by the United Nations, and we do not think that they are at a point where they could be dealt with by advantage through any legislative action of the Congress of the United States.

The time may come when action by the Congress will be appropriate and will help solve those problems. I can assure you that as quick as that time comes, the Congress will be consulted and brought into the picture.

At the moment those problems we believe are best dealt with through the United Nations. We are giving full support to the United Nations in its efforts in that respect.

We have taken the initiative in the United Nations with respect to a great many of these matters, and we quite agree that all possible efforts should be made to solve these problems.

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN MIDDLE EAST

You have got one of these interlocking problems. It is sort of a chicken and egg problem: Which comes first?

You have a situation where on the one hand if the existence of these problems gives the Soviet Union a great opportunity, you also have the fact that the Soviet Union is, to a very large extent, creating these problems, or at least making them insoluble.

They are stoking the fires of hatred in the area, trying to set country against country, people against people, and they are, as I said to Mr. Shepilov at the United Nations Security Council last October—I said, "You are trying to stir things up here on the theory that you can get advantage by fishing out of troubled waters. You are trying to trouble the waters all the time."

Now I believe these problems will be more soluble if we can reduce Soviet influence in the area. That is one of the purposes of this legislation, and I believe a byproduct of this legislation will be that some of these problems will become more soluble.

On the other hand, we have got to try to solve the problems quite independently of this legislation because if we could get the problem solved, then the opportunity of the Soviet Union would be less.

The two things have got to go hand in hand. They are parallel problems in a way. But I think they have to be dealt with through different instrumentalities.

This deals with the type of problem, this proposed joint resolution deals with the type of problem, which exists but which the United Nations cannot itself cope with.

On the other hand, there are these other problems which the United Nations can appropriately deal with, is dealing with, and I think that the best chance of getting some of those problems solved is to support their solution by and through the United Nations.

UNITED NATIONS LIMITATIONS

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Then we are virtually serving notice by this resolution that the United States does not propose to let a situation develop that would give the Russians a chance to move in and take control of the Middle East area.

We are telling them that we are going to use our strength to prevent any encroachment of that kind, and we are not simply passing the buck to the United Nations to solve all these problems.

Secretary DULLES. Not the type of problem—

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That is what I mean.

Secretary DULLES (continuing). Where United States action can either be vetoed or will be ignored by Russia.

We have seen a demonstration in relation to Hungary of the fact that there are very definite limits on what the United Nations can

do through the exercise of veto in the Security Council. The Soviet Union vetoed a resolution calling it to get out of Hungary. It wholly ignored the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly.

The same thing cannot be said of some of the other countries that were the subject of United Nations resolutions. They showed a decent respect for the opinions of mankind as reflected by General Assembly resolution.

But the Soviet Union does not. Therefore that phase of the problem cannot be dependably dealt with through the United Nations. There are some of these other problems which I believe can effectively be dealt with through the United Nations.

URGENCY OF RESOLUTION

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. You express as you have demonstrated to me very well, the urgency of the matter, but when I use the word "urgency" I am not quite clear just how you feel.

I would like to ask that as a final question. It will take time for our committee to consider this. It will take time for this matter to be debated in the Senate and the House, undoubtedly, and I am wondering if the amount of time so consumed is really as serious as it might otherwise be, for it is known to the world that we are considering this matter seriously, and that we do not propose to be caught napping.

We are obviously going to come up with some sort of a resolution that will serve notice that we do not propose to let that area of the world get into Soviet hands.

Do you think the urgency is such that we ought to move very rapidly or do you think we ought to move with contemplation, consideration, and careful study and then come to a conclusion that may well set precedents for the future?

Secretary DULLES. I think we should move, Senator, with all the rapidity that is consistent with a thorough examination of the matter. I do not believe myself that the Congress should ever be just stampeded into doing something of this importance on the ground there is not time to think about it.

I think there must always be time to study these important matters, and I know that if I were in the Congress, I would not want to be stampeded into doing something before I understood all its implications.

This is important. You talk about it setting a precedent. I do not know how much of a precedent it sets. I think the precedent has already been set by a whole series of acts which we have taken of a comparable nature.

Nevertheless, this is a new application of a very considerable importance. I am quite sure it will attract a very strong reaction from the Soviet Union. We are beginning to get word of that already at the present time.

It certainly is a very important matter indeed, and the Congress should have the opportunity to understand it and to discuss it.

I do not think that the situation will be irreparably jeopardized by the delays that are incident to that kind of a treatment.

On the other hand, I think that it is incumbent upon the Congress to realize that every day's delay means that the Soviet Union is getting that much deeper into the area, and that while the Congress should certainly demand and use all the time that it needs to understand the matter, it should not in my opinion take a day more than that, because every day is costing us something.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. That is the way I feel personally.

Mr. Chairman, I am through.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Saltonstall, do you have any questions to ask?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dulles, I have just a very few questions that have come to me as I have listened to this discussion.

UNITED STATES ACTION TOWARD COUNTRIES GOING COMMUNISTIC

Let me ask you this: Assume a country seems to be going far, by the evidence available to us, toward adopting an international communistic point of view.

That country does not request a military assistance program from us in any way, but we see that it is tending toward international communism.

What is our position? Do you contemplate any intermediate action, do we refer it to the United Nations, or what do we do?

That question has been asked me a number of times and I never answered it to my own satisfaction.

Secretary DULLES. Well, that is pretty much the same question as I understand it that Senator Smith put, although if it is different, you will correct me, please.

The question as I understand it is, if a certain state seems to be moving under the control of international communism, what do we do about it?

Senator SALTONSTALL. And requests no military assistance from us and no military program.

Secretary DULLES. Such a country would not request military assistance from the United States because that carries with it implications which a Soviet-dominated or affiliated state would not want to accept.

They will get their military assistance from the Soviet Union.

Now the question of what we would do about it is I think pretty well covered by my answer to Senator Smith, Senator Alexander Smith.

There are two Senator Smiths here.

If that is not the answer, perhaps I have not quite understood the import of the question.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Perhaps you have answered it. Senator Smith is awfully hard to hear over here.

Secretary DULLES. I am sorry.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is a question that has bothered me.

Secretary DULLES. Would you be good enough to repeat the question?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, it is a question that I as a Senator am asked a good deal, and it is a question that I have never answered to

my own satisfaction. I have written it out as follows: Assume a country seems to be going far by the evidence available to us toward adopting an international communistic point of view, and that such a country does not request any military assistance from us.

What then is our position? Do we contemplate any individual action? Do we refer it to the United Nations or do we just watch it go toward further international communistic control?

Secretary DULLES. We could not, I think, with advantage take such a matter to the United Nations because, perhaps wrongfully, it is not a crime by the Charter of the United Nations for a country to be communistic or even to be controlled by international communism.

The United Nations was set up with the participation and membership of countries which were controlled by international communism. Therefore there is no relief to be obtained in the United Nations merely because a country is going toward international communism, just as the Soviet Union could not obtain relief in the United Nations if a country was throwing off the bondage of international communism.

In other words, the United Nations does not freeze the political status quo. That does not mean we would not do anything, because there are a great many things to do.

I pointed out in my answer to Senator Alexander Smith that we would not use open armed force against such a country, because that we are obligated not to do by our charter and by our treaties.

But there are many influences that can be brought to play to bring such a country to desist in that course of conduct, or if it adopts it, to reverse it.

I do not believe, Senator Saltonstall, that among people who are basically anti-Communist it is possible to bring into being or to sustain a Communist-controlled type of government unless there is a capacity to use armed force to sustain it.

We have seen here in the last few weeks, in connection with Hungary, in connection with Poland, that even where there has been 10 years of Communist indoctrination, it just does not take, and it is only the threat of direct military action which enables such a Communist government to be sustained.

And when you have a situation where that direct action cannot be taken, or is deterred, as we propose by this resolution, I do not think that this thing you talk about is going to happen.

If Hungary were cut off from direct contact with the Soviet Union, and if there had been provision so that it did not have and could not put military force into the area, Hungary would have been free today.

I do not believe that there is any Arab or Moslem State which the Soviet Communists can take over, unless they feel that they can use military force to do it. They could do it perhaps temporarily by a coup, but I do not think they can sustain it by that military force, and this is what will stop that.

PURPOSE OF RESOLUTION

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, your purpose in passing this resolution, in adopting this resolution, is to indicate that any country can turn to us or turn to the free world for assistance if it so desires to do so?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And in that way the moral tone and the desire to be free is so great that it would do so. Is that a fair statement?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. It will show I hope the peoples of this part of the world that they do not need to succumb to communism because communism can bring to bear overwhelming military power against them.

Now that is a force which threatens to operate upon the area. We must deter that.

UNITED STATES POSITION TOWARD REQUESTS FROM COMMUNIST-ORIENTED GOVERNMENTS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Another question along the same lines, Mr. Dulles.

I think I know your answer probably.

Assume a request for economic assistance but no military assistance in a country where there is evidence of subversive infiltration. Will we undertake economic assistance, and if so, on what basis, on a hopeful basis, on a basis that we will restore their freedom if we give them economic assistance, or will we say that we refuse it under those circumstances?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we would I think certainly not give economic assistance to help a Communist-oriented government to maintain itself in power and to win the approval of its people. That is one thing we would not do. If what we did would in our estimation prevent the country from turning in that direction, then that would be another consideration.

We have had to apply considerations of that sort almost continuously as we applied over past years the Mutual Security Act, and we have to estimate what the purpose of the government is and what the effect of giving it economic aid will be.

One of the words that is in section 1, to which I attach importance, is that the nation "must be dedicated to the maintenance of national independence."

In other words, we wanted to make clear there that we were not planning to give economic assistance or to develop economic strength of a country unless that country was genuinely trying to maintain its national independence, and a country which is playing around with international communism in my opinion is not a country which is seriously concerned about its national independence, and it was that phrase in that article 1 to which I attach some importance.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Just two more questions and observations.

APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 3 TO PRESENT FISCAL YEAR ONLY

You have made it reasonably clear, I believe, that this resolution and the economic and military aid which is covered in section 3, applies to the balance of this fiscal year alone, and that both the military and economic aid, if any, in fiscal year 1958 will be determined, first, by the authorization bill, and then by the appropriation bill, for that fiscal year.

That may be on a different basis than what you are now asking for the balance of this year, for which you ask no new funds for this change in authority; is that a correct statement?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

PURPOSE OF RESOLUTION

Senator SALTONSTALL. It is also my understanding that this resolution is in effect to prove to any doubting people that the executive and the legislative branches of our Government are united to do what we can to prevent international communism from getting a further control over the Middle East.

It is not the purpose of this resolution to settle any of the problems concerning the Suez Canal or the Israeli-Arab boundaries and other disputes; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct, yes; although, as I have indicated, I think this resolution will tend to create a climate in the area which will facilitate the solution of those other problems.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

Secretary DULLES. Without this or something of this character, I think the other problems will become totally unsolvable.

Senator SALTONSTALL. This will create an atmosphere which will make it more possible to settle those long-standing disputes.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary; and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Sparkman, have you any questions to ask?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, most of the questions which I had in mind have been asked, and I don't care about asking you to repeat them. But there are a few things which I want to ask you about.

MIDDLE EAST REACTION TO RESOLUTION

I was interested in your answer to the last question of Senator Saltonstall, to the effect that the resolution would create an atmosphere in that area which you think would be conducive toward the settlement of these other problems.

What has been the reaction in that territory, generally, to the proposal? Has there been enough expression for you to give us an estimate of it?

Secretary DULLES. I would say that the general reaction in the area is favorable.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is what?

Secretary DULLES. Is favorable. The degree of enthusiasm varies from country to country, and also there are some divergencies between what the governments themselves say to us and some of the newspaper reporting, which sometimes seems to be a little inconsistent with what we otherwise learn through diplomatic channels.

The reaction in Syria is, I suppose, the least favorable; and Egypt has not in anywise committed itself, so far as we are aware, either for or against.

There is a very considerable measure of approval from practically all of the other Arab countries. I am not sure that we have any par-

ticular information about Yemen, but in the main there is approval, the main reaction is favorable, and is very favorable indeed in some of the countries.

Senator SPARKMAN. Much of the success of this program will depend upon the way those countries receive it; will it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; because we must always bear this in mind: that the day is past when this area can be protected by some foreign country setting up what used to be called a protectorate.

Now, this area can only be protected by the people and the governments themselves. We can help them. We can give them some of the things that they need in order to maintain their freedom and independence. But never in the world can a policy succeed if its premise is that this area is going to be made a United States protectorate.

They talk sometimes about filling in the vacuum which has been created by recent events. Well, the only way to fill in the vacuum effectively is to help the people and governments of the area to fill it in.

Now, the only doubt that there is about this plan is the doubt which has been sown by the Soviet Arab-language propaganda, which alleges this is a plan whereby in effect we are going to take over this area, reduce it to an inferior status, establish a kind of a protectorate over it, and run its affairs according to our views without regard to the views of the countries themselves, and the Soviet Arab-language radio claims this is a manifestation of colonialism.

Of course, that is a gross misrepresentation of what this plan is.

SOVIET THREAT TO MIDDLE EASTERN INDEPENDENCE

I, however, alluded to it in connection with your question, that the success of this plan depends upon the attitude of the governments and the peoples concerned. It does, absolutely. And if they do not want to maintain their independence or do not want assistance from us in maintaining their independence, then I don't think there is very much we can do about it.

But I am quite sure that the peoples of this area do want to maintain their independence. That, indeed, is the dominant sentiment in the whole area. It has until recently, in large part, been a colonial area, and the peoples are extremely zealous to have, retain, and strengthen their independence.

They feel that the greatest danger to their independence comes from what used to be colonial powers. They do not feel that the danger from the Soviet Union is so great. They do not know about what has happened in Hungary.

Most of the—well, they don't know adequately, because a good deal of the press and propaganda, as I say, is influenced by international communism, and they print very little about what the Soviet Union did to Hungary.

We are trying to get information in through our information services, but it is always the case, we find, that where an area or a country has suffered from one thing, that is the thing they fear the recurrence of, and something new and different they do not fear as much.

I found when I first went out to Japan, in the days you went out there with me—I remember on one important occasion, you and

Senator Alexander Smith, I recall talking in some of these countries out there, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, about the danger from international communism.

Well, in those days, that was some years ago, they were all more conscious of the danger from Japan than they were of that, because that is what they had suffered from recently, and that was vivid in everybody's mind.

One of the problems we face in this part of the world is to get people to realize that international communism is the worst form of colonialism there is, and that the old form of colonialism they fear and have been released from is gone for good. That is our big problem in the area.

But to go back to your question, the success of this program depends upon our satisfying the peoples of the area that this is going to be a program to enable them to help themselves to keep their own independence.

I think they realize that, and, therefore, I have good hopes that this program will accomplish its purpose through helping the peoples of the area to maintain their own independence.

MIDDLE EAST PRESS COVERAGE

Senator SPARKMAN. I was interested in what you said about the lack of information regarding this, and about the Communist-influenced press, pouring out its stream of propaganda.

But surely there must be a press within the respective countries not under the influence of the Communist propaganda machine. Are they not giving the facts? Are they not giving our side of the question?

Secretary DULLES. That is the case in some countries, but I would say that the great bulk of what the people learn and hear in that part of the world comes from Communist-inspired sources, or sources which are largely influenced by communism.

Senator SPARKMAN. What is our Information Service doing to offset this?

Secretary DULLES. It is working very actively on the matter. I talked about it several times recently with the head of the agency. He is going out there next week to see what he can do about stepping these things up.

UNITED STATES INFLUENCE THROUGH THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

But, you see, historically, Senator, the United States has not played much of a role in this area. There has been a good deal of British influence, a good deal of French influence. There has been very little United States influence except through the American University of Beirut, which has had a very considerable influence. And that influence is indicated by the fact that, except for the countries that are right up with borders against the Soviet Union, the country which most appreciates the danger from communism is Lebanon.

And Lebanon is very enthusiastic, indeed, about this program. But aside from the influence which, over the past years, has been exer-

cised by the American University of Beirut, much of the mediums of information in the area have been in the past influenced by British and French sources, who had the mandates in that area; and those have all now turned, of course, against the British and the French.

So that we have sort of an uphill battle there to get our real purposes fully across to the people.

REACTIONS OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS

Senator SPARKMAN. I was interested in what you said about Lebanon. I heard with a great deal of interest this morning that Dr. Charles Malik, Foreign Minister of Lebanon, had said that this could be a good program for the area, I believe.

And Senator Fulbright quoted the Foreign Minister of Jordan, I believe it was.

Have any of the other foreign ministers or high officials of state spoken out on it so far?

Secretary DULLES. They have spoken to us through diplomatic channels.

Senator SPARKMAN. But not openly?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think they have made any public statements about it, because I think that they want to get more fully informed as to just what the plan means and how it is going to operate, and things of that sort, before they commit themselves publicly.

IMPORTANCE OF REFUGEE PROBLEM

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, as to these Arab-Israel problems which you cite, and I think you give a rather logical reason for their being left with the United Nations, I have felt for a long time that the number one problem which had to be solved in that area, before we could hope for any stabilization, was the refugee problem.

That has been dragging for a long, long time. Does it have any real life in it at the present time in the United Nations?

Secretary DULLES. Well, as you know, of course the United Nations is keeping the people alive.

Senator SPARKMAN. Just alive?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. It keeps them just alive.

Senator SPARKMAN. When I talk about the settlement, I mean getting them out of those camps where they are just alive, and getting them resettled.

Secretary DULLES. I would not say that I see the prospect of any major resettlement at the present time. That situation is very bad. It continues to be very bad.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is it not a problem of high order?

Secretary DULLES. Of very high order, yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. It has a high priority in the settlement of the troubles in that area.

Secretary DULLES. I dealt with it quite fully in the address of August 26, 1955, which I referred to earlier. It is very difficult to work out a solution of that problem at the present time, because the Arab countries do not want to give up the position which, for political reasons, they have taken and want to adhere to, namely, that the place to resettle the Arab refugees is Israel. They say, "Let them go back."

Now, that is their political position, and they do not want to absorb all these refugees themselves, and thereby seem to renounce any possibility of their going back to Israel.

I do not think that Israel is opposed to a resettlement of some small part, at least, of these refugees. We have tried to bring about discussions a year or more ago as to possible resettlement, and how many would go here and how many would go elsewhere, but we were not able at that time to make any progress.

In some ways the Arab countries want to keep this problem open until the bigger problem of Israel and its frontiers and resettlement in Israel can be settled.

Senator SPARKMAN. I remember you made some very good suggestions in one of your speeches; it may have been the one to which you refer back in August. But I have often felt that the United States was capable of exercising stronger leadership within the United Nations toward a solution of these Arab-Israel questions. But I will not labor that further.

There is one other item about which I would like to ask you.

UNITED NATIONS POLICE FORCE

What is our attitude, if we have an official attitude, with reference to the United Nations police force? The one that is there now, if I understand it correctly, is only temporary. I think there are different interpretations as to when its existence ends.

Do we have an official attitude on setting up a permanent police force?

You know, of course, that you and I have discussed that on other occasions. In fact, we were serving as delegates together in the United Nations when the Uniting For Peace plan, which I believe you handled in the Political Committee, was proposed.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. We were together there and on the delegation when we proposed this Uniting For Peace resolution; and, as I say, I handled it on the floor of the General Assembly at that time; and part of that resolution was a provision for, you might call, standby forces; that the different member nations would designate certain contingents which would be held available to serve the United Nations on call.

Senator SPARKMAN. But it was not a permanent police force in the sense that I am talking about now.

Secretary DULLES. No. Those were contingents which could be called upon, but it was not a force in being.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is right.

Secretary DULLES. There has been for some time an effort to have at least a small force in being. Mr. Trygve Lie, the former Secretary-General, was extremely interested in trying to create some kind of force in being, and he brought up the proposals of that sort before the General Assembly several times.

They have never been adopted. Canada has been one of the strongest proponents of some kind of United Nations force; and it was very largely Canadian initiative, which we strongly supported, which led to calling into being this particular United Nations Emergency Force.

I would be glad to see, myself, some more or less permanent character given to this, although it raises quite complicated problems.

But in principle, the idea of a force is good. Of course, that was in the original charter concept; articles 42 and 43 of the charter provided for the creation of a United Nations force under agreements which would be worked out by the different member states. Those articles have always been dead letters, because the Soviet Union has always vetoed action under those provisions of the charter.

But if we could get back to that, I think it would be a very constructive thing, indeed.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I have a good many other questions, but I shall not ask them at this time. I think they have been generally covered, and there are other members who wish to question you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RICHARDS MISSION TO MIDDLE EAST

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Johnson, of Texas, have you any questions to ask?

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say this morning that former Chairman Richards of the House committee had been selected to head a mission to the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. When do you expect that mission to leave?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would like to see it leave by the 1st of February, but we do not want to seem in any way to take for granted action by the Congress on this legislation.

Senator JOHNSON. You do not expect it to leave until Congress has acted on your recommendation?

Secretary DULLES. I think it would be inadvisable for it to do so.

Senator JOHNSON. How long do you expect him to be gone?

Secretary DULLES. I would think probably 6 weeks or thereabouts.

Senator JOHNSON. What is the purpose of it?

Secretary DULLES. The purpose of it is to review the military and economic problems of the area as they had been altered by the events of the last few weeks, the last 2 months.

We had programs for the area which had been worked out originally about 18 months ago, presented to Congress about a year ago; but the situation has been so drastically altered in terms of the danger, in terms of the need, that we do not believe that these programs should be adhered to, but should be reviewed.

Senator JOHNSON. Would it be your purpose to use the recommendations of the Richards mission as a guide to the allocations you would make in that area of economic aid?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Would you feel that it would be necessary to have their recommendations prior to making judgments on what should be done in each country? Do you think it would be desirable?

Secretary DULLES. I think this, Senator: I was saying, in reply to a question from Senator Sparkman, I think, that the important thing to do is to a very considerable extent explain to these people what it is we are up to here. There is a lot of suspicion in the area being spread by the Communists.

It is alleged all we are doing is to move in to take over what had been colonial positions of other countries. And I think someone needs to sit down and talk with them in a fairly leisurely way to explain what our purpose is, what the dangers are that we see, how they can overcome these dangers.

I do not think that that can be done adequately by cable. Our own Ambassadors in the area are not adequately informed of our thinking, because it is just not possible to do it by cable.

We are getting Ambassador Hare back here, I think he is arriving today. We can talk to him. But we cannot pull the whole diplomatic corps from that area back here, and the best thing to do, I think, is to have somebody go out there who is thoroughly conversant with our point of view, what the purpose is, is thoroughly conversant with the point of view of the Congress as it will be manifested in these debates, and I believe that that is a very essential ingredient in the total program that we are doing.

In these situations, a certain amount of money is important, but far more important than money is understanding; and I think that a mission such as we have in mind, to which would be attached economic and military advisers, will do a great deal to help to bring about an understanding, and to bring about a welcoming of cooperation with us, which I believe is essential to the nations if they are to maintain their independence, but which cooperation may not be forthcoming adequately unless we quietly and patiently explain to them just what our policy toward the area is.

Senator JOHNSON. My question, Mr. Secretary, is: Is it your purpose, is it your plan, to use the recommendations of the Richards mission as a guide to the allocations you make to the Middle East, economic aid?

Secretary DULLES. To a considerable extent, yes.

Senator JOHNSON. All right.

Now—

Secretary DULLES. I said in answer to—

Senator JOHNSON. I am not questioning the wisdom of the mission at all.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON. I do not want to leave that inference.

I assume from what you said, the purpose of the mission is two-fold: The first is to explain our attitude and our views to the countries involved; and second, to come back and explain to you their needs and their requirements. Is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would like him to go out there with a very considerable authority, himself, to make some commitments, if it seemed to be necessary, within the confines and limits of the present appropriations, of course.

In other words, I do not think the situation necessarily permits of the delay of his going out there and coming back and perhaps going out again.

Senator JOHNSON. As I understand, one of the purposes of this commission is to arm the mission with the authority from the Congress to make commitments to the individual countries, and—

Secretary DULLES. I think that is part of what he should do, yes.

Senator JOHNSON. You think he will be in a position to do that. Will he have the facts necessary to permit him to provide a judgment?

Secretary DULLES. Well, he of course will not operate entirely on his own. It will be a mission which will have with it many experts in the area, both of a military and economic character.

But I do think that we have got to be in a position, once this legislation is passed, to move rapidly, because time is of the essence in this situation.

SERIOUS NATURE OF THREAT TO MIDDLE EAST SECURITY

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that the Congress is being asked to take a very extraordinary step. That step can be justified only if a serious threat exists.

Now, what can you say to the people of our country, within the bounds of security, which indicates that there is a present dangerous threat to the security of the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. I would say, Senator, if asked—and I gather you have asked me—that this is the most serious threat that we have faced over the past 10 years.

I say it for several reasons. In the first place, there is a threat which, if it led to an international Communist control of this area, would mean that the Communists could win without open war, areas which are endangered, but which probably the Communists or the Soviet Union would not want to risk open war to get.

I refer particularly to Western Europe.

They are very eager, of course, to get control of Western Europe. The vast manpower, industry, raw materials, that exist there would, if it fell under their control, decisively alter to their advantage and our disadvantage the balance of power in the world.

Now, there are two ways of their getting that control. One is by fighting to get it. The other is to get control of its economy so that it cannot exist except on Soviet Communist terms.

And if international communism gets control of the Middle East, they will be in precisely that position. They can, in effect, have their hand on the throttle which can either give or can cut off what is the lifeblood of Europe.

And I would not expect under those conditions it would be feasible for Europe to stay independent of Soviet Communist control.

I say the danger also is very great because I believe that the international communism needs a victory to offset a series of losses that have befallen them, and this is the area of the world where events seem to have played into the hands of international communism so as to give them perhaps the best chance for a victory of very great magnitude.

As I pointed out in my opening statement, there have been deterrents to the aggression by Czarist Russia and by Soviet Russia in the area. That situation has drastically altered within the last few weeks, and if I had to pick any place in the world today where I think the danger is great, I think I would put in first place the danger in the Middle East.

Senator JOHNSON. That is primarily because of the history of the Russian drive, and the fact that they need a victory and the general onward march of communism; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator JOHNSON. So we are going to justify this on those generalities rather than any other specific information you would like to give to the committee and the country?

Secretary DULLES. Well, sir, the evidence is ample, and has been accumulating at a very rapid rate over recent months, that the Soviet Communists are trying very desperately to take over this area. There is no lack of proof about that.

Some of the details would naturally have to be guarded for security purposes, but particularly over the last year there has been mounting evidence of their presence there in connection with military shipments and supplies, the presence of technicians, offers of assistance of one sort or another; the stirring up of trouble between Israel and the Arabs; the holding out to the Arabs the hope that if only they are allowed to come there, that they will extinguish the State of Israel; the constant influence brought in Egypt to prevent any satisfactory settlement of the Suez case.

I recall that at the Second London Conference that I attended, where the 22 nations were present, including the Soviet Union, we put up a proposal which was still being circulated privately among the members of the conference, and even while that was being discussed in a formative stage, the Soviet-Arab language radio blasted it as being nothing but colonialism, and so forth, obviously trying to make it impossible for President Nasser, if he wanted to, to accept those proposals.

The manifestations of the Communists in the area have been manifold, and on a steadily rising basis. Their radio broadcasts are being stepped up at a very rapid rate. There is just ample evidence, Senator, of their very great activity in the area.

And there is already beginning to be a sharp reaction to President Eisenhower's message to the Congress, and I suspect that it will become ever sharper as the days go on, because if, indeed, they are prevented from taking this area over, it will be a very bitter disappointment to them.

TYPES OF ECONOMIC AID PROJECTS PROPOSED

Senator JOHNSON. Presumably our answer to this activity is increased economic aid. Now, what types of projects do you expect to be undertaken under this economic aid?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we are not planning at the present time to increase the economic aid over and above—

Senator JOHNSON. I am not asking in amount. I am asking what kind, what type of projects are you expecting to have?

Secretary DULLES. Well, that will have to be the decision of the mission which we are sending out there. I suspect that there will have to be some shift away from what have been long-term economic projects, involving building roads and things of that sort, into something which will have a more immediate impact upon the economy of the country because of the threats which many of them are under of having to forego oil royalties, taxes, and the like, and because of the cessation of certain types of aid which they had been receiving from certain European countries who are not in position any more to do it.

Therefore, I suspect that the character of the aid may have to shift somewhat more to a budgetary and short-term basis rather than to a long-term basis which seemed most desirable a year ago.

Senator JOHNSON. What type of economic aid has been requested?
Secretary DULLES. In the past?

Well, have you got there the projects which were laid before the Congress? They were mostly quite long-term projects of development of the country, largely through roads and things of that sort.

Senator JOHNSON. Would the Aswan Dam project be one of the projects which would be undertaken under this aid authorization?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. No, sir; you can take that for certain, I believe.

AMERICAN TROOPS

Senator JOHNSON. Do you contemplate that under this proposition we would be called upon to station American troops in those countries requesting us to do so?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think there is any present plan to station any American forces in the area. There may be a little more in the way of American military technical assistance, but I do not think that there is any plan for any permanent stationing of any American ground forces in the area.

That can be gone into more fully when Admiral Radford is in executive session.

PURPOSE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROPOSED

Senator JOHNSON. Is the main purpose of military assistance which you recommend, to build defense networks among countries which actually border upon the Soviet empire?

Secretary DULLES. It would be primarily there, although in some other countries it is important to build up local security forces to counter possible internal subversion.

A great deal of importance attaches, Senator, to the type of military planning which is done in the area, particularly toward the north. This again is something which I think perhaps had better be reserved for executive session, but the question of the kind of forces there, and the disposition of the forces there, depends to a very great degree upon whether it can be assumed that if there is an attack there will be a measure of support from the United States, particularly in the form of airpower.

If that can be relied upon and become a part of the planning, then they plan one way. If it cannot be, then they have got to plan something else. And from the standpoint of the efficient use of their available resources, it is of the utmost importance that there should be a decision on that matter which will permit planning reliably to proceed at the present time.

ISRAEL-ARAB PROBLEM

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, do you consider that this program will have any beneficial effect toward solving the Israel-Arab problem?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator JOHNSON. How?

Secretary DULLES. Because one of the greatest obstacle to a solution of that problem is the growing problems of Soviet Communist

influence in the area. That influence is deliberately designed to be mischievous and to keep alive divisions in the area, division of Arabs against Israel, divisions of Arabs among themselves.

It is a mischievous, troublemaking influence. So long as that influence is powerful, then many of these problems become almost insoluble.

I believe that this program by tending, as I am sure it will, to minimize Soviet influence in the area, will at the same time make some of these other problems more soluble.

Senator JOHNSON. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. I want to announce that this session will last until 5 o'clock, when we will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

And I hope, Mr. Secretary, that you can find it convenient to attend.

Secretary DULLES. I shall.

SECURITY COUNCIL--VETO POWER

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Hickenlooper, do you have any questions?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think you have covered a vast area of questions which have arisen in the minds of most of us in this questioning thus far, but I would like to ask your discussion on that portion of section 2 of the proposed resolution which refers to action—

consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations; and, as specified in article 51 of the United Nations Charter, measures pursuant thereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Does that give an opportunity in the Security Council for Russia or any other member of the Security Council to veto, to prohibit, or to stop any action which the United States might feel called upon to take under the other terms of this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; it does not, because it comes the other way around: That under the Charter, and under article 51, action can be taken and can be continued unless and until there is action in the Security Council which is effective to restore peace and security.

Now, the Soviet Union in the Security Council has no veto power whatsoever upon our taking action under article 51. We do not have to go there to get its consent, and the authority of the Security Council under article 51 is merely that measures—it says measures taken by the members—now, that is in the past tense, measures have been taken—

shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

In other words, it would take affirmative action by the Security Council, and that affirmative action could not be taken without the concurrence of the United States.

INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think a great many people feel that such action as may be taken unilaterally by a country in case of aggression against that country's territorial boundaries itself is quite different from aggression against some foreign state far removed from the actual territorial boundaries of the nation taking such action.

In other words, it is perfectly understandable if some nation attacks the United States or any other nation, that the nation attacked can take through an emergency, such immediate action as is necessary to attempt to repel the attack.

Under this resolution, we are considering the matter of an attack on, and a request by, a foreign nation far removed from the boundaries of the United States. I merely wanted you to clarify what would or would not be the rights of the Security Council under these very different circumstances.

Secretary DULLES. It was to meet that point of view, Senator, that article 51 was drawn to recognize what is referred to as the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.

Now, I had some part in the drawing of that article at San Francisco, and it was drawn as it was drawn to meet the very point which you are making, namely, is there going to be a situation here where a nation can attack countries, weak countries, perhaps, one by one, and nobody can go to their aid unless the Security Council agrees?

And we all knew at that time that the Soviet Union might very well veto that. So what was recognized as an inherent right is not just the right of the nation which is directly attacked to react, but that that can be done on a collective basis. And it is, indeed, pursuant to that article that we have made the arrangements that we have in respect to the Republic of China, with respect to the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, North Atlantic Treaty, and the like.

It all assumes, and correctly assumes, that if there is an attack, there can be a collective defense, and that the Security Council has no power to prevent that.

We do not have to wait until the Security Council has acted. We felt, otherwise, that this Charter might create a kind of death trap for some countries, if they got into a situation where they could be attacked and they could not get helped except with the approval of the Security Council.

And I am sure you will find that the historical record on that point is very clear, was made clear in the hearings which were held before this committee in 1945 when the Charter was being considered.

UNITED STATES POSITION ON ECONOMIC AID TO COMMUNIST-DOMINATED NATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One other question that I would like to have your comment on.

I believe you said in answer to a question by one of the members of the committee a moment ago, that we had no intention or contemplation of giving economic aid to a country under the domination of international communism.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If some of our allies and friends, in spite of our own position, were to give economic aid to countries under the control of international communism, would we look with disfavor upon that kind of an action?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir, we would.

Of course, we have no legal control over them, but there are various ways whereby our views can be made known to them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

APPRAISAL OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Humphrey?

Mr. Flanders is absent. Mr. Humphrey will be called next.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, just a few moments ago, in response to a question, I believe from Senator Johnson, you indicated that we were facing the most serious threat in the past 10 years in the possibility of international communism taking over in the Middle East. I think I am paraphrasing your thought correctly.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. And if this were the case, if communism or Soviet Russia should take over, it would be a stranglehold, so to speak, on the lifeline of Western Europe, which would weaken Western Europe and ourselves.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I do not think anyone disagrees with your logic as to the possibility of the results of the sequence of events that you have outlined.

But, Mr. Secretary, my question is this: What has happened in the last few weeks which indicates to you that the situation is more critical than it was on December 2, when you were quoted as saying, and I have a transcript here of your comments:

I believe that the chances of peace in the Middle East are now pretty good * * *. The general impression which both the President and I have is that the prospects of peace are now reasonably good.

And on another page of that same transcript, you are reported as saying:

I do feel in a position to appraise the overall picture in the Middle East to say that the prospects of peace there today are, in my opinion, considerably improved over what was the case a month ago.

Now, that is only one of a number of statements which I have which indicate that you have been quite optimistic about the possibilities of peace in the Middle East.

Would you or could you tell this committee, if it does not violate any rule of secrecy or security, just what has happened in the nature of a Soviet buildup or new-found Soviet power since December 2 which indicates that we are in a dire situation beyond anything that you foresaw in those weeks just before Christmas?

Secretary DULLES. I think, Senator, that if the statement which I made on December 2 is examined, you will see that when I am talking about peace there, I am talking about peace in the war which was then going on, that is, the war going on between, or hostilities if you wish to call it that, then going on between Egypt on the one side, and Israel, Britain, and France on the other side.

You will see I said there that the situation was much better than it was a month ago. A month ago, the fighting was active. Bombs were being dropped upon Egypt, landing operations were in prospect, there was very active fighting going on in the area.

In the meantime, a cease-fire had been called for by the United Nations, and was in process of being carried out; also, with the evacuation of hostile forces from the area which was called for by the United Nations.

I was addressing myself, Senator, to that situation, not the situation which I am presenting to the Senate here today.

Senator HUMPHREY. I would accept that in part, Mr. Secretary, except that the questions were also addressed to you in relationship to the developments in Syria, which was not related directly to the so-called hostilities which were by that time in the position of cease and desist, and withdrawals were well under way by the 2d of December.

You are quoted as saying:

I think I said that I did not care to comment or appraise in detail the developments in Syria. I do not think, however, that they have achieved dimensions which endanger the peace of the area.

The next question was:

How is it, Mr. Secretary, that Mr. Hagerty in the last few days, and you, too, now picture the world situation, at least the Middle East situation, in a much more favorable light than is coming out of the other parts of the world?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know what the other parts are that you refer to.

Question. Well, the stories coming out of the Middle East, for one thing. They represent a situation much more serious than either you or Jim Hagerty—

Secretary DULLES. Well, I perhaps am not familiar with the reports you refer to, but certainly I think anybody must be indeed far gone in pessimism if he thinks that the danger of war in the area today is as great as it was a month ago.

I recognize that much of this did relate to the Egyptian crisis. But, Mr. Secretary, this is not the only statement. I have here, for example, the reports of our committee hearing of a year ago, on the 24th of February, 1956. There are your own statements of August 26, 1956, relating to the Middle East, in which the matter of Soviet aggression does not appear to be as great as the 3 basic problems, as you put it, of refugees, fear, and boundaries, and political problems.

I do not underestimate the intents of the Soviet Union. I think you recognize that every member of this committee realizes that the Soviet is bent on no good.

URGENCY OF RESOLUTION QUESTIONED

But what I am concerned about is, What is the rush all about? What is the emergency today which did not exist just a few weeks ago? Is there any real information which indicates that there is an impending disaster unless this committee proceeds forthwith, within the next few days or hours, to act, and act favorably, upon your request, sir?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I have not attempted to express the matter in terms of hours.

Senator HUMPHREY. Or days.

Secretary DULLES. I think I made that clear. The results of the events of the past 2 months have been cumulative and have created a

situation in the area where I believe, Senator, that unless action of this character is taken, and taken with all the promptness that is consistent with adequate consideration, the probabilities are that the area will be lost to international communism.

Now, I realize, of course, that these are matters of judgment, and certainly my judgment is fallible. I do not claim that I have never made mistakes, and my estimate of this situation may not be entirely accurate.

All I can say is that it is based upon a very great mass of information which has come in from many parts of the world, from covert sources as well as overt sources, and I know that there are countries in that part of the world who are today sustained in their opposition to communism only by the hope and the expectation that the United States will promptly act along these lines.

If that hope was taken away from them, I would be very greatly concerned about what the consequences would be.

Senator HUMPHREY. Was there any reason to believe, on their part, that this Nation was not committed to resistance of Communist aggression?

Secretary DULLES. Well, they know that we are in general committed to resistance or at least opposition to Communist aggression. They do not think that we are committed to do so by the use of armed force if they should be attacked.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, I have been one who felt that it might be very well for us to be a little bit more explicit about our intentions. I have, however, a column here which I would like to call to your attention, a column of a distinguished columnist in our country, a man of competence and great ability, Mr. Lippmann. He says:

Since 1947, it has been a fundamental American policy to oppose with force, if necessary, any military aggression by the Soviet Union. Mr. Dulles himself has frequently reaffirmed this policy in very strong language, notably his famous statement of March 20, 1954, when he declared that "there should be a capability for massive retaliation without delay against the capability of the Soviet Union to strike by land at any 1 of approximately 20 states of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia."

How, then, has it come about that the policy needs once again to be reaffirmed? It has come about because of the tone of the political campaign and the position taken by the Government in the Middle East and in the Hungarian crisis which broke out in the closing weeks of the campaign, and the impression has been created, especially abroad, that the President is a pacifist; that on many issues of the Middle East which are of vital concern to Europe he is a very considerable neutralist. The impression is no doubt false—

and I want to underscore that for myself—

and those who have the impression would find it hard to cite chapter and verse to support it. But there is no doubt that in greater or lesser degree the impression exists in every foreign office in the world. It has been fed by campaign oratory.

I do not want to go on into all this detail, but I want to ask you this, Mr. Secretary: Is it true that, because statements were made, for example, that we would have no involvement in the Middle East, where such a statement was made, that we now have to announce our willingness to use force because at one time some people may have interpreted some comments to be a renunciation of our willingness to use it?

REASONS FOR DECLARING INTENTIONS

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I would say that the reasons for this action are precisely the same type of reason, the same order of reason, as has led us progressively, which is the language of the Vandenberg resolution, progressively to make clear our intention in one part of the world after another.

We did not move all at once all over the world. We have only taken action which seemed to commit the United States to the use of armed forces in various areas of the world as the danger in these areas seemed to increase to the point where only action on our part might deter Soviet action which might lead to a third world war.

Perhaps it can be said, as regards some of the action that we have taken, that it should have been taken earlier. Perhaps it should be said this action should have been taken earlier, I don't know.

But if it should have been taken earlier, that is certainly no reason for not taking it now.

We moved progressively as the situation developed. We made the North Atlantic Treaty and, having made the North Atlantic Treaty, after the attack in Korea occurred we took further action to move United States troops into Europe and to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with a large force in being.

We took action progressively in the Far East, South Asia, and so forth. We have not yet put this thing on a worldwide basis.

Gradually, one part of the world after another is being brought into it, and perhaps we may end up with a—what you might call a—universal doctrine reflected by multilateral treaties or multilateral worldwide authority from the Congress.

But so far, the practice has been prescribed by the Vandenberg resolution, of moving progressively in these areas as the danger seemed to mount. And today it seems to us that the situation in the Middle East has become such as to make it necessary to act there as we have acted in other parts of the world where the danger seemed comparable.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, can you think of any part of the world in which the Soviet Union might move by direct overt armed force, where we would not resist them?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I believe, myself, that, if there was overt armed attack upon, let us say, Iran, that that would lead us to act.

But what we want, Senator, and I know what you want, is not to have that occur and then move. We want to take action which will deter it.

That has been our policy all around the world, to take the position and make it clear sufficiently in advance so that it wouldn't happen.

PROGRAM FOR PEACE

This is not a program for war. This is a program for peace. And the theory upon which we have been operating everywhere has been that where it looked as though that danger had grown to a point where it was serious, could be imminent, that we declared ourselves in a way which left no doubt in the minds of the possible aggressors or the immediate victims of aggression that there could not be action there without an immediate reaction on our part, and that they could make their preparations accordingly, and that there was no risk of a potential aggressor miscalculating in that respect.

That has been our policy. It has been a policy which we have carried on for 10 years, and on the whole it has been a policy which has worked; and I believe that the time has come to apply that same policy, that same practice, to this area.

DOES EMPHASIZING MIDDLE EAST DEEMPHASIZE OTHER AREAS?

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, Mr. Secretary, I surely respect your judgment on this matter. I want to say this, however, that I think by emphasizing the Middle East, we may, if we are not careful in this discussion, deemphasize other areas.

I think it is to be considered a policy of our Government, insofar as I have been able to understand, that overt Soviet military aggression in any part of the world is to be resisted. Is that not correct?

Secretary DULLES. That has never been made clear in that full scope, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is not the full intent of the Truman Doctrine one of resistance of Communist aggression—

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator HUMPHREY (continuing). Everywhere?

Secretary DULLES. I don't understand, if that had been so, then I do not see why we made the North Atlantic Treaty. I do not see why.

Senator HUMPHREY. There are many reasons for that. You have arrangements of mutuality. As a matter of fact, there are many desirable aspects to a treaty on occasion, and sometimes not so desirable.

I think you have outlined some of the less desirable ones, vis-a-vis the Baghdad Pact, but you have collective security. You may, as a method of resistance, have unilateral declarations.

We have had all kinds of statements on the subject. My point is not that we should not resist, but the point of emphasis may be very much what Senator Fulbright was trying to indicate earlier today, that by being inclusive, you may be setting up a doctrine of excluding. I hope that that would not be the situation here, because there is plenty of evidence, may I say, Mr. Secretary, in the President's own message on the Middle Eastern situation, that we have had Executive declarations made on several occasions relating to our opposition to aggression in the Middle Eastern area.

JOINT CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE ACTIONS

The President thought, however, that it was better now to have joint action by the Congress and the Executive.

There have been plenty of Executive actions; is that not correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; but the Executive action alone does not carry the full wallop, if you want to call it that, that the United States is capable of. I recall—you suggest, Senator, that the response of the Congress to the enunciation of President Truman covered the situation all around the world. But I recall that when the North Atlantic Treaty was up it was said that the heart of the treaty is the provision of article 5 which says that if there is an attack there we will respond. And I remember Senator Vandenberg saying that is the knockout admonition of the treaty, that is the thing that is going to create the deterrent. If we had already done it, I do not see any basis for that provision of the treaty or any basis for that interpreta-

tion of the treaty, and it went on the same way as we finally developed this policy and applied it around the world.

Now, so far as I know, the only exposed part of the world which has not yet been covered by specific action by the United States is this area.

This area is exceptional in that respect, and I do not think that exception ought to be allowed to exist.

You may say that there is an exception in the case of India. I do not think that is quite an exception. India is remarkably protected by the Himalayan Mountains and so forth, and India does not feel that it wants this kind of protection.

But except for that we have, through progressive steps, taken one after another, covered by specific declarations which had been shared by the Congress or the Senate, all parts of the world except this, and I think the persistence of this danger, particularly in the light of events that have taken place in this area during the past few months, make it absolutely essential that that gap should be closed.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, one gap that you are referring to apparently must be the State of Iran because Turkey has been closed under NATO, and Pakistan is under SEATO. There are the Baghdad Pact countries to which we have some moral commitment.

As a matter of fact, I recall that you, sir, were the initiator of the Baghdad Pact, at least the idea of the pact. So we do have some moral commitment.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO RESOLUTION

I am not arguing about whether or not we ought to be doing this. What I really asked about was what happened, what is the immediacy, what happened here in recent weeks that we ought to know about that made it so much more grave in light of Soviet intentions?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the events are, in the main, Senator, things that we all read about in the newspapers. Certainly, the events of the last 2 months, 10 weeks, have been such as to totally alter the situation in this Middle East part of the world, and it has altered it in a sense which initially, at least, is very much in favor of international communism.

It has greatly hurt the prestige and the authority of the western peoples, the Europeans, and in much of the world, including that part of the world, the United States is colloquially known as a European. In much of Asia and Africa we are lumped in on the general term "Europeans." And I do not really think that there can be very serious doubt in the mind of anyone who follows events, as I know all of the Senators do, that there has been a cataclysmic change in the situation in the Middle East within the last few weeks.

Now, President Eisenhower thought of calling a special session of Congress to deal with this situation the latter part of December. But it seemed, in view of the Christmas holidays and the fact that the Congress would, in any event, shortly be in session, that the situation could wait over. But he obviously did not think it could wait very long because the first act he took, even before the State of the Union message, was to present this situation to the Congress just as quickly as the Congress could be organized; and I really believe that the need of the area—I have had some of these Ambassadors come to

see me, and they just said unless the United States is going to do something more, make its position more clear, "We do not think that our governments can hold on in a policy which is reflective of the hopes and aspirations of the free nations of the world."

That is just the fact. Perhaps they should not be so frightened, but the fact is that they are, and the fact is that they need the kind of reassurance that would come from this kind of legislation.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF RESOLUTION

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, just a few questions in reference to the economic aspects of this resolution. I shall not detain you very much longer.

Under the resolve sections the economic assistance aspect reads:

The President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength.

I have before me the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. Is it not true that that same authority is in the act of 1954?

Secretary DULLES. I believe it is; yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. With reference to the military assistance aspect of the resolution, which reads:

The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance—

is that not also authorized under the Mutual Security Act of 1954?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

WHAT COUNTRIES ARE TO RECEIVE ECONOMIC AID?

Senator HUMPHREY. I would like to know to what countries, if any, we contemplate giving economic help. Are we planning on giving any economic help within the next 6 months to Egypt, and if so, why, and how much?

Secretary DULLES. We have no present plans for giving any economic help to Egypt. I cannot say what will happen within 6 months, because I do not know. All I can say is we have no such plans at the present time.

Senator HUMPHREY. And we would not contemplate, for example, discussions over the Aswan Dam in light of the legislation of 1956, of the last session of Congress; is that correct? I believe there was restraining language as to any appropriations for the Aswan Dam; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I know that the British have been paying the Jordanians for some time around \$32 million, is it, or so a year. Are we contemplating picking up that tab?

Secretary DULLES. No; we are not contemplating picking up that tab. We do consider that it is possible that the Government of Jordan may require some assistance if the area is not to collapse totally, and while I would not recommend the United States just moving in and picking up the British check, I do not exclude Jordan from the list of countries who might usefully be assisted under proper conditions

under this legislation and, indeed, under additional legislation, Senator Humphrey.

QUESTION OF A MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Senator HUMPHREY. Have you given any thought, Mr. Secretary, to the development of a Middle East development authority, a kind of regional economic authority, into which bank or central reserve funds could be deposited, into which could go some of the moneys of some of the Middle Eastern countries for purposes of economic development, and into which we could make a contribution?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; we have thought about that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Would this permit some of the oil countries, so to speak, once their flow of oil is reestablished and their revenues are approaching what was once normal, an opportunity to make a contribution?

Secretary DULLES. We have given a great deal of thought to that, which certainly has a great deal of logic to support it.

One of the great troubles in the area is that is very much divided within itself, and that is the reason why it has not proved practical until, up to the present time at least, to deal with the area in anything approaching a regional basis. Those differences are not just differences between Israel and the Arabs.

Senator HUMPHREY. No; that is correct.

Secretary DULLES. That is a difference, and it is, perhaps, one unifying force as far as the Arabs are concerned. But when you pass beyond that, you find that there are very sharp differences in rivalries as between the Arab countries themselves, and so far that has militated against the creation of a regional organization such as you speak of, although that has a great deal of logic and economics to commend it.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND AN ARMS RACE

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, I might just as well tell you that I am very much concerned about the possibilities of military assistance. I know that you have testified here before that you have been very deeply concerned over the dangers involved in an arms race.

Much of the restraint on the sale of arms to Israel as a part of the policy of the Government was due to this fear over an arms race.

Isn't there the danger here, again, in light of the squabbles between the countries and the area, not only Arab versus Israeli, but Arab versus Arab at times, that any military assistance to one country, unless tied down very carefully under the restraints which are in the Mutual Security Act, could promote an arms race? By the way, I note that the resolution does not have the limitations of the Mutual Security Act applied, and there are some specific reservations and limitations in the Mutual Security Act under military assistance which would not apply under the terms of the resolution before us.

I am, therefore, concerned as to the military assistance portions here for some of the countries. I am afraid we might be promoting a good little first-class struggle in the area rather than subduing one.

Secretary DULLES. One of the purposes, and I think one of the ef-

fects, of this action would be to obviate just such a condition as you refer to.

The important thing to make clear is that these nations for their own self-defense as against, at least, attack directed by international communism, do not have to rely entirely upon their own unaided strength. It is the deterrent which is possessed and reflected by United States power and its committal which, I think, will make many of these countries feel less disposed to have to go into an arms race of their own.

Now, if United States power is not brought into the equation in some way, there is very great danger that the action by the Soviet Union which, in a way, started the latter phases of this great difficulty, that is, the arms sale to Egypt, that that will extend in the area.

SOVIET UNION'S ABUNDANCE OF ARMS

The one thing which the Soviet Union has to superabundance is arms. They have largely replaced the arms that were used in the Second World War by more modern armament, and that has left a great mass of armament which is obsolete in terms of the very best fighting equipment, but which is quite formidable in terms of the equipment which exists in the Middle East.

That can be, and I fear will be, thrown lavishly into the area, with a view to creating trouble in the area, which is what the Soviet Communists want.

Now, I believe that the only effective way to stop that kind of thing and to prevent that kind of an arms race which would be conducted with Soviet arms, is for the United States to offer to make available to the area a certain amount of its power as a deterrent.

Under those circumstances, I think that the likelihood of these countries turning in a competitive way, which the Soviet Union would encourage, to the Soviet Union is much less.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, under existing law, insofar as military assistance is concerned, we have that authority. What you are adding now is that by the clear-cut statement of the availability of United States military power, there will be a tendency not to compete in an arms race; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. That is my hope; yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it also necessary, Mr. Secretary, to try to do something about this arms traffic in the area?

Secretary DULLES. It would be extremely desirable to do something about that situation. We do now have a resolution by the General Assembly—

Senator HUMPHREY. Correct.

Secretary DULLES. Which calls for the nonshipment of arms into the area of hostilities, and as far as we know that has been complied with since it was adopted. But, of course, there is a broader area where, if possible, some limitation on arms shipments should be sought.

Senator HUMPHREY. This resolution does not get at that problem, does it, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS

Senator HUMPHREY. This resolution does not get directly at the problem of Communist subversion or economic penetration in the area, does it?

Secretary DULLES. Not directly, no.

Senator HUMPHREY. And it does not get at the very difficult problem, the political problem, of Arab-Israeli relationships, does it?

Secretary DULLES. Not directly, no.

Senator HUMPHREY. What it does, as you have interpreted this so far, insofar as I have been able to understand, is to give a backdrop of security in the area; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. And would it then be your purpose, sir, to proceed from that position of strength or security to outlining policies and programs to meet these other, what I consider to be vexing and current, problems that face us?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is your Department, sir, and is this Government of ours, really concentrating its attention upon these immediate, every day, on-top-of-us problems that I have talked about?

Secretary DULLES. Do you say are we concentrating on it?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, sir.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

As I pointed out, they are at the moment primarily in the hands from the standpoint of action, of the United Nations, and particularly the Secretary-General. Hardly a day passes that we do not discuss these problems with him.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it is fair to say, Mr. Secretary, that the activities of the United Nations in this area will be about as productive as the influence of the strength and prestige of the United States, and what other friends we have can bring to bear.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Because we have not settled the crucial problems to which you have addressed yourself on August 26, and almost a year ago before this committee. They are still with us; and I think they may be with us in even more alarming proportions.

Well, the hour of 5 o'clock has arrived, Mr. Chairman, and I had a lot more questions, but I do not want to violate the 5 o'clock rule.

Thank you. I will cease and desist.

Chairman GREEN. Well, may we regard your interrogation as finished?

Senator HUMPHREY. You may regard my interrogation for the moment as recessed.

Chairman GREEN. We will stand in adjournment until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a. m., Tuesday, January 15, 1957.)

THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST

TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Theodore Francis Green (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations) presiding.

Present: Senators Green (chairman, presiding), Sparkman, Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Kennedy, Wiley, Knowland, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Langer, Aiken, and Capehart, of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senators Richard B. Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Byrd, Kefauver, Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Saltonstall, Smith (Maine), Case (South Dakota), Bush, and Barrett, of the Committee on Armed Services.

Also present: Senators Clark, Thye, and Dworshak, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; John B. Hollister, Director, International Cooperation Administration; Robert C. Hill, Assistant Secretary of State; Carl W. McCordle, Assistant Secretary of State.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE—Resumed

Chairman GREEN. The committee will please come to order.
Are you ready to go ahead, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Chairman GREEN. According to the list, at the close of the last meeting we were to call on Mr. Kefauver, if he has any questions to ask.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I wrote you a letter a number of days ago in which I set forth quite a number of questions. Some of these have been asked and others I will not have time to ask today, but I did want to ask some questions contained in this letter, and others I will ask during the second round.

CONSULTATION WITH NATO COUNTRIES ON RESOLUTION

Senator Smith asked you yesterday with reference to consultation with North Atlantic Treaty Organizations nations or ambassadors of other nations interested in the Middle East, and you told him that you had spoken with ambassadors and with the Secretary General of NATO, and there had been some discussion.

Do I take it from your answer, Mr. Secretary, that this was rather in the nature of informing them of what the proposed recommendation of the President to the Congress would be, or was there any real dis-

cussion to see if they agreed with the program or if they would be a party to it?

Secretary DULLES. I would say it was more in the nature of keeping them informed as to the way our own thinking was developing.

Of course, as I pointed out, the development of our thinking took account of our knowledge of their points of view, but I would not think it would be correct to say that there had been a detailed consultation with them about the contents of this program before it was brought to the attention of the Congress.

Senator KEFAUVER. Were there any consultations in working up a program with the foreign ministers, or with the prime ministers, of any of the NATO nations?

Secretary DULLES. Not beyond what I have indicated, and that was through ambassadors and permanent representatives in Paris, rather than through the foreign ministers themselves.

As I pointed out, there have been two meetings, I think, of the Permanent NATO Ministerial Council at which we have brought up this topic and have invited discussion of points of view. Actually, we have not received significant contributions as yet from that source.

Senator KEFAUVER. You stated yesterday, as we all know, that the British and French have had much greater interest in the Middle East in the years past than we have had; and further, that the life-blood of Western Europe depended upon the section remaining independent, presumably partly because of the oil supply.

And yet you made no effort, as I understand it, to try to get the British and French, and other NATO nations, to join in this undertaking of protecting this area against aggression by international communism?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct. We made no effort to get them to join in this proposal. I do not think that that would have been in the general interest to have done so.

At the present time, feeling is running very high in the area. Indeed, it is the most difficult and delicate situation in which to develop and carry out a policy that I have ever had any contact with. There are so many currents and crosscurrents in the area, so many misunderstandings, so many fears, that if you associate yourself with one country you automatically become hostile to another.

It is an extremely difficult and complex situation, and I do not feel that the result which we seek and which I am confident will be in the interest of the Western European countries, could have been promoted by a greater degree of cooperation or consultation than in fact has taken place.

That is a point of view which we did not ignore, where we weighed very carefully what we did and what we did not do. But I think it was generally recognized, I think it was recognized at the NATO meeting which I attended in Paris last December, that the ability of certain Western European countries to exert an influence in the area or seem to be writing the policy of that area would be counter-productive.

IMPORTANCE OF MIDDLE EAST TO EUROPE

Senator KEFAUVER. You stated one of the main reasons for this program was to prevent Europe from being at the mercy of international communism, I suppose partly because their supply of oil

might be cut off, so that they have much more at stake in that way in the Middle East than the United States does, do they not, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. They are in what you might call the first line. We are in the second line. Of course, our interest is also very closely identified with theirs. We have made very heavy contributions and sacrifices over the past 10 years on behalf of Western Europe.

I believe that our total aid to that area, in terms of loans, grants, and the like, amounts to some \$25 billion, which is some, at least, monetary measure of the concern we have for that area.

Now, of course, they are, as I say, the area to be first affected by the Communist domination of that part of the world, but we would not be far behind.

Senator KEFAUVER. They are largely dependent upon oil from the Middle East, and we are not. That is one of the differences.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct. I believe that approximately 90 percent of their oil comes from the Middle East. That cannot be replaced by oil from this hemisphere except in part. At the present time there are no early prospects of the replacement of the oil, as a power producer, by atomic energy; and even assuming that the oil resources are available, if the transit routes are closed, there are not enough tankers and large enough tankers to take the oil around the Cape of Good Hope, so that it is a situation which at the moment cannot be coped with if you had a Communist control of the area, which would affect presumably not only the transportation routes, which are partly disrupted at the present time, but the production, too, that would be a difficult situation for a considerable period of time.

CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO COUNTRIES

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, I think we all know that part of the deterioration of NATO has been the absence of working out programs together and keeping one another informed about our proposed actions. That applies on both sides of the situation.

I have read the report of the Committee of Three, Mr. Martino, Mr. Lange, and Mr. Pearson, and it seems to me that the recommendation of these three men for the strengthening of NATO in the way of consultation, discussion of programs together, has not been fully complied with, or at least the spirit of it, by just advising these people of what we were going to do rather than having genuine discussions with their foreign ministers or with their prime ministers as to policy.

Secretary DULLES. Well, Senator, you face an almost insoluble problem in that respect, and at the time when that report was before the Council last December and was approved, I spoke to it, and I pointed out at that time that under our constitutional processes, it is not possible for us to commit ourselves to discuss these things with our European allies in NATO before, for example, they are discussed with the Congress of the United States.

And I made a very specific reservation on that point, because it seemed to me necessary to do so. There are so many demands and legitimate demands upon us for consultation from many different sources, that they cannot all be met in the priorities which each would like.

Many people in many parts of the world want to have the chance of consulting with us at the formative stage of our policies; and, of course, in nations of the Middle East, they feel that they are entitled to consultation, too; that we shouldn't just have consultation with the Western Europeans.

The problem of meeting with these various requests for consultation, all understandable, all legitimate from their standpoint, creates very perplexing problems for us. The United States has, I think, gone further in consultation with NATO than any other member of NATO has gone.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF THREE

Senator KEEAUVER. Mr. Chairman, if it is not in the record, I would like to have printed in the appendix of the record the report of the Committee of Three that I have referred to, with regard to consultation and negotiation for the strengthening of NATO.

Chairman GREEN. It will be so printed.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE ON NONMILITARY COOPERATION IN NATO

(As released by the NATO Information Division at Paris on December 14, 1956)

Gaetano Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy; Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway; L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The Committee on Nonmilitary Cooperation, set up by the North Atlantic Council at its session of May 1958, was requested: "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in nonmilitary fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community."

2. The Committee has interpreted these terms of reference as requiring it (1) to examine and redefine the objectives and needs of the Alliance, especially in the light of current international developments; and (2) to make recommendations for strengthening its internal solidarity, cohesion, and unity.

3. The Committee hopes that the report and recommendations which it now submits will make NATO's purely defensive and constructive purposes better understood in non-NATO countries; thereby facilitating and encouraging steps to lessen international tension. The events of the last few months have increased this tension and reduced hopes, which had been raised since Stalin's death, of finding a secure and honourable basis for competitive and ultimately for cooperative coexistence with the Communist world. The effort to this end, however, must go on.

4. Interallied relations have also undergone severe strains. The substance of this report was prepared by the Committee of Three in the course of its meetings and intergovernmental consultations last September. Subsequent events have reinforced the Committee's conviction that the Atlantic Community can develop greater unity only by working constantly to achieve common policies by full and timely consultation on issues of common concern. Unless this is done, the very framework of cooperation in NATO, which has contributed so greatly to the cause of freedom, and which is so vital to its advancement in the future, will be endangered.

5. The foundation of NATO, on which alone a strong superstructure can be built, is the political obligation that its members have taken for collective defence: to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all, which will be met by the collective action of all. There is a tendency at times to overlook the far-reaching importance of this commitment; especially during those periods when the danger of having to invoke it may seem to recede.

6. With this political commitment for collective defence as the cornerstone of the foreign and defence policies of its members, NATO has a solid basis for

existence. It is true, of course, that the ways and means by which the obligation is to be discharged may alter as political or strategic conditions alter; as the threat to peace changes its character or its direction. However, any variations in plans and strategic policies which may be required need not weaken NATO or the confidence of its members in NATO and in each other; providing, and the proviso is decisive, that each member retains its will and its capacity to play its full part in discharging the political commitment for collective action against aggression which it undertook when it signed the Pact; providing also—and recent events have shown that this is equally important—that any changes in national strategy or policy which affect the coalition are made only after collective consideration.

7. The first essential, then, of a healthy and developing NATO lies in the wholehearted acceptance by all its members of the political commitment for collective defence, and in the confidence which each has in the will and ability of the others to honour that commitment if aggression should take place.

8. This is our best present deterrent against military aggression; and consequently the best assurance that the commitment undertaken will not be engaged.

9. However, this deterrent role of NATO, based on solidarity and strength, can be discharged only if the political and economic relations between its members are cooperative and close. An Alliance in which the members ignore each other's interests or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence. Recent experience makes this clearer than ever before.

10. It is useful, in searching for ways and means of strengthening NATO unity and understanding, to recall the origin and the aims of the Organization.

11. The Treaty which was signed in Washington in 1949 was a collective response—we had learned that a purely national response was insufficient for security—to the fear of military aggression by the forces of the U. S. S. R. and its allies. These forces were of overwhelming strength. The threat to Greece, the capture of Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the pressure against Yugoslavia showed that they were also aggressive.

12. While fear may have been the main urge for the creation of NATO, there was also the realisation—conscious or instinctive—that in a shrinking nuclear world it was wise and timely to bring about a closer association of kindred Atlantic and Western European nations for other than defence purposes alone; that a partial pooling of sovereignty for mutual protection should also promote progress and cooperation generally. There was a feeling among the governments and peoples concerned, that this closer unity was both natural and desirable; that the common cultural traditions, free institutions and democratic concepts which were being challenged, and were market for destruction by those who challenged them, were things which should also bring the NATO nations closer together, not only for their defence but for their development. There was, in short, a sense of Atlantic Community, alongside the realisation of an immediate common danger.

13. Any such feeling was certainly not the decisive or even the main impulse in the creation of NATO. Nevertheless, it gave birth to the hope that NATO would grow beyond and above the emergency which brought it into being.

14. The expression of this hope is found in the Preamble and in Articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty. These two Articles, limited in their terms but with at least the promise of the grand design of an Atlantic Community, were included because of this insistent feeling that NATO must become more than a military alliance. They reflected the very real anxiety that if NATO failed to meet this test, it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it, even though the need for it might be as great as ever.

15. From the very beginning of NATO, then, it was recognised that while defence cooperation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough. It has also become increasingly realised since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic cooperation, the development of resources, progress in education and public understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army.

16. These two aspects of security—civil and military—can no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments, either within or between nations. Perhaps NATO has not yet fully recognised their essential interrelationship, or done enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between its civil and military sides which is essential if it is to be strong and enduring.

17. North Atlantic political and economic cooperation, however, let alone unity, will not be brought about in a day or by a declaration, but by creating over the years and through a whole series of national acts and policies, the habits and traditions and precedents for such cooperation and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best; slower than we might wish. We can be satisfied if it is steady and sure. This will not be the case, however, unless the member governments—especially the more powerful ones—are willing to work, to a much greater extent than hitherto, with and through NATO for more than purposes of collective military defence.

18. While the members of NATO have already developed various forms of nonmilitary cooperation between themselves and have been among the most active and constructive participants in various international organizations, NATO as such has been hesitant in entering this field, particularly in regard to economic matters. Its members have been rightly concerned to avoid duplication and to do, through other existing international organizations, the things which can best be done in that way.

19. Recently, however, the members of NATO have been examining and reassessing the purposes and the needs of the Organization in the light of certain changes in Soviet tactics and policies which have taken place since the death of Stalin, and of the effect of the present turmoil in Eastern Europe on this development.

20. These changes have not diminished the need for collective military defence but they have faced NATO with an additional challenge in which the emphasis is largely nonmilitary in character. NATO must recognise the real nature of the developments which have taken place. An important aspect of the new Soviet policies of competitive coexistence is an attempt to respond to positive initiatives of the Western nations aimed at improving, in an atmosphere of freedom, the lot of the economically less developed countries, and at establishing a just and mutually beneficial trading system in which all countries can prosper. The Soviet Union is now apparently veering towards policies designed to ensnare these countries by economic means and by political subversion, and to fasten on them the same shackles of Communism from which certain members of the Soviet bloc are now striving to release themselves. The members of NATO must maintain their vigilance in dealing with this form of penetration.

21. Meanwhile some of the immediate fears of large-scale all out military aggression against Western Europe have lessened. This process has been facilitated by evidence that the Soviet Government have realised that any such all out aggression would be met by a sure, swift and devastating retaliation, and that there could be no victory in a war of this kind with nuclear weapons on both sides. With an increased Soviet emphasis on nonmilitary or para-military methods, a review is needed of NATO's ability to meet effectively the challenge of penetration under the guise of coexistence, with its emphasis on conflict without catastrophe.

22. Certain questions now take on a new urgency. Have NATO's needs and objectives changed, or should they be changed? Is the Organization operating satisfactorily in the altered circumstances of 1956? If not, what can be done about it? There is the even more far-reaching question: "Can a loose association of sovereign states hold together at all without the common binding force of fear?"

23. The Committee has been examining these questions in the light of its firm conviction that the objectives which governments had in mind when the Pact was signed remain valid; that NATO is as important now to its member states as it was at that time.

24. The first of these objectives—as has already been pointed out—is security, based on collective action with adequate armed forces both for deterrence and defence.

25. Certainly NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of this objective remain as essential as they were in 1949. Soviet tactics may have changed; but Soviet armed might and ultimate objectives remain unchanged. Moreover, recent events in Eastern Europe show that the Soviet Union will not hesitate in certain circumstances to use force and the threat of force. Therefore the military strength of NATO must not be reduced, though its character and capabilities should be constantly adapted to changing circumstances. Strengthening the political and economic side of NATO is an essential complement to—not a substitute for—continuous cooperation in defence.

26. In spite of these recent events, Soviet leaders may place greater emphasis on political, economic and propaganda action. There is no evidence, however, that this will be permitted to prejudice in any way the maintenance of a high

level of military power in its most modern form as a base for Soviet activity in these other fields.

27. We should welcome changes in Soviet policies if they were genuinely designed to ease international tensions. But we must remember that the weakening and eventual dissolution of NATO remains a major Communist goal. We must therefore remain on guard so long as Soviet leaders persist in their determination to maintain a preponderance of military power for the achievement of their own political objectives and those of their allies.

28. This brings us again to the second and long-term aim of NATO: the development of an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than the necessity for common defence. This implies nothing less than the permanent association of the free Atlantic peoples for the promotion of their greater unity and the protection and the advancement of the interests which, as free democracies, they have in common.

29. If we are to secure this long-term aim, we must prevent the centrifugal forces of opposition or indifference from weakening the Alliance. NATO has not been destroyed, or even weakened, by the threats or attacks of its enemies. It has faltered at times through the lethargy or complacency of its members; through dissension or division between them; by putting narrow national considerations above the collective interest. It could be destroyed by these forces, if they were allowed to subside. To combat these tendencies, NATO must be used by its members, far more than it has been used, for sincere and genuine consultation and cooperation on questions of common concern. For this purpose, resolution is more important than resolutions; will than words.

30. The problem, however, goes deeper than this. NATO countries are faced by a political as well as a military threat. It comes from the revolutionary doctrines of Communism which have by careful design of the Communist leaders over many years been sowing seeds of falsehood concerning our free and democratic way of life. The best answer to such falsehoods is a continuing demonstration of the superiority of our own institutions over Communist ones. We can show by word and deed that we welcome political progress, economic advancement and orderly social change and that the real reactionaries of this day are these Communist regimes which, adhering to an inflexible pattern of economic and political doctrine, have been more successful in destroying freedom than in promoting it.

31. We must, however, realise that falsehoods concerning our institutions have sometimes been accepted at face value and that there are those, even in the non-Communist world, who under the systematic influence of Communist propaganda, do not accept our own analysis of NATO's aims and values. They believe that while NATO may have served a useful defensive and deterrent role in the Stalinist era, it is no longer necessary, even for the security of its members; that it is tending now to become an agency for the pooling of the strength and resources of the "colonial" powers in defence of imperial privileges, racial superiority, and Atlantic hegemony under the leadership of the United States. The fact that we know these views to be false and unjustified does not mean that NATO and its governments should not do everything they can to correct and counteract them.

32. NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area. Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other, and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned with harmonising their policies in relation to other areas taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community; particularly in working through the United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the solution of the problems that now divide the world.

33. In following this course, NATO can show that it is more than a defence organization acting and reacting to the ebb and flow of the fears and dangers arising out of Soviet policy. It can prove its desire to cooperate fully with other members of the international community in bringing to reality the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show that it is not merely concerned with preventing the cold war from deteriorating into a shooting one; or with defending itself if such a tragedy should take place; but that it is even more concerned with seizing the political and moral initiative to enable all countries to develop in freedom, and to bring about a secure peace for all nations.

34. Our caution in accepting without question the pacific character of any Soviet moves, our refusal to dismantle our defences before we are convinced that

conditions of international confidence have been restored, will, particularly after the events in Hungary, be understood by all people of sincerity and good will. What would not be understood is any unwillingness on our part to seek ways and means of breaking down the barriers with a view to establishing such confidence.

35. The coming together of the Atlantic nations for good and constructive purposes—which is the basic principle and ideal underlying the NATO concept—must rest on and grow from deeper and more permanent factors than the divisions and dangers of the last ten years. It is a historical, rather than a contemporary, development and if it is to achieve its real purpose, it must be considered in that light and the necessary conclusions drawn. A short-range view will not suffice.

36. The fundamental historical fact underlying this development is that the nation state, by itself and relying exclusively on national policy and national power, is inadequate for progress or even for survival in the nuclear age. As the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty foresaw, the growing interdependence of states, politically and economically as well as militarily, calls for an ever-increasing measure of international cohesion and cooperation. Some states may be able to enjoy a degree of political and economic independence when things are going well. No state, however powerful, can guarantee its security and its welfare by national action alone.

37. This basic fact underlies our report and the recommendations contained therein which appear in the subsequent chapters.

38. It has not been difficult to make these recommendations. It will be far more difficult for the member governments to carry them into effect. This will require, on their part, the firm conviction that the transformation of the Atlantic Community into a vital and vigorous political reality is as important as any purely national purpose. It will require, above all, the will to carry this conviction into the realm of practical governmental policy.

CHAPTER 2. POLITICAL COOPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

39. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be constructive or solid political cooperation.

40. The deepening and strengthening of this political cooperation does not imply the weakening of the ties of NATO members with other friendly countries or with other international associations, particularly the United Nations. Adherence to NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some of its members; for instance within groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic cooperation and European unity should be parallel and complementary, not competitive or conflicting.

41. Effective and constructive international cooperation requires a resolve to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier than it otherwise would be. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and cooperation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.

42. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political—or economic—consultation in NATO. It is difficult and has in fact been shown to be impossible, if the proper conviction is lacking, to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.

II. CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICIES

A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation

43. The essential role of consultation in fostering political cooperation was clearly defined by an earlier NATO Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1951:

"* * * The achievement of a closer degree of coordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the 'habit of consultation' on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which NATO was established. * * * In the political field, this means that while each North Atlantic government retains full freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide an area of agreement as possible in the formulation of policies as a whole.

* * * * *

"Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognised in Article 4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."

44. These words were written five years ago. They hold true now more than ever before. If we can say that they have not been ignored by NATO we must also recognise that the practice of consulting has not so developed in the NATO Council as to meet the demands of political changes and world trends. The present need, therefore, is more than simply broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation. There is a pressing requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an integral part of the making of national policy. Without this the very existence of the North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy.

45. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of harmonising policies. Where common interests of the Atlantic Community are at stake consultation should always seek to arrive at timely agreement on common lines of policy and action.

46. Such agreement, even with the closest possible cooperation and consultation, is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that a steady and continuous effort be made to bring it about. There cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy.

47. There are, of course, certain practical limitations to consultation in this field. They are sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary to emphasise them in words. Indeed the danger is less that they will be minimised or evaded than that they will be exaggerated and used to justify practices which unnecessarily ignore the common interest.

48. One of these limitations is the hard fact that ultimate responsibility for decision and action still rests on national governments. It is conceivable that a situation of extreme emergency may arise when action must be taken by one government before consultation is possible with the others.

49. Another limitation is the difficulty, and indeed the unwise, of trying to specify in advance all the subjects and all the situations where consultation is necessary; to separate by area or by subject the matters of NATO concern from those of purely national concern; to define in detail the obligations and duties of consultation. These things have to work themselves out in practice. In this process, experience is a better guide than dogma.

50. The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances member governments, before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind. If they have not the desire and the will to do this, no resolutions or recommendations or declarations by the Council or any Committee of the Council will be of any great value.

51. On the assumption, however, that this will and this desire do exist, the following principles and practices in the field of political consultation are recommended:

(a) members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as a formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation;

(b) both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character;

(c) a member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible;

(d) in developing their national policies, members should take into consideration the interests and views of other governments, particularly those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view of consensus has been reached in the Council;

(e) where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. When for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more important that where an agreed and formal recommendation has emerged from the Council discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national actions or policies related to the subject of that recommendation.

B. Annual Political Appraisal

52. To strengthen the process of consultation, it is recommended that Foreign Ministers, at each Spring meeting, should make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance and consider the lines along which it should advance.

53. To prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit an annual report:

(a) analysing the major political problems of the Alliance;

(b) reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and cooperated on such problems;

(c) indicating the problems and possible developments which may require future consultation, so that difficulties might be resolved and positive and constructive initiatives taken.

54. Member governments, through the Permanent Representatives, should give the Secretary General such information and assistance, including that of technical experts, as he may require in preparing his report.

C. Preparation for Political Consultation

55. Effective consultation also requires careful planning and preparation of the agenda for meetings of the Council, both in Ministerial and permanent session. Political questions coming up for discussion in the Council should so far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed, so that representatives may have background information on the thinking both of their own and of other governments. When appropriate, drafts of resolutions should be prepared in advance as a basis for discussion. Additional preparatory work will also be required for the annual political appraisal referred to in the preceding section.

56. To assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in discharging their responsibilities for political consultation, there should be constituted under the Council a Committee of Political Advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals. It would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would include among its responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy.

III. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERMEMBER DISPUTES

57. In the development of effective political cooperation in NATO, it is of crucial importance to avoid serious intermember disputes and to settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement of such disputes is in the first place the direct responsibility of the member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations (Article 33) and the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To clarify NATO's responsibilities in dealing with disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly and to enable

NATO, if necessary, to help the settlement of such disputes, the Committee recommends that the Council adopt a resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty on the following lines:

- (a) reaffirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;
- (b) declaring their intention to submit any such disputes, which have not proved capable of settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organization;
- (c) recognising the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;
- (d) empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; and
- (e) empowering the Secretary General, where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in (d) above, to use the assistance of not more than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.

IV. PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

58. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance at first hand to see some of its activities and to learn of its problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

59. In order to maintain a close relationship of Parliamentarians with NATO, the following arrangements are recommended:

- (a) that the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences and give all possible help with arrangements for their meetings;
- (b) that invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend certain of these meetings. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussions would be increased.

CHAPTER 3. ECONOMIC COOPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

60. Political cooperation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together, and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests.

61. These common economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

- (a) cooperative and national action to achieve healthy and expanding economies, both to promote the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples and to serve as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;
- (b) the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movement of manpower and long-term capital;
- (c) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; and
- (d) policies which will demonstrate, under conditions of competitive coexistence, the superiority of free institutions in promoting human welfare and economic progress.

62. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and individual effort to promote them, need not in any way prejudice close economic relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political cooperation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time, the NATO countries have an interest in any arrangements for especially close economic cooperation among groups of European member nations. It should be possible—as it is desirable—for such special arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider

objectives of Article 2 of our Treaty, which are of basic importance to the stability and well-being, not only of the North Atlantic area, but of the whole non-Communist world.

II. NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

63. While the purposes and principles of Article 2 are of vital importance, it is not necessary that member countries pursue them only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to duplicate the operating functions of other international organizations designed for various forms of economic cooperation.¹ NATO members play a major part in all these agencies, whose membership is generally well adapted to the purposes they serve.

64. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas for collective economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. In fact, the common economic concerns of the member nations will often best be fostered by continued and increased collaboration, both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO. This collaboration should be reinforced, however, by NATO consultation whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved; particularly those which have political or defence implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole. This, in turn, requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in NATO in the economic as well as in the political field. Such economic consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments where the questions are clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance. Action resulting from such a common approach, however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

65. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein. Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a "bloc" in such organizations. This would only alienate other friendly governments. There should, however, be consultation in NATO when economic issues of special political or strategic importance to NATO arise in other organizations, and in particular before meetings at which there may be attempts to divide or weaken the Atlantic Alliance or prejudice its interests.

III. CONFLICTS IN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF NATO COUNTRIES

66. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiations or by multilateral discussions in other organizations. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The procedures for peaceful settlement of political disputes discussed in the previous chapter should also be available for major disputes of an economic character which are appropriate for NATO consideration.

IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

67. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is that of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever clearer that progress in this field can be decisive in determining the security of nations

¹ The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Cooperation (OECE) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the various other United Nations agencies, including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development in Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical-assistance programmes, and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).

and their position in world affairs. Such progress is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper role in relation to economically underdeveloped areas.

68. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers, and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilization of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems, state and provincial governments play the major part, and many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international cooperation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.

69. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that every possibility of fruitful cooperation is examined. As a first concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened composed of one or at most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:

- (a) to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent problems in the recruitment, training, and utilisation of scientists, engineers, and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term, of solving those problems;
- (b) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view of continued interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and
- (c) to propose specific measures for future international cooperation in this field, through NATO or other international organizations.

V. CONSULTATION ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

70. It is agreed that the Atlantic Community has a positive concern with healthy and accelerated development in economically underdeveloped areas, both inside and outside the NATO area. The Committee feels, however, that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development, or even for systematicallyconcerting the relevant policies of member nations. What member countries can and should do is to keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field. When required NATO should review the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance.

71. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot be considered in isolation from the activities and policies of the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are resorting all too often to the use of economic measures designed to weaken the Western Alliance, or to create in other areas a high degree of dependence on the Soviet world. In this situation it is more than ever important that NATO countries actively develop their own constructive commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating situations of which the Soviet bloc countries might take advantage to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries. In this whole field of competitive economic coexistence member countries should consult together more fully in order to determine their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.

72. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO's arrangements for regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation described above, there should be established under the Council a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be entrusted with preliminary discussion, on a systematic basis, of the matters outlined above, together with such tasks as may be assigned by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers. Since its duties would not be full-time, member governments

could be represented normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other international economic organizations. Membership, however, should be flexible, the Committee being composed, when appropriate, of specialists from the capitals on particular topics under consideration.

CHAPTER 4. CULTURAL COOPERATION

73. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural cooperation among their peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for the Alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural cooperation should be wider than continental. This, however, does not preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework. The Committee welcomes the measures for cultural cooperation within the Atlantic community which have been initiated by private individuals and nongovernmental groups. These should be encouraged and increased.

74. To further cultural collaboration, the Committee suggests that member governments be guided by the following general principles:

- (a) government activities in this field should not duplicate but should support and supplement private efforts;
- (b) member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community;
- (c) in developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting transatlantic contacts;
- (d) there should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects.

75. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the Council should work out arrangements for NATO courses and seminars for teachers.

76. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme; creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies; visiting professorships; government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; use of NATO information materials in schools; and establishment of special NATO awards for students.

77. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations and a specialist should be added to the International Staff in this connection. Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organizations such as that of July 1958 should be held from time to time.

78. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts among NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.

79. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in cooperation with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. Such exchanges might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should seek the assistance of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations in the further development of such exchanges.

80. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government or a private organization, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or the Study Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on "the role of the School in the Atlantic Community," should receive financial support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.

CHAPTER 5. COOPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

81. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be in-

formed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.

82. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time an understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organization is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted.

83. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this task if member governments do not make adequate provisions in their national programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist national governments in this work. The promotion of information about and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members.

84. One of NATO's functions should be to coordinate the work of national information services in fields of common interest. Governments should pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information about NATO to other countries. Coordinated policy should underline the defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its nonmilitary aspects. It should cover also replies to anti-NATO propaganda and the analysis of Communist moves and statements which affect NATO.

85. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given the resources by governments as well as their support, without which it could not discharge these new tasks—and should not be asked to do so.

86. In order to facilitate cooperation between the NATO Information Division and national information services, the following specific measures are recommended:

- (a) an Officer should be designated by each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;

- (b) governments should submit to NATO the relevant information programmes which they plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services should take part in these discussions;

- (c) within the NATO Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the nonofficial languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments;

- (d) NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest.

87. The journalists' tours sponsored by NATO should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade-union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organizations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should also be encouraged.

CHAPTER 6. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

88. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable of discharging the nonmilitary functions required of it. Structural changes are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory. It is for governments to make use of it.

89. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning of the Organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be fully implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

A. Meetings of the Council

90. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

91. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted. In order to facilitate free discussions, when Ministers wish to speak

in a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

92. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required and occasionally in locations other than NATO Headquarters. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. The Council of Permanent Representatives has powers of effective decision: in other words, the authority of the Council as such is the same whether governments are represented by Ministers or by their Permanent Representatives. Thus there should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

B. Strengthening the Links Between the Council and Member Governments

93. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be concerned primarily with NATO affairs. The purpose would be to help both in fostering NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on the common interests of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultations into effective action within the national governments.

94. To ensure the closest possible connection between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the participation of specially designated officials or the permanent heads of foreign ministries.

C. Preparation for Council Meetings

95. Items on the agenda of Ministerial Meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

96. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council's Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter 2, paragraph 56, and Chapter 3, paragraph 72.)

97. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, to an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal discussions among specialists with corresponding responsibilities are a particularly valuable means ofconcerting governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

98. Member governments should make available to one another through NATO "basic position material" for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

D. The Secretary General and the International Staff

99. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced.

100. It is recommended that the Secretary General preside over meetings of the Council in Ministerial, as he does now in other, sessions. Such a change with respect to the conduct of the Council's business would follow naturally from the new responsibilities of the Secretary General, arising out of the recommendations of this report. It is also warranted by the Secretary General's unique opportunities for becoming familiar with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.

101. It would, however, still be desirable to have one Minister chosen each year as President of the Council in accordance with the present practice of alphabetical rotation. This Minister, as President, would continue to have especially close contact with the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and would, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all

formal occasions. He would also preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.

102. In addition:

(a) the Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation;

(b) in view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance;

(c) attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the Secretary General, recommended in connection with the annual political appraisal (Chapter 2, paragraph 52) and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter 2, paragraph 57).

103. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on the efficiency, devotion, and morale of its Secretariat. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on the Secretariat new duties and responsibilities. Governments must, therefore, be prepared to give the International Staff all necessary support, both in finance and personnel. If this is not done, the recommendations of the report, even if accepted by governments, will not be satisfactorily carried out.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.

ANNEX

COMMITTEE OF THREE

FORMAL RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

The Committee of Three, consisting of Dr. Gaetino Martino (Italy), Mr. Harold Lange (Norway), and Mr. Lester B. Pearson (Canada), was established by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session on 5th May 1956, with the following terms of reference:

"* * * to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in nonmilitary fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community."

2. The Committee held its first meetings from 20th to 22d June 1956, at NATO Headquarters in Paris. During these discussions, the procedure to be followed by the Committee was established, and it was decided to send a Questionnaire to each NATO member government in order to obtain its views on a number of specific problems with respect to cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, and information fields and regarding the organization and functions of NATO. In addition, the Committee issued a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to the Questionnaire. The Questionnaire was circulated on 28th June 1956, and governments were requested to submit their replies by 20th August.

3. The Committee reassembled in Paris on 10th September 1956 and held a series of meetings lasting until the 22d of that month. After having examined and analysed the replies to the questionnaire, the Committee held consultations with each member country individually. The purpose of these consultations was to clarify, where necessary, the position taken by governments in their replies, and to discuss with the representatives of other governments in a preliminary way certain views of the Committee.

4. The consultations took place in the following order:

Wednesday, 12th September:

a. m.: Iceland (represented by Mr. H. G. Andersen, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the North Atlantic Council).

p. m.: Turkey (represented by Mr. N. Birgi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Thursday, 13th September:

a. m.: The Netherlands (represented by Mr. J. W. Beyen, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

p. m.: Greece (represented by M. E. Averof, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Friday, 14th September:

a. m.: Belgium (represented by Mr. P. H. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

p. m.: Germany (represented by Professor Hallstein, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).

Monday, 17th September:

a. m.: Luxembourg (represented by Mr. M. J. Bech, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs).

a. m.: France (represented by Mr. C. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

p. m.: United States (represented by Senator George, special representative of President Eisenhower).

p. m.: Portugal (represented by Mr. P. Cunha, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Tuesday, 18th September:

a. m.: Denmark (represented by Mr. Ernst Christiansen, Deputy Foreign Minister).

p. m.: United Kingdom (represented by Mr. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs).

5. In addition the Committee met with the following groups:

(a) On Wednesday, 12th September, meeting with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries, consisting of the following persons:

Belgium: Mr. Frans Van Cauwelaert, Mr. A. de Meeler.

Canada: Senator, The Hon. Wishart McL. Robertson, P. C.

France: Mr. Maurice Schumann.

Germany: Herr F. Berendsen, Dr. Richard Jaeger.

Netherlands: Mr. J. J. Fens, Mr. J. L. Kranenburg, Mr. E. A. Vermeer.

Turkey: Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek.

United Kingdom: Colonel Walter Elliott, C. H., M. C., M. P.

United States: Congressman Wayne L. Hays, M. C.

(b) On Saturday, 15th September, meeting with the Atlantic Treaty Association, represented by: Count Morra, Chairman, Dr. Nord, Vice Chairman, Dr. Flynt, Vice Chairman, and Mr. John Eppstein, Secretary General, and a number of delegates from national member organizations.

(c) On Tuesday, 18th September, meeting with General Billotte and Mr. Barton, representing the Signatories of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity.

6. As a result of these consultations a draft report to the Council was prepared. In this work the Committee benefited from the expert advice of three special consultants. They were Professor Lincoln Gordon (Harvard University), Professor Guido Carli (Rome) and Mr. Robert Major (Oslo).

7. The Committee met again in New York on 14th November and re-examined the report in the light of the important world events which occurred in the interval since its September meeting. The Committee, after approving the report, furnished the other Foreign Ministers with an advance copy, preparatory to consideration of the report by the North Atlantic Council.

CONSULTATIONS WITH MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, if there was no top level consultation with the NATO countries, did you discuss this matter with any of the foreign ministers or prime ministers of any of the Middle Eastern countries before recommending it to Congress?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. We, of course, have consultations with them through our ambassadors, and some whom I have seen, who have been here at the United Nations and the like, and those consultations and the results of them have been taken into account in the formulation of the plan now before you.

But we did not feel that we could take any one country or group of countries into our confidence in a unique capacity in the actual drawing up of the plan. It seemed to us that the best thing to do was to get all the information we could about the different points of view, give everybody an opportunity to present his point of view, and then ourselves decide what was the best course in line with basic American interests.

That is what we have done. It is not practical to consult with everybody at the same time. It is not practical to give priority to certain countries with reference to consultation, without creating very ill feeling in other quarters.

Senator KEFAUVER. Did you consult with the foreign ministers or the prime ministers of any of the Middle Eastern countries before recommending this program?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we had frequent talks through our diplomatic representatives with the foreign ministers of all of those countries. We did not formulate the plan and put it up to them and say, "Now, what do you think about it? Would you like it to be this way, or would you like it to be different?"

We didn't do anything of that sort. The first consultation of that sort that took place was when the President presented the matter at the bipartisan meeting at the White House on the 1st of January, and then when I presented it informally to these committees and to the House committees the next day, I think it was.

As a result of those consultations, the original plan was altered in a number of respects. But I think that in these matters, in a program of this importance, the United States ought not to have its policy become in a sense made fixed by consultations and agreements with other governments before there has been consultation here at home with those whose advice and participation is constitutionally necessary.

CAN UNITED STATES EXPECT HELP IN EVENT OF WAR IN MIDDLE EAST?

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Dulles, what worries me about this program is that we are undertaking unilaterally, by ourselves, a program for the protection of the sovereignty of the nations of the Middle East, which is primarily, of course largely, for the benefit of Western Europe, without their being a part of it, without having discussed the matter with their foreign ministers or prime ministers.

If we get in trouble there or into a war, who is obligated by alliance, by treaty, by agreement, to join us or help us in this undertaking? Who can we look forward to calling up to assist us?

Secretary DULLES. Well, Senator, let me say first, you say we are undertaking this for the benefit of Western Europe. That is in a sense true, but only in a sense—we are really undertaking it for the benefit of the United States—because our interest in this respect coincides with that of Western Europe.

Let me also say that if Europe, Western Europe, were, as you put it, a part of this plan, then I can say to you it would be absolutely doomed to failure from the beginning, because a plan for the Middle East of which certain of the most interested Western European nations are a part will not succeed, and I think that they would be the first to recognize that fact; indeed, are the first to recognize that.

Recent events have made it such that a plan of which they are a part, or which they appear to be the partial sponsors of, just would not succeed.

I happened to be looking last night at the scrapbook of my wife's about my first trip out to Cairo in May 1953, nearly 4 years ago, and the whole burden of the rather unfriendly reception that I got from the press there was that we were there just in the interests of the

British and the French, and there was a cartoon, for instance, of Churchill putting a mask over my face and saying, "Can't you go out there and fool the Egyptians into thinking that you are independent?" And I was presented as their stooge.

It is very difficult to appreciate, perhaps, from here the strong emotion which there is on that matter. It was very strong even 4 years ago; it is much stronger today.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Dulles, I will ask another question about joint action in the Middle East, but I want to get an answer to my question: If we get into a war out there, who, by treaty, by agreement or understanding, can we expect to help us in protecting the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. Well, there is no treaty obligation that we have with anyone which covers the Middle East.

Now, if we get into a general war with the Soviet Union, then we would expect to have as allies 42 countries with whom we have collective security arrangements which envisage that contingency.

TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1950

Senator KEFAUVER. You were saying a minute ago that it was impractical to include any Western European nations in an undertaking of this kind in the Middle East because that would doom it to failure.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Dulles, the tripartite agreement of 1950, while that was for the purpose of preventing an arms race between the nations of the Middle East, referred to aggression of one nation against the other.

That might have been enlarged so as to include Communist aggression against the Middle East; and if that could have been done, you would have had the British and the French as a part of that, anyway; would you not?

Secretary DULLES. It could have been, but both the British and the French indicated that they regarded the tripartite declaration as no longer binding upon them last October.

Senator KEFAUVER. But was there any discussion about getting them to revitalize their interest in the tripartite agreement and to include in it aggression by international communism?

Secretary DULLES. There was no consideration of that, because I cannot think of anything which would more surely turn the area over to international communism than for us now to try to go in there hand-in-hand with the British and French.

BAGHDAD PACT

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, the British and Turkey are in the Baghdad pact. Of course, some special consideration would have to be given to Israel, but that seems to have acceptance from some of the Arab nations in the Middle East. And if we went into the Baghdad Pact, we would at least have the British and Iraq and Pakistan and Turkey with us, would we not?

Secretary DULLES. Possibly you are not aware of the fact, but at the present time the Baghdad Pact powers have indicated their unwillingness to meet under the pact with representatives of the United Kingdom.

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Senator KEFAUVER. Well, if in some way you could have revitalized the Baghdad Pact, do you not think it would have been of some value to have allies who by treaty or alliance would join with us in case we got into war out there?

Secretary DULLES. I think, Senator, that our first job is not to get into war, but to keep international communism from getting control of the area; and that, I think, will be much more surely promoted by the course we have taken than by the course of trying first to reach an agreement whereby the British and the French and ourselves, in alliance, go back into that area.

RESPECTIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS

Senator KEFAUVER. One final question, Mr. Secretary: A good many of the substitutes which have been spoken of revolve around the question of whether the President already has the power to use the Armed Forces in the event that an attack upon the Middle East is considered adverse to the security of the United States, and you discussed it yesterday.

Have you or the Solicitor for the State Department prepared a legal memorandum on that question, or would you do so to put into the record, because that seems to be a point of difference between these various proposals.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; we have not done so. As I indicated yesterday, it did not seem to us to be entirely relevant to the present situation where the important thing is actually to have an impact upon the area, upon the Soviet Union and international communism, and upon those who feel endangered by it.

And, as I said yesterday, the opinion by the Solicitor of the State Department will not have that impact. Action by the Congress of the United States will have the impact; and if what we want to get is results, the way to get them is not by way of legal opinions, I think, but by the kind of action which we have taken heretofore which, when we have taken it, has always had a peaceful and constructive result, and I believe it will have that same result again.

Senator KEFAUVER. Would it be contemplated, Mr. Secretary, that Congress would be called upon to declare war if, after the passage of this, there were substantial armed conflict in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. The United States has not, I think, declared war for a long, long time. We have been in some wars, Congress has declared that a state of war existed, but unhappily the existence of a state of war does not depend upon whether Congress declares it or not. If it did, we would be in a very happy situation.

War is made by the acts of others, and may come to pass, as we have often found in the past, not through a declaration of war, but by the very fact of war.

I would assume, however, that if there were hostilities of a major character, Congress would be asked to declare that a state of war exists, or to find that it exists, which has been our practice, was our practice in both the First and Second World Wars, for example.

Senator KEFAUVER. By what section or article of the Constitution does Congress have authority to delegate to the President authority to use troops or to go to war without Congress declaring war?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I do not consider this a delegation of congressional authority. I regard it as an exercise of congressional authority.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, can you refer to any particular section of the Constitution which enables the Congress to delegate its responsibility of declaring war?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I am not suggesting, Senator, that Congress should declare war. Certainly this does not constitute a declaration of war. To create a situation such that in certain contingencies the Armed Forces of the United States may be used is nothing novel.

The situation exists today that if there were an attack upon the United States, and probably if there were an attack upon many other areas, the United States would act. That results from action which has already been taken by the Congress. I do not believe—

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, I pass at this time, and reserve the rest of my time for questioning.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

PROCEDURE ON QUESTIONING

Chairman GREEN. Before calling the next Senator, I would like to state that these meetings were supposed to be held yesterday and today, and then go over until after inauguration. We only got through half the Senators yesterday, and we will not be able to finish the list unless Senators show a little self-denial in asking all the questions they might ask. So I hope that, so far as feasible, they will limit themselves to questions which have not already been asked, or the important questions they have in mind.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to register objection to a new proposal to impose any self-denial on the representative of the people of any sovereign State, on what I consider to be one of the most important problems that faces this country.

In fact, I am so frightened about it I am almost speechless today, as my voice shows, and I do not care how long this takes, but as far as the Senator from Oregon is concerned, representing the people of my State, I propose to ask all the questions that I think ought to be answered by any witness appearing before this committee.

I am accustomed in these committee hearings to getting to a point, which we apparently are now reaching in this committee, where the pressure is to shorten the examination. I do not propose to be shortened in my examination, as a representative of the people of my State, and I want the Chair to understand that as we proceed.

Chairman GREEN. I do understand that, and I do hope that the Senator will have the opportunity of asking every question that he believes comes in that category. I entirely agree with the Senator that he ought not to refrain from asking any question he thinks necessary to bring out the facts on which we can base a proper decision on these matters which have been referred to us.

I simply want to draw attention to the fact, for such weight as it might carry, that there are different ways of asking questions and getting answers, and that unless we proceed at a faster rate than we did yesterday, some questioning will have to go over until next week.

I think that even then, if some other questions occur to any Senator which did not occur to him today, and which he would like to ask, he will have the opportunity later, beginning next week sometime.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I do not want the Senator from Rhode Island, the chairman of our committee, to think I am the least bit critical. I am willing to adopt any procedure, by Senators going by rotation, as I recall we did at one time in the MacArthur hearings, where we were limited to 20 minutes at a time. We rotated and kept coming back, and I thought it was a very fine procedure. I am willing to do that. I am willing to accede to any reasonable procedure.

But I do not think you are going to get the Secretary of State off the stand today or in another day, because he is the number one witness. In my judgment, he is the author of the plan, and I think he is the fountain of information on this matter, and I think we should keep him on the stand as long as any member of this committee thinks he wants to find out what the Secretary knows about the plan.

Chairman GREEN. Then it seems to me it would be just as well to state now that we will sit this morning until half past 12, reconvene at 2, and adjourn at 5; and any questions which remain unanswered which any Senators have not had an opportunity to ask, will go over to the following week.

Senator LANGER, have you any questions to ask?

SECRETARY DULLES' FORMER LAW PRACTICE

Senator LANGER. Yes; I have.

Mr. Secretary, I have just returned from North Dakota. This matter seemed so important to me that I went out home to get the reaction at the grassroots.

I want to ask you, first of all, whether your firm represents or did represent any oil companies in the Far East?

Secretary DULLES. You are referring to the firm that I was once a partner of?

Senator LANGER. Yes; the firm you used to be connected with.

Secretary DULLES. I retired from it in 1949.

Senator LANGER. Yes. But does your firm, the firm you used to be with?

Secretary DULLES. You say "my" firm. I have no firm at the present time, Senator. You mean the firm from which I retired in 1949?

Senator LANGER. That is right.

Secretary DULLES. I think that they may.

Senator LANGER. Also, what foreign countries did you represent when you were practicing law?

Secretary DULLES. During the first part of the Second World War, we represented the Central Bank of Belgium, and the Central Bank of Poland, which are not technically governments, but which are close to the governments, in efforts to recover gold which had been seized by the Germans.

As far as I can recall, those are the only governments we represented, except possibly we may have represented some governments of South America in some financing, although I think we did not. I think we represented the American bankers in practically all of those cases.

IRANIAN OIL AGREEMENT

Senator LANGER. Well now, during the time there was some trouble over this oil problem a few years ago, the Under Secretary, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., was over there settling that matter, is that not true?

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Hoover worked in connection with the settlement of the Iranian oil matter; yes, sir.

Senator LANGER. That agreement never was made public, is that not true?

Secretary DULLES. I just don't know.

Senator LANGER. Well, as a matter of fact, this committee never has been informed as to what those agreements were between the different oil companies or how they divided the oil, is that right?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know, Senator. I understood that Mr. Hoover had testified quite fully before the committee on these matters, but I am not personally familiar with his testimony.

Certainly there was an opportunity to ask him.

Senator LANGER. Would you be willing to make those agreements available to the committee?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know of any reason why they should not be, but I am not familiar with the agreements to which you refer, or whether they are classified or not.

I would be glad to look into the matter.

Senator LANGER. Well, what countries were involved in these agreements?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the countries which were concerned were the Governments of Iran, of the United Kingdom, the United States. I think that the French may have had some slight interest in the matter, I am not quite sure about that.

Senator LANGER. What American oil companies were involved?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I cannot tell you accurately. I do not even know their names. There were 4 or 5 of the large oil companies, I think, which were involved, but I cannot name them all.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Langer, if I may interrupt.

The question you asked was about the Iran Consortium Agreement of September 19-20, 1954?

Senator LANGER. Well, yes. I am interested in finding out what oil companies were interested in that.

Chairman GREEN. I may say that the agreement has been published. "United States 84th Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee, Subcommittee No. 5, part 2, on pages 1563 to 1651". You will find it printed in the work Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, volume 2, at page 348.

Senator LANGER. I want someone, either the chairman or the Secretary, to tell me what American oil companies were interested in that agreement.

Secretary DULLES. I am sorry, I can't tell you, but in due course, if you wish, I am sure Mr. Hoover will be available to testify on that subject. I think he has already done so.

Senator LANGER. How many million barrels of oil per year are these American companies entitled to under this agreement?

Secretary DULLES. I cannot answer these questions, Senator. I did not handle personally, in any way, the matter of these oil negotiations

which took place 3 or 4 years ago, and I just don't have the information about barrels of oil and things of that sort.

Senator LANGER. Mr. Secretary, can I get that information from Mr. Hoover when he testifies, do you know?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir, if you have not already gotten it. I think probably it has all been testified to, but I will either look up the record on that or, if it is not in the record, arrange to make it available.

(The information referred to follows:)

INFORMATION REQUESTED BY SENATOR LANGER REGARDING THE IRANIAN OIL AGREEMENT

1. Publication of the agreement.—Senator Langer inquired regarding the availability of the agreement between Iran and the group of international oil companies making up the consortium which was concluded on October 29, 1954. The basic document, the Government agreement, has been made public. As Senator Green noted during the hearings, it is published in the United States 84th Congress, House of Representatives Committee in the Judiciary hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee No. 5, part 2, pages 1503 to 1651. Certain other documents involving exchanges between the Iranian Government and the participating companies, as well as the participants agreement which is a private commercial contract among the companies participating in the consortium, have not been made public. The Department of State believes it would not be in the interest of the United States to release them, particularly since the friendly governments concerned have requested the United States Government to maintain the confidential nature of the documents. On June 27, 1955, Mr. Hoover informed Mr. Celler and other members of the House Judiciary Committee in the sense of the foregoing.

2. Constituency of the consortium.—Senator Langer inquired what American oil companies are involved in the Iranian oil agreement and what percentage of the total production each company is entitled to take.

(a) As originally formed, the consortium included the following companies with the indicated proportions of shares:

| | Percent |
|---|---------|
| The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (now the British Petroleum Co.) | 40 |
| Five American companies as follows (with 8 percent each) : Gulf Oil Corp., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., Standard Oil Company of California, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), The Texaco Co. | 40 |
| N. V. DeBataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (Shell) | 14 |
| Compagnie Francaise des Petroles | 6 |

On April 28, 1955, the following 9 independent American companies acquired a total 5 percent interest in the consortium by purchase from the original 5 American participants. Proportionate shares are indicated:

| | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| American Independent Oil Co. | San Jacinto Petroleum Corp. |
| Atlantic Refining Co. | Signal Oil & Gas Co. |
| Hancock Oil Co. | Standard Oil Company of Ohio |
| Pacific Western Oil Corp. | Tide Water Associated Oil Co. |
| Richfield Oil Corp. | |

The total 5 percent interest acquired by these companies was divided as follows:

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------|
| Richfield Oil Corp. | $\frac{3}{12}$ |
| American Independent Oil Co. | $\frac{2}{12}$ |
| Other 7 companies, respectively | $\frac{1}{12}$ |

(b) Each company is entitled to receive an amount of oil according to the percentage of its ownership in the consortium. The costs of operation are prorated on the same basis. The American oil companies are entitled to 40 percent of total production.

Total production of crude oil :

1955, 120 million barrels (325,000 barrels per day).

1956 (estimated), 185 million barrels (500,000 barrels per day).

USE OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN MIDDLE EAST

Senator LANGER. In your opinion, what is the probability of our American boys having to go over to the Middle East and fight in case this resolution is passed?

Secretary DULLES. I would say if this resolution passes, I think there is very little likelihood. If it does not pass, I think there is a very great likelihood.

Senator LANGER. If the resolution does pass, would you say there was a 50-50 chance?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I would say the chances are very much less than that.

Senator LANGER. If it does not pass?

Secretary DULLES. But if it does not pass, in my opinion, the chances are quite considerable that events will lead to a war.

Senator LANGER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you very much.

Chairman GREEN. Is that all?

We will now ask Mrs. Smith of Maine whether she has any questions.

Senator SMITH of Maine. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST

Mr. Secretary, as one who has consistently and constantly supported the Eisenhower administration on its foreign policy, with the sole exception of Tito—and incidentally, I think it would be a very grave mistake to have him visit this country—I am concerned about how conditions developed to create such a desperate situation in the Middle East that the Eisenhower doctrine has become, according to your words, extremely urgent.

Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the Secretary several questions in one package, because they are all related. Perhaps some of the points in my questions have been covered, but I want them covered in a related manner, if you please.

I will read the questions, and then repeat them, if you want me to, separately.

How long ago was first consideration given to making this proposal?

What prompted the final decision, and when was it made?

Why was it not made before? Could it have been foreseen and anticipated?

Have we been lax or our intelligence faulty in not acting sooner and preventing Russia from getting such a foothold in the Middle East?

Is not the decision considerably tardy, and what lessons can we learn in hindsight in an attempt to avoid such a future situation?

Do you wish me to repeat the questions separately, or can you answer them all?

Secretary DULLES. I think I get the general drift of your questions, and I will try to reply to them as a whole; if my reply does not cover them, you will then perhaps ask me to elaborate a little bit further.

Senator SMITH of Maine. I am quite anxious to have specific answers, Mr. Secretary, for the record.

Secretary DULLES. Well, maybe you had better, then, give them one by one.

Senator SMITH of Maine. All right.

How long ago was first consideration given to making this proposal?

BAGHDAD PACT AND RELATED EVENTS

Secretary DULLES. Well, consideration has been given to more positive United States action in the Middle East for some little time. That goes back, indeed, to the time when I came back from my first trip to the Middle East in the spring of 1953, at which time I suggested the organization together of the so-called northern tier countries, and that was followed, in fact, by the organization of the Baghdad Pact, and the United States has quite continuously through this period given consideration to the possibility of joining the Baghdad Pact.

The situation never seemed to be one where the purposes which we had in mind could best be served by joining the Baghdad Pact, and following the events of the end of October and the first of November, and the hostilities in the area, it seemed to be imperative that we should do something, and do something quickly.

We had appeals from many countries in the area indicating that with the animosities toward the Western European countries that had been created by those events, that they would feel very much exposed if the United States did not take some definite action.

We reconsidered at that time very intensively the pros and cons of joining the Baghdad Pact as a formal member, and decided that it would be preferable to take the action which is now recommended.

That process of thinking went on pretty much through the month of December, particularly during the latter part of the month of December.

It did not seem wise to try to fix on a policy until it was probable that the actual hostilities there would be brought to a close, and that was not a considerable probability until about the early part of December.

So that I would say that the crystallization upon this particular plan took place the latter part of December, the last half of December.

DELAY IN MAKING DECISION RE PROPOSAL

Now, what was your second question?

Senator SMITH of Maine. How long ago was consideration first given to making this proposal?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think perhaps what I have said covers that answer.

Senator SMITH of Maine. What prompted the final decision, and when was it made? You gave me the time.

Secretary DULLES. Well, the final decision was made the latter part of December, as I recall, around about the Christmas period.

Senator SMITH of Maine. Do I understand you, Mr. Secretary, to say that that decision could not have been made before, even though the emergency was rapidly growing?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think it could have been made before, because the situation was changing so rapidly that any attempt to take a fixed position would have been premature and, indeed, the need for the strong action now recommended did not become acute and apparent until the last couple of months.

The first part of that period of a couple of months had to be devoted to trying to bring an end to the war that was going on there at the time, because obviously you could not make any long-range planning while the war was actually going on.

As soon as it seemed as though the war would be brought to a close, then the need of some program was obvious. I do not think, however, that it could have been usefully done before.

There were very great complications in the matter of our relations with countries which at that time exerted a very considerable influence in the area, had a very large interest in the area, and it did not seem that a concerted policy could be worked out, nor did we want to adopt a policy which would cut across a policy which these other governments were following.

Senator SMITH of Maine. Then, according to your statement, this emergency was anticipated and prepared for, but not acted on until the emergency was at its peak?

Secretary DULLES. We had been thinking along lines of this sort, and various other alternative lines, for some little time. We did not crystallize our thinking in terms of the present project until the situation had clarified after the events of the 1st of November.

Senator SMITH of Maine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Does that conclude your questioning?

Senator SMITH of Maine. Thank you very much.

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES STATIONED IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Chairman GREEN. Next I will call on Mr. Mansfield.

Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, are there United States military forces, naval and other, presently in the vicinity of the Middle East as a precautionary measure?

Secretary DULLES. The Sixth Fleet is in the Mediterranean, and there are some destroyers in the Persian Gulf.

Senator MANSFIELD. The answer is "Yes"?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. They are there, are they not, because American interests are involved in the situation?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. They are there, are they not, by orders stemming from the Presidential authority to command the Armed Forces of the United States?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Congress was not asked to authorize this movement of forces into the vicinity of the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator MANSFIELD. It would seem, then, would it not, that the implication of this resolution, the constitutional implication, is that the President has the authority on his own to move our military forces to the firing line, but he cannot order them to fire without special authority from Congress?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it is hardly accurate to say that they are at the firing line. The only combat forces we have there are at sea in international waters.

Senator MANSFIELD. But they are in what the resolution calls, or the President's message refers to, as the general area of the Middle East.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

COMMUNIST ARMS SHIPMENT TO MIDDLE EAST

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, would you say that one of the most disturbing factors in the situation in the Middle East has been Communist arms sales and shipments to countries in that area during the past year or so?

Secretary DULLES. That has been one of the most disturbing factors, yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would this proposed resolution have any direct effect on such shipments?

Secretary DULLES. It would have no direct effect. I think it would have an indirect effect.

Senator MANSFIELD. There is nothing in the resolution, is there, which would be directed at curbing those Soviet shipments to non-Communist countries in the Middle East, even if they intended to use them for aggressive purposes?

Secretary DULLES. There is nothing in the resolution which authorizes the interruption of shipments of arms unless they would violate a resolution of the United Nations. There is, of course, the United Nations resolution, General Assembly resolution, calling for suspension of the shipment of arms to the area of hostilities, and the question of the enforceability of that would come up, perhaps, independently of this resolution.

Senator MANSFIELD. But in the meantime, even if it did come up, arms shipments could, if the Soviet Union so desired and countries in the area were acceptable to the idea, continue to be made? They could continue the shipments of those arms?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would the resolution act to curb shipments to Communist-dominated countries if any should come into existence, unless they used these Communist-supplied arms for aggressive purposes?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, the Soviet Union could go on shipping arms, say, to Egypt or Syria, if they so desired, in spite of the resolution before the committee?

Secretary DULLES. You put your finger on the heart of the problem when you say "if they so desired," because we do not believe that as this program gets under way, that that will be desired by the countries.

Senator MANSFIELD. But as a matter of fact, that is what is going on at the present time.

Secretary DULLES. Well, so far as we are aware, there are no shipments going on to any country there, except possibly in relatively small amounts. There was a shipment to Syria, we believe.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, Mr. Secretary, according to the press a few days ago (and this has to do with the Yemeni dispute with the British on the Yemen-Aden frontier), it was announced, I think by

the Yemen Government, although I am not absolutely certain, that it had received \$8½ million worth of Soviet arms.

We will just let that stand without an answer. We can corroborate that, I think, by a further investigation by this committee.

Secretary DULLES. We have no confirmation of that report, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. I believe I have the story out of the New York Times, Mr. Chairman, and I ask unanimous consent to insert that story in the record at this point.

Chairman GREEN. It will be so placed in the record.

(The article referred to is as follows:)

[New York Times, January 18, 1957]

YEMEN REQUESTS UNITED STATES INTERVENTION

ARAB KINGDOM CALLS FOR AID AGAINST BRITISH—BUYING OF RED ARMS IS CONFIRMED

By Russell Baker

WASHINGTON, January 12—Yemen called on the United States today to intervene against alleged British aggression in the Arab kingdom.

Assayed Ahmad Ali Zabarah, Yemeni Charge d'Affaires here, said that, in effect, he had asked the United States to fulfill President Eisenhower's determination to prevent further aggression in the Middle East by taking restraining action against the British.

Mr. Zabarah said William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State, "promised that he will talk to the British authorities" about the situation and notify the Yemeni legation of their position.

As he left the State Department the Yemeni envoy confirmed that his country recently had purchased arms from Communist Czechoslovakia.

This brought to three the number of Middle Eastern States now known to have completed weapons deals with the Soviet bloc. The two other nations are Egypt and Syria.

Confirmation that Yemen had accepted Communist arms came from Assayed Ahmad Ali Zabarah, the Charge d'Affaires. He would not say what types of weapons or what quantities had been bought, but in reply to a question he said that he had "heard" the cost put at \$8,500,000.

What actually is happening in Yemen is extremely difficult to learn here. Conflicting reports from Moscow, London, Cairo, Cyprus and the representatives of Yemen have created a confused picture.

British sources here denied that there had been anything classifiable as British "aggression" against the small Red Sea kingdom. There has been some violence along the border between Yemen and the British protectorate of Aden, these sources said.

Incursions by tribesmen across either side of the border have been a staple activity for years, they said.

Recently, however, they charge, Yemeni authorities had bribed and armed tribesmen along the border and encouraged them to maraud into Aden. British-supported forces aided in resisting the raiders and planes were used to spot and trace their movements, these sources said.

Yemen's appeal to the United States painted a far graver picture. A statement issued today by Mr. Zabarah suggested that the action went beyond tribal border raiding and involved British bombardment and other organized ground and air operations against Yemeni towns.

President Eisenhower, Mr. Zabarah said, had proclaimed his intention to "stop the aggression in the Middle East."

"This is aggression," he said. "A fired bullet will kill me whether it is Communist or democratic. The bomb will destroy my home whether it is British or Russian."

The British view expressed here was that Egypt and Moscow were encouraging Yemen to create another Middle Eastern sore spot for harassing the British.

One British source said, "It looks like part of the general project to twist the British lion's tail while the twisting's good."

Earlier today, officials noted, Pravda, the Soviet Communist party newspaper, had warned Britain to keep "hands off" Yemen. It asserted that it echoed the

"unanimous demand of all Arabs and of all peace-loving peoples who are fully determined to prevent the imperialists from starting a new military conflict in the Middle East."

It was noted here that this followed the Soviet Union's pattern of posing as the champions of the Arabs in the Middle East, after having done its utmost to create tensions between the Arab and western worlds.

The same pattern, it was noted, has been followed with signal success in both Egypt and Syria and, thus far, has constituted the Soviet technique of subversion.

To date this has been most successful in Syria, where the recent formation of a strongly leftist and pro-Communist Cabinet has roused deep official concern in Washington.

Frustation of this Soviet technique is one of the major Middle Eastern problems confronting the Eisenhower administration. Officials in Washington have contended that congressional approval of President Eisenhower's program for economic aid and United States resistance to overt Communist aggression in the area would help eliminate the subversion threat.

Democratic critics of the President's plan have contended, however, that it offers no United States policy for combating subversion.

(Also see p. 355.)

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, under this resolution, could the United States supply planes, tanks, and other weapons of war to, say, Jordan or Syria or Egypt or Israel?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; it could do so.

Senator MANSFIELD. Congress would, in effect, be authorizing such aid by passing this resolution, would it not?

Secretary DULLES. Congress has already authorized that by previous action.

UNITED STATES ARMS ASSISTANCE TO MIDDLE EAST

Senator MANSFIELD. In that respect, Mr. Secretary, what countries in the general area of the Middle East are we not supplying arms to in one form or another at the present time?

Secretary DULLES. When you say "the present time," I take it you mean over some period of time; you are not just speaking of a moment of time.

Senator MANSFIELD. No; I would say, to make it a little more exact, over the past year.

Secretary DULLES. Over the past year, we have—I think there have been sales, at least in small amounts and mostly during the first part of the last year, to, if you include that, to all of the countries of the area except probably Yemen. During the latter part of the year, those sales were stopped in relation to Egypt and to, I think, Syria.

Senator MANSFIELD. And to Israel?

Secretary DULLES. They were stopped in relation to Israel after, but only after, the attack of last October and the passage of the United Nations resolution asking that no arms be shipped to the area.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, is it correct to say that the purpose of the military assistance aspect of the resolution before us would be to strengthen the capacity of those countries for defense against Communist aggression?

Secretary DULLES. Direct or indirect, yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. What assurances would we have that once it were supplied, our military assistance would be used for purposes of defense rather than for acts of aggression against some other state in the Middle East?

Supposing, for example, we gave substantial supplies to Saudi Arabia or Jordan or any other country, might they not use these arms

against Israel? Or, if it were the case of supplying arms to Israel, might they not be used against certain of the Arab States?

Secretary DULLES. It is never possible to be absolutely sure in that respect, and our whole program of giving arms assistance to a great many nations realizes that there is always a risk that they could be abused.

So far we have not felt that the risk of abuse was such as to make it undesirable to carry out such programs. Precautions are taken and, as I indicated in my statement, particular cautions have been taken or would be taken to prevent anything like an arms race between Israel and the neighboring Arab States who are adjacent in territory to Israel.

QUESTION OF ATTAINING COMMITMENTS ON USE OF ARMS FURNISHED

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I suppose you would expect assurances from these countries to which, if this resolution passes, we would give arms.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And they would come from the existing governments at that time.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And governments in that area of the world change at least as rapidly as they do elsewhere, but the arms assistance which we supplied would still be there, and new governments might not necessarily be inclined to honor the commitments of their predecessors.

Is that a possibility you have taken into consideration?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; and we also have very much in mind the fact, as our previous policies have indicated, that the places where these arms are most needed are in areas which are more adjacent to the Soviet Union, and where fear exists.

The fear of the Soviet Union's armed attack extends primarily to the northern group of countries, and to some extent to Saudi Arabia, but we have not felt that it was sound policy to supply large amounts of arms to Israel or to the Arab States which were physically adjacent to Israel.

That policy of ours has been well established, and there is no intention to alter it, whether or not this resolution is passed.

As I say, we already have authority under existing laws to do the kind of thing that you are talking about, and we carry out those laws in accordance with these policies which I have described, and we would expect to continue to do so.

Senator MANSFIELD. And, as I understand it, you have made the statement, Mr. Secretary, that we have these agreements to supply arms to every country in that general area which extends from the eastern border of Libya to the east; to the Pakistan-Indian border on the west, including the northern tier nations of Iran, Turkey, as well as Pakistan on the north; and extending down into the Sudan, and perhaps Ethiopia, with the exception of Yemen.

Secretary DULLES. Perhaps I misunderstood you. I don't know that we have agreements with these countries to do it, but we have, in fact, been doing it.

Senator MANSFIELD. I see. But you do have agreements in some form or another with a sizable number of these countries?

Secretary DULLES. Well, there are agreements which they have made containing certain commitments which entitle them in some cases to get grant aid, and in some cases to get aid on a reimbursable basis.

Senator MANSFIELD. You mentioned the word "commitment." Under this resolution, will these countries which we aid, both economically and militarily, be expected to make some commitments?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we would expect them to follow some of the basic principles which we apply everywhere; that is, that they will not use the arms for aggressive purposes, and that they will not, without our approval, transfer arms given to them for one purpose to another government which might use them for a different purpose.

ATTITUDE OF MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES TOWARD COMMUNISM

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, are the Arab States in general inclined to neutralism?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it is not possible to generalize, and "neutralism" is a word which has proved somewhat difficult to define, I have observed in the past.

Such states as Turkey, Iran and Iraq, Pakistan, are certainly not inclined to neutralism in any sense of the word. I don't think that most of the countries are neutral toward international communism. They are mostly strongly opposed to communism. There is no neutrality of spirit at all toward communism throughout that area.

One or two of the countries are neutralist in the sense of not wanting to seem to be more closely associated with the United States than with the Soviet Union in trying to keep a kind of balance in between the two. That would apply to—well, perhaps I had better not name the countries.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I note that the 4 countries you mentioned by name, while 3 of them are Mohammedan in religion—Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan—they are not considered members of the Arab bloc or the Arab States referred to. And they, of course, are covered, with the exception of Iraq and Iran, under SEATO in the case of Pakistan, and NATO in the case of Turkey.

SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

I have in my hand a story out of Algiers which appeared in yesterday's paper, to the effect that Mr. Bourguiba, the Premier of Tunisia, has come out in favor of this aid program.

Now, as I understand it, his country would not be included in the general area of the Middle East which you delineated yesterday. It appears to me that the only support which has come for this particular resolution to date has been in the words of Mr. Charles Malik, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon. Have any other states indicated that they would be interested favorably in the resolution which we are considering at this time?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, does any country in the Middle East at the present time, in your opinion, face the possibility of an overt Soviet attack?

Secretary DULLES. I think they do face that danger; yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Has any country outside of the northern tier countries requested military assistance?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

QUESTION OF AID TO SYRIA AND EGYPT

Senator MANSFIELD. Under this resolution, do we propose to reward Syria and Egypt with economic and military aid?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. That question and answer might be subject to misconstruction unless I elaborate a little bit.

Senator MANSFIELD. All right.

Secretary DULLES. You say "reward" them. Certainly we do not intend to reward them with economic aid. I do not exclude the possibility that under certain circumstances they might get economic aid. I do not mean my answer to indicate they would necessarily be debarred.

Senator MANSFIELD. What you mean, Mr. Secretary, is that you do not agree with the use of the word "reward"?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1950

Senator MANSFIELD. What is the status of the tripartite agreement of 1950 at the present time?

Secretary DULLES. The British and the French have indicated they did not regard it as necessarily binding upon them.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would it be safe to say, then, that so far as we are concerned, it is a dead letter?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. As far as we are concerned, it is still an expression of the United States policy.

Senator MANSFIELD. But you just stated that Britain and France have said that they do not feel honorbound by it. As I recall it, the purpose of the tripartite agreement, on the part of the triple alliance of Britain, France, and the United States, was to preserve the borders of the Middle East; and if they were transgressed by any power, the three together would mutually consider ways and means of rectifying the situation.

Secretary DULLES. That also was expressed as to the prevention of an arms race between Israel and the Arab States.

UNITED STATES MUTUAL SECURITY PACTS

Senator MANSFIELD. How many mutual security pacts do we have in force at the present time?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think—you refer there to collective security treaties?

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think the actual number is about 8 or 9. I know that it involves 42 other countries. Some of them are bilateral, and some multilateral, and I would not want to be held absolutely to the number of them, but I think it is about eight.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, our agreements comprise at least 42 countries, even though the number of pacts may be considerably smaller, because of NATO, SEATO, and Anzus, and other agreements.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct. It embraces 42 other countries.

Senator MANSFIELD. Now, in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Europe, we have collective alliances. In the Far East we act alone, with the exception of the Southwest Pacific, where we have the Anzus Pact.

Under this resolution, does it mean that the United States is going to act alone in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. The resolution assumes that we will act with Middle East countries.

Senator MANSFIELD. With one or more of these countries.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

RELATIONSHIP OF REDUCTION IN UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it not true—and I think this is a matter of public record, but if I am stepping outside, please let me know—that the Army of the United States has been reduced by more than 350,000 men in the last 3 fiscal years?

Secretary DULLES. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it not true that the Marine Corps has been reduced in numbers at the same time, to the extent of about—I will have to guess on this one—40,000 men? I have the figures here somewhere.

Secretary DULLES. The Chief of Staff admits that he is not sure about the figure, either.

Senator MANSFIELD. The figures were furnished by Mr. Wilson. Although I have not gotten all of the figures I wanted from Mr. Wilson, I think I can corroborate that statement.

Is it not true the Navy has been reduced to the extent of something on the order of 16,000 men in the last 3 fiscal years, if not more?

Secretary DULLES. I believe so, sir; yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it not true that at the present time we are considering reducing the Air Force from 137 wings to 110?

Secretary DULLES. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs says that apparently you have information which goes beyond his own.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, the information—I may be wrong, and I certainly would not doubt Admiral Radford, for whom I have a great respect. But here is an Associated Press story which appeared in the Great Falls Tribune of Great Falls, Mont., as well as other newspapers throughout the country, which states that the Air Force Association—and I am delighted that we have the first Secretary of the Air Force here to look into this matter, a member of this committee, the distinguished Senator from Missouri, Mr. Symington—is supposed to have said that the Air Force "has the capability to build up to only 110 combat-ready wings under current financing," and I believe here is the editorial from the Air Force magazine of January 1957.

Now, I realize that there may be an expansion of numbers which could occur at the same time as a reduction in wings, but the point I am getting at is this:

Here we have been reducing our Armed Forces during the past 3 fiscal years. We have commitments with at least 42 countries—I have seen the figure 45 used—in the agreements of 7 kinds of mutual security pacts or thereabouts. Here we are called upon to assume another responsibility, to, in effect, go it alone, because while it may be with one

or more countries in that area of the world which is under consideration, it means, of course, in the final analysis, as we all know, that the emphasis will be on this country.

Now, how can we justify making all these mutual security agreements if we mean them, and I think we do, if at the same time we continually reduce our Armed Forces and possibly are considering another reduction at this time. If my memory serves me correctly, Secretary Wilson at a press conference a few months ago made the statement that the administration was going to reduce the forces of this country somewhere between 3 and 6 percent, and in numbers that meant a reduction in all services of somewhere between 130,000 and 160,000 men.

Now, how do we honor these commitments if we are called upon, if at the same time we keep reducing our forces and do not have the power to back up our pledged word?

EXTENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY STRENGTH

Secretary DULLES. The answer to that, Senator, I think, is to be found in several facts. The first fact is that there is no more illusory test of military strength than manpower.

The Soviet Union claims to have reduced its manpower by 2 million over the last couple of years. We have no way of verifying that but we think it is quite likely the case. But we do not for 1 minute think that their military power has been reduced. And there is nothing as illusory as numbers of men, in determining military power.

The President is satisfied that the military strength of the United States is at a new peak at the present time, and that fact is not derogated from by the fact that there may have been some reduction in actual manpower.

Indeed, that is the trend throughout the world wherever there are military establishments; namely, to reduce actual men as the power of weapons goes up, as has been the case historically, I believe.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. There is room for an argument there. I respect your views, but I certainly hope that we do not place too much reliance on robots and science and technology, and forget the fact that after all, it is the manpower in the long run which must finally occupy and win any war in which we might become engaged.

Secretary DULLES. I did not quite get a chance to finish. Let me just first say, you say you respect my opinion. I did not give any opinion. I do not feel qualified to. I said that President Eisenhower feels that, and I think that opinion is entitled to very considerable weight.

Now you asked why—

Senator MANSFIELD. May I say that I was associating you with the President and respecting both your opinions.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you very much.

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The second thing is, Senator, that we try to preserve peace through diplomacy and not straight brute force, and I believe we have done so by policies which were initiated under the prior administration,

have been carried forward by this administration, and that the series of agreements that you have referred to, instead of increasing our liabilities, increasing the danger, increasing the risk of war, making it more necessary to have more armed forces, operate in precisely the opposite direction.

That has been the theory upon which we have been operating ever since these policies began. I was one of those who at the time in the Senate worked very actively to help to bring about the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, and I said that unless we did assume these mutual commitments, it would require us to have a much bigger military establishment than if we had taken it. I do not consider that these arrangements increase our liabilities or require a bigger armed force. On the contrary, I believe that if we did not have these arrangements, if we did not make our position clear in advance as to what we would do, the risk of war would increase, and as the risk of war increases, then we have to build up our military establishment the more.

It is the existence of these arrangements which now cover most of the world but which do not yet cover this part of the world which gives greater insurance of peace and enables us, I hope, not to have as great a military establishment as would be necessary if we had to be armed to the teeth because of the likelihood of war through the Soviet Union and international communism picking up these countries one at a time.

That would be certainly a situation which would require us greatly to increase our military commitments.

This one we have in mind does not, in my opinion, require any increase whatever in our military strength.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, again I respect your statement, and I want to say that you are a most persuasive arguer for your point of view, but I sometimes wonder what would happen to this country if more than one mutual security agreement were called into operation at the same time with the steady reduction which has been going on in our armed services over the past few years.

POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

Does this proposal mean extension of the policy of containment, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES. It is certainly the policy of this administration, as it was I hope in the prior administration, to contain the Soviet Union in the sense that we do not want them to expand.

I do not think anybody wants that, and certainly we do not want it.

Senator MANSFIELD. You do not think that a containment is morally wrong?

Secretary DULLES. It is morally wrong if it means that you split the world with the Soviet Union where the lines now are, yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. But under the way it is being operated at the present time and by both the previous administration and this one, it is morally correct?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would not want to be asked to pass upon the morals of the prior administration. I think their morals were very high, but I do not really think that I am the competent person

to pass upon that. You I think suggest an interpretation of containment which has become a word of—I was going to say a word of art. I am not sure but what that rates it a bit high.

A policy of containment which in fact stops expansion is certainly a policy which I think this administration supports and which I believe the prior administration supported, and that is certainly a moral policy. If you stop with that, perhaps some question arises.

ECONOMIC AID

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, do you know how and where the economic aid will be spent?

Secretary DULLES. It will probably be spent just about in the same areas as was indicated at the presentation previously, with some adjustments due to the fact that the programs have been suspended in relation to Egypt, Israel and Jordan. The adjustments which will take place will probably be more in terms of deferring until we have a better look at the situation, the actual expenditure, than in terms of any great shift in areas.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, would you say that this resolution is the culmination of a global policy, that if this resolution is passed, there will be no more vacuums, outside of the one you mentioned yesterday comprising Burma and India, left?

Secretary DULLES. I would think so, yes, sir.

NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Senator MANSFIELD. Have we given any thought to negotiating with the Soviet Union on some sort of a settlement for the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. We have given thought to it, yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Just thought?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. What would our policy be toward a regime created by Soviet subversion?

Secretary DULLES. I have tried to point out—

Senator MANSFIELD. You mentioned that? That is fine.

Then we will go over the record on that.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

INSTANT RETALIATION POLICY

Senator MANSFIELD. Is this proposal the reiteration of the 1954 policy of instant retaliation at places and by means of our own choosing?

Secretary DULLES. It still remains a basic policy of the United States that if war is forced upon us, we will not necessarily confine hostilities to the places that the enemy picks.

LIMITATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF PRESIDENT

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, why does the President want to limit his power, thereby abrogate the Constitution to an extent, and create a precedent which may become recognized as a part of the Constitution through custom, especially in this hydrogen age?

In other words, why does he want to limit the power which he clearly has in his constitutional capacity as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States?

Secretary DULLES. Well, there are differences of opinion, Senator, as to whether he clearly has it or not. I do not think there is any desire on the part of President Eisenhower to limit the constitutional powers of the Presidency. He does, I know, feel very strongly that the policies in this respect of the United States are far more effective and are far more heeded if it is quite apparent that they are joined in by the Congress and the President, and that the fine distinctions as to what the President can do without the Congress or only with the Congress are not particularly relevant when you are dealing with a practical situation where the result we want is to have some other person stop, look, and listen before he acts, and there is no doubt whatever in the President's mind nor in mine that if the Congress takes this action, it will be much more effective as a deterrent than if the Congress does not take this action.

DEFENSE PERIMETER

Senator MANSFIELD. Would you say that the Mideast is to be in our defense perimeter?

Secretary DULLES. Well, that phrase "defense perimeter" is a phrase that I do not know just what it means.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, a perimeter is a line, an area which we include. It is not a new term, I believe.

Secretary DULLES. I would rather have you put that question to some of the military people, Senator.

ECONOMIC AID

Senator MANSFIELD. All right. Do you think \$400 million is enough to handle the economic aspect of this problem?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I do not think that has been suggested.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is just a start?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. I do not know what you are alluding to.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, the President in his speech requested \$400 million for the next 2 fiscal years.

Do you contemplate that the policy or the prelude to a policy which is now being considered would be finished in that period, or would there be appropriations and expenditures for some time or a long time beyond that, in an effort to bring economic stability to the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would not want to forecast the length of time, but I would like to correct one misapprehension which seems to be prevalent there with reference to these figures. The figures which were used, both in relation to this pending legislation and in the President's message, were not figures as to the amounts which would be available for the area. They were figures as to the part of such amounts which would be in a discretionary fund which could be used with greater freedom than the rest of the program because the situation is so changeable, and the changes have come about so suddenly in recent weeks and months that we do not think that it will be possible to lay before the Congress with the usual precision just how the money will be used.

It is not a question of the amounts which will be devoted to area. As I pointed out yesterday, approximately \$750 million has already been appropriated for this area, and the President is not asking for any more money.

All he is asking is that as regards part of the money that is already available, there be somewhat more discretion in its use so that it can be used more effectively.

It is a question of the most effective use of money under the conditions, and the President's message that you referred to did not talk about the necessity of \$400 million or any particular amount for the area. He said it should be available for discretionary use in the area.

Now there will probably be the necessity for other funds which will be subject to the normal limitations. In the past the Congress has voted the President discretionary funds which could be used in the area or outside the area.

The feeling is that in view of the present emergency conditions there, somewhat more discretion should be granted, if we are to achieve the result that we want.

Senator MANSFIELD. All right.

Now as I understand it, the President has enough in the way of funds in the present Mutual Security Act to take care of the situation in this area for the rest of this fiscal year, but he would like to have authorized \$200 million for fiscal year 1958 and \$200 million for fiscal 1959, to be used at his discretion in this general area. Is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. When the program comes up before the Congress for the next fiscal year, there will be in it a request for funds for the area, military and economic, and that will include, just as in the past there was established a discretionary fund for the Far East, it will include a request that part of the money for this area be in the form of a discretionary fund.

There is nothing abnormal about that. That practice has been adopted in the past.

Senator MANSFIELD. I was just trying to get the picture placed on the table, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And could you give us any idea how the figure \$200 million was arrived at?

Why 200? Why not 50 or \$500 million?

Secretary DULLES. It was arrived at as the best what you might called educated guess that could be made by the people who were familiar with the area and who had to calculate as best they could what degree of discretion with respect to existing funds would be adequate to meet the situation.

Originally as the bill had first been drafted, there was no such limitation put in the proposal at all. When I first read the draft that the President was thinking about to the Members of Congress here in the Senate and also in the House, the original proposal did not have a monetary figure in there as a ceiling.

We thought that the Congress might be willing to in respect of already appropriated funds, give the President discretion as to its use.

It seems that that was too broad, and indeed as drafted I think it was too broad because it looked as though it would allow very large amounts of authorized and appropriated but unexpended or unobliged.

gated funds in military programs throughout the world all to be shifted into this area.

So to meet what we thought was a reasonable point of view that we found in the Congress, this figure was written in. It was written in on the basis of talking to people who know the area, who know the economic and military needs of the area, as a best approximation that we could make as to the degree of elasticity which would be adequate.

I would not want to be prepared to guarantee that it would be enough, nor would I want to say that we would have to use all of it. But it is the best estimate we can make in a situation. I want to emphasize, Senator, I know you appreciate very well, it is a situation of urgency where time does not permit making the nice calculations which would obviously be desirable if time was not a factor in the situation.

Senator MANSFIELD. I understand that, but I assume that Ambassador Richards, when he heads this mission to the Middle East, will come back with the detailed program.

Secretary DULLES. He may not come back with the detailed program. He may come back having made commitments.

UNOBLIGATED BALANCES OF MSA FUNDS

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it true that the unobligated balance in the President's special fund, appropriated under section 401 (b) of the Mutual Security Act, is about \$74 million?

Secretary DULLES. I think that is the amount which is so far actually unexpended, but almost all of that is programmed, particularly for Hungarian relief which we estimate will cost about \$50 million.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it true that none of the authority contained in section 401 (a) of the act to transfer funds from other purposes has been used?

Secretary DULLES. I am told that there has been a small amount of transfer made under 401 (a), but the precise figure I do not have available to me here.

Senator MANSFIELD. Could Mr. Hollister furnish the committee with the precise figure?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, he will do so.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it true that the unobligated balance of development assistance funds is now about \$250 million?

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Hollister tells me that it is almost that, that much of it has been programmed but that it has not been obligated except for a small amount.

Senator MANSFIELD. Could Mr. Hollister furnish the committee a statement about this particular question?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. Do you wish in that the programming?

Senator MANSFIELD. No, just the figures—how much has been obligated—and from there we may have other questions.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it true that the unobligated balance of defense support appropriations for Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan is about \$250 million?

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Hollister tells me he is quite sure it is not that high, but he does not know the precise figure.

Senator MANSFIELD. Could Mr. Hollister furnish the committee the approximate figures?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, he will do so.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it true that under section 501, the balances in the development assistance account and the defense support account could be increased for use in the Middle East by transfers from other appropriations to the extent of \$270 million?

Secretary DULLES. We would have to check that.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Hollister will?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it true that \$25 million remains available for expenditure in this fiscal year from the Palestine refugee fund?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it true that the unobligated balance of technical cooperation funds which could be used in the Middle East is now about \$110 million?

Secretary DULLES. I am told that is not the case, but I am sure we can supply the figures.

Senator MANSFIELD. To that question?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it true that the total of nonmilitary unobligated funds which could be used for nonmilitary aid in the Middle East is in the neighborhood of \$1 billion?

Secretary DULLES. I am told that if you cut out all other programs, that would be the case, yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it true that of this \$1 billion in unobligated nonmilitary funds, about \$225 million can be used under section 401 of the Mutual Security Act, without regard to any of the requirements of the act?

Secretary DULLES. I believe that only \$100 million can be used freely, and of that, as I pointed out, most of it is either obligated or programmed at the present time for other purposes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would Mr. Hollister give a definite answer to that question?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it true that the total of military assistance funds now unobligated and unreserved which could be used in the Middle East is in the neighborhood of \$1 billion?

Secretary DULLES. Again I would be glad to supply the figures.

STATUS OF MUTUAL SECURITY ACT FUNDS

Senator MANSFIELD. We would appreciate it. In view of the current status of mutual security funds and the existing flexibility which the President has, is it fair to say that the request of the President in section 3 of the draft resolution for \$200 million in additional transferability and flexibility is mainly for psychological purposes, and reflects no real physical difficulty?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir, that would not be fair to say. The questions which you have been putting, Senator, seem to imply that we are asking for more money or that we think that existing appropriations for this year are inadequate. That is not the case. I have said that.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is not the implication either. What I am trying to get at is a picture of the funds under the Mutual Security Act as they are at the present time, because you will recall, Mr. Secretary, this committee is undertaking a survey of the foreign aid program. And we are very interested, and we should be, in the expenditures because, to use a current term, this is coming out of the taxpayer's pocket, and all I am after is information.

If I am wrong, I certainly will be the first one to apologize. That is why I want to know whether I am right or wrong, because I am sure Mr. Hollister can give the answers to the questions to this committee in writing very shortly so that we can consider the answers in detail.

I want to assure you there are no implications in the questions I am raising.

Secretary DULLES. Could I observe, Senator, you talked about the taxpayer's profit—pocket?

Senator MANSFIELD. Pocket.

Secretary DULLES. The purpose of this request of the President's is precisely to assure that the taxpayer's money which is already appropriated is spent to best advantage, and I think that is a result that we all want.

Now for example, the present requirements would be such that we would have to obligate this money, or the greater part of it, within the next few days. In view of the revolutionary change that has occurred in the area over the past couple of months or few weeks, we do not believe that the taxpayers' money already appropriated by the Congress will be spent to best advantage, unless we have more time to study the situation and spend it to better advantage than if we do it under the rules that were laid down a year ago.

All that we are trying to do is to get the maximum value out of every dollar that has been appropriated, and I do not believe, Senator, that you would want to insist that we obligate and spend this money in ways which will not give the taxpayer 100 cents in value out of the money, and I tell you we cannot do that under the present rules and regulations that apply to it, because those were made on the assumption that we were dealing with an orderly situation, a situation that we could see and study a year ago, and that rules and regulations laid out at that time would best serve.

Now all that has been changed by a sudden series of events that we could not have foreseen, and unless the Senate and Congress are willing to allow a little more flexibility in the expenditure if we have to move in and use the money up, for example, by the 30th of April, we will do it, but I assure you it will not be done as well, for example, as though we have a little more time.

That is all we are asking for.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, Mr. Secretary, I do not know why you are raising this particular point at this time, because that was not the intent behind my question. But as long as you have raised it, I might as well say for the record, as I have said many times before, that under the Mutual Security Act for the past 7 or 8 years, both Democratic and Republican Administrations have spent a greater percentage of their moneys in the last month or so of the fiscal year than they did in the preceding 10 or 11 months. Sometimes I think that is where the money have been spent hastily, and that is one of the reasons we

would like to find out something about the foreign aid programs, so that we would know where we are going. It is not a case of opposition to the program. It is a case of streamlining, making it more effective and more in accord with the policies of this country. But I have 3 more questions; 2 of them can be answered very briefly.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS

Is it not true that there are a number of long-standing projects in the Middle East, such as the Jordan River development plan, which cannot be put into effect until political settlements are reached?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it not true that the Palestine refugee problem cannot be dealt with until a greater degree of understanding in the area has been obtained?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it fair to say that no sizable amounts of money can be usefully spent in the Middle East until the Suez dispute is resolved and until Arab-Israeli hostility is reduced?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

(The following information in response to Senator Mansfield's questions was subsequently furnished by the Department of State:)

ANSWERS TO SENATOR MANSFIELD'S QUESTIONS OF JANUARY 15, 1957

GENERAL

In order to avoid unnecessary duplication in responding specifically to each of the 16 questions and in order to provide background information which is essential to the committees' understanding of the answers thereto, we believe it useful to precede responses with general comments applicable to all or most of the questions.

Section 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 19 is not intended to augment either through new appropriations or through transfers from other current Mutual Security appropriations, those funds which are already available to provide military, economic, and technical assistance in the general area of the Middle East. On the contrary, the unobligated and, to a large extent, unprogramed funds which are currently available for use in this area of the world are believed adequate in amount to finance those priority needs in this area which now seem likely to require financing before June 30, 1957. The problem to which section 3 is addressed is rather that of removing those specific restrictions on the use of these available funds which may prevent, or seriously hamper, their effective employment to meet these priority needs.

There are five appropriations under the Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1957, which, without recourse to transfers or other special authority, are available to provide one or another form of aid anywhere in the "general area of the Middle East." They are:

1. *Technical cooperation*.—An appropriation of \$135 million for bilateral technical cooperation programs on a worldwide basis, pursuant to section 304 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. Of this amount it had been originally planned to use slightly over \$40 million in the area here involved.

2. *Defense support, Near East and Africa*.—An appropriation of \$167,500,000, pursuant to section 131 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, for the provision of defense support in the Near East. This appropriation is intended primarily, as indicated in the original fiscal year 1957 congressional presentation, to cover the requirements of Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

3. *Section 201 assistance*.—An appropriation of \$250 million, pursuant to section 201 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, "for assistance designed to promote the economic development of free Asia, the Middle East, and Africa based on self-help and mutual cooperation of friendly nations, and to maintain economic and political stability in these areas."

4. Military assistance.—An appropriation of \$2,017,500,000, pursuant to section 103 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, for the provision of military assistance on a worldwide basis.

5. President's special fund.—An appropriation of \$100 million, pursuant to section 401 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, for use under the very broad provisions of section 401 (a) of that act, as amended, for any type of assistance anywhere in the world.

There are other appropriations under the Mutual Security Appropriations Act, 1957, which, unless recourse is had to transfer or other special provisions of the Mutual Security Act, are available only for specific forms of assistance in very limited sectors of the area in question. They are:

1. Defense support, Asia—An appropriation of \$873,500,000 pursuant to section 131(c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, for the provision of defense support in "Asia," a term which, under the legislative history of the Mutual Security Act, includes Pakistan. Secretary Dulles has indicated that West Pakistan could be considered as also being included within the term "general area of the Middle East" as used in the proposed joint resolution.

2. Palestine refugees in the Near East—A reappropriation of \$45,300,000, pursuant to section 407(b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, of unobligated balances of funds previously appropriated either (a) for contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East, or (b) upon a determination by the President that such a course would be a more effective one in achieving the same end-result, for use through any other agency to help in the relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement of Palestine refugees in the Near East.

As indicated above, these several appropriations provide funds which appear adequate, even without recourse to the transfer and other special diversion authorities contained respectively in sections 501 and 401(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and without any further congressional action, to carry out presently foreseeable programs that it is likely can actually be instituted in the "general area of the Middle East" during the balance of fiscal year 1957. However, in the light of developments which have occurred since the fiscal year 1957 congressional presentation, congressional action is required to remove restrictions and limitations on the use of certain of these appropriations if the program is to have the best chance of success.

Question No. 1: How was the \$200 million figure used in the resolution arrived at?

Answer: The original intention of the Administration, as put by the President in his special message to the Congress, was to ask the Congress to "authorize the President to employ, for economic, defensive and military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, without regard to existing limitations."

The President went on to say "I believe that, under the conditions I suggest, presently appropriated funds will be adequate for the balance of the present fiscal year ending June 30."

On January 2, 1957, the Secretary of State read to successive informal meetings held in the House of Representatives, and subsequently in the Senate, a draft of a joint resolution which it was thought would carry out the recommendations to be made by the President. This draft provided, among other things, for a new authorization to be available through June 30, 1959, "without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation" and that "any appropriations now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, may be used by the purposes of this joint resolution in accordance with the provisions of this section, when the President determines that such use is important to the security of the United States."

The initial reaction from the Members of Congress consulted was that the passage of the joint resolution would be delayed if it included a provision or any new authorization of funds. This reaction was sufficiently defined so that it was reflected in the President's message of January 5, above referred to. Subsequently, however, it seemed that there would also be objection to the exemption from existing provisions of law of all presently available Mutual Security funds. Accordingly, in the draft of the joint resolution which the President informally submitted to the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the prospective chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee immediately following his address of January 5, such exemption was limited to \$200 million.

This figure was not based upon estimates of precise projects or programs which might be undertaken in specific countries; rather it represents an acceptable measure of flexibility required this year to provide effective implementation of the resolution. The figure is substantial enough to indicate a strong purpose to act upon our stated policy. Flexibility in the use of the moneys is necessary to take account of the unpredictable nature of the task of assisting the nations of the Middle East to maintain their independence. We know that many of the countries in the region are confronted with a serious economic crisis as a result of the closure of the Suez Canal, the severance of oil pipelines and other consequences of recent military operations in the area.

Further, there is the probability, almost certainty, that international communism would itself make new and unpredictable efforts to anticipate and frustrate our efforts to help the nations of the area maintain their independence.

Question No. 2: Does the administration have a detailed program for the use of the additional \$200 million which would be made available under section 8? An illustrative program?

Answer: The executive branch is not proposing the use of an "additional \$200 million" for assistance in the general area of the Middle East, and section 3 was not included in the joint resolution in order to make additional funds in this amount available for that purpose. The administration does not have a detailed program, though some of the activities for which funds might be utilized were presented illustratively in the fiscal year 1957 congressional presentation. Many of these activities, because of intervening events, have been postponed or delayed. Detailing of the program must await Ambassador Richards' mission.

Question No. 3: Is it true that the unobligated balance in the President's special fund appropriated under section 401 (b) of the Mutual Security Act is about \$74 million?

Answer: It is assumed that Senator Mansfield's reference to the "unobligated balance" was intended to refer, not to the "unobligated balance" in this appropriation account in any technical sense, but rather to that portion of this account which is not already covered by Presidential determinations which have actually been made or are now in process. As of January 11, there were approximately \$74 million of the funds in this account which were not so covered; the unobligated balance, on the other hand, was, as of November 30, 1956, \$98,985,000. It should be noted, however, that there are additional requirements under consideration which represent potential claims against this fund in an amount approximating the balance remaining. These additional requirements, as they stood on December 31, 1956, were listed in the materials previously furnished to the committee. If these requirements were all met out of section 401 (b) funds, only negligible sums would remain in this account to finance important contingency needs which may arise during the remainder of the fiscal year.

Question No. 4: Is it true that none of the authority contained in section 401 (a) of the act to transfer funds from other purposes has been used?

Answer: Information has recently been furnished to the committee showing that \$29,072,000 of the authority available during fiscal year 1957 under section 401 (a) had been used through January 11, 1957.

Question No. 5: Is it true that the unobligated balance of development assistance funds is now about \$250 million?

Answer: As of November 30, 1956, the unobligated balance of funds appropriated pursuant to section 201 totalled nearly \$250 million. There have been some obligations in this account since that date but they are not large in relation to the total sum involved. It is this fact which constitutes one of the primary reasons for requesting authority that will permit a waiver of the 20-percent limitation on obligations in this appropriation account during May and June of this year.

Question No. 6: Is it true that the unobligated balance of defense support appropriations for Greece, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan is about \$250 million?

Answer: This question, as phrased, is based on the mistaken belief, apparently caused by the form in which we earlier submitted certain figures to the committee, that a single defense support appropriation covers Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. In fact, two appropriations are involved. One of these appropriations is for defense support in the Near East and Africa, which area includes Greece, Turkey, and Iran but not Pakistan. This appropriation totals \$167,500,000. Of this total of \$167,500,000, approximately \$20 million had been obligated on November 30, and approximately \$125 million was firmly programmed on December 31. The other appropriation is for defense support in Asia, which includes Pakistan, but no other portion of the Middle East, and

totals \$873,500,000. Of this latter amount, slightly over \$200 million had been obligated on November 30 and, as of December 31, more than \$820 million had been firmly programmed. Of the estimated fiscal year 1957 requirement for Pakistan from this second appropriation, nearly the entire sum remained unobligated on November 30, 1956, although, as of December 31, a firm program of \$80 million had been approved. Thus, it can be said that of the total of approximately \$250 million which is considered as primarily available for these 4 countries from these 2 separate appropriations, approximately \$230 million was unobligated on November 30, 1956, although, as of December 31, 1956, only about \$50 million was not firmly programmed.

Question No. 7: Is it true that under section 501 the balances in the development assistance account and the defense support account could be increased for use in the Middle East by transfers from other appropriations to the extent of \$270 million?

Answer: Theoretically, under section 501 transfers to the development assistance and defense support accounts could be made which would total more than \$270 million. However, such transfers could be made only at the expense of other important requirements for mutual-security funds. Furthermore, funds so transferred would still be subject to various limitations (mandatory loan requirements, obligation of not more than 20 percent in May and June, etc.).

Question No. 8: Is it true that \$25 million remains available for expenditure in this fiscal year from the Palestine Refugee Fund?

Answer: Of the \$45,800,000 made available for this appropriation account for fiscal year 1957, \$23,800,000 had not been firmly programmed.

Question No. 9: Is it true that the unobligated balance of technical cooperation funds which could be used in the Middle East is now about \$110 million?

Answer: It is true that, as of November 30, 1956, approximately \$110 million of the total of approximately \$135 million appropriated for technical cooperation on a global basis had not been obligated. However, as of December 31, 1956, all but \$8 million of the approximately \$135 million had been firmly programmed.

Question No. 10: Is it true that the total of nonmilitary unobligated funds which could be used for nonmilitary aid in the Middle East is in the neighborhood of \$1 billion?

Answer: Yes. However, such calculations are considered academic and highly theoretical, since the funds that would constitute the source of any transfer are, except in the case of some of the accounts available for the Middle East, to a large extent firmly programmed for important mutual-security requirements on December 31, 1956, and their diversion from the programs for which they are firmly programmed or clearly required, even where not firmly programmed, would be at the expense of other vital United States security interests.

Question No. 11: Is it true that of this \$1 billion in unobligated nonmilitary funds about \$225 million can be used under section 401 of the Mutual Security Act without regard to any of the requirements of the act?

Answer: There is no \$1 billion available. Of the \$150 million of authority contained in section 401 (c), approximately \$30 million already has been used, leaving about \$120 million of such authority technically free. Of the \$100 million appropriated pursuant to section 401 (b), approximately \$25 million is covered by Presidential determinations. Thus, in theory at least, by exhausting remaining authority and funds under section 401, it would be possible to use approximately \$200 million of the funds now available under the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1957, without regard to any of the requirements of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. However, only \$75 million, i. e., the funds remaining under the appropriation pursuant to section 401 (b), could be used without reference to the limitation on obligations in the last 2 months of the fiscal year which represents a serious obstacle to the implementation of programs needed in the Middle East. Further, there are urgent, competing claims, both for the funds available pursuant to section 401 (b) and for the authority provided under section 401 (a). In the case of 401 (b) alone, a list of additional requirements totaling over \$65 million has already been provided to your committee.

Question No. 12: It is true that the total of military assistance funds now unobligated and unreserved which could be used in the Middle East is in the neighborhood of \$1 billion?

Answer: Yes. As of October 31, 1956, the latest date for which we have reliable data, military assistance funds which were unobligated and unreserved totaled slightly over \$2 billion. As of December 31, 1956, all but approximately \$300 million of the total funds available for military assistance during fiscal

year 1957 was covered by an approved program or earmarked for programs under active consideration.

Question No. 13: In view of the current status of mutual security funds and the existing flexibility which the President had, is it fair to say that the request of the President in section 3 of the draft resolution for \$200 million in additional transferability and flexibility is mainly for psychological purposes and reflects no real fiscal difficulty?

Answer: For the reasons set forth in detail in the earlier paragraphs of this letter, particularly in answer to question 1, the answer to this question must be in the negative. This does not mean, however, that there is not an important independent psychological or political reason for including, as part of the proposed resolution, a specific provision which indicates the intention and desire of the United States Government—of both its executive and legislative branches—to support substantial programs of assistance to countries in the general area of the Middle East. On the contrary, Secretary Dulles has said that he considers a declaration of this character to be an indispensable part of the total proposal.

Question No. 14: Is it not true that there are a number of longstanding projects in the Middle East, such as the Jordan River Development Plan, which cannot be put into effect until political settlements are reached?

Answer: It is true that there are several long-standing projects in the Middle East which cannot be implemented at all, or which can only be implemented in part, until political settlements of one sort or another are reached.

Question No. 15: Is it not true that the Palestine refugee problem cannot be dealt with until a greater degree of understanding in the area has been obtained?

Answer: This may be true.

Question No. 16: Is it fair to say that no sizable amounts of money can be usefully spent in the Middle East until the Suez dispute is resolved and until Arab-Israeli hostility is reduced?

Answer: It is not true that no sizable amounts of money can be usefully employed in the general area of the Middle East "until the Suez dispute is resolved and until Arab-Israeli hostility is reduced."

Chairman GREEN. Thank you.

I next call upon Mr. Stennis. Does he have any questions?

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, most of the points that I was primarily interested in have already been covered but I do want to emphasize a point or two.

NATURE OF EMERGENCY

You consider this emergency legislation?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. And you are not asking for any additional funds, economic or military?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator STENNIS. On the economic aid you are merely asking for elimination of some restrictions.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. You mentioned one yesterday, the restriction here about the allocation. Have you given the details of any further restrictions you wanted removed or that you wanted to avoid with the new legislation?

Secretary DULLES. I think in my statement yesterday I did so, and I would be glad to—

Senator STENNIS. If you did that is sufficient. We won't go over that now.

Secretary DULLES. And I think, as I indicated, that it is possible in that respect to tighten up slightly the provisions of section 3 as now drafted, so as to make it more apparent just what are the present restrictions that we want to get rid of for present purposes.

Senator STENNIS. This being primarily emergency legislation, and I think it is, and primarily for the purpose of impressing Russia with our unanimity between the Congress and the President for a stand of strength, why not just eliminate all the argument about the economic policy and the economic aid and put this strictly on an emergency basis and strike out everything here except section 2 regarding the use of Armed Forces, and let this bill move just on that naked power?

Secretary DULLES. Because, Senator, there is an economic emergency as well as a military emergency. If that were done, as I point out, it would require that the already appropriated moneys would be spent in ways which seemed to be most desirable a year ago, but which may not be as desirable now.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned having to allocate these funds by April 1, I believe was the date.

You do not have to allocate them at all. You can just withhold them; can you not?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we can withhold them, but the plight of the area has so much worsened during recent months that the need which evoked these funds a year ago is greatly intensified today.

Senator STENNIS. It seems to me that this whole matter here is emergency legislation with reference to the Armed Forces, and that it is being bogged down here and encumbered with these other matters than can wait.

Concerning economic aid you really do not have a new plan, and it is going to have to run the gauntlet of waiting in the major bill anyway. That will be coming in a few weeks or certainly in a few months.

I notice further here in that connection that section 1, as I understand it, is just a reiteration of present authority with reference to economic cooperation.

Sentence 1 of section 2 is a restatement of present law with reference to military assistance, and section 3 could come out for the reasons that I have indicated.

It seems to me the authorization of the use of Armed Forces is the primary thing with which you want to impress Russia. Later you could impress these other countries with your economic program as worked out.

Do you think section 3 is essential?

IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC AID SECTION

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir, I do. I would want, and I know the President would want, to do everything possible to facilitate the prompt passage of this emergency legislation, but we do feel that one of the great dangers of the area is subversion, that that will partially be corrected if we take action which seems to deter armed attack, but that it is also extremely important that there should not be a breakdown in any parts of this area of orderly government through the economic and financial crisis which is about to move in on them.

And we just do not think, Senator, that unless we have a little more leeway to deal with these moneys already appropriated, that we will be able to deal with that aspect of the problem, and much as we would like to simplify, the problems just do not lend themselves to simplification, and we have given a great deal of thought to this.

We know that it does create certain obstacles and delays to keep this in, and we discussed it very thoroughly in the executive branch of Government with the President. I know he feels, and I hope that the Congress will agree, that some aspect of this economic thing must be dealt with at the present time.

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

Senator STENNIS. Well, let me direct your attention now then to line 11 of section 2, the word "authorize."

You said a while ago that you consider this bill an exercise of congressional authority. I think, Mr. Secretary, that there is a lot in what you say about the practical aspects of it, but we ought to keep the record straight.

I think we are rewriting the Constitution in a large way when we come in on these emergency matters, and they are emergency matters, and pass direct legislation in which we say in express terms that we will authorize the President to employ the Armed Forces.

I think that one of the pillars of our form of government is that the President is the man that is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States. I object to that word "authorize," and even though there is precedent for it in the Formosa resolution, I think it ought to be changed to the word "approve," which would certainly give as much moral force and impress Russia or anyone else even more I think.

But if your argument is correct, I think that the Congress under that same authority could send armed forces around over the world.

Now you would not say that the Congress could pass a law that would send armed forces around to different places of the world, could it?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator STENNIS. And Congress could not withdraw forces that had already been sent by the President, I mean by resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I believe there was some little argument about that at one time.

Senator STENNIS. Well, it was not resolved in favor of Congress recalling them as an Executive order could recall them. The Congress could cut off the money.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. But I think those points illustrate the danger we get into here when we set up these precedents, that the Congress is authorizing the employment of troops in various areas, because under that same authority they could do other things.

Would you object to the use of the word "approve" or some similar word other than the word "authorized" in line 11?

Secretary DULLES. I would like to study that a bit before I give an answer, because as you point out, these words are significant and the choice of words is significant.

We used this language because it was language which seemed to meet with the approval of the Congress in relation to the Formosa resolution. If it is desired by Congress to think of another word, I would be glad to study the use of that word, if you suggest "approved" instead of "authorized."

Senator STENNIS. I so request, Mr. Secretary, a study by you and your staff of another word, and I hope that we can study it here too, because I believe we are building up there a series of precedents that will distort the power and embarrass future Presidents, maybe embarrassing to the Congress to change the structure of the Constitution itself.

Mr. Chairman, those are all the questions I have.

Chairman GREEN. I call on Mr. Knowland.

PURPOSE OF SECURITY PACTS

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, I will try to keep from being repetitious, both to save wear and tear on you as a witness here and also on the committee. Is it proper to assume that the reason for the several pacts which we have heretofore entered into, either bilateral or multilateral in nature, has been to prevent and to discourage Soviet aggression or aggression by international communism on the non-Communist nations of the world?

UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS ON MIDDLE EAST AND HUNGARIAN SITUATIONS

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, is it correct to say that in the recent developments that took place in both the Middle East and in Hungary, the United Nations was in a position to function in the Middle Eastern situation because the several nations directly involved, namely, Egypt, Israel, Great Britain and France, agreed to United Nations intervention and the sending of a temporary emergency force?

In other words, it was done with the approval and acquiescence of the nations involved?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. The action was taken in the General Assembly, which, as you know, can only recommend.

It cannot impose. Therefore it depended upon a voluntary acquiescence by the nations concerned, and that acquiescence was given. Those countries, as I have often put it, showed, to use the words of our Declaration of Independence, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind as expressed in those resolutions.

Senator KNOWLAND. Both conditions, Mr. Secretary. The first step, acting under instructions from the Government of Washington, was for Ambassador Lodge to ask for an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The Mideast action of the Security Council was first vetoed by, I believe, both Great Britain and France, and then the matter went before the General Assembly.

That is correct, is it not?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct; yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. So that the reason that the recommendatory action by the General Assembly could be effective is that by that time, for whatever reason it may have been, the Governments of Great Britain, France, Egypt and Israel agreed to accept the emergency forces?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now in the situation that was happening about the same time in Hungary, the matter first went to the Security

Council. It ran up against a Soviet veto. Then following the same procedures, we went to the General Assembly, but in that case, not having a decent respect for the opinion of mankind, the Soviet Union neither did then nor has it since complied with any of the 10 resolutions passed by the General Assembly. Is that not correct?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. So we were faced with a problem where nations could die while delegates talk.

In other words, having in mind what happened in World War II, where Holland, I believe, was overrun by Nazi Germany in 6 days, and Belgium was overrun and surrendered in 20 days, by the time a prolonged debate took place in the General Assembly, one or all of the nations of the Middle East might conceivably go down the drain, is that not correct?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

EXPIRATION DATE OF RESOLUTION

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, Mr. Secretary, directing your attention to the resolution, would there be any objection that you could see to the Congress, if in their judgment they felt it was wise, adding, at the end of section 5, substantially as follows: "or when the Congress by concurrent resolution shall so determine"? This would provide alternative means of rescinding the powers or bringing an expiration date; i. e., either when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions, created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, or when the Congress by concurrent resolution shall so determine.

Secretary DULLES. I think there would be no objection to that on the part of the Executive. I think that some thought should be given by the Congress itself, whether it prefers to have it in the form of a concurrent resolution or of a joint resolution, but I am quite sure that President Eisenhower would accept whatever was the considered judgment of the Congress in that respect.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, we are taking, of course, a substantial step and one of great significance, in which Congress in advance is being asked for certain authority.

We are doing it, assuming that it is done, as a partnership relation with the Executive.

Secretary DULLES. That is right; yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. And it seems to me under those circumstances that it would not be unreasonable for the Congress to want some kind of a provision in here by either concurrent resolution or joint resolution so that they might have a voice in the termination of this authority, which otherwise might go into the indefinite future.

Secretary DULLES. I am sure it would be quite acceptable to the Executive branch of Government to take either of those solutions, whichever the Congress, after consideration, decided it wished itself.

REPORTING TO CONGRESS ACTION TAKEN UNDER RESOLUTION

Senator KNOWLAND. Calling your attention to section 4, where it now reads, "The President shall within the month of January of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder," would there be any

serious objections that you can presently throw light upon to changing that to read "The President shall within the months of June and December of each year report to the Congress," so that we would not have an entire 12 months' period lapse without Congress being advised?

Secretary DULLES. There would certainly be no objection to two reports a year. Whether those particular dates are the best—Mr. Hollister suggests that perhaps July and January might be better, but I am sure there would be no serious difference between us on that.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am certainly not wedded to the specific months. It did seem to me that 12 months was a relatively long period and that the Congress should have more frequent notice, without it being burdensome by being on a monthly or quarterly basis.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. The only reason, frankly, that I rather preferred June and December was that Congress normally would adjourn about the end of July or the very first few days of August. It seemed to me that if the report came in in the month of June, we would be sure that the Congress would be in session 1 month subsequent to that time; whereas, if it did not come in until the last day of July, we might under the La Follette-Monroney Act be adjourned and therefore we could not, if we decided to, act on the information until the following January. I ask you to hold those dates or some dates in mind, with that in mind.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

EFFECT OF CONGRESSIONAL REPUDIATION OF RESOLUTION

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, Mr. Secretary, what, in your judgment, would be the effect if the Soviet Union got the impression that the Congress in effect had repudiated the request for this authority on the part of the President of the United States in the Middle Eastern situation?

Do you think that that might have a tendency to encourage adventures by the Soviet Union?

Secretary DULLES. I am sure that it would, Senator. I would like to say this: That I have never believed that a President ought to deliberately put the Congress in a position where it either had to do something that it did not want to do or else risk the security of the United States by refusing to do so, and I can assure you that the present President of the United States had no such purpose in submitting this proposal to Congress.

SIMILARITY OF RESOLUTION'S POLICY TO PRIOR POLICIES

We had every reason to believe, and have today every reason to believe, that the basic policy that is expressed here is a policy which is acceptable to the Congress and which it has applied jointly with the Executive on many past occasions. And while there can be legitimate question as to the precise formulation of the policy in relation to this situation, certainly the President believed and I think had good reason to believe and still has reason to believe, that the basic policy, which is that which was outlined in the so-called Truman doctrine of 1947, which has been carried out in numerous treaties and acts of Congress, that there is complete agreement between the President and the Congress with respect to these matters.

Certainly, Senator, anything which seems to suggest that the basic position which this Nation has taken unitedly for the past 10 years is now reversed, and that we would sit by with equanimity and watch the Soviet Union or international communism take over these countries in the Middle East, that would be disastrous, and it would not only be disastrous in that area, but it would throw grave doubt upon the strength of our determination under other treaties and arrangements of this sort that we have made.

Now as I say, in putting this up to the Congress, the President felt and feels that he is merely asking the Congress to reaffirm in relation to this vital area basic policies which have been adopted and applied elsewhere, and which are susceptible of application to any area where this kind of danger exists.

We have progressively applied these policies one after another to various areas as the danger became imminent, and in asking the Congress to do again in this situation what it has done in 8 or 10 prior comparable situations, the President is merely asking for a reaffirmation of basic policies which has been embraced by the Congress throughout the last 10 years, and the different administrations, Republican and Democratic.

You have had Republican Presidents dealing with a Democratic Congress, you have had Democratic Presidents dealing with a Republican Congress, but whatever the complex has been, this common theme has run through our policy for the past 10 years, and if anything were to be done which indicated a departure or flinching away from that policy, the consequences of it would be disastrous, and in my opinion would confront us with a choice either of seeking communism virtually take over the world, or else having to fight.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, I think that testimony has already made it clear that in the loss of the Middle East, one of the adverse effects would be on Europe and on our own defense.

INABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS TO HANDLE MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEM

Up until the recent developments before the United Nations, it was at least conceivable, had the Soviet Union respected the resolutions of the General Assembly, as Great Britain and France and Israel and Egypt respected the resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities, that this kind of agreement or resolution might not—I say “might” advisedly—have been necessary. But having been one of the delegates at New York and having sat through a good part of these meetings that were held growing out of the Middle East and the Hungarian crises, and having seen how the Soviet Union has completely ignored the resolutions of the General Assembly as well as vetoing the resolution of the Security Council, I do not see how we could depend on the United Nations to defend this area of the world against that type of Soviet action.

It seems to me that this resolution grows out of the developments that have taken place in the last few months in the clear example of the Soviet's lack of respect for the opinions of mankind.

Secretary DULLES. I agree with that, except that I think neither you nor I nor many of the Members of Congress had a great deal of confidence at any time that they would show such a decent respect. Because of that we took the action which we did take in relation to other parts of the world.

Certainly recent developments have highlighted the fact to which you point, have demonstrated that there has not been any change in the character of the Soviet Union.

The leopard has not changed his spots, and therefore it becomes more than ever important to take the action which is now before the Congress.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, I agree with that, and am prepared to support the President's request for the use of armed forces if necessary.

I believe they are less likely to be required with the passage of the resolution than if that question should be left in doubt.

FORMOSA RESOLUTION

I must say in all frankness, however, I would have preferred personally a resolution similar to that which we passed similar to Formosa and the Pescadores, a straight resolution saying in the words of the resolution "that the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States" etc.

And I would ask that that resolution be printed at this point in the record.

Chairman GREEN. It is so ordered.

PUBLIC LAW 4—84TH CONGRESS

CHAPTER 4—1ST SESSION

H. J. RES. 159

JOINT RESOLUTION Authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and

Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,

Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific Area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and

Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and

Whereas the President of the United States on January 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by International conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

Approved January 29, 1955, 8:42 a.m.

ECONOMIC AID FEATURES

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, on the economic side, where I find myself greatly troubled as far as this resolution is concerned, I think you made a case here as to the importance of the administration's having flexibility in dealing with that area of the world. If the only way that you can get flexibility for the use of already appropriated funds or their authorizations is by including it in this resolution, I am certainly prepared to keep an open mind in that regard.

I personally would have preferred, again, if there is sufficient flexibility in the current mutual aid bill which has been passed by the Congress, that the economic phases and the flexibility be handled in that way.

You only have a limited period of time—until July 1. In any event we will have a new mutual aid bill before the Congress which will have to be acted on one way or the other before we adjourn, and I would hope that for the longer term period that that phase of it could be handled in the mutual aid legislation.

Frankly, my own feeling in regard to the necessity of language being in this resolution will depend to a considerable extent on the answers which Mr. Hollister gives to the questions raised by Senator Mansfield and others as to the amount of funds that are now available and the amount of flexibility. (See p. 124.)

I would be pleased if you could explain again, because it is not clear in my mind, why it is essential, assuming you have the flexibility and the money, that the economic phase be attached to this particular resolution.

Secretary DULLES. Certainly such a memorandum will be promptly prepared. As I have indicated, we believe that we have the money. I think we can show by citing chapter and verse that we do not have the flexibility.

Now I think that the degree of flexibility that we require can be expressed in a section 3 which is much more tightly drawn than the present section 3 is, and I think drawn in a way which will not encounter any serious objection on the part of the Congress.

Certainly that is my hope. This whole business of the Mutual Security Act and the appropriating act constitutes a mazō which is to me so complex that I find it very difficult to answer questions regarding it without having an expert adviser at my right hand.

It really is an extremely complex matter, and I think that the best way to handle it would be to have a carefully prepared memorandum which would be submitted.

I did something like that before the House committee, and that is more satisfactory, I am sure, to everybody, including myself, than to try to testify orally on these matters.

I find that I inadvertently make inaccurate statements. At present I say the whole matter is so complex, you have the provisions of the appropriating act which seem to cut across the provisions of the authorizing act.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Secretary, will you kindly prepare and submit such a memorandum?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. Yesterday one of the Senators read a section, I think out of 401 of the authorizing act which seemed to be very broad, but there was another provision in the appropriating act which cut across it, and as I say, there are so many complexities to this situation that it is not easy to testify orally regarding it with accuracy, and I will put in such a memorandum as the chairman has referred to.

(See p. 124 and p. 360 for information supplied.)

Chairman GREEN. Thank you.

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, that does not mean that we will be foreclosed on the examining on the memorandum?

Chairman GREEN. Oh, no, not at all.

Senator RUSSELL. I have seen the allocations.

Chairman GREEN. It was just a suggestion.

Senator RUSSELL. It is going to be brought in and I want to have the opportunity to ask questions about it.

Chairman GREEN. Certainly.

MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, we are getting in a slightly different field, as I am sure you understand here, with this resolution. We have had our North Atlantic Alliance, which was a treaty ratified by the Senate, and our other pacts to which you have referred which have been multilateral.

We have had the bilateral agreements with Korea, with Japan, with the Republic of China on Formosa. We have had our mutual aid agreements which have required certain undertakings on the part of the recipient nation growing out of some rather bitter experience we have had in the past where the arms were either misused or the economic aid was misused. And the Congress in its judgment had written in some, I think, generally accepted restrictions for the protection of the money of the American taxpayers and to make sure that the supplies got to the places where they were intended to go.

Now, in this particular field, during the emergency and for the reasons which you have outlined, I can understand how a treaty may not be practical to meet this urgent situation; that some of these nations may not be in a position to, or may not want to, for obvious reasons, to enter into that kind of a mutual aid agreement with us.

But it does seem to me that it presents a very real problem to the Congress, because heretofore every country or group of countries that we have offered to assist has undertaken some mutual obligations.

Now in this case, as I understand it, that is not so except as they may have already assumed some mutual obligations under other pacts of which we are a part.

I hope that either now or in the future you might indicate to this committee whether or not this lack of such mutuality is purely to get over the danger that you presently see or whether that is now to become permanent policy so that countries to which we give aid in the future will not be required to undertake certain mutual obligations.

Secretary Dulles. The policy of the administration is to obtain assurances of that kind, and indeed we already have agreements of that kind with the four northern countries, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. And they would be, presumably they are indeed, under present programming the principal recipients of assistance here.

PROBLEMS OF PHRASEOLOGY IN MUTUAL SECURITY ACT

There are some problems about the phraseology now in the act which creates political problems with respect to some other countries to which we would want to give some assistance.

There are political situations in the area and political connotations in the area which were not in the mind of Congress when some of these provisions were drawn up.

They were drawn up, I think, in 1951, in relation primarily to Europe.

While the European countries are sophisticated countries and they have a terminology which is meaningful to them, sometimes this does not have the same meaning to other people. I recall that on this visit I made to Cairo and other parts of the country when I landed in Cairo I made a statement which I thought was a good statement, in which I talked about cooperating for our mutual good and also for the good of all the free world.

Well, I thought that that was all right. I learned to my surprise that the statement had not been well received, and I inquired why.

They said "In this part of the world when you talk about the free world, that means Britain and France."

That is just a connotation that words pick up, and that is one of the words used in the present act which is not a very happy word to use, in fact raises very serious political difficulties for the countries of the Middle East because it has a certain connotation.

Words pick up a certain connotation, just as when the Soviet Union talks about democracies we know perfectly well they do not mean our kind of democracy. They mean the so-called peoples' democracy. And the words pick up meanings of that sort; and, as I said, words which were drafted with primary reference to Europe are not appropriate and need to be reconsidered.

It is a few of those things which embarrass us very greatly at the present time during this emergency period.

NEED FOR MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS

Senator Knowland. That is why, Mr. Secretary, I think it is very important that the record before this committee, before we finish, make it clear that there are certain reasons why we might make an exception here. Otherwise, I can visualize nations elsewhere in the world saying: "Why, you are giving them economic aid and you are giving them military aid, and you are not requiring of them the obligations set forth by the Congress. Therefore, do not treat us as second-class nations; we want the same rights and prerogatives." And that would mean a complete breaking down of all the safeguards the Congress has written over the period of a good many years; so I hope it will be made clear that this is to meet a special situation in the Middle East, and is not meant as a precedent for all the other recipients of aid.

LANGUAGE OF THE RESOLUTION

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now one last question which you may not desire to answer in open session, but it is one that is going to be at least discussed in time. I think it is important to be raised now, and that is calling your attention to section 2, and the language reading "he is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations"; and now the language to which I particularly want to refer is: "requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism."

QUESTION OF TAKING ACTION ONLY IF ASSISTANCE REQUESTED

Now the matter that troubles me greatly is: Assume for the moment that Iran, which now has a stable Government and a non-Communist government, should at some date in the future have a Communist government.

If that were done purely internally, that would be one type of a situation, and presumably this is not meant to cover that type of a situation.

But supposing that a Communist government invited the Soviet Union to send into Iran Soviet armored divisions and other divisions, actual troops of the Soviet Union. This obviously would outflank Turkey; it would outflank Pakistan; it would drive a wedge down to the border of Iraq.

I would not want the implication to go out that we would not be in a position to take whatever action our national interests required, if that—we can even say unlikely—event should happen.

But if the impression goes out that we would only take action in the event of a request by the government, and that government should make no request, I would certainly hope we would not sit idly by while Soviet divisions were penetrating and completely destroying the defense capabilities of Turkey, Pakistan, and perhaps the whole Middle East. And I raise that question because I think it is one which needs to be thoroughly understood both at home and abroad.

Secretary DULLES. I think that a point like that could very usefully be covered in the report of the committee.

Now in the illustrative case you give, and which you say is unlikely in fact to happen in our opinion, we would not be then acting primarily to protect the political independence of that particular country. We would be acting to protect the interests perhaps of Turkey and ourselves, and certainly there is no intention or thought to abandon any rights that we may have in that respect.

Under article 51 of the charter, there is the right not only of collective but of individual self-defense if an armed attack occurs, if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.

Well, in the contingency you give, an armed attack might well have occurred through the entry of Soviet divisions into a member of the United Nations. There is then a right of action or a possibility of action so far as the charter is concerned, and there we would be acting perhaps by a motivation different from what is envisaged here.

I do not think that we can act to help to protect a country unless it itself wants to be protected.

Now we may act for other reasons of our own interest, and that is not excluded at all, I think, by this resolution, and I do not think it should be; and perhaps that could be made clear in the report which the committee might adopt in recommending, as I hope it will, this resolution to the Senate.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I hope it is something that both the executive branch and the legislative arm would give future attention to; and whether that could better be done by a slight change in the resolution or by language in the committee report is something I think we will have to mutually determine at a later date.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is all.

Chairman GREEN. The hour of half-past 12 has arrived; time for adjournment.

We will meet again here at 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Green (presiding), Sparkman, Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Kennedy, Wiley, Knowland, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Langer, Aiken, and Capehart, of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Also present: Senators Richard B. Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Kefauver, Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Saltonstall, Smith (Maine), Case (South Dakota), Bush, and Barrett, of the Committee on Armed Services.

Chairman GREEN. The meeting will please come to order.

According to the program, we will now hear from Mr. Case, of South Dakota, if he has any questions to ask.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, if I might interrupt on a question of procedure, I would like to make a suggestion that if we are going to sit until 5 o'clock, at half-past 3 or thereabouts, there be a recess for 5 minutes.

Chairman GREEN. If there is no objection, it will be so ordered.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PURPOSE OF RESOLUTION

Mr. Secretary, on the basis of the questions which have been asked and which you have answered, would it be fair to say that this resolution proposes to reaffirm authority granted already in two respects, namely, the granting of economic assistance and the granting of military assistance in the general area of the Middle East; and the establishment of new authority with respect to two things, first, the employment of armed forces and, second, the making available of \$200 million for expenditure for the purposes of this resolution without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. And would it be fair to say that the heart of this resolution is the first of those last two new grants of authority, so to speak, the employment of armed forces?

Secretary DULLES. That is perhaps the most significant paragraph of the proposed resolution, although as I said in my opening statement, I think that if there were no attention at all paid to the economic problem of the area, that that would be a very grave and serious deficiency.

Senator CASE. However, there is some authority for granting economic aid to the area now.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. As I pointed out, the money is all there; it is just a question of having somewhat more elasticity in the use of the money.

Senator CASE. Now, the reason that I ask that is because I was struck by the question which Senator Stennis asked with regard to constitutional power involved here, and your earlier statement that we do not declare war any more, but we pass resolutions recognizing that a state of war exists.

DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR

Is there any standard definition in international law by which nations would determine that a war exists?

Secretary DULLES. There is no precise measuring rod to determine the difference between what are sometimes called border incidents, and affairs of that kind, and a full-fledged state of war. There is a sort of a twilight zone there which is not measured by any known legal yardstick.

Senator CASE. If armed forces were employed against the United States, would you assume that Congress would be justified in passing a resolution declaring that a state of war exists?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Well, the reason that I have asked those questions, obviously, is that from the standpoint of the people against whom the armed forces were employed, a state of war might be presumed to exist as far as they were concerned. Would that be a fair statement? Would foreign nations be inclined to regard our use of armed forces against them as creating a state of war as far as they are concerned?

Secretary DULLES. I would rather put it that their use of armed force has created a state of war. It would be their initiative.

Senator CASE. Well, that assumes that that would be the case.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator CASE. But to that extent, this is an employment, then, of the constitutional right to declare war; is it not?

Secretary DULLES. No, I would not think that this obviated the necessity, if there was a state of war, of Congress declaring that that state of war existed in order to bring into force many legal statutes, and things of that sort, that pertain to the state of war.

Perhaps that answer is not responsive to your question. I may not quite have understood it.

Senator CASE. Is there anything in this resolution which you think would empower or authorize the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States unless there were armed aggression against the United States?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. It would permit the use of the Armed Forces of the United States if there were aggression against one of the states of the Middle East.

Senator CASE. I think that the use of armed forces would come awfully close to creating a state of war, as far as that is concerned.

Secretary DULLES. Well, it probably would create a state of war, but we have found, or at least judged, and I think found, that experience shows that if we make that clear in advance, then the aggression does not occur; and, as I say, that is the policy which we have applied already in many parts of the world.

Senator CASE. I am not disposed to argue that. I am inclined to think that is correct.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator CASE. I think if they know in advance that armed aggression against one of these states would bring us into it that might act as a deterrent.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

EXPIRATION DATE OF RESOLUTION

Senator CASE. But if we actually employ the Armed Forces, I think that creates a state of war, as far as they are concerned, and probably as far as we are concerned, and with that thought in mind, I wanted to go to section 4 and section 5 with respect to the duration.

I have been thinking somewhat along the same line that Senator Knowland indicated this morning when he said that he felt there should be some provision for a congressional termination of the authority granted by the resolution, and I had in mind to suggest that in line 16 where the language of the proposed resolution reads, "This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine," and so forth, to insert at that point, after the word "determine," "or the Congress by concurrent resolution shall declare that the peace and security," and so forth.

Secretary DULLES. As I indicated this morning, Senator, I think that something like that would be entirely acceptable, if the Congress prefers to have it that way. I think there is a question of judgment as to whether or not it should be expressed in terms of a concurrent resolution or a joint resolution, but as I say, whichever the Congress wishes in that respect would, I am quite confident, be acceptable to the President.

Senator CASE. Of course, we went through that debate as to whether or not we should use joint resolutions or concurrent resolutions in connection with several of the war powers during the 1940's, and it is my recollection that in most instances Congress preferred to make it a concurrent resolution rather than a joint resolution. For a joint resolution, requiring the President's signature, could in a conceivable situation call for a two-thirds vote to make it effective.

Secretary DULLES. Yes. Well, as I say, if that is the preference of Congress, I am quite sure that would be acceptable to the President.

Senator CASE. And you may recall, also, that when President Truman proposed giving him powers to draft men for service in the military, and using the military to break the railroad strike, the House of Representatives before it passed the requested resolution put on a termination of that sort.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Just one further aspect of that, and that is in section 4, the proposed resolution says:

The President shall within the month of January of each year report to the Congress his actions hereunder.

Yesterday, when Senator Russell was interrogating you, at one point you said, and I am sure that this was with reference to the economic assistance:

No, no; I am only talking about the present fiscal year; not a word said relates to any other year.

Then Senator Russell said:

I cannot agree with you there. It may not be a word, and I am not going to split hairs on the verbiage of it. But when we meet and declare that the President is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence, you might construe that as a 1-year program, but those people down there are not. They will be getting their programs on a 20-year basis if I am not mistaken.

That, it seems to me, in view of that testimony, it becomes even more important that we have an understanding, if this is to be more than 1 year, it be possible to terminate it by a concurrent resolution of the Congress without going back to the Executive.

Secretary DULLES. Yes; I would quite agree.

AID FOR EGYPT

Senator CASE. I think you have already been asked as to whether or not Egypt would be eligible for aid under this act, and your answer was that it could be.

Is my memory correct?

Secretary DULLES. That is about what I said; yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Did you notice the story in the New York Herald Tribune yesterday under a byline by Marguerite Higgins, stating that the Department of State had turned down a request by Egypt to buy wheat, and also to permit the use of \$5 million worth of Egypt's own funds for the purchase of medicine in the United States?

Secretary DULLES. No; I did not see that article.

Senator CASE. Has it been called to your attention?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator CASE. The article, I think, Mr. Chairman, probably should appear in the record; and while I do not have it with me, I can give the substance of it, and I would like to ask permission that it be inserted in the record.

Chairman GREEN. It may be so introduced.

(The article referred to is as follows:)

UNITED STATES REBUFFS EGYPT'S BID FOR WHEAT DECISION POINTS TO DIFFICULTIES IN TRADE POLICY

By Marguerite Higgins, New York Herald Tribune News Service

Egypt, which is technically eligible for economic aid under the Eisenhower doctrine, has just been rebuffed in a request to buy surplus United States wheat, it was reliably learned yesterday.

Diplomatic sources said the refusal was based in part on fear of antagonizing Britain and France, which look on aid to Egypt as a means of bolstering Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom they regard as their enemy. Also the State Department does not wish to commit itself until it has more indication of Egypt's attitude on the Suez Canal and on some kind of arrangement with Israel.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has said Egypt and Syria would be eligible for economic aid under the Eisenhower doctrine if it were determined that they were not dominated by Communist totalitarianism. He also observed that Nasser was not as bad as he had been painted.

The necessity to turn Egypt down was clearly troublesome at a time when the State Department is doing its best to better the West's position in the Middle East and to clarify this country's desire to help newly developed countries in that area.

One Arab source said: "If you do not give us the alternative of trading with you, how can you reproach us for turning to the Soviet bloc for help?"

Egypt also asked the United States to release \$5 million of Egypt's blocked funds for purchase of medicine in this country. This also was refused.

EGYPT'S WHEAT AND MEDICINE REQUESTS

Senator CASE. There were two points to the story: First, that Egypt had sought to buy some wheat and that the Department of State had vetoed the purchase of wheat. Second, she had sought to spend \$5 million of blocked funds of Egypt for the purchase of medicine, and that had been vetoed by the State Department.

Can you say whether or not that is correct?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know of those specific applications, whether they were made or not. I would say that the United States, acting through the Treasury Department, had blocked Egyptian funds in this country following the seizure by the Egyptian Government of the Universal Suez Canal Co.

It did so for various reasons, including the importance of having some funds here against which we would have recourse in the event that it was held that the Suez Canal Co. had rights against the Egyptian Government, and that if the ships, for instance, paid to the Egyptian Government as they did following that seizure, and it was held that legally they should have paid the Suez Canal Co., there would be a fund to use, to have recourse to, to satisfy those claims.

Now, those funds are still blocked, and we have not yet seen any reason to ask the Treasury Department to unblock the funds.

So that basically, assuming these requests were made to use the funds, it may very well be, and probably is, that the request was not granted because it would not be consistent with the blocking procedure which we are following today.

Senator CASE. It would be that, rather than the use of the presence of the funds as a means for applying economic sanctions, so to speak, against Egypt?

Secretary DULLES. No. This was done for the reason I indicate, primarily, last July, I think, or the first of August.

Senator CASE. On what basis would you justify the refusal to sell wheat to Egypt?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it isn't a question of refusing to sell wheat to Egypt; it is a question of unblocking Egyptian funds.

If Egypt has other funds to use to buy wheat, there is no reason that I know of why she cannot do it.

Senator CASE. Well, the story used the term of "blocked funds" only with reference to the medicines, as I recall. I do not recall that it brought "blocked funds" into the sale of wheat.

Secretary DULLES. Neither Mr. Hollister nor my advisers here know about this instance which is referred to in the article to which you refer. They have a copy of the article here.

Senator CASE. It seems to me that it might be interesting to have somebody go into it to determine the truth of the article, for from a

propaganda point of view in the Middle East at the present time, it could have, it would seem to me, a very unfortunate effect.

(See p. 167 for information received from the State Department relative to this matter.)

Senator CASE. Would there be any disposition, with the passage of this resolution, to use the economic assistance part of the authority, for penalties as well as rewards?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I am not sure just how we could use it as a penalty except in the sense of not permitting Egyptian participation in the fund. Is that perhaps what you refer to?

DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

Senator CASE. Well, does not part of the Mutual Security Act provide funds for the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities under the general terms of Public Law 480? Are not part of the funds of the mutual security appropriations available for facilitating those sales?

Secretary DULLES. No; Public Law 480 is entirely distinct from the Mutual Security Act.

Senator CASE. I know it is distinct from it, but I thought that a portion of the funds which are available for the Mutual Security Administration can be used for facilitating the sale or disposal of farm products.

Secretary DULLES. I am told not.

Senator CASE. Surplus agricultural commodities.

Secretary DULLES. I am told that is not the case.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act involves surplus commodities. It is separate.

Senator CASE. It may be separate, but it would accomplish the same purpose. Under section 402, do you not have funds for facilitating the sale of surplus commodities?

Secretary DULLES. If you want to ask Mr. Hollister, he is more familiar with it than I am.

Senator CASE. That is perfectly all right.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Section 402 is the section of the Mutual Security Act which provides for the use of surplus commodities in some of the programs which are adopted with various countries under the Mutual Security Act, and we are required by the Congress to put at least \$250 million of our operations into that program. Surplus commodities must be used to that total with respect to the current year's funds.

Senator CASE. Well, under section 3 of the proposed resolution, you would be able to take \$200 million out of the funds available for the Mutual Security Act and use them for the purposes of this resolution, without regard to the provisions of the basic Mutual Security Act.

Mr. HOLLISTER. I don't see how it would affect that, unless we were released from the requirement of putting up at least \$250 million under section 402. I don't see how this provision would release us from that requirement.

Senator CASE. Do you not contemplate getting this \$200 million by taking it from some of the earmarked funds in the Mutual Security Act?

Mr. HOLLISTER. There are no earmarked funds, really, Senator. There are programs which are presented to the Congress when the original presentation is made. Then as we go along in the year, some of the programs which we present to the Congress turn out to be unwise or perhaps inadequate or perhaps a little bit too much, and they are changed from time to time; and also, some of the funds which were not presented to the Congress for particular countries are programmed for new developments as they occur.

But there is no earmarking of any particular funds for, we will say, section 402 activity.

Senator CASE. Do you mean that this \$200 million will be obtained from funds for the Mutual Security program without disturbing the \$250 million provided in section 402 for the surplus commodities?

Mr. HOLLISTER. There is no fund provided, Senator, under section 402 whatsoever. There is no special fund. We are merely required, when we take the total amount of funds which are appropriated for our use during the year on the economic side of the mutual security program, we are required to put at least \$250 million of that into surplus commodities; and if we don't, to the extent we don't, we have just that much less funds to spend.

There is no special fund, however, set aside to do that with. We don't—and we try as we work through the year—it is one of the difficulties we have in working these programs out that we must all around the world, in making our programs, get as much of section 402 commodities into those programs, so that we can fill up the \$250 million requirement.

Senator CASE. And that would not be impaired at all by the language of section 3 here?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I don't see how this language would affect that.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, those are all the questions I would like to ask the Secretary.

COMMITTEE SCHEDULE

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, it has been agreed that the committee would continue its deliberations until 5 o'clock this afternoon, and then that it would not have any other meetings until after the inauguration of the President of the United States.

Due to some confusion as to possible conflicts on Tuesday morning, I desire at this juncture to ask unanimous consent that when the joint committee shall conclude its labors today, it stand in recess subject to the call of the chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Any objection to that?

If not, so adopted. Thank you.

Mr. Morse, I believe you have some questions to ask.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. You may proceed.

Senator MORSE. I shall proceed with my questioning of the Secretary for only 15 minutes at this time, out of consideration of my colleagues on the committee, so that others can ask questions this afternoon. But I will limit myself at this first round to 15 minutes on the basis of my understanding that after we have all had our first round of questioning, we will then start over again, and Senators will be

allowed a second opportunity or a third, if necessary, to discuss this matter with the Secretary.

I am correct in that understanding; am I not?

Chairman GREEN. That is assuming, of course, that that will be adopted. It has not been adopted.

Senator MORSE. I hope I am still a good enough lawyer to protect my procedural rights, and I have an hour of questioning, I think. I certainly think I would not take that amount of time, and it would be quite impolite of me to take it, at this time, with the understanding that my colleagues will protect my rights.

Senator RUSSELL. If I may interrupt, I might say that the unanimous-consent request that I asked of the committee was made on the premise that it would be impossible to conclude the examination of Secretary Dulles today, and it would be necessary for him to return for another meeting of the committee.

Senator MORSE. I shall proceed for 15 minutes, Mr. Chairman.

USE OF AMERICAN TROOPS

Mr. Secretary, I would like to direct your attention first to section 2 of the resolution, and ask if the administration would be willing to accept an amendment to the resolution providing that immediately after the President employed troops or ordered the employing of troops, he would report his action to the Congress for ratification.

Chairman GREEN. Is that in the form of a question?

Senator MORSE. Yes; that was a question.

Secretary DULLES. I am sure that the President would be glad to accept a provision that after any use of troops, he shall report to the Congress. I am not quite sure what the phrase "ratification" means.

Senator MORSE. Well, I can understand how there might be a difference in regard to the respective powers of the two branches under the separation of powers clause. I only seek to ask questions this afternoon; I will do my arguing later. But it might help for the background of questions to say that I do think we have a great difference of opinion among us as to the powers of the President.

Do I understand your answer to be that you would go so far at least as to accept an amendment that if the President finds the situation such that he believes it necessary to order the use of troops, he would forthwith report that fact to the Congress?

Secretary DULLES. I perhaps misunderstood your first question. I thought you said if he uses the troops, that he would then report to Congress.

Senator MORSE. Well, let's take a hypothetical case. Let us assume now that he becomes satisfied that there is an act of military aggression by Russia against Iran, and he immediately, as I think he should under those circumstances, and has the power to do anyway, employs our troops. I am asking you if you would accept an amendment to the effect that after he has issued that order, that he then report to Congress forthwith, setting forth his reasons therefor.

Secretary DULLES. The President has already said, I think, in his message to the Congress, that if he had occasion to use his power, he would keep, as he put it, in hour-by-hour contact with the Congress if it was in session; or if not, if any serious affair was involved, he would immediately call the Congress into special session.

Now, whether it is desirable to incorporate that in the resolution or not, I don't know, but I think that declaration of the President's purpose gives the basic answer to your question.

Senator MORSE. Well, I understand the President said that. I am not thinking about this President or any other President. I am thinking about history, and our constitutional system, in relation to that history.

I want to assure you that I propose to meet this very serious problem, I think, created by this resolution, quite impersonally.

I have read in recent weeks everything I could find available, for example, of the previous employment of troops by Presidents throughout our history, including those incidents involving Latin America.

What I am talking about here today is something which we have faced from time to time in various ways throughout our history, and I have always felt as I have read that history that so much misunderstanding could have been avoided if there had been a forthwith report by the then President to Congress, and Congress given at least an opportunity to decide on what course of action it wanted to follow under its constitutional power.

ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE REQUIRING PRESIDENT TO REPORT FORTHWITH TO CONGRESS IF TROOPS EMPLOYED

So I simply ask the question: Would you be willing to accept additional language to this resolution which would make it a requirement under the resolution that the President report to the Congress, which means, of course, that if we are not in session, then a special session will be called immediately which, under modern transportation, means 24 hours? I think, Mr. Secretary, that would help some of us, at least, to try to reach a common ground of understanding with the administration on this resolution. But if this resolution is going to be given to the President without any requirement therein, whether it is this President or any other President, that he report forthwith, some of us are going to have greater difficulty with the resolution.

Secretary DULLES. I cannot speak with final authority for the President about something which is new, but on the basis of what the President has said in his message, I would conclude, and I think that the Congress is justified in concluding, that if it was desired to put a provision in the act that such a use of force should be immediately accompanied by a message or a report to Congress, that there would be no objection to that.

Senator MORSE. I think you understand if he did or did not, it would still leave Congress free, even though they passed the resolution in its present form, to face the issue of ratification or nonratification.

You made some comments earlier today that led me to believe that you might entertain the view that such an action in the use of emergency powers by the President might not be subjected to congressional action except by way of appropriations.

This is not the place to debate that, but I certainly would not accept that point of view, either. I hold to the point of view that under the Constitution, Congress has the power to repeal an action of the President of the use of the Armed Forces of this country if, in the opinion of the Congress, it is an unwise action.

But because I have that view, I am raising this question as to whether or not language would be acceptable which would make it mandatory,

under the resolution, that the President make the report, and that would at least give us the springboard, so to speak, for that constitutional debate at that time.

I think, may I say most respectfully, it also would be a salutary check on any President, X, Y, or Z, if he knew that he had to make the report, and that that would open up the constitutional debate as to whether or not his action was wise.

DELEGATION OF POWER TO DECLARE WAR

Well, Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the war declaration power of Congress under article I, section 8, can be delegated by the Congress to the President?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. That leaves open, then, the question of both fact and law, depending upon our respective opinions, as to whether or not this is a delegation of warmaking power.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. I was interested in your comment that we in these modern days do not declare war; we simply declare that a state of war exists.

I checked through these recent declarations, the German, Italian, and Japanese, and in those instances we found as a matter of fact that war had been declared against us. We did not formally declare war, and the declaration said we recognized that a state of war existed, but we did formally declare the war, nevertheless, under article I, section 8, of the Constitution. Is that not true?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we declared that a state of war existed. Now, I assume that action would be under the constitutional section to which you referred. Certainly it was designed to bring in force all the war powers of the Executive, and of various statutes.

Senator MORSE. Well, there was an open declaration of war against Germany, December 7, 1941. The declaration said:

That a state of war between the United States and the State of Germany which has been thrust upon the United States hereby is formally declared—and we used similar language in all the other instances.

And I respectfully submit that it in no way changes the fact that if we did not find the fact to be that a state of war exists or existed, we were still in a position where we would undoubtedly have declared the war under certain circumstances.

ACTIONS NOT WITHIN SCOPE OF RESOLUTION

Now, I would like to discuss with you a moment the very interesting hypothetical question that Senator Knowland raised this morning with regard to Iran. I think his hypothetical question provided that Iran was taken over by a Communist regime from within; I assume by the vicious subversive tactics that we know Russia tries to exercise in every fertile field where she thinks those tactics might be successful, and that after the government had been changed into a Communist government, that government then asked the Soviet Union to send in battalions of tanks and air forces, and Russia proceeded to carry out that invitation.

Then the question of the Senator from California was to the effect, would we under those circumstances intervene?

I wondered if you would discuss that with me a bit further, because as the Senator from California pointed out, that would flank Turkey, that would jeopardize a good many of our vital interests in the Middle East.

Would we proceed in that case under this resolution, or would we proceed in that case independent of this resolution and under provisions of the United Nations Charter?

Secretary DULLES. If we acted in that case, Senator, I would not consider that we were acting under this resolution. We might be acting under the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, of which Turkey is a member, and which might be endangered by that action, or we might be acting under the provisions of article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. But we would not pretend that we were going in to help a government which did not want our help.

If we acted in that case, we would be going in to help ourselves or to help Turkey, but not under the pretense that we were trying to help the government.

The Soviet Union, in reverse, attempted that in Hungary by saying it was going in to help the Government of Hungary. We all know that there was no real independent government there, and that what it was helping was not the people or the nation of Hungary, but the Soviet Union's own ambitions.

I think that when we have professed to act to help some other country, we must be quite sure that we do have a request from that country to do it.

Now, there are other reasons for acting which, as I say, may be another treaty or may be the Charter of the United Nations, and the inherent right that that recognizes, but I would not say that under those circumstances we would be acting under this authority.

Senator MORSE. I think this clarification is very helpful, Mr. Secretary, because I find that a few of us are confused in regard to what the situation would be in any fact or circumstance in which actual military invasion of one of these countries in the Middle East by Russia did not occur, and whether or not this resolution, as far as the employment of troops is concerned, goes beyond a fact situation in which there is actual armed aggression by Russia against one of these countries.

LIMITATIONS OF RESOLUTION

Now, am I correct in my interpretation of your statement that this resolution, as far as the use of American Armed Forces is concerned, is limited to the fact situation in which Russia commits a military aggression against one of the countries of the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. It is limited to actual armed aggression, armed attack by a country controlled by international communism.

Senator MORSE. I understand that it might not necessarily be Russian battalions that go from the Soviet Union, but may be Russian battalions or troops controlled by Russia that had come through a country in the Middle East that is controlled by international communism.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

REPORTS TO CONGRESS

Senator MORSE. You have already covered it, but in order to make perfectly certain in my own mind, in section 4 of the resolution you are willing to accept an amendment such as Senator Knowland suggested this morning, where the President would make his so-called regular formal reports twice a year, and those months being July and December, rather than once a year in January, is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. I left open the precise month. I think there was some—I think he suggested June.

Senator MORSE. Yes, he did, June and December.

Secretary DULLES. I think we suggested January and July, but I would not quarrel about that very long.

Senator MORSE. Those are formal reports, may I make the record clear, and do not refer to the type of report that my first question referred to, namely, the report I would like to see him make immediately after the employment of American troops.

Secretary DULLES. I understand, Senator.

Senator MORSE. As to section 5, it is agreeable to you that we try to work out some language whereby we could agree on a termination also by some type of resolution by the Congress, as well as by the decision of the President?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

QUESTION OF AMENDMENT TO DEAL WITH ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM

Senator MORSE. Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, to an amendment which provided that if arms are used by the Arabs against Israel or vice versa, we would intervene?

Secretary DULLES. No; I do not think that this resolution is an appropriate place to deal with that problem, Senator. It raises a great series of new problems, and I believe if, at this juncture and by this resolution, we limit ourselves to the problem of international communism, we will have done all that we can usefully do in that respect.

And I would not be in favor of mixing into this resolution the Arab-Israel problem.

Senator MORSE. Well, I respect that point of view. I wish I could agree with it.

One of the concerns we find in our country is the concern over both the use of military and economic assistance in the Middle East, and the use to which that assistance may be put in connection with their own Middle East problems and conflicts, as well as the problems of Russia.

One of my colleagues this morning was examining on that point—I think it was the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Kefauver—and pointed out something, I think, which needs to be emphasized in this record.

You ship these arms into the Arab States or into Israel, and you build them up to military power, and then their leaders think the time is ripe for them to settle, shall I say, their own little backyard quarrels, and they are not very little, and we are finding ourselves providing them with the very sinews for a war in the Middle East

that could very well lead to a third world war. Is that not a possibility?

Secretary DULLES. That is a possibility. I think that the Congress can properly recognize the fact that, although the Executive has had authority in those respects under existing and previous legislation, we have adopted and carried out the policy of not promoting an arms race through the sale or grant of arms to Israel and the Arab neighbors who border on Israel, and I would assume the same discretion which the Congress has already entrusted to the President in that respect could continue to be entrusted under this legislation.

Senator MORSE. Well, one of the alleged purposes of this resolution is not only to seek to prevent the advancement of communism, but to reduce the possibility of war. Would not some such language as I propose make it clear to the Arab States and to Israel that if they follow any warlike activity, we will intervene, and likewise help to preserve the peace?

Secretary DULLES. I would think it was wiser to follow here the precedent that was set in the case of the Southeast Asia Security Treaty. There the United States made clear by a paragraph in the treaty that the only armed aggression with which we were concerned under article IV was Communist-armed aggression.

Now, we did that, Senator, for the reason that there were within the area possible conflicts, and we did not want to become involved on one side or another of those conflicts; that what concerned us primarily was the Communist threat.

So with the concurrence of the Senate, and there were Senators who helped to negotiate that provision, we limited the scope of that Southeast Asia Treaty, not to aggression generally, but to Communist aggression, for the very reason, as I say, we did not want to get involved in what might be intra-area conflicts.

And I think it would be wise to do so in this resolution at this time. I do not say that the time may not come, indeed I hope it will come, and I have tried my best to bring it to come, when the Arab-Israel situation either will be so stabilized or can be stabilized by a treaty, a resolution of the kind you describe.

At the moment, I do not think that that time is yet here, nor do I think it would be wise to introduce that element into this particular resolution.

Senator MORSE. Your testimony also sets forth information, of which we were aware, that Russia is doing a great deal of propagandizing work in the Arab States to stir up animosity between the Arab States and Israel, and apparently to indicate that in some instances she would be helpful to an Arab State in wiping Israel off the map as a state.

That being the fact, do you think that such language as I proposed might have some negative influence in getting some Arab States to accept the objectives of the resolution?

Secretary DULLES. I am inclined to think the result will be just the contrary.

Senator MORSE. You mean if we put language in which may include action if the Arabs attack the State of Israel, that they would not be more inclined to accept the resolution? I do not think I made my previous question clear.

Secretary DULLES. Perhaps I misunderstood your question.

Senator MORSE. Let me restate it.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MORSE. I am briefly asking whether you think if we put the language I proposed in the resolution, namely, that we would intervene in case of a war within the Middle East between the states of the Middle East, that would cause some Arab States to look upon the resolution with less favor as far as their cooperation is concerned?

Secretary DULLES. With less favor?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. I think it probably would, yes.

ATTITUDE OF ARAB STATES ON RESOLUTION

Senator MORSE. Well now, on the basis of the present wording of the resolution, Mr. Secretary, how many Arab States have indicated that they would cooperate in carrying out its provisions?

Secretary DULLES. I would say about five have taken a sympathetic approach.

Now, the question of actual cooperation, of course, has not been dealt with at all, either by them or by us, because the first step is to get this authority, and until it is obtained and we know the form in which it will be granted, there is really no basis for concrete discussion.

But there is no Arab State which has closed the door on cooperation, and several have taken a very favorable attitude toward it insofar as they understand it.

Of course, I say this: The program has been very considerably misrepresented in the area by the Soviet Communist propaganda, representations of their agents and the like, and, as I said earlier, if the plan were really the way the Communist propaganda is portraying it, it would be quite understandable that the Arab countries would not like it.

I am quite confident that when it is fully explained to them, most if not all would want to cooperate with it.

PRESSING CONCERN OF ARAB STATES IS ECONOMIC

Senator MORSE. If we eliminated the economic features of the resolution, do you think the same number of states would be interested in cooperating?

Secretary DULLES. No. I think that the most immediate concern of most of the Arab countries—when I say "Arab countries," I exclude at the moment Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, which are Moslem, but I don't include those as Arab countries—their most immediate and pressing concern is economic; and while, as I have indicated, this legislation would not make available any more money than is now available, it would, among other things, show that we are alive to the economic problem, and I think that that fact itself is tremendously valuable. Otherwise, I am afraid that this will be portrayed as an interest only in military matters, and that is a portrayal of the United States which is often made; that we think too exclusively in purely military terms.

And that is why I feel that some recognition by the Congress at this juncture of the economic problem, is a really indispensable part of the total program.

Senator MORSE. You mean by that, Mr. Secretary, that their primary fears at the present time are economic, and their secondary fears are military?

Secretary DULLES. I would say that most of the states, at least, feel that their exposure is due to the economic situation which makes it difficult for them to maintain adequate loyal security forces and to maintain a sufficient level of acceptance by the people generally so as to assure the continuance of stable order.

Now, some of them, particularly those to the north, are more concerned about the military threat, but I would say if we just counted heads on the states without regard to their location, and so forth, you would find that most of them who are concerned about their independent survival feel more concerned at the moment with their economic plight than with the military threat.

Now, I don't say that that is a correct judgment. Perhaps we from a detached position can make a more accurate judgment of the military danger than they make themselves, but I am just responding to your question in terms of my own estimate of their own thinking.

Senator MORSE. I judge from what you say that it would be fair, then, to say that the United States has more concern about military danger; or at least the Middle East States have more concern about the economic danger.

Secretary DULLES. I think that is a correct generalization. As I said in answer to some questions yesterday, nations very rarely are alive to the danger which they have not previously encountered, and—just as I pointed out in the Far East—after the close of the Japanese War, there was much more concern about the revival of Japanese militarism than there was about the threat from the Soviet Union.

So they do not feel the same awareness of the military threat as do now the countries of the Far East who have seen what happened in Korea, or those in Europe who have seen what happened in Hungary. The Hungarian picture has not been adequately portrayed to the people in the Middle East.

"FREE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST"

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, in many of your statements that I have read, and also the President's speech, the phrase is used over and over again, "The free nations of the Middle East."

Would you name for the committee the nations of the Middle East that are free nations—I know it is a relative term—but that are free nations in the sense of individual citizens of the nations having the rights of freedom such as we know them with respect to our Bill of Rights, such as we know them when we talk about freedom?

Secretary DULLES. The words "free nations" used, I am sure, by the President, and whenever I used them, I used them not to describe the internal freedoms of the people, but whether or not the nation itself is free from external domination.

Now, the European satellites, for example, are not free, because their affairs are to all intents and purposes run from Moscow.

In that sense, I think that all of the Middle East countries today are free. None of them are Soviet satellites or run by international communism.

That does not mean to imply that all the people within these countries have the rights which we normally attribute to a democratic society. That is by no means the case.

Senator MORSE. Broad as the term is, of course, I think it is important to make the record clear on it. How many of these states that we seek to protect under this resolution are free in the sense that you have just used the term, democratically free, in that they have parliamentary governments, bills of rights, and are free from a local government that could be classified as totalitarian in comparison with democratic governments?

Secretary DULLES. I do not believe, Senator, that there are many, if any, states in the area which would measure quite up to what your and my ideals in that respect would be.

The nations in the main there have recently emerged, most of them, from a state of colonialism. That applies particularly to the Arab States.

Of course, you have in Turkey a pretty highly developed society, with elections and so forth. The same applies to Pakistan. But I am thinking now, and I think your question relates more, perhaps, to Arab countries than it does to the other Moslem countries, and there they are evolving toward a society which gives more rights to the individual and more choice as to how and by whom he shall be governed. But that is not yet developed to a point where it could be compared, I think, with the kind of a political structure that we have in the United States.

Senator MORSE. I think that one of the greatest deterrents we have to avoiding war is, of course, the political freedom of the inhabitants of the Nation. Some of the Middle East countries, in my judgment, are totalitarian, about as totalitarian as countries come. Do you think that there is any danger that we might find ourselves running the risk, with war lords in those areas, of finding ourselves involved in a war which might have been avoided if they did not have the assurance of this resolution that we would come to their rescue if Russia should commit an act of war against them?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think so. Bear in mind there is nothing automatic about this resolution. It does not, the resolution itself does not, bind us to take any specific action, and there would be a judgment to be exercised at the time.

Senator MORSE. One final question.

BUYING FRIENDSHIP OR SUPPORT

Some of the critics of this resolution, Mr. Secretary, have written in recent days that, subject to the evaluation that we seek to buy an alliance in the Middle East, that these nations have a history of not staying bought.

What would be your observation on that?

Secretary DULLES. I would say I entirely agree that no nation stays bought. Any nation which can be bought is not going to stay bought, and I can think of no way to waste money more flagrantly than by trying to buy friendship or buy support or buy allies.

Never would I spend a nickel on that.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I did not keep a stopwatch, but I will return to my questions later.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry not to have been here yesterday. And if I ask anything which intrudes on your testimony yesterday, I am sorry.

PRESENTATION OF PROPOSAL

What was your position with the Department of State in the spring of 1950? You had an office three or four doors down from Dean Acheson in a State Department office.

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think my technical position was that of consultant, and I had been asked primarily to undertake the negotiation of the Japanese Peace Treaty and certain related security treaties in the Far East.

Senator SYMINGTON. The reason I ask that is in those days, apparently the idea of the administration was to come down to the Congress and attempt to get a bipartisan trademark of approval on various plans like the agreement re Greece and Turkey, the Marshall plan, the Berlin airlift, and so forth; and then have it presented to the public.

Apparently now, unless I am mistaken, the idea is, at least in some cases, to first leak it to the public through the press, and then come down to the Congress.

Would you care to comment on that?

Secretary DULLES. I would not say that is the idea, but sometimes it happens that way.

Senator SYMINGTON. Am I to infer from that, sir, that there was no plan whatever of the administration to try this out first in the press?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And then to bring it down to the Congress?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now to another point. At the time we had the Berlin airlift, we debated at length whether or not to put an armored train into Berlin, with the possibility of having the Russians shoot our soldiers off it. It was finally decided that we would have the airlift instead of putting in the armored train.

I cannot imagine being much closer to war than that. And yet, as I understand it, you say that today we face the gravest problem of the last 10 years. Is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. So you think our chances of going to war, unless we do this, are greater today than they were at the time of the Berlin airlift?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

PURPOSE OF RESOLUTION

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, let's leave aside for the moment, Mr. Secretary, the economic aspects of this resolution. With that premise, can you point out anything else in the resolution except an attempt to impress on the world the fact that we are now willing to preserve whatever position we think right in the Middle East by fighting?

Secretary DULLES. Did you say to "preserve whatever we think"?

Senator SYMINGTON. May I restate my question.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, please.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let's leave aside for the moment the economic aspects of the resolution. With that premise, can you point out anything in the resolution except an attempt to impress on the world the fact we are now willing to fight to preserve whatever position we think right in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. The part of your question which would force me to make a negative reply if I just answered "yes" or "no" is your phrase "whatever we think right." If you would substitute for that "to preserve the political independence and territorial integrity of the nations of the area who want our help in that respect," that would be correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, we would not think that was wrong, would we?

Secretary DULLES. To preserve?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. So it would be whatever we thought was right, would it not? I do not mean to get into semantics about it, but our policy would be to fight for what we thought was right in the Middle East. Is that not correct?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think there is a little semantics involved there, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. If there is, correct me.

Secretary DULLES. It is quite true that we think it is right to preserve political independence and territorial integrity in the area, and that is what we are limiting ourselves to.

There may be other things in the area which we think are right, but we do not propose necessarily to fight for those. We limit our commitment to those two things.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

INTERNAL SUBVERSION

Especially after noting your testimony as reported in the press yesterday, how does the only aspect of this resolution except the economic aspect bear on another very real danger; namely, the danger of internal subversion in any of the countries in question?

Secretary DULLES. The question was covered quite fully yesterday, but I will be glad to recapitulate again what I said yesterday.

Experience in history, I think, demonstrates that there is no internal subversion or, if it should occur, that it cannot last, except under three conditions:

One is that there is an element of danger and possibility of the use of overt military power.

Second is that the country is not able to maintain an adequate loyal security force of its own.

And the third is that economic conditions be such that the people in desperation will turn to communism.

Now, if you can stop those three conditions, you have done, I think, everything that is possible, and I think everything that needs to be done, to stop subversion.

POLITICAL SOLUTIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. Well now, Mr. Secretary, regardless of how we do it, is not what we are really after something much broader than this particular resolution, and not contained in any way in the resolution, namely, the political solution of such problems as the Israel-Egypt situation, and various other political problems?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we hope that this resolution will help to improve the atmosphere, the climate, so as to make some of those other problems more soluble. But I would not say that that is by any means the only thing we are dealing with, because even if those problems were solved, there would be, I think, still danger from international communism, to which this resolution is directed.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you say we now have decided to put up money and armed forces because we have failed to accomplish, in any other way, our effort to solve the political situation?

Secretary DULLES. I don't understand your question.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I understand it, the theory of diplomacy is that you attain and maintain friends, and certainly today we haven't many friends in the so-called free world.

Now we are going to put up money, and are going to state we are willing to use military force. Is that not correct?

Secretary DULLES. It is certainly not correct that we have no friends in the world.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you say that we have more friends or less friends in the last year?

Secretary DULLES. Many more.

Senator SYMINGTON. Many more. Thank you.

USE OF ECONOMIC AID TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL FORCES

Now, returning to the economic aspect, as I understand, reading the resolution and the testimony, what you really want is freedom to move the money around which has been appropriated?

Secretary DULLES. We do not want to have freedom to move it around geographically. There is enough money available for the area. What we want is to be free from some of the conditions which apply to the use within the area of money already allocated to the area.

Senator SYMINGTON. Specifically, Mr. Secretary, do you intend to take any of these funds to pay the ordinary operating expenses of these Mideast countries, including, for example, the pay and maintenance of internal security forces?

Secretary DULLES. We might, yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you care to describe where, and how?

Secretary DULLES. No, because that would give rise to expectations in certain countries which we might, on reflection, decide not to realize.

Senator SYMINGTON. But, if necessary, you would support a police force in a country to keep down an uprising that you thought was wrong. Is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. If we felt that a country was unable by its own resources to maintain the security forces necessary for internal order

and prevent Communist subversion, then we would consider assisting them.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you do that even though it was fairly clear a majority of the people wanted the government you did not want?

Secretary DULLES. You mean that most of the people wanted communism?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. Well, that is such a remote contingency that it is hardly worth answering, I think, Senator. There are no people in that part of the world who want communism.

COMMUNISM IN ITALY

Senator SYMINGTON. I noticed you mentioned the religious aspect yesterday, in your testimony about communism. It has always impressed me that a great country like Italy, with over 99 percent of the people Catholics, nevertheless has as perhaps its largest party the Communist Party; so I do not see how we can say that we are sure that they do not want communism if they think it will improve their lot, in a country, say, like Syria.

Secretary DULLES. Most of the people in Italy who vote the Communist ticket do not do so because they are Communists or want Italy to go Communist. They do that because that is a vehicle for registering a protest against conditions as they are. It is not really a desire to have communism.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, Senator Bridges and I went over to Europe and looked into that situation about 3 years ago, and I would like to respectfully differ with at least part of that with you, but it is not pertinent.

AMOUNT OF FUTURE AID REQUIREMENTS FOR MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE

Let me ask you this question: Would you not say, based on the status quo you have emphasized, that if we are going to do the job we have to do to bail out this situation, we are going to need a good deal more than \$200 million or \$400 million to do it?

Secretary DULLES. As I indicated this morning, Senator, \$200 million is not the amount of money. There is already appropriated for this year for this area about \$750 million. When we talk about \$200 million, all we are talking about is releasing a part of the money from some of the restrictions which prevent its most effective use during the balance of this year.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand that. But if we get into this program, and if we will face up to what is happening to the French and British economies, they are going to need billions of dollars, are they not, unless we want to let NATO go down the drain?

Secretary DULLES. Now you are asking me about economic aid to Europe.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am asking about whatever is necessary to preserve our position. The word "perimeter" was referred to by the able and distinguished Senator from Montana. We have a perimeter somewhere, presumably the perimeter of NATO, presumably as important as the perimeter of the Middle East; and vice versa. But if,

based on what has happened in the Suez, we are trying to rescue the situation, regardless of whose fault it is, it is actually going to cost billions of dollars instead of any \$200 million or \$400 million. Is that not correct?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I am trying to find out, Senator, whether you are addressing yourself to this resolution in this area, or to the world situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am addressing myself to the importance of Middle East oil to Europe, and the importance of Europe to us, and the importance of the Middle East to us. It all ties into one. The oil of the Middle East directly affects the economy of Europe, and vice versa. I imagine the resolution is premised on that fact. Certainly we don't need the oil here comparable to what Europe needs, as far as the Middle East is concerned.

Secretary DULLES. I do not foresee that as far as the Middle East is concerned, there would be need for any more funds than something of the general order of magnitude which has been appropriated for the area during the last year or two.

Now, it may be that there will be some shifting there. There may be some increase which will be sought in terms of the military assistance in the area. But the general order of magnitude, I think, will not alter.

Now, as far as the situation in Europe is concerned, it looks as though there would be the need for some assistance there. Already the United Kingdom has drawn down a substantial sum from the International Monetary Fund, and has a line of credit for \$500 million from the Export-Import Bank, and there may be needs of that sort, possibly, in relation to some of the other countries of Europe.

We hope and believe that the canal will be opened for operations, at least for the medium sized and smaller tankers, by early in March, and perhaps for all ships by May, and that that will end the particular crisis which came about through the closing of the Suez Canal.

There still, of course, is the pipeline problem through Syria also to be dealt with, but we do not envisage that this thing will involve any vast sums of money.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. That includes Europe?

Secretary DULLES. It includes Europe, excluding, of course, such items as the drawing down of the British funds from the International Monetary Fund.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you want to define "vast sums of money"?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I say I would consider that that was a pretty good chunk of money.

Senator SYMINGTON. \$500 million?

Secretary DULLES. No, it was more than that.

Senator SYMINGTON. How much more?

Secretary DULLES. They are drawing down from the International Monetary Fund?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. They have partly drawn down and have available earmarked for further drawing down, I think a total of nearly \$1 billion.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

CHANGE IN DETERRENT ROLE OF CERTAIN WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS

May I now ask a question more on the military side. In your statement yesterday you said, and I quote:

There has been a change in the possible deterrent role of certain Western European nations.

By this change, do you refer to the redeployment of French and British forces from Western Europe to, say, Africa and Cyprus, or to the relatively greater Soviet military strength, or to both?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I referred primarily to another factor, which is the decreased possibility of military cooperation between the United Kingdom and certain Arab and Moslem States.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. Does not this known shrinkage in NATO strength place an even greater burden on the United States as regards Western Europe?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we have not attempted to replace in any way the military strength which was deflected by the sending of certain of the French forces from Europe to North Africa. That we have not attempted to replace at all. And in that sense, I think the answer to your question is "No."

Senator SYMINGTON. Does not your present proposal regarding the Middle East also imply a greater military burden on the United States?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. It does not imply it?

Secretary DULLES. No, I don't think so.

UNITED STATES MILITARY STRENGTH

Senator SYMINGTON. In view of the deteriorating deterrent position to which you refer, why do we continue to allow our relative military strength to be reduced as against that of Russia?

Secretary DULLES. I don't think we do.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I suggest you have a little talk with your brother sometime.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. In your statement yesterday, you said:

The Middle East area is at once endangered by potential military threats against which there is now no adequate deterrent.

Does this mean you consider the United States military strength today an inadequate deterrent against war now in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. No. I think it is an adequate deterrent as long as the people out there realize that it would be used. The important thing now is to make clear that it would be used. Nothing is a deterrent unless it is used or usable.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you already answered this question, but I will ask it again. Do you think the threat of war that you now emphasize would be less if we maintained our relative air superiority over Russia?

Secretary DULLES. I think the threat of war has not been increased. On the contrary, it has considerably diminished because of a series of things which happened. Of course, the relative airpower is a

factor in the equation, but only one; and if you take all of the factors in the equation, I think that the situation is better off from our standpoint than it had been for some time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, how could a threat of war, just for my own information, be decreased if at the same time you say that the danger now is the greatest?

Secretary DULLES. I said that the danger is greater unless we take action which is quite within our power to take to meet that danger.

UNITED STATES MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. My next question, Mr. Secretary: You said yesterday the Soviets had military equipment in superabundance.

Have we any such superabundance?

Secretary DULLES. We have, I think, a superabundance of the type of equipment which I was referring to, that is, equipment which was rendered obsolete since World War II by modernization.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the threat of military aggression is so great, would it come as a surprise—

Secretary DULLES. I should perhaps correct the last, because Admiral Radford tells me that while we had a superabundance of that, much of it has already been given away, so that what remains of the obsolete equipment is now not as great in our case, of what remains, as in the case of the Soviet Union.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right, sir. If the threat of military aggression is as great as is implied, and would come as a surprise, as presumably most military action would these days, could we get our forces there, in your opinion, in sufficient time and with sufficient quantity?

Secretary DULLES. That is a question which I would rather have you put to Admiral Radford from the military standpoint.

From the political standpoint, I would like to reemphasize that we are here operating upon the principle, which we have applied in so many cases, so far successfully, that if we make clear our willingness to fight if there is an armed attack, and if we had the capability to fight, that then we will not have to fight, and I think that is a sound principle.

As I say, it has been applied in many cases heretofore, and I think it is a principle to apply now, in the interest of avoiding having to fight.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask you this question, from the standpoint of what two civilians think about it:

The testimony before a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee was that this country today cannot lift and properly support a single division overseas. If that is the situation—I am talking about airlift of course—with the premise that time is important in modern warfare, would we be in a position to carry out our obligations with all these commitments we have all over the world, if we cannot lift and properly support overseas a single division, and do you think our threat under this resolution will be taken too seriously by the people involved?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, I think it will.

REASON FOR FRENCH AND BRITISH CEASE-FIRE ACCEPTANCE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, there was an article written by a responsible reporter this month, the first sentence of which says:

The Russians are known to have numbers of 700-mile range rockets in place in East Germany, aimed at London and other British targets some 450 to 500 miles away. What part the Soviet threat to use them played in the Anglo-French cease-fire decision is one of the intriguing questions of the Middle East story.

Later on in the article, it says:

The British and French naturally have denied that the rocket threat played a part in their cease-fire decision, but American Ambassador to France Douglas Dillon commented in a December 10 radio interview that fear of Soviet action was the primary reason for the cease-fire.

Everybody knows we haven't any such rocket picture directed against our enemies as the one described in this article. Now I would like to ask two questions:

First, if that article is true, are we going to seriously impress these people with the threat implied in this resolution?

And second, was Ambassador Dillon's statement correct as reported?

Secretary DULLES. Ambassador Dillon made a subsequent statement which clarified, I think, very considerably the portion from which you have read, in which he indicated that a major factor in the decision, in his opinion, had been the action which had been taken at the United Nations.

He told me he had intended to include that in his original statement, but this was a newscast, I think, where he was cut off before he had finished expressing fully his ideas, and he elaborated somewhat later on in a further statement.

I think if the two statements are read together, they give a quite correct picture.

Senator SYMINGTON. You read this article?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I think there is an additional statement, and I would like, Mr. Chairman, with your approval, to put it in the record.

Secretary DULLES. Does that contain also the supplementary statement that he made?

Senator SYMINGTON. I will read it to be sure.

Later, Dillon got out a statement saying that he had not meant to minimize the moral pressure of the U. N., but only to indicate that a number of different elements may have influenced the British and French decision.

Is that what you refer to, sir?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, that part is now also in the record.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

I may say that we, Senator, do not know of any such rocket staging areas that are referred to in that story.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

GUIDED MISSILES

Senator SYMINGTON. But if there were, if the story was correct, then it would tend to verify what General Spaatz wrote, perhaps nearly a year ago in News Week, an article in which he said that if the Russians did get the IRBM, the intermediate range missile, first, in operational quantities, they would be in a position to blackmail Europe. Would you agree to that?

Secretary DULLES. Not necessarily, because guided missiles are only one way of getting an explosion to a target, and the fact that they might be ahead in that one way for a time would not necessarily be conclusive or mean that we do not also have a deterrent.

But I may also add that I have no reason to believe that they will get ahead of us in that game.

AGREEMENTS CONTEMPLATED WITH MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have just a very few short questions left I would like to ask the Secretary.

Exactly what kind of new agreements will be made in the political field with Middle Eastern countries under this program? Roughly, what plan is there for that?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we do not expect to make any agreements of the kind which would constitute what you might call executive agreements or treaties, certainly not without bringing them back to the Congress.

Now, there probably will be in the military field and in the economic field a certain type of planning whereby we will in effect suggest to the countries that if they do certain things, that then we would expect to be able to help them out, and that would be applicable to both the military and the economic field. But it would not constitute any obligation in the way of an executive agreement or treaty binding on the United States.

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to be sure I understood your testimony this morning. Will the Richards committee have final authority to sign military agreements and economic agreements as well as political agreements?

Secretary DULLES. The Richards committee would have the authority to do the kind of a thing which is now being done under the Mutual Security Act, that is, to make commitments.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me repeat my question, Mr. Secretary, to be sure I understand your answer.

The question is: First, if we are going to have new agreements in the political field and military field and economic field, as I understand it, you feel we may, and with that premise—

Secretary DULLES. No; excuse me. I said we did not plan any new political agreements.

Senator SYMINGTON. Or military?

Secretary DULLES. Or military agreements.

Senator SYMINGTON. Or economic?

Secretary DULLES. Or economic.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then what agreements will be the type and character of agreements that the Richards committee will sign?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I do not think they will sign any such agreements other than the normal type of agreement which is made now under the Mutual Security Act which obligates certain money for certain purposes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see. Will Britain and/or France play any part in these negotiations, to the best of your knowledge?

Secretary DULLES. We don't foresee that they will at the present time. Of course the United Kingdom is a member of the Baghdad Pact, although as I pointed out this morning I think, at the moment, not a very active member.

But if as we hope and believe that situation alters, there would then quite likely be discussions with the military committee, for example, of the Baghdad Pact.

TREATY VERSUS RESOLUTION PROCEDURE

Senator SYMINGTON. My final question. We have had discussions about the Vandenberg resolution and the importance of this legislation as a resolution.

I read your testimony on that. But actually isn't it possible to consider that what we are doing here is signing a group of treaties at one time by agreement?

Couldn't we handle this matter as it comes up treaty by treaty, after a resolution expressing the desire of the Congress to support the President and yourself in the matter?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we do not intend, Senator, to make any treaties. I just pointed that out.

Senator SYMINGTON. Couldn't you do it with a treaty?

Secretary DULLES. No; we do not think you can. We have given very, very careful study to proceeding here by the treaty process rather than by resolution, and we do not think the situation at the present time lends itself to that. It may later on, but not at the moment.

Senator SYMINGTON. And why not with a treaty or treaties at the present time?

Secretary DULLES. Making separate treaties or making collective regional treaties, the differences between the different countries in the region as among themselves.

The situation is so confused and there are so many crosscurrents that we do think that it is wise to attempt to freeze ourselves into a position with reference to any of the countries in the area at the present time, and that moving with greater flexibility and with less commitments is the wise course to deal with the situation which is as confused and in some respects as unstable as that situation is now.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. The committee will take a recess of 10 minutes now. If you will return then we will hear from Mr. Aiken if he has any questions.

(Short recess.)

Chairman GREEN. The committees will please come to order.

Senator Aiken, have you any questions to ask?

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Chairman GREEN. Go ahead.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, you have been asked such a generous quota of questions relating to the military and political implications of this resolution that I am going to be considerate and confine my questions, which will be brief, to that part of the resolution which authorizes the President to cooperate in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence of the countries with which we will have agreements.

But before coming to that question, I would like to have further clarification of two matters which were brought up earlier today by other members of this committee.

AMENDMENT OF RESOLUTION TO REQUIRE REPORT TO CONGRESS IF ARMED FORCES EMPLOYED

The first relates to a query by Senator Morse as to whether you would be willing to accept an amendment requiring the President to report to Congress immediately whenever he employed the use of United States Armed Forces under authority granted by this resolution. I read you a quotation from the President's message to Congress. It will be found about the middle of page 7 of his printed message, which reads as follows:

If, contrary to my hope and expectation, a situation arose which called for the military application of the policy which I ask the Congress to join me in proclaiming, I would of course maintain hour-by-hour contact with the Congress if it were in session. And if the Congress were not in session, and if the situation had grave implications, I would, of course, at once call the Congress into special session.

What is your interpretation of that paragraph?

Secretary DULLES. I interpret it as indicating a recognition by the President of the very basic and fundamental fact, which is that in these matters which may involve war, there has got to be an effective working partnership between the President and the Congress, and the Nation cannot survive if it is divided as to such matters.

Therefore the President would surely report to the Congress, and as I indicated to Senator Morse, I think I cannot conceive that the President would raise any objection to including a specific reference to that in the resolution itself, because it is quite in harmony with what he said, and which you have quoted, and to which I think I alluded in my own answer to Senator Morse.

Senator AIKEN. You would regard the report to the Congress as a report to the whole Congress and not consultation with one, two, four, or six Members of the Congress?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. And also the President states that he would call a special session of the Congress if the situation had grave implications.

Can you imagine any instance where the United States Armed Forces would be used in repelling an attack upon a friendly nation that would not have grave implications?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I can, Senator, and that is the reason why the contingent clause was put into the President's message. There might, for instance, be a probing or spoofing operation whereby, let us say, a hostile plane attempted to fly into one of these countries to find out whether or not we were serious.

If we reacted at once, that might be the end to the whole affair. That was the kind of thing which led the President to say "if it were serious."

Senator AIKEN. You are referring to an incident in which United States Forces might be involved?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. United States personnel?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

EGYPT'S WHEAT REQUEST

Senator AIKEN. Now the other matter, which I think requires further clarification, is one which was referred to by Senator Case relating to the newspaper story which stated that the United States had been sidetracking a request from Egypt for 6 months, a request to purchase 100,000 tons of wheat. (See p. 144.)

That is about 3½ million bushels. Any deal in wheat of this nature would be handled by the Department of Agriculture; would it not?

Secretary DULLES. Handled by what?

Senator AIKEN. The Department of Agriculture.

The State Department does not sell wheat.

Secretary DULLES. Yes; I think that would be handled by the Department of Agriculture.

Senator AIKEN. Has the State Department at any time told the Department of Agriculture not to make such a deal with Egypt?

Secretary DULLES. I think not.

Senator AIKEN. Do you know of Egypt ever having made such a request of the Department of Agriculture?

Secretary DULLES. I do not know, and Mr. Hollister just tells me that he does not know.

Senator AIKEN. That is what I want to bring out. The fact is that the Department of Agriculture has not been approached by Egypt in regard to such a deal.

The State Department has not advised the Agriculture Department not to make such a deal. The Department does have the wheat which it could sell but it is not soliciting orders from Egypt nor anyone else because of the expiration of authority in Public Law 480. That is, they will use up all of the authority contained in Public Law 480 to sell wheat and other surplus commodities without soliciting orders; and, as I understand it, Egypt has not at any time approached the Department with the view to purchasing this wheat.

(The following information was furnished by the State Department for the record :)

The following material is supplied in response to a question by Senator Aiken on Egypt and Public Law 480 programs:

Fiscal year 1956

During fiscal year 1956 the Government of Egypt asked for title I sales of 250,000 tons of wheat, 100,000 tons of corn, and 20,000 tons of cottonseed oil. Three wheat sales agreements were signed for \$5.6 million on December 14, 1955, for \$5.6 million on February 8, 1956, and for \$8.4 million on February 17, 1956, making a total of about 200,000 tons of wheat all of which was delivered. The United States Government did not take any conclusive action during the remainder of fiscal year 1956 on the rest of the Egyptian request.

Also during fiscal year 1956, under title III, the United States Government supplied Egypt assorted foodstuffs values at \$38 million through CARE and other voluntary agencies for supplementary rations for school lunches, the needy, including persons in the Gaza strip who were not being helped by UNRWA. The title III foodstuffs were practically all distributed by October 1956.

Fiscal year 1957

The Government of Egypt initially asked for a title I sale of 435,000 tons of wheat and flour, at the beginning of fiscal year 1957. The United States Government has never taken any action on this request. Toward the end of December 1956, the Egyptian Embassy transmitted its Government's request for title I sales of 200,000 tons of wheat, 200,000 tons of corn, 75,000 tons of flour, 12,000 tons of tallow, 5,000 tons of oil for soap, 30,000 tons of cottonseed oil, 5,000 tons of tobacco, and 1,000 tons of canned meat. In answer to this last request, the Department of State informed the Egyptian Embassy that it could not be acted upon unless the most exceptional circumstances prevailed since the authorization under which agricultural surpluses were sold abroad was virtually exhausted and appropriate congressional action was required for a new authorization.

For a program to provide supplementary rations under title III, to be administered by voluntary agencies, the Government of Egypt transmitted through CARE a request for assorted foodstuffs worth an estimated \$55 million for fiscal year 1957. The United States Government still has this title III request under consideration.

ECONOMIC AID

Senator AIKEN. Now my other question relates to our economic and assistance programs in the Middle East. I understood you to say yesterday that we are committed to programs in all but two or three of the Middle East nations.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct, and we have programs of varying size, I think, in all of these countries. They were suspended in three of them as a result of the hostilities, withdrawal of American personnel and other causes of that kind. That applies to Egypt, Israel, and Jordan.

Senator AIKEN. It is not true that in carrying out these programs the greater part of the expense is paid by the country which is involved, and the United States furnishes technicians to see that the work is carried on adequately?

Secretary DULLES. That is true as to the technical assistance program. It may not be true as to some of the other programs, but I do not know that we have any such programs actually in operation at the present time.

Do we, Mr. Hollister?

Mr. Hollister says he could not answer that question or give me the answer in detail because it varies a little bit in terms of different projects, and he would prefer not to discuss those particular projects in open session.

PROJECTS IN IRAQ

Senator AIKEN. But, for instance, isn't it common knowledge that we have allocated about \$2.3 million for projects in Iraq?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; that is the technical assistance program.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. And as to that, you are quite correct, Senator, that on those projects we supply technicians and the like and the country concerned puts up the great bulk of the money that is required.

Senator AIKEN. I was not referring to military projects or any kind of a project the nature of which is not common knowledge.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. And while we are appropriating or allocating \$2.3 million to the programs in Iraq, which will be used largely for supplying technicians, isn't the Government of Iraq expected to spend about \$238 million in carrying out the actual work on these projects?

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Hollister tells me that the ratio of relative contributions varies in a good many cases.

Sometimes it may be only on a 50-50 basis, sometimes it may be on a 10 to 1 basis whereby we put up \$1 and they put up \$10 or more. It varies somewhat in terms of particular projects.

Senator AIKEN. I realize that, Mr. Secretary. I expect that with the programs in Iraq the Government is paying an exceptionally large part of the cost.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL

Now I come to the question I want to ask. Isn't it a fact that in spite of the gains and the progress which we have made with these programs in the last 2 years, that we still lag behind meeting our full commitments as to supplying technical personnel?

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Hollister tells me that that is true in a number of cases. It is not true in all, but it is true in a number of cases.

Senator AIKEN. And am I correctly informed that this lag in meeting our commitments in some of these countries has generated quite a degree of impatience among the governments of those countries?

Secretary DULLES. I wonder if it would not be better perhaps if Mr. Hollister answered on this aspect.

Senator AIKEN. I am almost through, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. HOLLISTER. It is true that there is always impatience, Senator. You are talking technical assistance now. There are technical assistance programs in perhaps some 60 countries around the world, perhaps more, counting some of the territories of other countries, and there is always a certain amount of complaint by the people with whom we work that it is not going fast enough or the documentation is too detailed, some of which is justified and some is not.

It is the kind of thing we are working on all the time to improve. There are undoubtedly complaints in Iraq and various other countries because the thing does not go as smoothly as they would like to have it go.

The countries in every case would like to have much greater freedom in carrying on things just as they want, rather than under the controls that we think are necessary to protect the funds and to see that things are done efficiently.

Senator AIKEN. And they are asking for more technical personnel, aren't they?

Mr. HOLLISTER. They are, in a great many cases, asking for more technical personnel and we are slowing it up because we don't think in many cases we can get the kind of technical personnel we would like to have.

We feel it is better to slow a program up and have better personnel rather than to push it forward with weaker personnel.

Senator AIKEN. Now if we are to impress the people of these countries with the friendship of the United States for them and the ad-

vantages of the Western World, isn't it important that we continue as rapidly as possible with our programs for schools and hospitals, irrigation and power projects, highways?

Doesn't that make a very strong impression on the people?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Where these programs are being carried on?

Mr. HOLLISTER. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. And what I was wondering is this: If we are unable to fully meet our commitments on these programs now, what would we gain by making commitments for further programs between now and the 1st of July?

Wouldn't it be more important to accelerate the work on the programs which we have already agreed to?

And I am not speaking about military projects.

Mr. HOLLISTER. No; I thought you were discussing generally the technical assistance programs and the lack of technical ability in those programs.

If you are talking about general aid programs of one kind or another, it depends entirely upon the category of which you are talking.

Many millions, in fact hundreds of millions, of the mutual aid program, mutual security program, are in commodities which are delivered to a country, and those commodities are in turn sold in that country, and they engender local currency which is used for various purposes.

Now that can move forward very fast. A project such as the building of a powerplant obviously may take 2 or 3 years. It depends upon what country you are talking about and the nature of the program, as to whether or not it can go forward fast or may have to be slowed up until you get all your technicians ready and all your engineering work done.

Senator AIKEN. I was wondering how important it is that you have authority to make further commitments between now and the 1st of July under, say, the mutual security program.

Mr. HOLLISTER. It is important because the developments in some of these countries may be such that it may be necessary to put into effect rather fast some program which can be put into effect fast, rather than one of the slower ones that you are talking about.

Senator AIKEN. And, also, if you cannot get the personnel to carry on the programs that we are already committed to, where would you get the personnel to carry on the new programs? In fact, could they be started before next summer?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Well, Senator, we would obviously not try to start a new program in a place or in some field where there was already an inadequacy of personnel, unless perhaps the necessity of the situation were such that we would shift personnel from somewhere else to this area in order to bring about the results we might want to bring about.

Senator AIKEN. Then the authority contained in this resolution would give you the right to talk new programs with them in the near future?

Mr. HOLLISTER. To plan to for the future you mean, talk about programs which might be put into effect later?

That would be possible.

Senator AIKEN. You would have very little opportunity to carry out those programs before the end of this fiscal year?

Mr. HOLLISTER. You could make an agreement and you could obligate the funds before the end of the fiscal year, even though the program itself might not go forward until later, and you would get the benefit of having made the agreement with the country, having obligated the funds and shown your good will and your intention to help them in the future, even though the actual implementing of the program might be some months afterwards.

Senator AIKEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Bush, have you any questions you would like to ask?

Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, I first would like to compliment the Secretary upon his endurance and his patience in answering such a wide variety of questions here these past 2 days. I am proud to say his directness in answering them gives one a feeling of his great competence in the position which he occupies on this issue and in the resolution which he is supporting.

MIDDLE EAST OIL

I want to lay a little emphasis in my questioning, Mr. Secretary, on the fact that we in the United States have a very real interest in this situation, that what appears to be the purpose of this resolution is primarily for the benefit of the United States.

As it says in the whereas clause: "Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered," and I wanted to develop that point a little bit with just a very few questions.

Earlier in the session you made some comment about the extent to which Western Europe is dependent for energy on oil that comes from the Mideast, and I believe you said to the extent of about 90 percent, is that right?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator BUSH. Now that would apply to the economic life of Western Europe.

Would it also apply to the North Atlantic Alliance from a military standpoint?

Would they likewise be so heavily dependent on Middle East oil for energy for their airplanes, tanks, trucks, and so forth?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. The North Atlantic Treaty forces in Europe and the Mediterranean fly in Middle East oil. Their trucks, their tanks, their vehicles move on Middle East oil, and the ships operate with Middle East oil. By land, sea, and air, motion is primarily dependent upon such oil.

Senator BUSH. So that any eventuality which shuts that off permanently, or for any extended period, from Western Europe would have a very serious and damaging effect upon the defenses that are based in Western Europe, airbases and other defense establishments; is that not so?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

NORTH AFRICAN AIRBASES

Senator BUSH. Now then, is it not true that we do have some important airbases in north Africa?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator BUSH. Does the effectiveness of those bases in north Africa to some degree depend upon the Middle East being free so that the oil can move smoothly and freely through the Mediterranean to the West?

In other words, aren't those north Africa military bases which we have also dependent to some degree, to an important degree, upon this Middle East oil supply?

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Secretary, did you get Mr. Bush's question?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; I got the question.

On the advice given me by Admiral Radford, I would say that the actual aviation gasoline that is used there probably does not come primarily, immediately, from the Middle East, but I would say this, Senator: that if the Middle East should fall under Communist control, the position in all of Africa would become a very doubtful dependability from the standpoint of political repercussions there, because the Middle East countries exercise politically and psychologically a great deal of influence upon the whole of Africa; and indeed, in my opinion, if the Middle East were lost, it would carry with it the loss of Africa, at least there is a high degree of probability, and of course with that goes a great many things, not only the bases in north Africa but also extremely important raw materials which are obtained from Africa.

I think it is no secret that a great deal of the makings of our atomic weapons come from Africa and, of course, large amounts of copper and things of that sort.

Senator BUSH. Those bases, were they not originally placed there in line with our general policy of defense against possible Communist aggression so that we could have points in that area from which we could launch retaliatory attacks?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. That is a part and a very essential part of our whole defense system. You might call it the defense of the United States, as well as other parts of the free world—because we are all united in that respect—depends upon having such numbers of bases and sufficiently diversified bases around the world so that there can be this capacity for retaliation; and that capacity exists in a form which is not susceptible of all being knocked out perhaps by a single initial strike from the Soviet Union itself, and this is all part of that system.

If this area were lost, it would cut a great gap in our whole strategic defense policy.

OIL PRODUCTION

Senator BUSH. That is the point I wanted to bring out.

And furthermore, Mr. Secretary, the alternate route for sending oil to the West around the Cape of Good Hope, if the Middle East should fall, one might say, under Soviet Communist aggression, would it not really imperil the route via the Cape of Good Hope to a large extent?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it would do worse than that, Senator, because it would imperil the production.

Your sources of oil would then be gone, so there would be nothing for your tankers to carry even if you had the tankers and had the routes. That is the gravest aspect of the matter.

As things are today, despite the interruption of the Suez Canal and the interruption of the Iraq petroleum pipeline, there is still ample

production, some of it going through pipelines that remain open and some of it going with tankers around the Cape, but there remains the production.

If the contingency that you refer to would happen, there would not even be the production, so you do not get to the problem of transportation because you have got nothing to transport.

SECURITY IN MIDDLE EAST—ALLIES

Senator BUSH. Now, Mr. Secretary, there has been a frequently used phrase that we are going it alone in this resolution. I would just like to ask a question about that.

It seems to me that we are not going it alone, but rather in this particular resolution and by this policy we are endeavoring to do our part, our share, in a situation in which we are very much involved with other nations in the West. But let me ask this: Do you expect other countries, allies of our or otherwise, presumably allies of ours, to make similar declarations respecting the security of the Middle East, and their intentions in that connection?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would think that similar declarations have been made already by our allies; and indeed at the last meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council there was agreement as to the interdependence between Western Europe and the Middle East, so that there is no doubt about their attitude toward these matters being in that respect at least similar to our own.

Now their welcome in the area is not as warm as it was a year or two ago, and their capacity to help has been somewhat diminished. But their recognition of the importance of this thing is very great, and indeed our own action has been in part—I won't say prompted by, exactly, but encouraged—by declarations made by the Middle East countries themselves and by the countries of Western Europe that they regarded stronger and more palliative action by the United States as absolutely indispensable.

The ambassadors of many of the Middle Eastern countries came to me last month to urge in the strongest terms that we should take some such action, and to point out that if we did not do it, that their ability to hold on with non-Communist governments and regimes would be in grave jeopardy. But there is no sense in going it alone in the sense of adopting a policy which runs counter to the policy of our friends and our allies.

On the contrary, this runs exactly parallel with the kind of thing which they want done, and which to some extent they are not able to do independently of us at the present time.

Senator BUSH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have no other questions.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Long is absent.

I will ask Mr. Jackson if he has any questions.

SUEZ CRISIS

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Senator, I understood your testimony to be that there has been a dangerous situation in the Middle East for some time, a serious threat; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. And I also understand that you feel that this resolution will help to avert a conflict in the area?

Secretary DULLES. Avert attack against the area; yes.

Senator JACKSON. You mean that it will only act as a deterrent to outside aggression? I thought you-----

Secretary DULLES. I should have used perhaps the phrase "by aggression, direct or indirect," which was the phrase that President Truman used in his Greece-Turkey message.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, if this resolution had been brought before the Congress 6 months ago and acted upon, don't you think we would have averted the Suez affair?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I do not.

Senator JACKSON. Do you feel that we did not have any knowledge of what was going on prior to the Suez incident?

Secretary DULLES. We knew a great deal of what was going on. I went to London three times for conferences on this general matter. During the last part of July, I think, I went the first time, and then in August and again, I think, in October.

There were three conferences I attended in London dealing with the crises caused by the seizure by Nasser of the Suez Canal Co.

Senator JACKSON. Did we know or have reason to believe that the British, the French, the Israelis and/or all of them were going to make this attack that did take place?

Secretary DULLES. No. We knew that that was a course of action which had been under consideration for some time, and indeed that was the occasion for my first trip to London where I went on an emergency basis I think the end of July or thereabouts. That at that time did not include any knowledge that there was an Israeli attack in contemplation.

Senator JACKSON. But we knew that the British and French might attack.

Secretary DULLES. We knew that they were thinking of that as the course of action, and the United States did not think that was a wise course of action, and I went there for the purpose of explaining our point of view.

Senator JACKSON. Do you feel that the people within the executive branch of the Government then had no knowledge of any information that the Israelis were going to make an attack?

Secretary DULLES. No, we had no such knowledge.

Senator JACKSON. You had no such knowledge? You feel that the appropriate departments within the executive branch of the Government did not have that knowledge?

Secretary DULLES. No, we did not have that knowledge. Of course as soon as the total mobilization was ordered, then we suspected that something like that was in contemplation, and the President at once sent a personal message on an urgent basis to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, but that was the first inclination we had that any large scale attack might be in contemplation.

Senator JACKSON. When was that?

Secretary DULLES. There had been border raids back and forth, retaliatory raids.

Senator JACKSON. Yes. When was that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would have to get a calendar.

Senator JACKSON. I mean approximately.

Secretary DULLES. I think it was on Sunday, October 28, to the best of my recollection.

Senator JACKSON. The 28th of October?

Secretary DULLES. The 28th of October.

Senator JACKSON. That was the first information we had?

Secretary DULLES. I think so.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I think this is something that ought to be gone into in executive session because I am not sure that I quite agree with all of this.

Secretary DULLES. I think that the notice about the mobilization occurred when I was in Dallas talking to the Foreign Affairs Council there on Saturday, the 27th, and I think that that information came in while I was away, and it may have been on the 26th or 27th of October.

At any rate it is a matter of public record, I think.

Senator JACKSON. The Ben Gurion note was made public, yes?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. But that is the only information we had of Israeli intentions prior to that time?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. At the appropriate time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to go into that question when we get into executive session.

I will not pursue it any further here now.

Chairman GREEN. I wish to suggest that there might be a more appropriate time to do it than this.

Senator JACKSON. Yes, I said the reason I am not pursuing further questioning along this line is obvious.

You feel then that this resolution will not in anywise lessen the danger of conflict between States in the Middle East area?

Secretary DULLES. I feel, Senator, and I think I testified to the effect, that it will, I think, create a climate which will make it more possible to settle some of these intra-area conflicts, but that is a byproduct you might say of the resolution and not a direct result of the resolution.

Senator JACKSON. And you feel that had this resolution that you now request been in effect say last summer or early fall, that the British, the French and the Israelis would have moved nevertheless?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it is highly speculative, of course, to know what would have happened under a different state of facts. I do not know that I should be asked to speculate about that kind of a hypothetical case.

Senator JACKSON. Well, of course, I am trying to get at the urgency of this situation. I want to say that I agree with the need for strong and determined policy, and I want to try to support a good, strong stand in the Middle East, but we are getting a lot of mail and we have to answer our constituents.

This was gone into somewhat yesterday, and I do not want to be repetitious, but do you feel that the situation is more critical now say than it was in September or October?

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Secretary DULLES. As far as the danger of the area falling under control of international communism, there is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that it is far more critical.

Senator JACKSON. How about the military threat?

Secretary DULLES. The Soviet military threat?

Senator JACKSON. International communism, that is the way you are using it. You don't use "Soviet" in the resolution?

Secretary DULLES. I say countries controlled by international communism.

Senator JACKSON. Yes. Well, they are synonymous, but for the purpose—

Secretary DULLES. No, it is much broader. For instance, China we consider controlled by international communism.

Senator JACKSON. You feel that Red China is now independent of the Soviet Union or not subject to their domination at the present time?

Secretary DULLES. We believe that both Russia and mainland China are subject to the control of international communism.

Senator JACKSON. Who controls international communism?

Secretary DULLES. Well—

Senator JACKSON. Well, is it a joint operation between Russia and China? Are they operating jointly, do you think, as copartners now?

Secretary DULLES. International communism, Senator, is a phrase which I assume has a meaning from the standpoint of the Congress because it uses it very frequently, and the phrase "countries controlled by international communism" is a phrase which we did not invent. We picked it out of the present Mutual Security Act as a phrase which Congress—

Senator JACKSON. We want to know what it means in connection with this legislation.

Secretary DULLES. It means the same thing here, Senator, exactly as it meant and means in the Mutual Security Act.

Senator JACKSON. What did it mean in the Mutual Security Act?

Secretary DULLES. Congress passed the act and I assume knows what it meant.

Senator JACKSON. You folks in the executive branch administer it. What does it mean?

Secretary DULLES. Well, international communism is a conspiracy composed of a certain number of people, all of whose names I do not know, and many of whom I suppose are secret. They have gotten control of one government after another. They first got control of Russia after the First World War. They have gone on getting control of one country after another until finally they were stopped. But they have not gone out of existence.

International communism is still a group which is seeking to control the world, in my opinion.

Senator JACKSON. I am not going to get into a long philosophical discussion on it.

Secretary DULLES. You can have a long discussion, Senator, on whether or not the Russian State controls international communism or international communism controls the Russian State. There are all kinds of books and theses written about it. Stalin wrote a book about it. You can argue about that one for a long time. But I think the meaning is reasonably clear because it has been used by the Congress and is a well-known phrase.

Senator JACKSON. Would you not agree on this: that international communism has been used to date as an instrument of Russian foreign policy since 1948?

Secretary DULLES. I would put it the other way around.

Russian foreign policy is an instrument of international communism. I may say the Caracas resolution which was also endorsed I think unanimously by the Congress, talks about the danger of international communism getting control of political institutions.

Senator JACKSON. Do you think Tito still influences Russian foreign policy?

Secretary DULLES. No; I do not think Tito is controlled by international communism. He is communistic but he is not controlled by international communism.

Senator JACKSON. Since when do you think that has been true?

Secretary DULLES. Since he broke with the Cominform in 1948, I believe it was.

SERIOUSNESS OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

Senator JACKSON. You feel, you say, that the situation is more serious now. Could you tell the committee, within the realm of security, wherein the situation is more serious in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. The situation is more serious in the Middle East from the standpoint of the danger of attack by countries controlled by international communism because of various factors which I think I alluded to in my opening statement.

One of them is that the deterrent which was formerly provided in very considerable measure by certain countries of Western Europe no longer operates as a deterrent.

Secondly, the fact that the closing of the Suez Canal and some of the pipelines has very grievously affected the economies and the budgets of some of these countries so that they are in great difficulty in maintaining a stable international order.

From both of these standpoints the situation has become much more serious during the last few weeks.

Senator JACKSON. You say that some of the European countries have lost their deterrent capability?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Which ones are you referring to?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think one thing that I might refer to is the fact that the United Kingdom, by its treaty with Egypt, had the right and probably still has the right in theory at least in law to reoccupy the Suez base in the event there is an attack on the area from without.

The Egyptians have now given notice that they do not regard that right as continuing to exist. That illustrates the kind of thing I have in mind.

Senator JACKSON. Didn't we pressure the British a bit to get out of the Suez base and to leave under that stipulation?

Secretary DULLES. We felt that it was not practical for the British to have a base that would be really worth while in an unfriendly country, just as we believe that ourselves. We do not believe that our bases abroad depend essentially upon legalisms. We think that they

depend there for effectiveness upon the good will of the country where they are, and that is a point of view which we take with regard to our own bases and which we take with regard to anybody else's bases.

PRECEDENTS FOR RESOLUTION

Senator JACKSON. Now, Mr. Secretary, you state that this resolution has precedents?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. The principle of this resolution has been applied along with a dozen cases I suppose around the world.

Senator JACKSON. I just want my recollection refreshed.

Do you recall a resolution that we passed that embodies both the authority to the President of the United States to employ the Armed Forces and at the same time provides unlimited military and economic aid up to \$400 million, where that is all combined in one resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it is not in this resolution, Senator. Where did you get the figure \$400 million, sir?

Senator JACKSON. Well, you are given authority to remove the restrictions and utilize existing funds up to \$400 million, I believe.

Secretary DULLES. No; \$200 million.

Senator JACKSON. \$200 million, all right; \$200 million.

Can you cite a resolution where the two are combined, the factors that I have just mentioned?

Secretary DULLES. No; I cannot.

Senator JACKSON. So there is not a precedent for this particular resolution as it is in its entirety, is there?

Secretary DULLES. No; it is not an absolute blueprint of anything that has taken place in the past.

The principles of it are exactly the principles which we have applied in the past.

ECONOMIC AID

Senator JACKSON. Wouldn't it be better, and I am interested in giving the President a strong hand—wouldn't it be better to remove the economic aid and the foreign aid debate from this resolution and deal with the military problem separately, give the President that immediate authority—I want to help him—and then when Mr. Richards returns from his trip, we will have a bill of particulars as to how much this aid is going to cost, and we can act promptly.

Wouldn't that be better?

Secretary DULLES. It might and probably would facilitate the debate here in the Senate, but I believe we have got to balance against that some very important considerations, which are that in my opinion unless this resolution indicates a concern for the economic plight of the countries as well as for their military defense, it will largely fail in its intended purpose.

Now that concern for the economic plight of the countries can be shown, as is the case by this resolution, without authorizing or appropriating a single dollar more of money out of the Treasury of the United States.

Senator JACKSON. I understand that.

Secretary DULLES. And if you can accomplish a great result with no expenditure, it seems to me that the Congress would be willing and desirous of doing this.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, the only bad part of this is that you are amending the provisions in the Mutual Security Act in order to accomplish this objective.

It would seem to me to be a lot better to deal with this military problem without delay, give the President that authority, let your team go over there and report back what they need, and then we could act on the basis of the information that will be given to us.

What we are doing now is to give blanket authority to this team that will go into the Middle East, and they in effect will be able to obligate funds in the field, as I understand your previous testimony.

Secretary DULLES. That is essentially correct.

Senator JACKSON. We are in effect appropriating that money without any justification, just that there is an emergency. We do not know what they are going to obligate, whether they are going to build dams, irrigation projects or what have you.

We don't know whether it is going to involve capital outlay, technical assistance or what.

Secretary DULLES. The choice, Senator, is this. If the Congress insists that the money already authorized and appropriated shall be spent according to the program that was laid before the Congress a year ago, then that will be done.

I say to you, and I think commonsense confirms the fact, that in view of all that has happened during the last few weeks, that to spend the money in the way that was projected 18 months ago is not the most efficient way of doing it, and I am trying to find a way to spend the money already authorized and appropriated in a better way than will be the case if Congress does not give us this discretion.

I think it is foolish to spend money say on some long-term project that was sound 18 months ago, when the need may be to give some immediate relief to prevent a country going Communist. But if Congress insists that it must be spent in the old way, that is Congress' right.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, they do not have to spend the money immediately. They wait until Mr. Richards gets back. I just think this is a dangerous precedent.

Secretary DULLES. You mean to send all the aid to the area now?

Senator JACKSON. No, but you say there are projects out there that are no longer needed. If they are no longer needed, you ought to suspend them.

Secretary DULLES. They are needed but not in the priority that was thought to be the case 18 months ago.

Senator JACKSON. I do not see why the people that you have available to you cannot come in here and tell us exactly what they are going to do. I think it is a dangerous precedent indeed, to send a team out with a blank check to start writing out checks for projects throughout the Middle East, and to obligate those funds in the field.

It has never been done before to my knowledge on a scale that is proposed here. I think you are jeopardizing the immediate support that the President justifiably needs from Congress to strengthen his hand in dealing with the military situation.

But by mixing the military and economic aid this way, we may well jeopardize the whole program. That is just my own view.

Secretary DULLES. Well, I hope very much that that is not the case, because in my opinion the whole program will be jeopardized if Congress does not show concern with the economic plight of these countries at this time.

ISRAELI PROBLEM

Senator JACKSON. Now 1 or 2 other matters here and I will stop.

You have indicated that the Israeli problem is a matter for the United Nations, is that right?

I mean the settlement of the boundary has been fundamentally a U. N. responsibility.

Secretary DULLES. The U. N. is dealing with that problem at the present time. Not the long-term boundary problem but the problem of stabilizing the armistice lines.

Senator JACKSON. If that is the case, wouldn't it be well, in recognition of the serious problem that the Israeli, Egyptian and Jordanian conflict is for the peace of the Middle East, plus the Suez problem and plus the refugee problem, wouldn't it be wise for the United States, through appropriate action in the U. N., to insist that the U. N. troops stay in that area until there has been a resolution of the Egyptian-Israeli dispute, the Arab refugee problem and the Suez Canal difficulty?

All of that is essentially one problem.

Secretary DULLES. We would hope that those troops would be permitted to stay there until some of these problems emerge toward solution. Of course we are not in a position, you understand, to insist.

Senator JACKSON. I didn't say that. I suggested that we support, through appropriate action, which would require an amendment to the existing authority.

Secretary DULLES. I think you used the word "insist," but I am sure that wasn't what was meant.

Senator JACKSON. I didn't mean insist; I meant that we ought to take appropriate action through the U. N. Unless you settle those basic problems, I think the American people are going to be misled into thinking this resolution is going to bring peace.

The first thing you know, we will again have another flareup in this area.

AFGHANISTAN

Now, one other matter. I have noted with interest that nothing has been said about Afghanistan. It is a Moslem State, is it not, adjacent to the Soviet Union?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Would you tell the committee the political situation that exists within Afghanistan at the present time insofar as Soviet influence is concerned?

Secretary DULLES. Well, there is, I think, considerable Soviet influence in Afghanistan. They have made an economic loan to Afghanistan of, I think, \$100 million and a good deal of that money is already being actively spent in various economic developments, roadbuilding and things of that sort.

Senator JACKSON. Isn't it a fact that they are in the process of building a road for the first time from Termez, which is in the Soviet Union and the Republic of Uzbekistan to Kabul, and then from Kabul to the Pakistan frontier. Are you aware of that?

Mr. HOLLISTER. They are not building from Kabul to the Pakistan frontier.

Senator JACKSON. They don't plan to?

Mr. HOLLISTER. They may plan to but are not doing it now.

Senator JACKSON. It is a part of the Russian economic program, isn't it?

Secretary DULLES. We have some plans to build to the Pakistan frontier, but not the Soviet Union.

Senator JACKSON. But isn't it true that the Afghanistans have a slight quarrel with the Republic of Pakistan in connection with an area on the Afghan-Pakistan frontier?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, there is an area called Pushtoonistan, where tribes have been fighting each other since time immemorial, I guess.

Senator JACKSON. I mean, the Russians are building a road which will give them military access to Afghanistan by road for the first time.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, that could be.

Senator JACKSON. That is correct, isn't it?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Then isn't it also true that the Soviets are in the process of training and providing support to the Afghan Army and their military establishment?

Secretary DULLES. I think they are giving it some slight support, yes.

Senator JACKSON. Isn't it true that the Soviet infiltration in Afghanistan is serious?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. I wondered why Afghanistan was left out of this area.

Secretary DULLES. Well, I don't know that it was.

Senator JACKSON. Well, is it included?

Secretary DULLES. I would prefer to discuss that in executive session, if I may.

Senator JACKSON. All right. Now, Senator Saltonstall asked you a question that I didn't get the answer to. He asked what happens under this resolution where a state is being subverted by international communism, is being infiltrated and taken over.

What can you do under this resolution to stop that, to save a state that refuses to ask for help, military or economic.

Secretary DULLES. I do not know that you can do anything particular under this resolution. Of course, we believe that under this resolution, that that contingency will not arise.

Senator JACKSON. Do you feel that the passage of this resolution will preclude a state from being subverted from within?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, I think it will.

Senator JACKSON. Why is it that in Afghanistan where we have been pouring in millions and we are worse off as far as our foreign policy is concerned today than we were prior to giving the aid?

Secretary DULLES. We have not contributed very much to Pakistan.

Senator JACKSON. No, Afghanistan, I said.

Secretary DULLES. To Afghanistan.

Senator JACKSON. We haven't, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES. No. We haven't contributed nearly as much as the Soviet Union has, for example.

Senator JACKSON. I am talking about the period prior to the recent events. Have we not appropriated quite a substantial sum of money in the way of dam construction?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Do you want me to answer that?

Senator JACKSON. Yes; I would like to know how much we have spent, Mr. Hollister, in Afghanistan, compared with what the Soviets have spent prior to their economic agreement of a year ago.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Well, I can't give you the exact figures of what the Soviets have spent on their promised loan.

Senator JACKSON. Tell us what we have spent.

Mr. HOLLISTER. We have, just before the close of the last fiscal year, we made an agreement with Afghanistan to put a substantial amount of money into developing airports, and to supplying them with a certain amount of equipment, and we have also got a contract with Pan American which has just been signed up, for technical aid to their airlines.

That has been the most substantial thing that has been done.

We have also planned to give them certain help in further development of their Helmand Valley. What you are talking about as having been done in the Helmand Valley in the past was not done under mutual security legislation. That was a loan that Afghanistan worked out with the Export-Import Bank some years ago, and it was a direct loan to the Export-Import Bank.

Senator JACKSON. It is not the loan we have put in there, then?

Mr. HOLLISTER. From this country.

Senator JACKSON. Through an instrumentality of the United States Government.

Mr. HOLLISTER. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. The Export-Import Bank?

Mr. HOLLISTER. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. And that runs into millions, does it not?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Do you feel that the Soviet Union has done less than we have, or more, prior to a year ago?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I think, unless we knew what the Soviet Union had done, it would be pretty hard to say, Senator. The Soviet Union has done more in the last few years than we have done.

Senator JACKSON. Or in the last few months.

Mr. HOLLISTER. You must have some figures that I don't know about.

Senator JACKSON. I wish you would supply the unclassified information that you have on what aid we have provided, either through mutual security or through loans, through the Export-Import Bank, and what the Soviets have done, and with the dates.

Mr. HOLLISTER. All I can say is, we will give you what we have done. We can't give you what the Soviets have done, but we can give you the information we have available. That is very hard to get.

Senator JACKSON. You have public information through our Embassy there, what they have announced they have done.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes; they announce they do a number of things, and then they don't do them.

Senator JACKSON. Don't you think our Embassy people have a general idea? I was in Kabul in September when I left the Soviet Union, and I have some ideas, I think.

Mr. HOLLISTER. You may have more—

Senator JACKSON. Most of it has been done just recently.

Mr. HOLLISTER. It has been done, most of it, to a large amount, in the last couple of years, I would say.

(The information referred to follows:)

United States assistance to Afghanistan:

| | |
|--|--------------|
| United States Export-Import Bank loan for Helmand Valley development----- | \$39,500,000 |
| Total obligated for assistance to Afghanistan from United States economic aid programs administered by ICA and predecessor agencies as of June 30, 1956, of which----- | 25,118,000 |
| Loans----- | \$8,434,000 |
| Sales of wheat for local currency (sec. 550)----- | 1,172,000 |
| Technical cooperation grants----- | 7,212,000 |
| Development assistance grants----- | 10,300,000 |
| Total United States as of June 30, 1956----- | 64,618,000 |

Nearly half of the United States technical assistance has been for the purpose of supporting the Helmand Valley project, a regional agriculture and reclamation development. The remainder of the ICA Technical Cooperation program is devoted primarily to education through contracts with Wyoming University and the Columbia Teachers' College and to rural development through the Near East Foundation. Small projects in public administration, mining, and public health are also underway. Of the Export-Import loan, \$37.2 million has been for the Helmand Valley's major civil-works construction, and \$2.3 million was earmarked for the establishment of a Central Highway Maintenance Organization. The local currency proceeds of the section 550 wheat-sale programs will be used for developmental purposes as agreed between the two governments. Development Assistance of \$15.3 million (\$10.3 million of grants and \$5.0 million of loans) obligated during fiscal year 1956 will assist establishment of an internal air-transport system and supply some equipment to help maintain the Helmand Valley Canal system.

In addition to all the foregoing, under Public Law 480, title II, the United States has agreed with Afghanistan on a sale of wheat valued at \$5.7 million (CCC cost). Including transportation, the total program cost is estimated at \$8.0 million.

Soviet bloc assistance to Afghanistan:

Loans and credits:

| | |
|---|-------------|
| U. S. S. R.—Bakery, silos, street paving, buses, oil storage tanks----- | \$6,600,000 |
| U. S. S. R.—Various projects of economic development----- | 100,000,000 |
| U. S. S. R.—Recent armament credit----- | 35,000,000 |
| Czechoslovakia—Cement plant and light industries----- | 5,000,000 |

Total Soviet bloc as of June 30, 1956----- 146,600,000

The latest information available to the United States on the \$100 million Soviet credit of December 1955 indicates that under that credit the U. S. S. R. undertook to devote special attention to developments in agriculture, irrigation, power, establishment of automotive maintenance shops, and construction of an airport at Kabul. The Afghan Government signed project agreements on three projects on June 18, 1956, (1) an automotive repair shop, (2) a fertilizer factory and (3) a materials testing laboratory. In addition to the oil-storage tanks, grain

silos, asphalt paving, and asphalt plant in Kabul which were financed by the earlier \$6.6 million Soviet credit, the Afghans appear to be negotiating with the Soviets for a considerable number of development projects, none of which have reached the implementation stage, but some of which are evidently being surveyed at this time. So far there is no indication of extensive Soviet participation in highway development, except for occasional Soviet-built machines employed by the Afghan Government to repair existing dirt roads in various parts of the country. To date only a very few of these machines have been seen south of the Hindu Kusik Mountains, since the present concentration of Afghans and Russian interest appears to be improvement of roads along their common border in northern Afghanistan. As far as is known, the Soviet bloc credits are all repayable in commodities. In addition to these, there were two minor grants to Afghanistan, consisting of a small hospital unit and some buses, no Russian grants of technical assistance were included.

GROUND FORCES SUPPORT

Senator JACKSON. Now one last question.

Mr. Secretary, have we discussed with our allies the need for bases to support local forces to implement this policy, such as staging areas and so on that we might need?

Secretary DULLES. No; we have not discussed those with our allies, because we believe that we have the facilities that we now need to implement this program.

Senator JACKSON. Do you feel that we have ample bases and staging areas to maintain local forces, United States Armed Forces to implement this program, without making any arrangements with our allies or friends overseas?

Secretary DULLES. I have not spoken, Senator, about maintaining United States ground forces in the area. There is not any present planning for that.

Senator JACKSON. It would be rather difficult to move ground forces into those states. I think the Soviets really would call us imperialists. I am talking about adjacent areas.

Secretary DULLES. Well, our principal arm, I take it, would be the Sixth Fleet and its airpower, and the understanding we have with Turkey, which is already a member of the North Atlantic Treaty, and with which we do a good deal of cooperative planning.

Senator JACKSON. I am talking about ground forces to support this program.

Secretary DULLES. I was just saying that we don't now plan, as far as I am aware, any ground forces to support this program.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, I take it that you are going to rely on naval and air power to implement this.

Secretary DULLES. Primarily, I think.

Senator JACKSON. The authority here covers everything.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. It says, "employ the Armed Forces," I think, of the United States.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, in the event of an armed attack.

Senator JACKSON. Yes, but I take it that you feel there is no need to have ground forces adjacent to the area involved in this resolution, in order to properly implement this program.

Secretary DULLES. That is my feeling; yes. You can question Admiral Radford more fully about that, but you know we have the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which carries somewhat similar commitments as regards areas of Southeast Asia. We have never—

Senator JACKSON. We do have military units, ground units, however, in the Far East; do we not?

Secretary DULLES. Not within the endangered areas; no.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I wasn't suggesting, Mr. Secretary, that these troops be placed in the Middle East States. I don't suppose they will grant that permission.

I was merely trying to ascertain whether or not we have made any agreements for staging areas to be located in those countries that are allied with the United States one way or the other.

Secretary DULLES. No. We have already certain arrangements, I believe, with Turkey, as far as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but other than that, we have not made any arrangements. Whether they will be needed or not will be determined, I suppose, in the light of developments and after this legislation is passed.

Senator JACKSON. That is all.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Capehart?

Senator CAPEHART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First I want to say, Mr. Secretary, that having sat here for nearly 10 hours or over 10 hours listening to you yesterday and today, I think you have done a very remarkable job. One has to admire your patience. Some 27 Senators have been asking you questions repeatedly, and I think it is a great tribute to you, the frankness with which you have answered all their questions.

They may not have agreed with you, I don't know that I agree with every one of your answers, but I certainly have a great admiration for your frankness in answering these questions.

My conscience hurts me a little bit to ask you to continue here. It is nearly 5 o'clock, but I do have a few questions.

GREECE-TURKEY LOAN

Primarily, I would like to get the record straight, or rather, make a record here, in respect to our foreign aid help that we have given over the past 10 or 12 years.

In talking about this help, now, I am not thinking in terms of World War I or World War II, or the United Nations. When was the first so-called foreign aid or military aid project presented to the American people?

Secretary DULLES. You say which was the first?

Senator CAPEHART. Yes; which one was it, when and where? Was it the Marshall plan or the Greek-Turkish loan?

Secretary DULLES. I think the first one was a bill which Senator Vandenberg and I introduced as a bill jointly in the Senate in August of 1949. That was the first bill which authorized the appropriation of \$1 billion, of which \$500 million was for immediate expenditure and \$500 million for contract authority as the first military defense act for Europe.

Senator CAPEHART. That was what act? Was that the Greek-Turkish loan?

Secretary DULLES. No. The Greece-Turkey appropriation was not—that was money advanced, as I recall, through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, \$400 million. That was in March 1947.

Senator CAPEHART. That was given to whom, primarily?

Secretary DULLES. Greece and Turkey.

Senator CAPEHART. That was the Greek-Turkish loan.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. Now, what was the purpose of that?

Secretary DULLES. The purpose of that was to strengthen the economy and the military organization of Greece and Turkey so that they could be more secure against the very imminent threat of Communist attack. At that time there was Communist attack going on, particularly across the Greek border.

Senator CAPEHART. And what was the amount of that?

Secretary DULLES. I don't recall how it was apportioned between Greece and Turkey.

Senator CAPEHART. No; I mean the total amount.

Secretary DULLES. \$400 million.

Senator CAPEHART. Did that cover both economic and military aid?

Secretary DULLES. It did, for that year. I think there was a supplemental appropriation later on.

Senator CAPEHART. And did that bill give the President of the United States the right to employ all personnel of the United States?

Secretary DULLES. It did.

Senator CAPEHART. And did we send military men into Greece and Turkey at that time?

Secretary DULLES. We sent in quite a few military personnel, although we did not actually detail any combat units to the area, as far as I am aware.

MARSHALL PLAN

Senator CAPEHART. Now, was the Marshall plan the next project?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. That came along in 1948.

Senator CAPEHART. And what was the total amount spent on the Marshall plan?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it was about 16—

Senator CAPEHART. We are getting now toward the end.

Secretary DULLES. It was about \$16 billion.

Senator CAPEHART. What was the purpose of the Marshall plan?

Secretary DULLES. It was to rehabilitate the economies of the Western European countries so that they could better retain their freedom.

Senator CAPEHART. And did that include both economic and military assistance?

Secretary DULLES. No; that was entirely economic.

Senator CAPEHART. Entirely economic at that time. But it later developed into a military—

Secretary DULLES. The first military act which was the predecessor of what have been since the Mutual Security Act, at least their military aspect was the act that I referred to, which was passed in the Congress in August 1949.

Senator CAPEHART. Then later we had the economic development corporation as applied to Western Europe; did we not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. And how much money did we put in that?

TOTAL UNITED STATES AID TO EUROPE SINCE 1947

Secretary DULLES. Well, I am told that the total figure for Western Europe, which includes the Marshall plan and the military assistance, amounts to about \$25 billion, but I can't break it down.

Senator CAPEHART. In other words, total help given to Western Europe, starting in 1947 up to date, has been about \$25 billion?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. And the purpose was what?

Secretary DULLES. To strengthen Western Europe economically and militarily, so that it would be able to resist Communist subversion and attack, and stay free and independent.

KOREAN WAR

Senator CAPEHART. And we, of course, fought the Korean war, did we not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. What did the Korean war cost?

Secretary DULLES. Well, those costs have never been segregated. I think it has been estimated at several billion dollars, but they were never segregated, from a budget standpoint, from our current military expenditures.

Senator CAPEHART. Would a good guess be \$20 billion?

Secretary DULLES. I think that would be too high, probably.

Senator CAPEHART. Possibly \$15 billion?

Secretary DULLES. Admiral Radford says he thinks around \$15 billion.

Senator CAPEHART. And what was the purpose of fighting the Korean war?

Secretary DULLES. That was to preserve the Republic of Korea against being taken over by international communism, and to prevent the threat that that would carry to our entire position in the western Pacific.

PURPOSE OF MILITARY PACTS AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Senator CAPEHART. Now, we have entered into some 8 or 10 different military pacts or security arrangements with some 43 nations, I think. What was the purpose of those?

Secretary DULLES. The purpose of those pacts was primarily to create a deterrent to Communist-inspired attacks which would jeopardize their freedom, and we believed, in the long run, our own freedom.

Senator CAPEHART. We have built X number of airbases in Turkey. I think that is no secret.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, we have.

Senator CAPEHART. And Spain and other places.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. For what purpose?

Secretary DULLES. For the purpose of creating a deterrent to attack by the Soviet Union against ourselves or our allies.

Senator CAPEHART. And we entered into the Formosa resolution, which was agreed to and passed by the Congress, which gave the President the right to use armed forces if, in his judgment, that was the thing to do; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. Now we are talking about an agreement with the Middle Eastern countries for which we are asking no additional funds whatsoever at the moment; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

Senator CAPEHART. All we are asking for, or all the resolution asks for is that, in the judgment of the President, if it becomes necessary, he might use force; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct; and use with somewhat more discretion \$200 million out of some \$750 million already appropriated.

TURKEY AND SPAIN

Senator CAPEHART. We have a treaty, do we not, with Turkey?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. As a result of our airbases. And if Turkey was attacked by any nation of the world, would we not immediately go to its rescue?

Secretary DULLES. Well, certainly, if it was attacked by Soviet Russia, we would go.

Senator CAPEHART. And isn't that true of Spain at the moment, as the result of our airbases in Spain?

Secretary DULLES. We have no treaty with Spain, but the practical effect is that if there were an attack upon Spain, it would almost surely involve an attack upon the armed forces of the United States, to which we would surely react.

REASON FOR ADOPTING RESOLUTION

Senator CAPEHART. Now, being one that has been very, very critical over the years of all of these things that we have been discussing, wouldn't one have to come to this conclusion: that as a result of all the things that we have enumerated, and all the treaties that we have made, and all the commitments that we have, that therein lies the best or the one valid reason for accepting this recommendation of the President?

Secretary DULLES. To my mind, the Nation is so deeply committed to this course of conduct that it would be unthinkable if we should stop at this point and, in a sense, gag at a gnat after having swallowed a camel.

Senator CAPEHART. Would you compare it with running a 100-yard race for 95 yards and then quitting at the end of it?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. I have said he who wins the last battle wins it all. You could also put it: He who finishes the course wins all.

Senator CAPEHART. And isn't what is being asked for so small in comparison—that is, economically speaking or moneywise—to all the other agreements that we have made, and moneys that we have spent, that one can hardly think of them in the same breath?

Secretary DULLES. I think we get a greater increase in security this way, with least expense, than in any of the other cases that you have mentioned.

We already have the military forces necessary to operate here as a deterrent in the Mediterranean and in the bases which are in the area. They are there for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty. They can equally well be used for other purposes.

The money has already been appropriated, and the only question, really, in my mind that is before the Congress in this matter is as to whether at this point, after having gone so far ahead in so many directions and at such a great cost along this line, that we now want to reverse our field. I don't believe we do.

IMPORTANCE OF MIDDLE EAST RAW MATERIALS

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Secretary, maybe I ought not to ask this question. It would be better to be handled in executive session, but isn't it a fact that whether we like it or whether we do not, we must be realistic about the matter of raw materials in the section that we are talking about, and that you cannot possibly win against this ideology that we are fighting throughout the world, if we lose this territory?

Is that a fair question?

Secretary DULLES. I don't like to be categorical or admit defeat under any circumstances, but I say it would be extremely difficult.

Senator CAPEHART. Not that it would mean so much to the Soviets as it would mean to them to deny particularly Western Europe the right to use these raw materials.

Secretary DULLES. The Soviets have no need for the natural resources in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, they have done the same as our exporters, but the ability to cut off the supply of those materials to Western Europe would give them virtually a stranglehold upon the economic life of that part of the world.

Senator CAPEHART. And to be denied their raw materials to the free world, and particularly Western Europe, means that the potential enemy who does not need those raw materials automatically wins the so-called race, does it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. It means, in effect, the 25 billion we have already spent goes down the drain.

Senator CAPEHART. Do you think the American people realize at the moment what it would mean to the economy of the United States if those raw materials of the Middle East are lost to the world?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I don't believe that we have adequately wakened up to that possibility. But, of course, if the economy of Europe is lost to us, the effect of that upon our own economy would be catastrophic.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR MIDDLE EAST

Senator CAPEHART. One more question and then I am finished, and that is, after we have entered into so many, many mutual security arrangements, peace treaties, the United Nations, and fought the Korean war and spent, not counting the cost of World War I and World War II, literally billions and billions and billions of dollars, who is responsible for our failure to tie this Middle East situation down many, many years ago?

Why wasn't it tied down many years ago? Why was it left open there when we were entering into the Marshall plan, and the Greek-Turkish loan, and the Greek-Turkish business?

Who was responsible for leaving the most important part of the world to the free nations of the world wide open, without any security agreements, without any military help to speak of, when any 6-year-old child should have known that the success or failure of the fight between the 2 ideologies in the world, in my opinion, lies right there? Who was responsible for that?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would not like to answer that question, Senator.

Senator CAPEHART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. May I ask the Secretary this: I said that we would try to end this hearing at 5 o'clock. There are three gentlemen who have not been heard from and one of them is absent. The other two say they won't take more than 10 minutes apiece. But I don't like to keep you any longer than necessary.

Secretary DULLES. I would rather stay, Senator, so that before you recess—

Chairman GREEN. The others can finish in less than 10 minutes apiece. Then we will have completed the list.

Secretary DULLES. Fine. I will be glad to cooperate in that.

Chairman GREEN. Knowing these have been 2 hard days, I don't like to impose on you.

Mr. Barrett.

Senator BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I will be very brief. You have been very kind and very considerate. It seems to me that you touched on the nub of this whole problem a moment ago.

Now, for a long, long time Russia has had its eyes on the Middle East. That was true under the Czars, and it was and is true under the Bolsheviks. The only difference is that the Bolsheviks did something about it. They moved in, and they are in there now.

MIDDLE EAST OIL

As my colleague, Senator Bush, and Senator Capehart pointed out, the situation in the Middle East, insofar as resources are concerned, has changed materially in the last 15 years.

Fifteen years ago we had an oil reserve of 35 billion barrels in this country, and today we have the same 35 billion barrels of reserves. On the other hand, the Middle East had a reserve at that time of 6 billion barrels, and today it has a reserve of 250 billion barrels of oil, and today it is supplying about 75 percent of the free world's oil requirements.

Secretary DULLES. We have had another development, sir, that might also be mentioned, and I hadn't alluded, I think, to it up until now.

During the last few years the economy of Europe has changed, a coal economy to an oil economy.

Senator BARRETT. That is right.

There is no way to transport these bombs or get these airplanes to fly unless you have oil to make the gasoline.

The way it seems to me, Mr. Secretary, we don't have any other alternative except to approve this legislation, but still we must admit that there is a calculated risk in going ahead with this proposal.

That little area in the Middle East is packed with such a tremendous oil resource; in fact, there is enough oil in that area to pay off our debt three times. Each of the wells in that section of the world produces about five or 6 thousand barrels a day while wells in this country produce about 13,000 barrels a day on the average. It seems to me that there is great question about how far we can go if that oil is shut off from the free world.

But by the same token, it seems to me that Russia knows all this, just as much as we do, and they are not going to give up as easily as some people seem to think. They know as much about those resources there in the Middle East as any of the rest of us.

QUESTION OF WINNING BY ECONOMIC AID THOSE COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO RUSSIA

Here is a question that seems to me we ought to get an answer on. Do you think that we can win over those countries in the Middle East that are friendly to Russia, such as Syria and Egypt, by economic aid as a result of this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. I think we can, Senator.

I would say this: that I believe that the issues which we face here in the Middle East are perhaps more serious, more complicated, and the issues are less clear, than in any other single spot in the world.

I am quite sure that there will be a strong Soviet reaction. They are, of course, involved in many other departments but I do not think that they are going to let victory in this area elude them without a very strong effort.

We may find the Soviet reaction here stronger than almost anywhere else in the world where we have tried to apply the principle we have underlain in our past action and which underlies this.

Also, as I pointed out, there are within the area cross-currents which the Soviet Union can take advantage of. Nations hate nations; people hate people, and that is not just between Egypt and the Israelis. There are differences between the Arab countries themselves.

The Soviet Union has a chance to move in and play its favorite game of playing one against the other. I do not minimize the fact that this is going to be a very tough problem. It is not going to be solved just by passing this resolution.

The problem of applying the resolution, the diplomatic efforts that will have to be made, are going to be immense, and the outcome is by no means certain. It is not easy at all.

But I do say this, Senator: Without this resolution, I would really feel hopeless of being able to overcome those difficulties.

Senator BARRETT. I agree, Mr. Secretary, and I think that the people of this country and the people of the world ought to know by now that the Russians have never given up their overall objective to get control of the free world. Certainly, the easiest way for them to achieve their objective is to take over those tremendous resources in the Middle East.

ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT

Now, the other question that bothers me a little is this: Assume that the resolution is passed and carried out. Does it increase the danger that we will become involved in the internal difficulties between Israel and the Arab States?

Secretary DULLES. Increase the likelihood?

Senator BARRETT. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. I don't think so.

Senator BARRETT. Well, it seems to me, to be realistic about it, that we have got to take into consideration the fact that Russia will bend every conceivable effort just to do that very thing.

Secretary DULLES. Russia has certainly tried to stir up that issue. I think they deliberately had that as a purpose when they started supplying arms to Egypt a year or more ago, and certainly, they are going to try to keep that issue alive.

Whether the issue will subside or not as a result of what we can do under this resolution, I don't know.

I think that it will. I believe that we can, through a proper and wise use of the authority that is proposed here, that we can minimize the Soviet influence in the area, and thereby minimize its malevolent purposes of stirring up trouble within the countries of the area.

But the future is certainly one where we are confronted with great difficulties. As I say, I don't think for a minute that the Soviet Union is going to roll over and play dead just because this resolution is passed.

Senator BARRETT. I think my 10 minutes have expired, Mr. Chairman. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Ervin, sorry you have been delayed so long.

EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES-CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Secretary, I have trouble with a constitutional question. Andrew Jackson said his oath to support the Constitution obligated him to support the Constitution as Andy Jackson interpreted it. I have the same feeling.

Now, in my opinion, the constitutional power of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy does not permit him to commit Armed Forces of America to action, without a declaration of war by Congress, or a ratified treaty or a congressional authorization, except in cases where it is necessary for him to do so to repel an actual or threatened attack upon the United States or its Territories, or an actual or threatened attack upon the Armed Forces of the United States.

That being my interpretation of the Constitution, the solicitation of my vote for this proposition is, according to my way of thinking, a solicitation for me to vote to delegate to the President the power of Congress to declare a state of war in the Middle East at his sole, unbridled discretion, so I have trouble there.

Now, is my interpretation of the Constitution wrong, as one lawyer to another?

Secretary DULLES. If I have followed you rightly, Senator, you said that one of the conditions was that if the employment of armed forces is authorized. This would be such an authorization.

Senator ERVIN. The Constitution contemplates that the Congress, rather than the President, shall determine the question whether the Armed Forces of the United States should be committed to offensive war, and that being so, this is a resolution which asks Congress, as I see it, to delegate to the President the power to make a determination which the Constitution contemplates that the Congress should make.

Secretary DULLES. I would question that, Senator.

Now, you also indicated treaties. Of course, I don't think treaties can override the Constitution, but I think it must be within the power of this Government to decide and declare in advance that the Armed Forces of the United States would be used in certain contingencies.

If we don't have that power anywhere, if that question must be left uncertain until the attack occurs, then we don't possess the current power, the power to end miscalculations, which is essential, I think, for our very national survival.

I believe that it is entirely within the Constitution of the United States that the Congress should determine, or the Senate, acting through its treaty process, should determine in advance that certain action is so hostile to the United States that the President would be authorized to react against it.

Senator ERVIN. Well, this resolution doesn't say exactly that. It says that the President shall make that determination.

In other words, conditions are not laid down, and it is giving the discretionary authority to the President to act or refuse to act, and so the result of this resolution, in my judgment, is a delegation by Congress of its constitutional powers to the President.

UNITED STATES ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

Bypassing that question, I have other troubles with it. You have pointed out that countries of Western Europe are dependent upon this oil, and I find that that is certainly true, that there are fifteen countries of Europe, outside of the Iron Curtain, that are vitally concerned about the continuing flow of this oil. They are Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland, Denmark, Italy, Turkey, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, France, Austria, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.

Now, under this proposal, the United States proposes to go in there and assume this entire responsibility without calling for any of these countries to furnish a single man or a single cent toward the discharge of this terrible task, is that not so?

Secretary DULLES. No, that is not entirely so, because if the contingency that is envisioned here should occur, almost surely, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, of which Turkey is a member, would be brought into the situation, and also, the Southeast Asia Treaty, of which Pakistan is a member, would be drawn into the situation.

Senator ERVIN. Let me rephrase the question.

If Congress passes this resolution, it will be obligating the United States alone to perform this task, would it not?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it would be obligated to do it alone if it did not involve the North Atlantic Treaty area, which includes Turkey, if it did not involve the Southeast Asia area, which includes Pakistan.

Senator ERVIN. Isn't most of your powder keg in other areas of the Middle East, rather than those? The danger is really in the other sections of the Middle East rather than in those areas, is it not?

Secretary DULLES. I think that there is a gap there, particularly represented by Iran and Iraq, which is now covered, not by the North Atlantic Treaty. Of course, it is covered by the Baghdad Pact, which would involve the United Kingdom.

Senator ERVIN. As I draw this deduction from your testimony, that owing to the great number of divisions in the Middle East, that we cannot safely arm the people of those countries in most instances for aggressive warfare, is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. That being true, since this plan does not envisage receiving any assistance from the 15 European countries, which are so strongly dependent upon this oil, and since we cannot expect aid of any substantial nature in aggressive warfare from the people of that locality, then this plan, in effect, undertakes to reserve in large measure the exclusive privilege of fighting wars over there to America.

Secretary DULLES. Well, I wouldn't put it quite that way, Senator, the exclusive privilege of wars. The whole purpose of this thing is to prevent a war.

Senator ERVIN. I realize that, but if this resolution passes in this situation, and a Korean-like situation exists, if Russia, for example, were to arm one of the nations of the Middle East and started in to offensive warfare, the United States would be without any aid, any legal capacity to call on any other nation on the face of the earth for any assistance, wouldn't it?

Secretary DULLES. We would be in somewhat the same situation we were in in the case of Korea, where we started in before we knew whether or not anybody would help us.

Senator ERVIN. Exactly.

Secretary DULLES. But they did come along, 15 other nations did come along to help.

Senator ERVIN. Well, we were in Korea, I think, at the instance of the United Nations. At least, that is what we have always been told.

This is not a United Nations proposition. This is a proposition of the Government of the United States, and under this you say it is a very dangerous situation over there. If it is a very dangerous situation, there is likely to be a war, isn't there?

Secretary DULLES. No; not if we deal with it properly.

Senator ERVIN. I am not talking about an economic situation now; I am talking about a military situation.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

USE OF GROUND FORCES

Senator ERVIN. Do you go so far as to state it was not the plan that we would station any ground forces over in that area?

Secretary DULLES. There is no such present plan that I know of.

Senator ERVIN. That is what worries me about the hurry about this thing.

If we have no present plan to station ground forces in that area, then in the event of war, started like on the Korean basis, with ground troops, we would have to bring men in from some other area of the world, would we not?

Secretary DULLES. I think that Admiral Radford can clarify some of this when he testifies, but let me say this, Senator, on the question of urgency:

As I have indicated here, I think, several countries of this area told us last month that unless the United States could quickly make clear its intention to concern itself seriously with this area, and do so within

a matter of days they thought there was great danger that the area would decompose and be lost.

Now, we urged them to hold on, and said: "Now, hold on."

I said to them: "I think you can count upon the United States taking action, and taking it promptly. I can't tell you now just what it will be or the precise date, but be of good heart and hold on."

And they are doing so.

Senator ERVIN. Then the value of this resolution is propaganda value, isn't it, or psychological?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the words "propaganda" and "psychological" are words which are often misunderstood.

I would say it is quite essential that these countries should know, and know positively and as strongly as we can make it, that they don't stand alone.

Senator ERVIN. But the thing that bothers me about it, as you contemplate the operation of this plan, if we are going to have sufficient opportunity to move in ground forces from other areas of the world into this area, then why will we not have sufficient opportunity in the event some emergency arises, to have Congress act in a constitutional manner before the armed services are actually employed there?

Secretary DULLES. The employment of armed services does not depend upon moving ground troops from the United States over to the Middle East. We have got striking power that can be brought into play in a matter of minutes already in that area.

Senator ERVIN. You cannot defeat infantry with that power, if ground troops move in on the other side. You can't very well defeat them by the use of naval power or by the use of air power, because they can dig into the ground pretty well.

Secretary DULLES. You can deter them, I think, from moving in. You see, the whole theory—let's take our whole Southeast Asia Security Treaty. There was some talk there and some desire on the part of some of the members, that we should build up an actual force in the area, and we said we felt that would be a source of weakness rather than strength, that the important thing was to keep strategic power available at a central location, with striking power.

That is the theory upon which the United States is operating in the whole Western Pacific. That would be the same theory upon which you would operate in this area.

Senator ERVIN. I understand you to say with reference to section 3 that you think it is best to pass section 3, that is, to authorize the use of \$200 million for any purpose that the President sees fit there, that it is necessary for us to pass that in order to indicate to the people there our interests in their economic plight. You stated that, as I understood it.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

CHANGES IN MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SITUATION

Senator ERVIN. Well, does not the fact that last year the Congress passed appropriations of \$750 million for use in that area of the world indicate our interests in that economic plight sufficiently?

Secretary DULLES. That indicated an interest in a very different kind of economic plight than exists today.

The economic plight that we were dealing with a year ago is very different from now, when they have been cut off in much of the area from a large part of their normal revenues, and it is just like if you prescribe a certain diet for a person who is in a certain state of health, and all of a sudden he gets another sickness, you say: "Well, don't bother me again, I gave you a diet."

Well, the fellow says: "That diet was all right for me then, but now I have got something else wrong with me."

You say: "Never mind; I showed my interest in you."

Senator ERVIN. I understood you to say we had given those people in grants somewhere in the neighborhood of \$25 billion.

Secretary DULLES. That was Western Europe.

Senator ERVIN. You did state that we had appropriated—

Secretary DULLES. I said there is appropriated—

Senator ERVIN (continuing). \$750 million?

Secretary DULLES. There is appropriated this year for the general area of the Middle East for military and economic assistance about \$750 million.

Senator ERVIN. If that is not sufficient to assure them or give that reassurance, how much more would we have to appropriate to do it?

Secretary DULLES. I am not asking, Senator, for a single dollar more to be appropriated for that purpose.

All I am saying is that it was appropriated and has been planned up to the present time to be used to meet a certain economic condition, and that economic condition is now suddenly changed, and some part of that same money ought to be used in a somewhat different way.

Senator ERVIN. Just one more question, I think.

REMOVAL OF BRITISH TROOPS

As a matter of fact, this area has been made the more unstable by the removal of approximately 85,000 British troops from it, hasn't it, during the past several years?

Secretary DULLES. I think that is a matter of judgment. My opinion is it would be far more unstable at the present time if those troops had not been removed.

Senator ERVIN. Well, as a matter of fact, up to about 3 years ago there were approximately 85,000 British troops stationed in the Middle East, were there not?

Secretary DULLES. There were at the Suez base between eighty and ninety thousand people. Some of those were technicians, but many of them were troops.

Senator ERVIN. And they were removed largely at the insistence of the American Government, were they not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Well, the American Government—

Secretary DULLES. The American Government expressed the view, which I have just expressed here to you, namely, we did not believe that that base would be a usable and effective base unless it could be maintained with the good will of the Egyptian people.

That is a proposition which I believed very strongly, which I applied to ourselves as much as I applied it to anybody else. The application of that, the British agreed with it.

Senator ERVIN. That was a communication by you to the British Government, was it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; sure, I told that to the British Government. But I may say if they had not independently agreed with it, they would not have done it just because I asked them to.

Senator ERVIN. But they didn't do it until after you had suggested the advisability of that, did they?

Secretary DULLES. There was a difference of opinion within the British Government itself on that proposition. They became persuaded quite independently of our advice or our views, that there was no use trying to keep a base in Egypt if the Egyptian people were hostile.

Indeed, the weakness was so great, Senator, that during the short period during the spring of 1953 they had 80,000 troops there, and in order to strengthen them against the Egyptians they had to move in 8,000 more from Cyprus during that period, and this was eating them up. It was not a source of strength, it was a source of weakness, and they realized that fact.

Senator ERVIN. But you also pointed out the desirability to move them, did you not?

Secretary DULLES. We pointed out the desirability of trying to develop good relations with Egypt.

Senator ERVIN. Then you pointed out they could develop those relations by removing troops?

Secretary Dulles. No, sir; we did not like to have the troops moved at all, but it did not seem possible to maintain good relations with the Egyptians without that.

Senator ERVIN. Anyway, as it was, the Suez Canal seizure did not occur until the last contingent of those troops had been removed, did it?


Secretary DULLES. No. There were still some there when the seizure occurred.

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Secretary, I want to express my appreciation for your patience, and also my sympathy because you have been cross-examined by us about many things.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman GREEN. The meeting stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m., the meeting was adjourned.)



THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST

THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Theodore Francis Green (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations) presiding.

Present: Senators Green (chairman) presiding, Wiley, Fulbright, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Humphrey, Mansfield, Knowland, Morse, Aiken, and Kennedy, of the Committee on Foreign Relations;

Senators Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Saltonstall, Johnson (Texas), Flanders, Kefauver, Smith (Maine), Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Barrett, and Ervin, of the Committee on Armed Services.

Also present: Senator McClellan; Adm. Arthur W. Radford, United States Navy, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and John B. Hollister, Director, International Cooperation Administration.

Chairman GREEN. The meeting will please come to order.

Mr. Secretary, we are glad to have you with us again. This will be the third day during which you have appeared before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services in support of the President's proposal on the Middle East.

I hope, Mr. Secretary, that it will be possible for members of these committees to complete their questions today, and that it will be possible for us to meet with you early next week to discuss some matters in executive session.

I understand that Admiral Radford will appear with you at that time.

I propose this morning, if it is agreeable to members of the committees, to call on them in the same order which was followed last week. I hope they will keep in mind that we would like to finish the Secretary's open testimony today.

I have one question which I wanted to ask at this time.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question on procedure first?

After we finish with the Secretary, is it the plan of the chairman then to go into executive session on succeeding days to hear Admiral Radford and other witnesses, or are we going to have other witnesses in public hearings before we go into executive session?

Chairman GREEN. No, I think the program will be, as I just suggested, to meet with the Secretary in executive session to ask questions which are not proper to ask here today.

Senator MORSE. And then subsequent to those executive sessions we will go back into public hearings to have other witnesses appear at public hearings?

Chairman GREEN. You mean after we finish with the Secretary?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Chairman GREEN. I think so.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RESOLUTION

Last week, Mr. Secretary, I sent you a copy of Senate Joint Resolution 19 with certain amendments which had been proposed during our hearings last Monday and Tuesday.

I wonder if you would care to comment on the acceptability of these amendments to you.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE—Resumed

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I would say that some of the suggestions are acceptable from the standpoint of the President and the executive branch of Government, and some others would not be acceptable.

But I would very much prefer, if it is agreeable to you, to postpone a discussion of what you might call technical drafting changes until we can meet in executive session. It is very difficult to discuss drafting changes in a public session, and the meeting—

Chairman GREEN. Very well, sir.

You understand, I think, and I hope everyone else does, that these were just a tentative attempt to reduce the area of disagreement, if any.

Secretary DULLES. I appreciate the effort, and I think it is a constructive move forward, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. I would prefer, however, to make comments on the aspects of it which involve drafting changes, which involve often legal considerations, until the closed session where our staffs can get together also.

Chairman GREEN. Then we will proceed with this second round, and I will call on Senator Russell.

AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS UNDER EXISTING LAW

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, during the course of your prior examination, and in your statement, there was considerable discussion of availability of funds under existing law for both economic assistance and military assistance in this area.

As I understood it, you were to present some kind of a statement which would give the position of the State Department with regard to these funds.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. We have given the chairman yesterday, I believe, a very detailed analysis of the state of the funds. (See p. 124.)

I would like to recall, if I might, Mr. Chairman, the language which the President used in his message to the Congress, where he said:

The legislation now requested should not include the authorization or appropriation of funds, because I believe that, under the conditions I suggest, presently appropriated funds will be adequate for the balance of the present fiscal year.

In other words, there is no question whatever now raised as to the adequacy of the funds that have already been appropriated and been made available. That is why we do not here—and I keep trying to emphasize this, because in some quarters of the public and press it seemed not to be entirely clear, that we are not asking for any more money at all.

What we are asking for is to free some of the existing money from some of the present limitations so that it can be spent somewhat more freely and in ways which could not have been anticipated a year ago.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, I did not suffer from the same confusion. I understood that all the way through.

Secretary DULLES. I understand.

STATUS OF SECTION 401 (b) FUNDS

Senator RUSSELL. But there is a question in the mind of some of us as to the status of the funds which are made available under section 401 (b), the special Presidential fund, which may be spent without any restriction on other funds of which you complain.

I have looked into that, and I have the so-called secret statement of the International Cooperation Administration of the status of these funds. I know of no reason—I think I am about as security conscious as the average man—as to why this should be so secret.

Can you tell the committee why this fund, why the status of this fund, has to be stamped as secret?

Secretary DULLES. Could I ask Mr. Hollister to speak to this question, Mr. Chairman?

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Mr. Chairman, occasionally it is necessary in the use of the President's special funds, in making determinations for the need of them, to use them in some area where immediate publicity might be hurtful.

In general, there would be no particular objection to making it public. But there are always things in the process of going forward in the use of these funds where, until they are entirely completed in connection with some country, it might be unwise to give full publicity to it.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, you are familiar, of course, with the secret statement dated January 4, 1957, on the status of these funds?

Mr. HOLLISTER. There were two statements given, as I remember. I would have to check them, Senator. There was one which was not secret, where there were some totals given; and then there was one which was secret, where it was broken down by individual countries.

It is that breakdown by individual countries which it seemed unwise at the time to make completely public.

Senator RUSSELL. That is the statement to which I refer. I did not suppose there would be anything classified about dealing with totals, without mentioning the name of the country, would there?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Well, I think there are one or two places there, Senator, where perhaps it is not yet public—I would have to check each one of those things individually. I could do so, if you would like to have me.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, I am talking about—

Mr. HOLLISTER. You see, the secrecy of these things is sometimes just a matter of a few days. At the particular time that the necessity for aid arises, it is perhaps unwise to say anything about it. Then as matters develop in a few days or 2 or 3 weeks, everything becomes public, and then obviously the necessity of holding them somewhat confidential is removed.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, the statement to which I refer shows a balance of \$74,221,000 for which determinations have not been made.

Mr. HOLLISTER. That—

Senator RUSSELL. And you have under consideration additional requirements for 7 countries totaling \$66,500,000.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Something like that; yes, sir. Those, of course, change very rapidly, as you can understand.

One of the things involved in this is the aid to the Hungarian refugees, where, as presently planned, it probably will be necessary to take most of the funds from the 401 funds of the President; and until we know exactly what that is going to cost, we don't know what the requirements are going to be.

Senator RUSSELL. That happens not to be the largest item in this tentative allocation. When was this allocation made for this \$66,500,000?

Mr. HOLLISTER. At different times. You see, Senator, we don't allocate everything at once. We try to use this fund of the President's for emergencies, things which have not been planned—and generally things which were not in the presentation made to the Congress.

Now, as these things develop, they may be definitely obligated from those funds, or they may be pretty definitely determined and yet not obligated. And then there may be some things which are tentatively determined which we see coming up over the horizon, but which we are not yet ready to say are definite and final.

Senator RUSSELL. The point I wish to make, when I have an opportunity to do it without violating any classifications of documents, is that it seems to me some of these allocations here cannot be justified on any emergency basis comparable with that which you gentlemen asserted existed in the Middle East.

Mr. HOLLISTER. It may well be the case, and that happens all the time, Senator, that we have something which is allocated more or less firmly in some area, and then something else comes up which is of greater importance, and then we try to shift to whatever we think is of greater importance at the time.

It illustrates one of the difficulties of this work, whereby a change in conditions in some particular area, in some particular country, may make it quite important and quite essential to take money which was tentatively allocated and sometimes quite firmly allocated somewhere else.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, there is a good deal of difference between a Presidential determination made or in process, and an additional requirement under consideration; is there not, Mr. Hollister?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Quite.

Senator RUSSELL. So you had only made a determination or had in process determinations for \$25 million of this \$100 million, of which you tied up \$66.5 million in requirements under consideration.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Senator, it is not tied up. We program as best we can at the time, and this program changes all the time. This is not necessarily tied up.

I have before me the list of items to which you refer now, and the different countries to which you refer, and I can see 1 or 2 places where I believe it would be unwise to make public what the figures are.

Senator RUSSELL. Well—

Mr. HOLLISTER. And yet it may well be when the time comes that money will not be spent in that way, but spent somewhere else.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, I shall pursue the matter further in executive session, although, frankly, I know of no reason why these figures ought to be so highly classified.

But there is available \$74 $\frac{1}{4}$ million which has not even been placed in process of allocation yet?

Mr. HOLLISTER. No, sir, that is not the case. Placed in process of allocation is entirely different from being obligated.

Are you referring to the \$250 million which is in the section 201 funds, or development-assistance funds, where the obligation has been very small?

Senator RUSSELL. No, sir. I had direct reference now to the Presidential funds of section 401.

Mr. HOLLISTER. I thought you said \$250 million.

Senator RUSSELL. No, sir; I said—

Mr. HOLLISTER. I beg your pardon.

Senator RUSSELL. I said there was \$75 million which was not even in process. It has just been tentatively placed in requirements under consideration.

Mr. HOLLISTER. It all depends on what you mean by "in process."

Senator RUSSELL. Well, I did not originate that description. You did. This comes from the International Cooperation Administration.

Suppose you tell us, then, and explain to us what a Presidential determination "made or in process" means. That is your definition; it is not mine.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Well, those are Presidential determinations which you might say are almost completed. I thought your reference to in process was meant with respect to our whole programming and obligating activities.

Senator RUSSELL. No, sir. I was just taking in mind every scrap of information I have been able to get from your office, and trying to develop something from that.

The additional requirements under consideration, then, that is not considered even in process, according to your definition?

Mr. HOLLISTER. It is not in process as far as a Presidential determination is concerned.

Senator RUSSELL. So you have \$75 million, approximately, completely free in that fund now which can be expended in any way you see fit in the Middle East?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Any way the President sees fit, yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, he usually goes on your recommendation, does he not, and that of the State Department?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Recommendations which have been adopted as a result of conference with the State Department, the Department of Defense, and any other interested agency. They are all joint con-

clusions which are then referred to the President with the recommendation that he make the determination.

SECTION 201 FUNDS

Senator RUSSELL. Leaving the section 401 funds, where we have \$75 million which is available after 7 months of the fiscal year, under the 201 funds you have some \$275 million which is available.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Two hundred and fifty million was originally appropriated by the Congress. Of that, only a small amount has been obligated. But a very large part of it has been programed.

Senator RUSSELL. You can obligate any of that which you see fit prior to, is it, 30 days or 60 days before the expiration of the fiscal year?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Eighty percent of that must be obligated within the first 10 months of the fiscal year.

Senator RUSSELL. So you are going—

Mr. HOLLISTER. Otherwise, it reverts to the Treasury.

Senator RUSSELL. So even if the Middle East budgets had not arisen, you would have had to have made some obligation or commitment of these funds prior to May 1 of this year.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. And you have all of that money available that you could allot under the provisions of that law.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes, sir. But I should add that there are a number of matters programed where discussions have already been started with the countries involved, and that money will be used, not only in accordance with the presentation made to the Congress last year, but also in accordance with what we think is the best planning we can make at the present time.

PRESS COMMENT REGARDING RICHARDS MISSION

Senator RUSSELL. Now, going back, Mr. Secretary, to your testimony, I am just a little confused by which is first, the cart or the horse, on this thing.

In your testimony about the way you were going to set this program up, it seems that you are under the impression that none of these funds were to be allocated or no agreements were to be made until Mr. Richards made his mission out there.

Did you see the article in the press purporting to be an interview with Mr. Richards, in which he stated that he was merely to go out there and confer with these people, and it appeared the day after you testified here?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir, I do not think so. I do not recall that.

Senator RUSSELL. You did not see that article in the Washington Star?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator RUSSELL. It may have appeared in other papers. I do not have it here now, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to have that incorporated in the record, because there is a great deal of confusion as to just how this program is to be developed.

Chairman GREEN. Will you identify it for the record?

Senator RUSSELL. It is an article which I saw in the Washington Star.

Senator FULBRIGHT. If the Senator will yield, I have it here.

Senator RUSSELL. Thank you.

(The article referred to is as follows:)

[The Evening Star, Washington, D. C., Friday, January 18, 1957]

RICHARDS UNSURE OF ROLE AS "DOCTRINE" ENVOY

(By Crosby S. Noyes)

As the first tangible product of the Eisenhower doctrine, it's no wonder if the administration's newest special ambassador wears a somewhat glazed look these days.

A little more than a week ago, James Prioleau Richards was cozily nestling down into retirement on his 500-acre farm in South Carolina. At 62, after 24 years in the House of Representatives, including 4 as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he looked forward to taking it easy.

As a whole, his career as a legislator was often summed up by the word "unobtrusive." A soft-spoken, homespun geniality had won him a warm spot in the hearts of most of his colleagues but few headlines.

The world at large first took notice of Mr. Richards when he lost his trousers and \$200 while sleeping on a Spanish train in 1949. There were other mild flurries later—a spat with the administration over foreign-aid cuts, unkind words for India's roving Ambassador Krishna Menon, a characteristically blunt endorsement of the proposed invitation to Yugoslavia President Tito: "* * * let him come. As a general proposition I think it would do all those fellows good to come over here."

His departure from Washington last summer created no stir. Said one old friend:

"He's just a real old down-to-earth South Carolinian who loves to hunt and fish, loves his farm, and loves his cows."

This was up to a week ago. Today, the sign on the door to a State Department office suite reads "James P. Richards, Special Assistant to the President." Inside, two secretaries pound briskly at typewriters. A visitor, waiting his turn, may be startled by the unusual sight of Secretary of State Dulles hastening away from a closed-door conference with his new envoy.

Small wonder if the transition has resulted in a certain bewilderment or if the kindly, quizzical, white-haired man, sucking his pipe behind the desk, seems more plausible as a gentleman farmer than as a supersalesman of American foreign policy. Natural enough also if he should be a little hesitant in talking about his new role.

BUSY LISTENING

"This thing," he cautions, "is still pretty much in the talking stage. I've been running around here for the past few days, listening in at all sorts of conferences and getting briefed by a lot of people. They've been real nice and the Secretary's door has always been open. But I don't want to sound like I was making policy or talking for the Department."

In fact, although the new Presidential assistant has been impressed by the urgency of his mission and a sense of its critical importance to the country, he is still waiting patiently for any specific information on what exactly he is supposed to do.

There is a hint of confusion on this score even among the administration leaders who appointed him. President Eisenhower described his mission as one "to explain the cooperation we are prepared to give" to the Middle East. Secretary Dulles, on the other hand has explained it to the Senate as a fact-finding tour, in the course of which Mr. Richards would "ascertain" what kind of assistance the Middle Eastern states were prepared to receive.

EXPECT LITTLE OF BOTH

"I expect it might turn out to be a little of both," Ambassador Richards says in his relaxed way. "I'll go out there and talk with these people and tell them what we've got to offer. Then I'll come on back here and be able to tell Mr. Dulles, 'This is what you can do here,' or 'This won't go over so well here.'"

One thing, at least, is quite clear in Mr. Richards' mind. Insofar as possible, he will steer clear of what he calls the "basic problems" of the area—the settle-

ment of the Suez Canal and the Arab-Israeli dispute—and concentrate on the job of combating Communist moves.

"If this gets mixed up with that other stuff, we'll just get no place at all," he says. "We'll do what we can, but I'm afraid the basic problems of the Middle East won't be settled in my time."

Beyond this, however, Mr. Richards, like most of his colleagues on Capitol Hill, seems to have only the vaguest picture of the product he will be expected to sell. Also like his congressional friends, he seems to share some of their vague doubts about certain aspects of the Eisenhower doctrine.

"I took this job, because I approve in principle with the idea," he explains. "I always believed in broad discretionary powers for the President in dealing with these complicated situations. And if it turns out that they're trying to do something I can't support, I suppose I can always resign."

At the moment, Mr. Richards' lack of precise knowledge about his mission extends to such questions as when he is likely to leave, how long he may be gone, what countries he might visit and who may accompany him. Unofficially, he thinks it unlikely that he will leave until after Congress approves President Eisenhower's request for a joint resolution endorsing the new doctrine. He hopes, somewhat wistfully, that the job can be wound up within the 6-month period suggested at the time of his acceptance.

BIGGEST PUZZLE

The greatest void, however, surrounds the question of what Mr. Richards will say when he gets there. The impression is that, by rushing in to fill up the vacuum in the Middle East, the State Department has created something of a vacuum of its own, with Mr. Richards somewhat uncomfortably in the middle. With no very extensive personal knowledge of the area—he visited it briefly in the course of a round-the-world tour in 1954—the new Ambassador hopes fervently that some of the gaps will be filled in before he takes off on his mission.

In the meantime, Mr. Richards is not letting his new appointment go to his head. As a veteran politician, he is inclined to narrow down his qualifications for the job to the lowest of common denominators, relating up the problem the administration faces in selling its new doctrine to Congress.

"If you come right down to it," he says softly, "I guess they wanted a Democrat for the job. I've been a Democrat all my life."

Secretary DULLES. Could I comment on that, sir?

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

COMPOSITION AND PURPOSE OF RICHARDS' MISSION

Secretary DULLES. The general idea that we have, and in which Congressman Richards concurs, I am confident, is that as soon as this program is adopted by the Congress, he will proceed to the area as head of a task force which will include also high-ranking members from the Department of Defense, from the International Cooperation Administration, and from the Department of State.

That group will, of course, also carry with it the advance thinking which has been done by these different departments in relation to this area. They will visit the different countries and perhaps some adjacent countries, and will keep in constant touch with the Department of State and their different other agencies, and through them the President of the United States.

We think it is quite likely that certain commitments will be made by that group while in the field as a result of the exchanges of views which will be taking place between them and the administration at Washington, and within the general policy directives which the President will have given before they start out, and which will have been confirmed, perhaps, as a result of the exchanges which take place while they are out in the field.

The point I want to make is primarily that no final commitments are made except under the authority of the President of the United States.

Secondly, however, it may be necessary to reach those commitments on the basis of telegraphic exchanges and reports, and not necessarily to await the full completion of the mission, which may have to visit quite a large number of countries, and the return of that mission to the United States.

Senator RUSSELL. This is reversing the process we have ordinarily had on these aid programs. Heretofore, you send out your mission or you compile a program down in the Department of State, and then you come to the Congress. Has that not been the policy in the past?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the policy in the past has been that we have presented illustrative programs to the Congress to justify the requests which we make for authorizations and appropriations.

After the Congress has acted upon that and has made the money available, then the detailed working out is carried forward, and the actual commitments in a technical sense are generally, I think, made in the field through our ambassadors on the basis of authority which proceeds from the President here in Washington.

Senator RUSSELL. But in this case, you want to make the money available, and then let Mr. Richards take it out there and commit it?

Secretary DULLES. That is always the process, sir. There is no commitment ever made until the money is first made available.

TENTATIVE ECONOMIC AID PLANS

Senator RUSSELL. Well, you have tentative plans, have you not?

Secretary DULLES. We have illustrative plans which have not, however, ever been discussed with the countries concerned. If the countries concerned knew in advance what our tentative planning was, it would create pressures and ultimate disappointments and discontents, so that the whole process would bog down in great ill will.

Therefore, the tentative planning which is the basis for illustrative presentation to Congress is rarely, if ever, a matter of prior consultation with the countries concerned. It reflects the judgment of the teams in the spot, the country teams, under the general guidance of the Ambassador. They report back their estimate of the situation, the kind of thing they think should be usefully presented.

Those are presented to the Congress in executive session so that word of our thinking shall not get out to the countries concerned; and only after the Congress has authorized the appropriation of funds do we get into the basis of detailed negotiations with the countries.

PREROGATIVES OF CONGRESS

Senator RUSSELL. Well, I was not so much concerned about your negotiations with other countries, Mr. Secretary, as I was about the prerogatives of Congress. The only real power that a parliamentary body has is the power of the purse, and that power has been very tenuous on this aid program since its inception.

But it seems to me that in this case we have absolutely no power or no prerogatives reserved. In the course of your testimony, you testified that these funds could be used for anything, from the ordinary

operating expenses of the governments involved to the settlement of refugees and the undertaking of major water and irrigation developments.

RICHARDS MISSION

Now, that is a pretty broad field. I cannot think of anything which you could possibly spend the money for as between governments other than in those fields, and I just want to know why you did not send Mr. Richards out there as soon as he was employed so he could come back and give the Congress the benefit of his advice in fixing this program, rather than asking Congress to adopt the program pig-in-a-poke fashion, and then be told later in a report what has been done with the funds.

Mr. Richards has been, you had his services available for some time, and it would seem to me he could have flown out there and gotten back by now and given the Congress the benefit of his investigation.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Well, Mr. Chairman, we try to do these things in a way which we think will meet with the approval of the Congress. We gave consideration to the procedure you suggest, and the best information we could get and the best advice that we could get was that Congress would very greatly resent it if we took it for granted that this program would go through and sent out a special mission to the area on the assumption that there would be such a program.

Now, we know the need of this program.

Senator RUSSELL. May I interrupt right there?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. You knew that you had large sums which were available which Mr. Richards could have committed under existing law; did you not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. All right.

HEART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL

Secretary DULLES. The whole heart of this program, Senator, is to recognize the existence of a new and very dangerous and critical situation, and to indicate so that all the world will know, including the Soviet Communists and everybody else, that we intend to take serious steps about it; and if that is not the view of the Congress, then in my opinion this area will be lost with a great and maximum disaster to the United States.

Now, all that we are asking in the economic and military assistance field is that out of about \$750 million already appropriated, authorized by the Congress and earmarked for this area, about 25 percent, or \$200 million, shall be free from some of the existing restrictions so that what is in effect our enemy will not know in advance just in what direction we are going to use that ammunition.

And I say this: That if we have to have everything pinned down so that we know in advance and the Communists know in advance and everybody knows in advance just what we can do with this ammunition for peace, it will not serve its purpose, and we need to have at

least \$200 million here available so that nobody knows what is going to be done.

And if Congress is not willing to trust the President to the extent of allowing that latitude to 25 percent, roughly, of the funds already appropriated, and if we have got to account in advance as to how all that is going to be spent, I say that we cannot win this battle.

If you send a general into a battle with a certain amount of ammunition, and tell him in advance "You can only shoot this ammunition in a certain direction," the enemy is going to come around in another direction.

That is the same situation we have here, Mr. Chairman, and there are all kinds of ways in which we cannot predict, in which we will be combated in this area. And if all of our ammunition has got to be earmarked in advance as to precisely when and how it must go, I say there is no use trying to carry this battle on, and surely there must be a recognition of the fact that recent events here have created an emergency of major proportions. It has created a new economic situation of great danger. It has created a military situation of great danger.

And out of the money already appropriated, a certain amount ought to be freed from some of the present restrictions so the President has more latitude in its expenditure, and we are not asking for another dollar of appropriations, not another dollar of authorization; we are asking that some of this money should be spent in ways in which we are not now going to telegraph our punch in advance as to just how that is going to be spent.

I say this kind of a battle that we face there cannot be won unless there is at least that degree of confidence between the Congress and the President.

SENATOR RUSSELL. Well, I do not put it on the basis of confidence at all, and you have used a military illustration. You have got \$250 million available under section 201, and \$75 million available under section 401, which can be spent or allocated, \$75 million without any restriction of any kind. And if I had a general in the field who was that well armed, and the emergency is as great as you indicate it is, I would consider he was derelict in his duty had he not moved in to fire what he had and stopped this enemy, at least prepared to stop him, instead of waiting back and building up a vast reserve and letting the emergency overtake him.

You have had that. They are available now. There is no question of confidence at all involved in it. But you refuse to even consider investigating it until you get a further removal of restrictions by the Congress, restrictions which do not apply until the 1st day of May 1957. They are not on the funds at the present time. They only apply 10 months after the beginning of the fiscal year.

I think the Congress is entitled, in view of all those circumstances, the fact that you have all of that money available, to get a little better idea about the extent, the length, the breadth, and size of this program.

Now, have you done any work at all to work up this program? Have you made any tentative allocations of the funds which you have available, or are you waiting until the Congress takes action?

SECRETARY DULLES. Well, as I had pointed out, sir, there is about \$750 million which is already authorized, approved, and allocated for

this area. Of that, \$550 million is untouched by our present proposal, and naturally all of that work and planning is going ahead.

We have not got any tentative program as to how the other \$200 million of this \$750 million will be spent, because we do not think that we have sufficient information as to how that can be spent now to best advantage until we have reviewed the situation.

You will appreciate, as I pointed out, I think—

Senator RUSSELL. Well, those funds are available, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DULLES. The \$550 million we are proceeding right ahead to commit and obligate in a perfectly normal way.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, why did you not send Mr. Richards out to get information which would help you allocate that money? That is more than you are asking for in this resolution.

NEED FOR EMERGENCY FUNDS

Secretary DULLES. Because, Senator, we felt we had to have a certain percentage, roughly 25 percent, of what is now allocated for the area, available to use on a more or less emergency basis in the light of developing situations. The other 75 percent is moving ahead normally.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, you have the \$75 million in section 401. That has absolutely no restrictions on it, and has not even been taken up for examination or in process, to use the words of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

Secretary DULLES. We know, as a matter of fact, there is another \$66 million there, so that in effect we will have to use practically all of that fund for other than purposes for this area.

We could switch, of course, from other areas to this. That will create an emergency somewhere else. For example, the Hungarian refugee business is not nearly taken care of yet, and I do not know whether we want the Hungarian refugees to sit around and rot.

It seems to me that it is much better to release a certain amount of additional money which is already earmarked for the Middle East.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, I do not want to go into a classified document, but you have tentatively set up a very small proportion of those funds for the Hungarian refugee program in addition to what you already have definitely allocated.

So you are not making any steps at all on the funds which are available, and utilizing the services of Mr. Richards as your envoy to this area with the money which is now available, to see how far it can go.

You do not think that that would be wise at all to wait until the Congress has approved in advance this program which has not yet been developed. Have you made any study to see whether or not any of this money could be utilized in loans rather than grants?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. We have already given illustrative programs to the Congress which has led the Congress to appropriate \$750 million for this area, and of course these programs are going ahead. Some of it has been obligated; some of it is in process of being obligated.

But there are new and emergency situations which we cannot foresee, and where we have got to hold a certain amount in reserve for possible emergency use to meet new conditions.

The impact, as I pointed out, of the economic dislocations of this area are only now beginning to be felt because, as I pointed out, there

is a lag between the payments of royalties, and so forth, and the actual taking up of the oil. So you have got about a 2 to 3 months' normal lag there.

The situation is going to be encountered at the present time. The activity of the Communists is stepped up. We do not know what they are going to do, and we do not want them to know to the last dollar what we are going to do.

I cannot imagine anything that would be more disastrous in our effort to save this area than to tell, in effect, the Communists in advance that "You can know exactly what we are going to do, and that will use up all the money; therefore, you can know there is going to be no more money available for something else," and that is where they will move.

You must have some elasticity in this kind of a struggle, Senator. And what we are asking for, I think, is very modest in terms of roughly only 25 percent of what is made available for the area, and I do not want to say today, perhaps, every dollar will be spent precisely as was pointed out to Congress.

But the important thing is that those who are fighting us in the area should not be able to know in advance that it will be spent that way, so that they do a little guessing.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, of course, you do not think you are going to be able to spend this money down there without the Russians or Soviet or world communism knowing where you are spending it; do you?

Secretary DULLES. We may be able to hold it back so that it takes them a little bit by surprise.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, that means the allocation or the publication of the fact that you are going to spend the money.

Secretary DULLES. Well, their knowledge of the fact, and, of course, that knowledge becomes known rather easily as soon as you begin to talk on a serious basis with some of these people. There may be present emergencies we may want to meet right away. There may be others we may want to hold something back in reserve for, where they will not know.

Senator RUSSELL. It seems to me everything you said is all the more argument why Mr. Richards should have been sent out there to gather facts for this program.

Secretary DULLES. He is doing a great deal of work here. He is not wasting his time, I assure you. There are country studies going on here.

Once he gets to an area, he can only study that area. Here he is studying 10 or 15 countries all at once, with all the advice he can get from the State Department, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Defense Department, and he is not wasting any moment of his time.

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, that this article from the Washington Evening Star of Friday, January 18, 1957, entitled "Richards Unsure of Role as 'Doctrine' Envoy," may appear in the record.

Chairman GREEN. It will be so included in the record at the point first mentioned. (See p. 205.)

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions relating to details of countries which will receive these funds. One of them is Saudi Arabia, and inasmuch as the King of that country is on his way over here on a visit now, I assume that those questions would be better put in executive session, and I shall not pursue them at this time.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

Chairman GREEN. Is that all?

Senator RUSSELL. Yes.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Wiley, have you any questions?

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, very few.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF'S NEED OF DISCRETIONARY POWER

Mr. Secretary, as I listened to the discussion this morning, it seemed to me that historically we had another situation when this country was in very serious danger. Before we were a nation, we entrusted Franklin with funds which were placed in his hands to be used as he thought best. He used them, and afterward no accounting was demanded of him.

Now, is there any analogy between the present situation and that when we were becoming a nation? I think you mentioned the seriousness, the threat to our own very national existence. Do you see any analogy?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; I do. It is an analogy which can be found in that case; it is an analogy which I think is always to be found when you face a very desperate struggle with an enemy who cloaks everything in secrecy, who has no Congress to which to report, who can always act suddenly and unexpectedly.

If you get everything that you have committed in advance, in detail, so he knows precisely what you are going to do, and also by the process of subtraction precisely the things you cannot do, you are at a tremendous disadvantage. And always, in situations of this sort, there has to be a measure of discretion given to the Commander in Chief who is running this operation. And this is not now a normal situation as exists in various parts of the world where we have our economic and our military assistance agreements, and they are worked out at a leisurely pace which takes generally about 3 or 4 years from the time the program starts in embryo form until the money is finally spent. This is not that situation.

It is perhaps what may be the most tense battleground of all the struggles that we have had with Soviet communism since the close of the war. It is the last place that they have a chance to win what might be a decisive victory.

And, as I say, the Commander in Chief who has got to run that campaign has got to have a little leeway, and it seemed to us, and the President, when all he asked for was a certain amount of discretion, regards 25 percent of the money that has already been appropriated for the area, that that was a minimum to ask for, and that there ought not to be any question about granting it.

Originally, as you recall, Senator, the President had suggested asking in this legislation for increased authorization for the next fiscal year. In view of the urgency of the situation, and the fact that it was obvious that that request for increased authorization for the next

fiscal year would involve a very considerable delay, the President took that out of the proposed legislation which I had here, which I read, I think, to most of the people who are here present, on the 2d of January, and which asked for an increased authorization for the next fiscal year.

In order to stay within the limits of what Congress had already authorized and approved, and to involve no question of this sort, that was taken out, because of the fact that the President felt that the urgency of this situation was such that we ought not to raise any matters which might be unnecessarily controversial, and it was felt that we could get ready for and make the normal presentation for the fiscal year that is coming up, 1958, in the way that we would normally do.

Therefore, between the date when his resolution was drafted in the executive branch of the Government, and the date when it was presented here as a result of this appearance before, in the Foreign Relations room, between the members of the Foreign Relations Committee and a number from the Armed Services Committee, and the leadership, that was dropped out in an effort to cooperate with the Congress and to try to get this thing done quickly, and in a way which would be necessary if it is to have its maximum impact.

That indicates, I think, a very strong desire on the part of the executive to cooperate with the Congress and not raise anything which we thought would be controversial. So we dropped out any request for new authorization in this legislation, and all we asked for was a freedom from some of the existing restrictions as to 25 percent of the money that was already authorized and appropriated for this area.

And I would hope very much that the Congress would feel disposed to grant that very minimum measure of confidence to the President in the light of the very difficult problems that face us in the area.

REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF TWO HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS

Senator WILEY. Again you have covered my question, but I am going to repeat it because there has been a great deal of questioning and confusion.

Congress has already appropriated the funds necessary under section 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 19. Two hundred million dollars of that would have to be obligated and spent by May 1, unless we give the President discretionary power in the use of that amount. Is that the point?

Secretary DULLES. That is the principal point. There are three restrictions from which we would like to be released as regards this roughly 25 percent of the money allocated for this area.

The first is the restriction on date by which it has to be committed.

The second is the restriction as to the percentage that must be made in loans.

And the third is the provisions that military assistance must comply with all the provisions of, what is that section—section 142, which contains some specifications which are very difficult to secure compliance with in this particular area of the world. Those specifications were drawn up in 1951 with primary relation to European countries, and their understanding, and they are not in some respects adapted to the situation which now confronts us in the Middle East.

THE INTERESTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Senator WILEY. It is very clear from my mail that there is a great deal of confusion which has arisen out of the hearing and newspaper accounts. Is it, in your judgment, in the national-defense interests that we pass this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. The answer to that, in one word, is "Yes." I can multiply that into words, if that would add to any emphasis, but perhaps just to say "Yes" is enough.

Senator WILEY. Is it because the Russians, if they were to get the Near East with its oil, would then have a stranglehold on Europe and also a passageway to Africa, where lodges the vital strategic materials reserve of the world?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Therefore, if we were to see that territory taken over by the Kremlin, it would mean that our allies would be more or less incapacitated, because oil is necessary to their very economic life-blood, and almost to the defense of Europe. It would mean also, if they were to take over Africa, that our stockpiling of the vital materials would practically have to cease, except for the vital materials we would get from the Far East.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. That is why you say, applying the law of national self-preservation, it is necessary that we take this step?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Has it been estimated that we would spend in the nature of a half a billion dollars a day in defense if we were to get into a third world war?

Secretary DULLES. I have seen such estimates; yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Therefore, it is the judgment, as I understand it, of the President, of three Presidents, that the proposed program is necessary for the safety of America and the peace of the world.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Thank you, sir.

That is all.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Secretary, would it be agreeable to you if this meeting adjourned at 12 o'clock and reconvened at 2?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Chairman GREEN. It will be so done.

Mr. Saltonstall, have you any questions?

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 117

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dulles, may I detain you just a moment. Have you a copy of this House Joint Resolution 117 in front of you?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I was interested in your colloquy with Senator Russell.

Now, you take the first section on page 2—

The President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the area of the Middle East—

and so forth—

in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

Now, certainly you do not intend by that section and by the use of the word "authorized" to usurp the responsibility of Congress in any way with regard to appropriations?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; certainly not.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Then if you added after the word "assist" in line 4, words to this effect or similar ones which might be improved, "within appropriations made available by Congress," that would still leave the effect of what you wanted to do and make it clear that you could not go beyond the appropriations made by Congress. Do you agree with that?

Secretary DULLES. I think if there is doubt about that, that there would be no objection to language making it clear that that authorization does not involve an appropriation or authorization of funds. I think that this language, as I recall, is in substance taken out of the present law, and is merely pointed up in relation to the Middle East.

But certainly, Senator, if there is any ambiguity about the purpose of it, and that that word "authorized" should be interpreted as meaning an authorization of new funds, that is not the purpose.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I recall Senator Byrd's questions to you the other day with relation to that section.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, if you turn to section 3, if I may read it for just a moment:

The President is hereby authorized, when he determines that such use is important to the security of the United States, to use for the purposes of this joint resolution, without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation, not to exceed \$200 million—

and so forth.

Now, there is certainly some concern with relation to the words "without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation."

If you struck those words out, and in line 3 inserted these words—see if this covers your general idea—"to use for the purposes of this joint resolution in the general area of the Middle East," strike "without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation" and then to continue:

not to exceed \$200 million from any appropriations now available and unobligated for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.

Would that not cover your purposes, because you do not want any more new funds, and leave out those words, which are very broad in their meaning, "without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation"? Would that not still carry out what you want to do?

Mr. Hollister suggests there is \$250 million now available, even if some of it is now programed, and \$75 million available in the President's fund. Then you have got over \$200 million there by changing a few programs, and if it is unobligated you could carry out the purposes of the Mutual Security Act in the Middle East, in the general area of the Middle East. Would that not cover your purposes?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. I do not want to be held to particular drafting language until I can see it and study it in writing.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I agree.

Secretary DULLES. But in general, if of the funds already authorized and appropriated, not to exceed \$200 million could be spent under

the same authority as is now prescribed by section 401 of the Mutual Security Act, and without regard to provisions of section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act of 1957, which was the one that fixes the time, that would meet our purpose.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that would eliminate some of these words which give very much concern to some of our colleagues, some of the members of this committee.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. I do not know about the concern, but it would make it more specific just what are the limitations we wish to avoid.

Naturally, there is no desire to avoid the ordinary accounting procedures, reporting to Congress, and things of that sort.

GRANTS VERSUS LOANS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, there was some question about whether this money would be on a grant or a loan basis. Certainly it is your intention to make this money available on a loan basis, if it is possible to work that out for the best stabilization of these countries in the general area of the Middle East and improving them, so that they may turn toward us rather than the other way; is that not correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; and I think in general there is no disagreement with the proposition that where you are making loans to a country which is going to improve its economic strength, that that could well be put on a loan basis.

There are other types of expenditures which sometimes have to be made to meet the kind of emergency which now exists, where a loan basis is impractical, partly because it would involve the delays incident in those countries to getting parliamentary approvals, because it would expose the program to the Communist propaganda directed to the members of parliament who would have to approve the loans.

It would expose the things to delays and to public exposure in a way that would be undesirable and, therefore, while in general I know the President would try to carry out the provisions of the present law, and while, as I say, as regards 75 percent of the money applied to this area it would still remain subject to the provisions of the present law, there may be some situations which will arise as a result of the present emergency, as a result of new and at present unknown and unpredictable Communist tactics, where we might want to spend the money quickly without waiting for the loan processes to go through.

Senator SALTONSTALL. As you pointed out to Senator Byrd the other day, this \$200 million may, the great bulk of it, go to military assistance, anyway, may it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. This is for either military or economic.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Fulbright, have you any questions?

SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, in view of the Secretary's answers to Senator Russell's questions about what the Secretary intends to do with this fund in the Middle East, and his reluctance to be specific, and in view of the analogy drawn by the Secretary and the

Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Wiley, between Benjamin Franklin and the present situation, I would like to make a suggestion to the committee.

In his last appearance before this committee, the Secretary of State drew a very dark and gloomy picture of the conditions in the Middle East, and he has confirmed that picture this morning.

In essence, he told this committee that the Russian or Communist menace in the Middle East has created for the United States the most dangerous situation since the end of World War II, more dangerous than the conditions at the time of the Berlin airlift in 1948, or during any of the other crises with which we have been confronted.

At one point in his testimony he went so far as to say that unless we approved the proposal which he has presented to us, he believes there is a very great likelihood that American boys will be required to fight in the Middle East.

Furthermore, he emphasized the economic distress of the whole area of the oil-rich States of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, as well as of Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, which have no oil.

In addition to the testimony of Secretary Dulles, it is common knowledge that our two strongest allies, Great Britain and France, had been grievously wounded by our policies in the Middle East and in the United Nations. Not since the turn of the century have our relations with the other peoples of the free world been so strained and so unsatisfactory.

Nations in whose behalf we have spent billions from our Treasury are now indifferent, if not hostile, to our policies.

This disastrous and remarkable collapse of our relations with our closest allies has taken place under the direction of the present Secretary of State and apparently during the relatively short space of a few months.

At least it was but a short time ago, less than a year, on February 24, 1956, that the Secretary himself told the Committee on Foreign Relations in a public report on the Middle East that the Russians had made very little progress in the Middle East in the last few years and that the military danger from Russia was less than the danger from competitive coexistence.

Now, Mr. Chairman, many commentators and many thoughtful observers of our national affairs have stated that if we accept the proposal of the Middle East submitted to us by the Secretary, it is in effect a vote of confidence in the administration's conduct of our foreign relations. The Secretary has reemphasized that, I think, a moment ago in the statement to Senator Russell.

This resolution is indeed a broad, unrestricted grant of power over our Armed Forces and over enormous economic resources.

It is a blank check for the administration to do as it pleases with our soldiers and with our money. To justify voting for it one must indeed have a full and deep confidence in those who are to administer such far-reaching powers.

Speaking for myself, Mr. Chairman, I need more convincing evidence than I have had up to this time that the Secretary of State has evolved policies regarding the Middle East which are in the interests of our national welfare. I regard the course of action which he has been following as harmful to our interests, as being calculated to weaken the influence of the free world in the Middle East; as disastrous

to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and as damaging to our friendship with Great Britain and France, two of our oldest and strongest allies.

REQUEST FOR "WHITE PAPER" ON MIDDLE EAST POLICY

So, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that this committee ask the Secretary to review his conduct of our foreign relations in the Middle East, at least since the time when he visited General Naguib in Cairo and gave him a silver-plated pistol. Such a review, in my opinion, should reveal to the members of this committee why the leaders of the Government of Great Britain, our oldest and closest ally, affirmatively concealed from us their plans to take action which they knew would seriously affect our interests in the Middle East.

I have seen no reasonable explanation of why Great Britain and France, the two greatest beneficiaries of our foreign-aid program, should want to deceive us. Surely the members of this committee should know what motivated this unprecedented action by responsible and friendly governments both, before we are asked to express our confidence in the conduct of our foreign affairs during that period.

It is clear that, in hastening or even permitting the collapse of British influence in the Middle East, vast new burdens are to be thrown upon our own sorely strained budget and upon our armed services.

Already we read of British plans to withdraw their support of Jordan, of their cancellation of orders for fighter planes and of a revival of talk of withdrawing their troops from Germany.

In addition to these matters, I think the committee should be informed fully about the course of our relations with Colonel Nasser, how and why we became involved in the Aswan Dam project and what led to the Secretary's abrupt withdrawal of the offer just as it was being accepted by Colonel Nasser, a procedure calculated to give the greatest possible offense.

This committee should be given an explanation of why we failed to obtain any kind of agreement from Egypt concerning the operation of the Suez Canal, the existence of Israel or the defense of the area generally in return for our assistance in ousting the British from the Suez Canal area.

One cannot help wondering why our mediation proved so fruitless regarding the interests of the West in that area.

In view of the apparent failure of our actions in the Middle East to create stable and peaceful conditions on that area and in view of the serious breach of our principal alliances, is it not sensible for us to try to understand how we got in this situation before we endorse the policies and policymakers who have directed these affairs?

It may be that there are sound reasons for every action we have taken, for every policy we have followed, but I do not believe the acceptance of such a conclusion should be a matter of faith. I believe that before we are required to give or to withhold a vote of confidence in the stewardship of Secretary Dulles, we should be given information which would enable a reasonable man to form a sound judgment as to the wisdom of our policies, past as well as future.

I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that proceeding as we have by 10- or 20-minute question periods, unrelated and uncoordinated, and under an atmosphere of urgency, we can hope to gain sufficient understand-

ing of these affairs to enable us to discharge our duty under the Constitution. The Founding Fathers did not contemplate that the advice and consent of the Senate should be grounded upon faith alone without knowledge and understanding of the subject matter, especially in the absence of long experience justifying such faith.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to suggest that before we dismiss the Secretary as a witness and before we proceed to a vote upon this resolution we invite the Secretary to prepare and present to us a thorough chronological detailed description of the course of events in the Middle East leading up to the crisis which now confronts us.

In short, Mr. Chairman, what I am suggesting is that the Secretary furnish this committee an official white paper on the Middle East before we are called upon to vote upon this resolution.

As one member of the committee, I regard it as improvident and unwise to make a grant of authority to disburse large sums of public money, without restriction of any kind, for objectives which are vague and unspecified, and by people who have disproved their foresight, their wisdom, and their effectiveness in the field of foreign affairs.

The seriousness of our present circumstances, according to the Secretary's own statement, necessarily raises a question as to the validity of our foreign policy in the Middle East during these past 3 or 4 years.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that suggestion to the committee in all seriousness, and I hope that the committee members will consider it. As soon as we have an executive session, I expect to ask for formal action on the suggestion.

Chairman GREEN. At present, the Secretary of State is coming here to explain and submit himself to questions regarding the proposed Senate Joint Resolution 19, and the questions must be limited to that subject. I think he has spent a great deal of time here already. He came here again and is willing to spend a whole day here. We cannot interrupt these proceedings to act on any plan such as you suggest without commenting on its merits.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I don't suggest that we act at present. I said when we are in executive session.

Chairman GREEN. Will you ask the witness a question that you have in mind?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I submit that already in answer to the question of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Russell, the Secretary has made it very clear that he does not intend to be specific about what shall be done with this money; that he asks this committee to accept this proposal on faith that it will be spent in an efficient and effective way.

I don't know how much plainer he can be in his attitude that he is not prepared, nor does he intend, to answer questions as to what his program is in the Middle East. That is, I think, sufficient justification for the suggestion that I have made.

QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE

However, there are, of course, many questions that should be answered. Whether it is possible definitely to open these questions in an orderly manner under the procedure imposed upon us in this committee, I doubt. However, I shall proceed to ask some questions.

Senator MORSE. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GREEN. What is it, Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. A parliamentary inquiry; I want to raise a question about procedure. I think I understand the position of the Chair, which is that at this meeting we should proceed to cross-examine the Secretary in respect to the resolution before us, and his position on it. But I am sure the chairman doesn't mean to imply that the proposal of the Senator from Arkansas should not be considered by this committee, if necessary, by an uninterrupted executive session of this committee. I happen to hold to the point of view that the Senator from Arkansas has laid down a request here that ought to be considered by this committee before any examination of the Secretary is completed. We have differences of opinion on this committee about this matter, and some of us share the view of the Senator from Arkansas that until we get the white paper that he asks for we are not in a position, representing the people of the sovereign State that sent us here, to vote on this resolution. I want to join the Senator from Arkansas in the request that an early meeting in executive session be held to consider a motion that he suggests.

Chairman GREEN. Well, the chairman simply rules not against the proposal but against bringing it up at the present time. We have already heard the Secretary of State in part. We called this adjourned meeting so that those who had not finished their questioning could do so, and those that were absent that time could have this first opportunity to do so. Until that work is completed, orderly procedure requires that we do not take any other action on any other matter. So I would be glad to give an opportunity to every Senator here, in due order, to ask questions as to the joint resolution which we have been considering.

I don't say we shouldn't consider his proposal at the proper time; but this is not the proper time, it seems to me.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said, I do not ask the committee to take action on it now. As I said in my initial statement, I do not think it proper and I do not ask the committee to act in open session now. But in the first executive session I expect and intend to ask the committee to act on it. As I said a moment ago, in view of what I think is the clear position of the Secretary, that what is to be done under this resolution is a matter entirely within the discretion of the executive and one on which they do not intend to elucidate in order to enlighten the committee. I really think that questions on that subject are rather futile. So pending action upon that resolution, I will defer any further questions of my own, and reserve my further questions at this time.

Chairman GREEN. Very well, there will be a proper time at which to bring it up.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, of course, the request of any Senator is entitled to consideration at the proper time. However, if the world situation is as serious as it is we must not put ourselves in the position of Nero. We here fiddle while Rome probably burns, and to me that is the real issue. If it is as serious as we are informed by three Presidents, and by the head of the Armed Forces of this country, as well as by the Secretary of State, then we should consider first things first and dispose of them. I remember that as a boy on the farm we had to

shoot a bull that was pleasant some days and wasn't very good on other days. To get rid of him, we had to shoot him.

Well, there are a lot of bulls in the Near East, and there are a lot of nations over there, including the Kremlin, that would like to see us fall asleep on the main issue. Are we going to apply the law of preservation and preserve America? To me that is what we have got to do and not be led up a blind alley by attacking the Secretary.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Senator SYMINGTON. Parliamentary inquiry?

Chairman GREEN. Have you any questions, Mr. Byrd?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman GREEN. I have called on Mr. Byrd. Any questions? He is not here. What did the Senator ask?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman GREEN. Yes. State it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are we proceeding in normal rotating fashion in the questioning of the witness or can any member of the committee make a statement when he thinks it is advisable?

Chairman GREEN. The list has been made up according to seniority.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Smith of New Jersey?

EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to the Secretary, before I ask him 1 or 2 questions, that this member of the committee has full faith and confidence in the President of the United States and in the Secretary of State; that this member of the committee believes we are in a crisis; and that this member of the committee will support the administration in this crisis. He regrets exceedingly that there should be any delaying tactics in meeting this emergency in the world today. If we give the impression to Russia and to the other countries abroad that we are wavering under the leadership of President Eisenhower, that would be the most serious thing that could happen, in my judgment, at this moment of time.

I wish to express myself forcibly on that subject. I shall stand against that possibility right straight through, and I shall try to prevent any attempt to delay action on this very important resolution.

PROVISIONS FOR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID

Now, Mr. Secretary, I just have 1 or 2 questions which I think may clarify my own thinking on this. Just a brief word: I think I understand clearly why we are joining the economic section, of the resolution, section 1, with the military section, section 2. However, I have been asked so many times as to the reasons why they must go together, that I want to give you the opportunity just to state briefly to us, why it is important that both those sections are jointly essential and why the economic factor means so much in developing the confidence of these people in the United States and in what we are doing today.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, the impression of the people in the area is that their danger is more economic than it is military. Whether

or not that impression is correct or not remains to be seen. And in some of the countries in the north they feel that the danger is more military perhaps than economic but in other areas they feel it is more economic than it is military.

Whatever the judgment in that respect may be, and whichever is right, it is, I think, true beyond a peradventure of a doubt, that for us to take a purely military approach to this situation would be self-defeating. It would play into the hands of those of our enemies in many parts of the world who claim that we are only interested in military things, we are only interested in bombs and arms and the like, and are not interested in the welfare of people.

From the standpoint of meeting subversion, there are three essential ways to do it. One is to take away the fear of direct attack through creating a deterrent, because the existence of that fear plays into the hands of local Communists.

Secondly, to help to provide an adequate security force which is loyal, well trained and disciplined, and thirdly, to try to create economic conditions which will not make the people feel that they have to turn in desperation to communism, and to avoid such budgetary crises as would lead to a breakdown of orderly government through the fact that the government has no resources.

Now if you limit yourself just to the military aspect of this matter, you cover an important point, but only one-third of the whole.

The 3 points are of equal importance in my opinion, and without all 3 being taken care of, there is a fatal gap in our program.

Therefore, Senator, I feel that it is indispensable to cover in this resolution not only our willingness to react with force if need be to any armed aggression in the area, but also our willingness to build up the security forces in the area and to help the peoples in the area to overcome what might otherwise be a desperate and intolerable economic position, and to help the governments of the area if need be to get over temporary emergencies due to the breakdown of their processes as a result of the crises of the closing of the canal, the cutback in revenues from much of the oil, the taxes and transportation dues that were paid for oil, the breakup of commerce and tourism generally and things of that sort which created a very great emergency, one which could not have been predicted at first and the full consequences of which are not yet predictable.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I notice from the language of section 1 that this economic strength would be dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

In other words, you are desirous of building up a feeling among the people in the area that we are interested in their national independence and in assisting their development, by our offers to strengthen them.

Secretary DULLES. If we felt that there was a government there which was really selling its people out, we would not of course want to contribute to that government. Only if the government is really working for national independence, is aware of the dangers of international communism, and wants to be strong as against those, that would be the conditions under which our economic, financial assistance would be given.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Trying to find out which of those countries are eliciting our aid is one of the assignments of the mission, is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. One more question.

I admit I am confused by the questions of Senator Russell because it seems to me Senator Russell is asking us to pinpoint and designate publicly every nation we plan to help. I understood that the reason for your desire for flexibility was so that you would be free and able in case some new crisis might arise, to go here, go there, or wherever such crisis might be, with this fund, and that without that flexibility and that strength, you would be very much handicapped in making this full resolution effective. Is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. That is very much the case, Senator. When a struggle reaches the intensity which this is likely to reach and is reaching at the present time, the need for greater flexibility goes up.

Now, the Congress has already indicated a willingness to put certain funds under the discretionary control of the President. What we are suggesting here is not a practice which is new. It exists under the present law. All that we are saying is that in view of the new emergency which has arisen since the Congress last acted, that the amount of moneys in that category should be somewhat increased.

Now, that is not, as I keep saying, going to increase by \$1 the amount that is spent. Money is going to be spent anyway. The question is, is it going to be spent to the best advantage. We believe that it will be spent to the best advantage if some more of the money is made available through the President's discretionary fund than if under present conditions it is required that everything should be spelled out in advance so that there is no flexibility as against an enemy who strikes in the dark and there is a necessity of going through any parliamentary process.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I assume that there would be no objection to discussing the possible uses of this fund in an executive session with the committee, but that it is not desirable to make such discussions public because of the danger of the enemy getting information it should not have.

Secretary DULLES. We could discuss the possible uses of them, yes, but as I say, in considerable part the uses are not yet defined and ought not yet to be defined until we are more sure that they will meet the kind of a problem which we will have to face as this contest goes on.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I have at the moment.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Bridges is absent. Mr. Sparkman is absent. Mr. Johnson of Texas.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, I trust that you will not regard me as fiddling if I attempt to elicit some information that I should like to have. There are many questions that I will reserve for executive session. I do want to make it abundantly clear that I do not want my questions of you to be regarded or interpreted as lacking faith either in the President or the Secretary of State.

PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

The President on yesterday made this statement at his press conference:

It is Congress' prerogative and responsibility to inquire into everything that affects any law they might wish to pass.

Now he was speaking about another subject, but I know of no better authority to use on this occasion to justify the desire of some of us to get more information about this program. Of course I have no criticism of Senators who have already voted and made up their minds before the testimony is in, but so far as I am concerned, I hope that we will not be branded as attempting to delay action because we seek to ask a few questions.

Now, Mr. Secretary, when you testified before this committee on January 14, Senator Johnson asked this question (p. 64) :

Would it be your purpose to use the recommendations of the Richards mission as a guide to the allocations you would make in that area—

speaking of the economic aid.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

We elaborated on that to some extent covering several pages that followed. On yesterday a very distinguished correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune, a Mr. Rowland Evans, asked this question of the President:

Sir, one of the main points of resistance to your resolution in the Senate is—there seems to be no clear understanding of how the \$200 million might be spent.

Could you elaborate on that point, sir, a little bit further than you did on that to Mr. Brandt?

And the President replied, and I quote:

No, because the only way I can find out exactly how to spend the \$200 million, it would be through the medium of the Richards mission which we expect to send to the Middle East, and which cannot leave until the resolution has been passed.

SUGGESTION THAT CONGRESS KNOW FINDINGS OF RICHARDS MISSION
BEFORE ACTING

Now the question is, Mr. Secretary, in your wealth of wisdom and with the President's great knowledge of foreign affairs, if neither of you is willing to make a decision and allocate a dollar until you have before you the recommendations of the Richards mission, why do you not think that the Congress is entitled to the benefit of those recommendations also before it acts?

Secretary DULLES. In the first place, Senator, it is not quite accurate to say that we are not willing to allocate a dollar, because as I pointed out there is about \$750 million which is allocated now for this area, of which at least \$550 million, probably more, will be spent in accordance with the general programs which were outlined before the Congress when it authorized and appropriated the money last year.

Now as regards the residue of not to exceed \$200 million, that may have to be used quite a bit on an emergency basis.

Now the fact that some moneys may at times have to be used on an emergency basis has been recognized by the Congress on a good many occasions where it has authorized substantial sums to be available at

the discretionary use of the President, and what we are saying here is that the situation in the Middle East has taken unpredictably a turn so that within the last few months many new problems have arisen.

They are problems of urgency, they are problems as to which there will be very intense struggle going on, and as regards some of that money, we suggest 25 percent of it, \$200 million, that there should be the capacity in the President of acting promptly.

This covers, as has been pointed out, not just economic assistance. It also covers military assistance and is a modest sum I think to spend on that basis in view of the emergency of the situation, in view of the kind of opposition that we are meeting.

Of course if it is feasible to discuss these things with the Congress, we will do so in an informal way, but I believe that we cannot accomplish results that we need unless as regards some of this money there is a capacity to act promptly.

Senator JOHNSON. Now, Mr. Secretary, I tried to get you to answer that question in the last session and now I have tried to get you to answer it again. As nearly as I can tell you have not answered the question as yet. If you think the Richards mission is justified—and I gather you do, and I am not prepared to dispute it—and the President feels that it is essential to send out there to get him information, why are you not willing to let Congress reserve its judgment on these allocations until we have the benefit of their recommendations?

PRESIDENT'S OPINION

I quote further from what the President said yesterday:

You see, many countries, in my opinion, want more military equipment than is good for them, because they get too much, it gets too expensive to maintain, and then their economy goes down instead of up.

It is that old thing of balancing the various kinds, the elements of your strength, the economic and military as well as the moral.

So I think that until we can get that kind of a study—

I assume speaking of the Richards study—

I think that until we can get that kind of a study we would not give any program of expenditure at all.

ROLE OF CONGRESS

Now you said in your original statement to this committee that Congress should play a part that is more than just being an observer. I have been here many years in Congress, hearing my colleagues on both sides of the aisle talk about discretionary authority, just give us a little more leeway downtown, and I am just wondering if the Secretary of State and the President feel the need of recommendation before they act, why they should not be willing to give us the benefit of those same recommendations. We are in session, we could act.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, let me say this: If I could have an assurance that the Congress would act as quickly as the President would act, there would be no doubt about it at all. But as perhaps the evidence makes clear, the processes of bringing back these detailed proposals to Congress take a long period of time, and this situation does not permit of that.

There are going to be occasions I can assure you—I can't identify them but they are going to be occasions—when we will get a cable from somewhere in the Middle East which will say we must commit \$5 million, \$10 million for such a purpose overnight in order to hold the situation.

Now if under those circumstances we have to come back to Congress, make a presentation before the authorizing committees of both Houses, before the Appropriations Committees of both Houses and then get it passed by the Congress, I would say that this is a hopeless situation, Senator. It just cannot be done that way. You have got to have some money where you can act quickly overnight.

Senator JOHNSON. You have that money, you have some money now?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. To do that and act quickly. If you wait until you formulate your entire program, until you have information and judgments—

Secretary DULLES. Not the entire program, Senator.

DISCRETIONARY FUNDS

As I say, we have got already authorized and appropriated for this area approximately \$750 million. Three-quarters of that at least will go right ahead in accordance with the ways that have been explained to the Congress. A maximum of 25 percent—it probably won't be that much—would be put into the discretionary fund because the present discretionary funds are in prospect of being depleted, and this situation could not have been foreseen.

If we could have foreseen this situation a year ago, we would have asked at that time, and I hope Congress would have given, a larger discretionary fund.

Senator JOHNSON. Congress through the years has been acting on these foreign-aid programs and they have not always been speedy and hasty but they have been reasonably expeditious. I think that you can trust the Congress to act with reasonable care on matters vitally affecting this Nation and not to drag their feet. I know of no disposition to do so. It seems to me if the Secretary of State and the President feel the need for further information before they reach a conclusion, that they will give the Congress the same privilege they reserve for themselves. I have no doubt if Congressman Richards came back with recommendations based on information he had obtained that appeared to be sound to the Secretary of State, appeared to be sound to the President of the United States and they were submitted to the Congress, the Congress playing more than just an observer role, as you pointed out the other day, would evaluate those recommendations and make a prompt decision. All I am asking is why we should not be given that opportunity.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, the Congress has never passed on specific budgets, never, and if we inaugurate that process here, and if we cannot talk with foreign countries with respect to the expenditure of authorized and appropriated funds for the area except on the basis of taking back the specific project to Congress, that would be an inhibition. We have never done that.

NEED FOR RICHARDS MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator JOHNSON. You think then that it is all right for the Secretary of State to say that we will not act until we get the recommendations of Mr. Richards.

The President says we cannot act until we get the recommendations of Mr. Richards, but to the Congress, you say you must act now blindfolded without knowing what his recommendations may be, whether he may try to justify \$200 million or justify \$2 million?

Secretary DULLES. The whole operation of this Mutual Security Act is on the basis of Congress authorizing and appropriating the money for certain general purposes for certain general areas in advance with certain transfer and discretionary features on it. The actual allocation never comes back to Congress, Senator. We always act in terms of our specific projects, on the basis of the recommendations of the people in the field and in exercise of the President's authority.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, that is what I am asking. Why do you object to coming back?

If you need the recommendation from Richards and the President needs the recommendation from Richards, why do you object to the Congress looking at those recommendations before it acts?

Secretary DULLES. Because it is not a practical procedure and it is not the procedure that the Congress has ever asked before during the 10 years of life of this act.

Senator JOHNSON. I would say, Mr. Secretary, respectfully, that this is somewhat of an unusual procedure that you are asking here, a rather extraordinary step, and if you are asking an extraordinary step, I see no reason why the Congress should not ask that they be provided with the same information that you require before you make a decision.

That seems reasonable to me.

Secretary DULLES. Does your suggestion apply to the whole of the Mutual Security Act or only to the part of it which—

Senator JOHNSON. My suggestion applies to the authority that you ask here so far as economic aid in the Richards mission is concerned. You say in your testimony that you feel it is necessary to have the recommendations of this mission before you make your judgments.

You want him to go out there, you cannot follow normal diplomatic channels, you have sent for some Ambassadors, they are coming in, but you want to go out there and get a feel of the situation, kind of explore what they are going to do, and I assume determine what type of projects they need and where we are willing to make allocations, and then have Richards transmit that to you and you review it, and the President in effect says the same thing yesterday.

Now I say if you need that information and think it is helpful to you, before making the decision, why should not the Congress be entitled to the same information before it is called upon to legislate?

Secretary DULLES. Senator, the Congress has recognized in all the Mutual Security Acts to date that it is not practical to act in that way. That general authority must be given to the President to spend certain designated amounts of money in certain areas for certain general purposes but the specific allocation of those funds is made by the President without further reference to Congress.

That has been the procedure which we have followed right along in this act, and I think any other procedure would be quite unworkable, particularly when you face an emergency situation of the kind that you face today in the Middle East.

QUESTION OF NEED FOR RESOLUTION

Senator JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Secretary, I shall not belabor that further, but I want to quote a statement from the President's statement, and I quote:

Include the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.

Now concerning the general need for this resolution that you have submitted, do you think that we are required to announce the military program for a particular area of the world when we have already announced on many occasions our intention to engage Communist aggression wherever it occurs?

Secretary DULLES. There has never been, as far as I know, any congressional action which was as broad as that.

Senator JOHNSON. I think that is correct, but do you think that is required in this instance and that it must be that broad and that the various proclamations and letters and statements, warnings issued, are not sufficient?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, do you think that by defining the conditions and the circumstances under which we would intervene in a Middle Eastern armed crisis, that we might be limiting ourselves unnecessarily, and does it appear that a general policy to combat Communist aggression anywhere is insufficient to convince the Soviet that such a policy includes the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. It is quite obvious from the Soviet reaction that they believe that this resolution means something far more significant than if there were no such resolution. The Soviet reaction to this thing has been strong and violent and it is obvious that they attach very considerable importance to it.

I am sure of a deterrent effect which would not exist if this action were not taken.

ASWAN DAM

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, you turned down the Egyptian request for the Aswan Dam loan on the ground that the Egyptian economic situation rendered repayment of that loan doubtful.

Will the same criterion be observed in the use of the economic assistance as provided in this program?

Secretary DULLES. The reasons for the turning down of the Aswan Dam were several. They included among other things the fact that we believed that a country which was gaging its economic resources for military equipment to the extent that Egypt seemed to be doing would not be able to carry out this affair of very great magnitude over a period of years.

Another factor in the situation was that 2 days before the Appropriations Committee of the Senate had unanimously voted that we

should not use any of the money for this purpose. Naturally we took that into account too.

Senator JOHNSON. Now will you use the same criterion that you used in turning that down apply to the applications we may have for additional economic assistance?

That is my question.

Secretary DULLES. I am not quite clear nor do I get the import of the question, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON. As I understand it, you turned down the Aswan Dam, you just indicated that you did, because you thought that the economic situation of Egypt made it unlikely that they could repay that loan.

Now will you apply that same criteria to any other aid, if it appears it is unlikely that they can repay it, will you refuse to make the allocation?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we will not engage in projects which are presumably of a financial nature and contemplate repayment unless we think there can be repayment.

Does that answer your question?

I am not trying to be evasive about it but I do not quite understand it. There are some loan requirements which would be waived by this present resolution, if it is passed in the form that it is presented, as I have indicated, because we think that in some cases there may have to be advances not covered on a loan basis, because the effort to get it on a loan basis would probably create—it would be illusory and would involve internal delays and an opportunity for blocking by the Communists, which would be undesirable.

There are a number of economic projects which are under way and which are going ahead but do not cover anything like the Aswan Dam project.

As I say, there were a lot of reasons, Senator, against the Aswan Dam business. That was a project which involved our working closely together in an affair of very great magnitude for 10 to 15 years. It would have required of the Government of Egypt an austerity program over that period which would be very difficult for its people to bear. The foreign lenders who imposed the austerity requirements would have come in for criticism, and I was satisfied among other things that the project instead of promoting good relations with the people of Egypt would have promoted bad relations because the blame for this whole austerity program within Egypt would have been passed on to the United States.

There were a number of factors that entered into the decision about the Aswan Dam.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, do you think we would refuse to join with the Soviet Union in making allocations for specific projects such as dams and irrigation projects and so forth, and is there any likelihood that the Soviet Union will make substantial funds available for that purpose, in your opinion?

Secretary DULLES. I cannot tell. It is a possibility. It is one of the things that you cannot predict, and that is one of the reasons why we are facing some unpredictable possibilities.

We need to have some leeway ourselves, but I do not envisage it is at all likely that there would ever be a project in which we would go into cooperation with the Soviet Union in this area, because we

know that any money they spent there is for the purpose of infiltrating their people in and trying to take over the economies and the political bodies of that country.

RICHARDS MISSION

Senator JOHNSON. Do you expect the Richards mission to be abroad roughly 6 weeks?

Secretary DULLES. Oh, I would think about 6 weeks, yes.

Senator JOHNSON. And if you get the authority you have asked you would not expect to make any substantial allocations until you have got the benefit of their recommendations?

Secretary Dulles. No. We would probably authorize allocations as they went along, or we might do that or we might not. I just cannot tell. I would not exclude the possibility.

Senator JOHNSON. Who makes up that mission other than Chairman Richards?

Secretary Dulles. I could not actually mention names today, but there will be high officials from Defense, from the International Co-operation Administration, and from State.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Hickenlooper, any questions?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No questions.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Flanders?

EFFECT ON RESOLUTION OF SOVIET-RED CHINA PRONOUNCEMENT

Senator FLANDERS. Mr. Secretary, this question may have been asked before, but I would like to put it to you.

Did the joint pronouncement of the heads of the Soviet and Red China Governments in any way reduce the potency of this proposal?

Secretary DULLES. The proposal indicates—the statement indicates the propaganda line which they will take, but I do not think that in any way defeats the potency of the proposal.

SOVIET COUNTERACTION

Senator FLANDERS. Following along the same line of thought, is it not true that in general any proposals for increasing the use of force will result in a corresponding opposition by a counterforce? Perhaps you don't want to discuss that as a general principle, but simply with relation to this particular situation?

Secretary DULLES. I would say, sir, that if properly used, the creation of force and a committal to its use operates as a deterrent, and if the country feels deterred, it may reduce its own military potential because it does not intend to use it.

Senator FLANDERS. I am not quite sure that I have grasped that. Perhaps I can get it in my next question.

What is there in this proposal for the Middle East that cannot be countered by the Soviet Government?

Secretary DULLES. That cannot be countered?

Senator FLANDERS. Yes. What is there in the use of arms, what is there in economic assistance, what is there in it of any sort that we propose to do that the Soviet Government also cannot do?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we can do by this something which they cannot do or undo. That is to give to some of these areas that feel endangered a sense of security.

You take a country like Iran, for example. It lives in a certain sense of insecurity. After this action has been taken, there will be a far greater sense of security, and that is something that the Soviets cannot undo because the people of the area believe that we will have deterred the Soviet from open armed aggression against Iran.

Senator FLANDERS. Well, will there be anything of the same nature, for instance, with reference to a sense of security (?) with regard to Syria, which is on the other side of the fence, so far as we know?

Secretary DULLES. Well, certainly Syria does not feel today under the menace of open Soviet attack. There is not the fear there. Perhaps there should be, but there is not. Therefore, that particular factor does not come into play in the case of Syria as it would in the case of the more northern countries.

Senator FLANDERS. I think the justification for the position lies simply in the question of aggression and nonaggression, so that as long as there is no aggression against Syria, why there really is no security that she is looking for, although she claims aggression on the part of the Government of Israel, and could perhaps make some sort of a case for it.

But it seems to me that there is in this an opportunity which the Soviet Government is using and will be using to counter our proposals, and that we have to think with regard to it not what we think, how we analyze it, how it looks to us, but how does it look to the nations of the Middle East as a whole?

CONSIDERED ALTERNATIVES TO RESOLUTION

Did you consider alternatives such as an arms embargo that could be monitored, the strengthening of the United Nations forces, and so on?

Were those things considered as alternatives or concomitant policies?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; and if we could get an arms embargo, that would probably be desirable under certain conditions. Of course, there is a present embargo, or at least a request that there should be no shipment of arms to the present area of hostilities, and, as far as we know, that is being lived up to by all of the parties.

Of course, the area of hostilities is a limited portion of the whole area. There are other portions of the area which have treaty relations with us and are members of the North Atlantic Pact or of the Southeast Asia Security Pact, and, of course, we have arrangements for supplying them with weapons and for the use of their forces as part of the total forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for example, and we would not want to take action which would preclude our cooperating with them in the military field in these areas.

ARMS RACE

Senator FLANDERS. Are there, so far as your Department is aware, any arms supplies at present flowing into the Middle East from the Soviet area?

Secretary DULLES. I did not quite get the first part of that question.

Senator FLANDERS. Are there, so far as your Department or your information goes, any supplies of arms or other material useful in warfare at present flowing from the Soviet area into the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. There have been some shipments fairly recently into Syria. There have been no shipments that we are aware of into Egypt since the hostilities broke out and since the resolution that I referred to was passed.

Senator FLANDERS. In your judgment, does this undertaking affect the arms race in any way? Does it tend to mitigate it, does it leave it where it is, or does it tend to increase it?

Secretary DULLES. I don't think it has any detectable effect upon what you refer to as the arms race. I think it leaves it about where it is.

Senator FLANDERS. When you say "what I refer to as the arms race," is there some indication in your mind that there is not any such thing, that is are you thinking that I have an idea that is untenable when I speak of an arms race?

Secretary DULLES. What I meant to refer to, Senator, was I think you were referring to the arms race as the overall arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Senator FLANDERS. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. There is also a question of an arms race in the area between Israel and the Arab States.

Senator FLANDERS. I am referring to the overall arms race.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, I think there is such a competitive effort on in terms of at least certain types of arms.

Senator FLANDERS. I will end my questions, Mr. Chairman, with a brief comment. I am willing to trust to the President of the United States decisions under this measure as to the use of arms, as to the use of economic forces, economic activities. I do wish we had a more constructive policy to trust to him. I am not at all sure that this helps to solve the problems of the world and of that area even, and I am quite sure that to a certain degree at least our force will develop counter-forces which will negate it.

That is just an expression of opinion. I do not ask you, Mr. Secretary, to subscribe to it, but I do say that I shall support or express my confidence in the President's judgment by the vote when the proper time comes.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you.

Senator Humphrey?

Have you any additional questions?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. I suggest that we adjourn at 12, until 2 o'clock.

Senator HUMPHREY. Will I be permitted to start questioning at 2 o'clock?

Chairman GREEN. Yes.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Green (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations), presiding, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Sparkman, Humphrey, Langer, Morse, Aiken, Long, and Kennedy, of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senators Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Kefauver, Smith of Maine, Symington, Jackson, Barrett, and Ervin, of the Committee on Armed Services.

Chairman GREEN. The meeting will resume.

Mr. Humphrey, you have some questions to ask the Secretary?

Senator HUMPHREY. I have, yes sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, there has been a good deal of discussion during your testimony as to the economic aspects of this program, and I want to ask you a few questions about it.

DATE OF DECISION RE NEED FOR RESOLUTION

But before I get to that, I would like to ask this question: When did you and President Eisenhower come to the conclusion that the resolution which is now before us was urgently needed?

Secretary DULLES. I would say about the latter half of December, about the—along about the—15th or 20th of December.

IS RESOLUTION RESULT OF A STUDY OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION?

Senator HUMPHREY. Was this as the result of considerable study within the Department, the National Security Council, and through our diplomatic officers?

Secretary DULLES. I think it would be fair to say that. Of course, we have been studying the situation very closely for a considerable period of time, realizing that as things were going, that once the termination of the occupation, you might say, of Egyptian territory by foreign forces was completed, there would be the necessity in the area of a United States program to backstop, so to speak, the more particular activities of the United Nations.

We were considering throughout that period what we would do, various alternatives, such as joining the Baghdad Pact and things of that sort. Our sense of urgency was reinforced by messages which we had from our Ambassadors, from a joint visitation upon me of the Ambassadors of the four Asian Baghdad Pact countries that took place, I think about the 20th of December—a number of events at that time which brought things to a climax.

Senator HUMPHREY. Now, Mr. Secretary, in light of the fact that this resolution was apparently at least in the embryonic stages from the time of the visitation of the foreign, the four representatives of the Baghdad Pact countries, up until the middle or the latter part of December, did you ask any of your representatives of the Mideast area—the states which have been referred to in these discussions—did you ask any of your diplomatic representatives, any of the Ambassadors, any of the International Cooperation Administration people, to present to you an economic program, to resurvey, in other words, the needs, and to present tentative plans and proposals which might combat international communism?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think that we did, although as far as the instructions to the representatives of the International Cooperation Administration are concerned, I cannot speak; I do not know what, if anything, was done in that respect in that area. As far as the State Department is concerned, I do not think so.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, I understand from your testimony that you did not call upon the heads of missions, the Ambassa-

dors who were in charge, theoretically at least, of our informational services, our technical assistance, our economic aid, our military assistance, all activities in the areas—that you did not call upon them for an appraisal of the situation with plans and programs to meet it, is that a correct statement?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, that is a correct statement, in answer to your question as you put it. Of course, we have a standing invitation out to those people to make any suggestions which seem to them to be wise and appropriate.

Under the standing instructions, the Ambassador has a primary responsibility for the drawing together of the different United States activities, and making recommendations about them, and a constant instruction to report to the State Department any views that he may have about these matters.

Now, there was no—as far as I know in the State Department, at least—there was no modification of those instructions or addition to them at that period.

Senator Humphrey. Did you get any urgent or new suggestions of a dramatic nature from your representatives in that area which indicate the same degree of urgency which you have stressed before this committee?

Secretary Dulles. Well, we had a number of cables from them—I do not know whether you would call them dramatic or not—pointing to the necessity of there being a more positive United States program in the area along the lines of that which we have recommended here.

ECONOMIC AUTHORITY

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, you are asking for a substantial grant of economic authority. I must confess that insofar as the military authority is concerned, I still am sufficiently old-fashioned in terms of my constitutional law interpretation to believe that the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. I am of the opinion that the only reason there was any request for reaffirmation of this is because for a period of time someone may have gotten the idea that we renounced the use of our strength, and now we have to be willing to announce it.

So I am not going to quibble over the matter of the military aspect of this. The President is the Commander in Chief, and I am not about ready to help rewrite the Constitution here at this table.

But when it comes to the economic part of it, Mr. Secretary, I want to know whether or not any ambassador sent you any plans or programs or any detailed information relating to immediate or long-term economic policies and aid of an urgent nature.

Secretary Dulles. I do not recall that he did, Senator; and if there were new programs of that sort, I would, of course, communicate that information to the Senate. I am not aware of any.

The basic strategy underlying the request for more discretion is a decision which was taken primarily here in Washington by the President and his top advisers, in the light, not of the situation in any one particular country, but in the light of the overall situation, in the light of what we anticipated the Soviet and what we call international Communist moves were in the area; as to all of those matters, the best judgment that we have in that respect is made here in Wash-

ington, not by people in the field who see this situation from the standpoint of 1 particular country, 1 particular capital.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, I want to follow this up for a moment, but I just want to ask an informational question here on detail.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM PLANNERS

How many International Cooperation Administration people do we have stationed in the Middle East or in the Mideast countries?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I would have to get those figures. I do not have them available here.

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Hollister tells me that there are several hundred, but he is not able to be more precise at the moment.

Senator HUMPHREY. Several hundred.

Is Mr. Hollister able to inform us as to how many of these might be considered to be program planners or people with special insight into designing and the formulation of programs and policies at the top level in the International Cooperation Administration?

Mr. HOLLISTER. We have a program officer in almost all of the larger missions, and of course program and planning officers in Washington.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have these program planners and program officers been called in or were they notified after December 20, let us say, that the Department of State was going to present a broad resolution to the Congress and, in being so notified, were they asked to gather preliminary data as to what, if any, new economic plans and programs might be initiated in this area?

Mr. HOLLISTER. The program officers in the field?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. HOLLISTER. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. So they have not been used on this resolution for the purposes—

Mr. HOLLISTER. You asked before?

Senator HUMPHREY. I said since December 20.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Since December 20; I would want to check that, Senator. As far as I know, no general order has gone out to the field to start new programming.

(In response to the foregoing questions, Mr. Hollister subsequently submitted the following statement:)

Staff directly employed by ICA in the field, in the general area involved (United States direct-hire personnel), totaled 1,080 as of December 31, 1956, of whom 200 were paid from administrative funds. As a result of disturbed conditions in the area it was necessary (in late October and November) to move 199 employees away from their normal duty posts in the area to other temporary havens.

As of the date you mention I estimate there were 42 superior level field officers whose duty assignments and regular responsibilities required them to undertake policy-program planning and to have specific insight into policy and program design and formulation for this area. They are advised by other members of their own staffs and guided from Washington.

TIME ELEMENT FOR EFFECTIVE USE OF \$200 MILLION

Senator HUMPHREY. How long do you think it would take to spend a couple of hundred million dollars effectively in this area, Mr. Secretary? I do not mean how long it would take us to get rid of it. I

mean how long would it take us to spend it for constructive, effective proposals which would be useful in combating the inroads of Communist penetration?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we have programs which now involve the expenditure in that area of approximately \$750 million, as was presented to the Congress about a year ago.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, sir.

Secretary DULLES. Now, it won't take any longer to spend that money than we then contemplated, but in view of the fact that the situation is radically changed since then, we think that at least some of the money can probably be spent better, and we would get more advantage out of it, if there is more flexibility, and that some of these plans we now have will have to be modified.

But there is no use, Senator, talking about modifying the present plans if we are not going to get new authority, and to upset the whole business prematurely would do a great deal of damage in the area.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Well now, Mr. Secretary, you constantly remind us that unless we do something here, that we are going to take upon ourselves a terrible responsibility, and I think we are all aware of the responsibility in this committee, and the grave responsibility, that is yours, sir. And all that anyone is trying to do here is to be able to present to the American people a sensible proposal.

COMPARISON OF PROPOSAL WITH MUTUAL SECURITY LEGISLATION

I think you know that I have been one who has consistently supported economic assistance, and I listened this morning attentively to your description of the similarity between this proposal and what is done under Mutual Security.

I suggest that it is not as you put it to us. When we are asked to authorize funds under Mutual Security, we have books in here which stand a foot deep, labeled "Confidential" or "Restricted," and then a book which is labeled "Secret" in which we can find out how much money is going to go into each country, how the programs are planned, and what the programming is for the coming fiscal year.

And that is what Senator Johnson, as I got it, was asking for this morning, and what Senator Russell was asking for. We are not asking that each and every little project be laid out before us in blueprint, but, in light of what you said about the radically changed conditions, and in light of the fact that there still is, according to my calculation, \$170 million of 401 (a) funds available to you, and around \$75 million of 401 (b) funds available, some of that having been programmed for other items, such as the Hungarian relief, which is a minor amount compared to the total.

QUESTION OF AID FOR EGYPT

I want to ask you what radical changes have taken place, for example, in Egypt, that are going to affect your programming between May 1 and June 30 of this year—because between now and May 1 you have all kinds of authority—which will necessitate your spending and committing and obligating, at once, additional funds in Egypt.

I want to go into this country by country. I think we must find out.

Secretary DULLES. I do not desire, by answering these questions, to leave any implication that we intend to give or to withhold aid to any particular country.

If you are interested in knowing the economic changes which have occurred in Egypt within the last few weeks, that is very easily done.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. I can understand—

Secretary DULLES. Is that what you wish?

Senator HUMPHREY. I can understand what economic changes have taken place there, but is it not a fair and fitting question for a committee of Congress, 2 committees of Congress, 30 Members of the United States Senate, somewhere along the line to get an indication of just what the plans are with regard to Egypt?

Secretary DULLES. The question which perhaps would be more appropriate would be as to whether at this stage we want to tell the Soviet Communists what we have in mind for Egypt, and as to that I have a very clear answer, and the answer is "No."

Senator HUMPHREY. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary, and I recall your telling this committee not long ago that one way of dealing with the Soviets was to make it perfectly clear to them what we want to do.

I cannot play both sides of the street well. I must say I have heard very repeatedly from you, Mr. Secretary, that one of the mistakes of our former foreign policy was that we left areas uncertain, and you have emphasized the importance of certainty in dealing with the Soviet Union. I think there is merit to that position.

Now you want certainty when it comes to the matter that we are going to meet them militarily if they attack. If they attack, according to the design of this resolution, they have got to attack according to the way we expect them to, or it isn't going to work.

Secretary DULLES. I want a measure of certainty, Senator. I want enough certainty so they will know they are going to be in trouble.

But when it comes to certainty in terms of saying we are going to employ just so many men at such-and-such a time for such a period of service, and so many in the air, on the ground, and upon the sea, at that point I say there should be no certainty.

PROGRAM PLANNING FOR MIDDLE EAST

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, I am not going to be led off into these paths of intellectual wilderness that we get into in these discussions, because you know what I am talking about.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir, I think I know.

Senator HUMPHREY (continuing). Since you have come here with a figure of \$400 million which you say you need, I want to know if you can give us any guesstimate—I won't even ask for a considered estimate, but a good guess—as to how much of that would go to, let's not take Egypt, let's take Iraq, for example, a friendly country. Do you have any idea about how much you think might go to Iraq?

Secretary DULLES. We have already told the committee, Senator, a year ago what our programming was for this area.

Secretary HUMPHREY. Well, we know that.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Secretary HUMPHREY. But you are asking for a change in that.

Secretary DULLES. If you want to know whether or not some of those programs should be changed, or not, to better advantage, I certainly could not attempt to answer that in public session.

Senator HUMPHREY. I respect your judgment.

Secretary DULLES. And I think also that it must be recognized that this planning business takes time. You talk about the plans which were worked out before, those plans took about 6 months. You cannot just do these things by sending a cable out to the area.

But I am proceeding here, and I think this program of the President's proceeds, sir, on something that is quite fundamental, which is that if all of a sudden you have an earthquake in an area, you don't necessarily want to spend the money the same way you had planned to spend it before the earthquake happened.

Senator HUMPHREY. Certainly.

Secretary DULLES. That, I think, is quite elemental.

You say, "How are you going to spend it in place of that?" I say that it will take a little time to work that out, but we should do it just as rapidly as we can, and that a certain amount of leeway should be allowed.

I am saying that as regards about 75 percent of the money that is appropriate, we expect to spend that just as though the earthquake hadn't happened; in other words, there is going to be no change there.

Senator HUMPHREY. All right.

Secretary DULLES. We think we may want to have changes as regards a certain amount to meet a totally new situation, both in terms of the economic crisis of the area and the threat to the area.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, now, Mr. Secretary, you just said to me that plans take time. I agree. You said that it would take about 6 months to develop plans and yet this morning you answered in response to a question from Senator Johnson that Mr. Richards and his committee were going to be able to do this in 6 weeks.

Secretary DULLES. I said that they might be able to commit some of the money within 6 weeks and should be free to do so.

Senator HUMPHREY. All right.

FLEXIBILITY IN USE OF FUNDS

Secretary DULLES. I also said that one of the principal objections that we find in the present legislation is that it requires us to move too fast, and that unless we get a freedom in that respect, we will just have to go ahead blindly committing this money the way it was scheduled a year ago on the basis of plans which have been made 6 months before that, which I don't think makes sense.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, that of course is not exactly the situation because you have all kinds of flexibility between now and May 1. Is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we have not all kinds of flexibility. We have considerable flexibility, yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Considerable. You have about as much flexibility that you can have without being fluid. You could transfer funds rather generously, can you not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, we can. I wish I could get it across that I am not planning, we are not talking here about transferring any funds at all. These are funds that are already committed to the area.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand that, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DULLES. And we are not talking about transfer, Mr. Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, now, you were saying, Mr. Secretary, that you are not asking for any new money.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are saying that you are asking for more flexibility as I understood it.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. My position is, unless I am misinformed and if I am I surely want to be corrected—

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. My understanding is that between now and May 1 you have, under the terms of the Mutual Security Act, section 401 (a) and (b) funds, other funds in the Middle East, in the Middle East and African area funds, considerable flexibility to move funds from one country to another.

Secretary DULLES. I am talking now about the area, within the area.

Senator HUMPHREY. Within the area?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is right.

Secretary DULLES. There is no commitment on a country-by-country basis, you understand.

Senator HUMPHREY. That's right. You can transfer these funds within the area just about as you wish.

Secretary DULLES. Perhaps I misunderstood you or you misunderstood me. Now the word "transfers," I think, has a somewhat technical meaning and normally is used in reference to funds which are allocated, let's say, to the Far East or to Latin America or something. Now there is a transfer there. That transfer authority we don't think we need to invoke in this case.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have some transfer authority under the act itself.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Until May 1 you have authority to use funds that are set aside for a particular area with considerable flexibility; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we have to get most of them, 80 percent of them, committed by the 1st of May.

Senator HUMPHREY. That's right.

Secretary DULLES. Under the present law.

Senator HUMPHREY. The reason we asked for that, Mr. Secretary, is that under the mutual security program we have found out in Congress that the month of June has been a wild month of obligating funds hit and miss in an effort to get the funds obligated before the end of the fiscal year. I think that is a fair statement.

It has been a shocking demonstration to Congress again and again that about June 1 we have found billions of dollars of unobligated funds, and the Congress said, "Look, if you are going to obligate funds, you had better. And if you haven't obligated them by April 30, we will give you a couple of more months but you had better do it systematically."

That is what has been done by the act of Congress.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. All right. Now, Mr. Secretary, I want to know how you are going to spend more funds than are presently unobligated in the Mutual Security Act of 1956? Can you spend any more money between now and June 30 than is available under this act now?

Secretary DULLES. No. I guess we could, but we don't intend to.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let's assume that you had it. Do you think you could spend it effectively?

Secretary DULLES. I think, perhaps, I wouldn't want to speculate about that really because we don't speculate about—we have so many things that we have to be worried about, we don't have to speculate about things that are purely hypothetical.

HOW WILL FUNDS BE SPENT?

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, is it a fair question to ask responsible officials of the Government, when they come up here to ask for money, whether they have any ideas how they are going to spend the money?

Secretary DULLES. Certainly, it is a good question to put.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have any idea as to how it is going to be spent?

Secretary DULLES. But I have to constantly repeat you are asking about substantial additional amounts of money. We are not asking for a dollar of additional money and I am just trying to make it clear in every other sentence that I make that we are not asking for additional money.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand that, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DULLES. But you say, Senator, you just said to me, I am up here asking for additional money.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are here asking for the right to move the moneys around over and beyond what the present fund designates; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Not to spend it in any areas that have not been designated. What we are saying, Senator, is in the main, and there are two or three other points, this is not exhaustive of them all, but in view of the fact that the planning was done on the basis of conditions as they were 18 months ago and in view of the fact that within the last couple of months there has been an economic crisis there and a political crisis there, we think we can do better with obligating this money if we have some more time to do it.

Now if the Congress in its wisdom says, "No, you can't have more time to obligate the money, you must obligate the money just as though this economic and political crisis had not occurred," then of course we will have to do it that way.

But your objection to the fact that generally we can do it on a more regular and well-spaced basis does not apply when you face an upheaval such as occurred during the last couple of months.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, whenever we are asking questions as to just what you think might be necessary for additional programming, you say you don't know, and I must say that is a rather unsatisfactory answer.

Secretary DULLES. Well, Senator, if we knew, we would never be here asking for this authority at all. We would just obligate accordingly, and I admit that it would be nice if you had officials who were omnipotent and who, seeing a crisis like this, could immediately gage the economic consequences, could immediately foresee what the Soviet Communists were going to do on their side. Now if you have somebody like that, who can read the minds of people, and thereby know what is the best thing to do to anticipate them and also to know, if they know, they won't change their plans, that would be a wonderful thing.

I don't profess to have any such knowledge as that and the reason we come down here and ask for more latitude is frankly for the reason that there are these unknown factors that are now injected into the situation and if they were not unknown factors in the situation we would never have to ask for more flexibility.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, Mr. Secretary—

Secretary DULLES. I don't apologize a bit for saying that I don't know, because if I knew, there would be no possible occasion for this legislation, and this aspect of it.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, you knew quite well some time ago that everything was all right. I have statement after statement here from both you and the President assuring the American people repeatedly that everything was just fine. Are you saying that the State Department, the International Cooperation Administration, the National Security Council, and the President of the United States didn't know that there was trouble in the Middle East before the last week of October? Six months or a year ago wasn't there an appreciable amount of the same types of trouble in the Middle East as exists there now? Wasn't there the problem of poverty upon which communism feeds, and the problem of the harnessing of the waters of the Nile?

NEW MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS

It seems to me that the only new problems are the problems of military destruction and the balance of payments, or the fiscal problems relating to countries who no longer get their royalties. They can get those royalties if they can open the Suez Canal and if they will mend the pipeline in Syria. Those are political problems that are not going to be helped by this resolution, as far as I can see.

Secretary DULLES. Well, on the contrary, Senator, I think they will be very much helped by the resolution, very much.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have any reason to believe that this resolution will bring Syria around to a more friendly attitude?

Secretary DULLES. I have reason to believe that it will; yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. You do?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. And you had reason to believe at one time before that Syria was close to coming to a better understanding with us, as I recall.

Secretary DULLES. There was a time when that was quite likely; yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. And yet they continue to accept Soviet arms?

Secretary DULLES. Some of our hopes for the area were upset by the military action of last November; yes.

SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS ON "FACE THE NATION" AND "MEET THE PRESS"

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, Mr. Secretary, I hope you won't think that I am being too contrary when I say that there have been times before that you have given us assurances that just didn't work out. For example, I have a statement here, Mr. Secretary, when you appeared on Face the Nation on October 21, you were asked how you felt we could definitely open a common policy toward easing the situation in the area. You replied:

Well, we have definitely opened a common policy—
speaking of the British and the French—

While we have sometimes started out with somewhat different points of view, we have ended up together, and the fact that there are certain minor superficial differences as to details doesn't detract from the fact that basically we do have a common policy.

I submit that 8 days later, Mr. Secretary, you had to tell the Nation you did not know what the British or the French were doing. They were on the march. They were landing forces in Egypt. Now if these kinds of assurances to the Nation are to be made, how are we to accept the assurance now that all that is being asked for in this resolution is urgently needed and if given will meet the problem?

Secretary DULLES. I recall in that same press conference that you refer to on Meet the Press, Senator—

Senator HUMPHREY. Face the Nation.

Secretary DULLES. Well, I thought you were talking about Meet the Press, that was September 23.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is October 21.

Secretary DULLES. Well, could I say on September 23 I was asked "Would you say the danger of war over the Suez Canal is now ended or reduced?" Answer: "No, it has not been ended." October 9: "We are here dealing with a situation which endangers the maintenance of international peace and security." October 16: "No one can say with certainty that there will be a peaceful solution in accordance with the principles of justice, international law as called for by article I of the Charter of the United Nations." October 27: "I cannot predict the outcome. The situation is grave."

Senator HUMPHREY. Well now, since you have mentioned those, Mr. Secretary, may I just suggest to you that the President of the United States in a conference on October 12 said:

Now before we start I have an announcement. I have got the best announcement, I think, I can possibly make to America tonight. The progress made in the settlement of the Suez dispute this afternoon at the United Nations is most gratifying. I don't mean to say that we are completely out of the woods, but I talked to the Secretary of State just before I came over here tonight and I will tell you that both in his heart and in mind at least there is a very great prayer of thanksgiving.

Now I like all these optimistic notes, but it is a peculiar thing to me that everything was just as optimistic as could be for a long period of time and we just could not see that anything was going wrong and that everything was going well.

You had your users association proposal; there was evidence on the part of your testimony that we were making decided progress in the Middle East, particularly in relation to the Suez; and now we have

a complete reversal, and there is an urgent pressing need for immediate action. I commend you for recognizing that there are problems in the area. I have felt that way for a long time but I want to know how you intend to handle these problems. There is considerable money available to the Department of State. I don't think a checkbook is going to cure these problems.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, can I say for the 50th time, perhaps, we are not asking for a checkbook, we are not asking for a dollar more.

GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN SPENDING REQUESTED

Senator HUMPHREY. What are you asking for, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES. I am asking for greater flexibility in spending the money that has already been appropriated and which will be spent in that way, the way that was mapped out a year ago. If Congress thinks that despite what has happened in the area, despite the economic revolution and cataclysm there, despite the political situation that has happened, we should still woodenly go ahead and spend the money just the way that seemed best a year ago, if that is the judgment of Congress, we will have to do it that way. I say that it is not sensible to do it that way and that the money can be better spent, the American taxpayer will get more for his money.

We will accomplish this program of keeping the area from communism much better if we have a little more latitude, a little more time, a little more discretion to take account of these recent events.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you upon that realization. The problems of the area were grave last year and you did not ask for more flexibility. You asked for regional funds for the Far East but not for the Near East. I would also like to cite to you, Mr. Secretary, you haven't spent the money that is now available to you for the Middle East. I would also appreciate your noting that you testified that Mr. Richards' committee would be able to do a good deal of this work within 6 weeks. Between now and April 30 there are more than 6 weeks, and there is still considerable flexibility in these projects after May 1.

I think it is wrong to make this committee, because it asks questions as to how you intend to spend \$400 million, appear that it is against economic assistance.

I am not against economic assistance. But I want to know how much King Saud is going to get. I want to know how much these oil-rich countries are going to get. I think the American taxpayer has a right to know how much these countries that have fabulous resources of oil are going to get out of the American treasury.

I want to know how much they are going to contribute to this pool of funds. I think we have a right to ask whether or not we can really stop the onrush of communism, within the next 6 weeks, by giving the aid you request.

Now if we have waited this long, Mr. Secretary, that is a very, let me say, shocking condemnation of the policies that have been pursued to date.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, you asked me—you would like to know how much they are going to get.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. I say they are going to get precisely the amount that was appropriated by the Congress for the area a year ago.

Senator HUMPHREY. For the area.

Secretary DULLES. That's right.

PROGRAM PLANNING BY COUNTRY

Senator HUMPHREY. But you know the Congress also had before it, Mr. Secretary, an idea of what each country was going to get under the area.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. We are not at liberty to divulge that to the public as it must not be released. But we did meet in executive session, where each country's program was available for examination, before the money was ever voted, Mr. Secretary. And all that the responsible members of this committee have ever asked is that you give us information concerning plans for the use of these funds. We are not even asking that the folks who pay the bill get the information.

Secretary DULLES. The folks that pay the bill never got that information, Senator. It was always dealt with and always has been dealt with in executive session. These were never any commitments in the law—

Senator HUMPHREY. Correct.

Secretary DULLES. To spend the money in any particular country.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is all we are asking for now, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DULLES. And I say it is quite true a year ago we gave for illustrative purposes an idea as to how the money would be spent in the area.

Senator HUMPHREY. That's right.

Secretary DULLES. And if you gentlemen think it should continue to be spent that way despite the fact you have had a cyclone in the area since then, well you have got the last word on it, so it will be. But I say it doesn't make any sense insisting that it be spent that way.

COMMUNIST PENETRATION

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, I say it doesn't make sense that in 6 weeks you can design policies and programs in the Middle East in a turbulent situation where you hardly know where boundaries are going to be. And when I hear testimony that in 6 weeks the Richards mission is going to be able to give you and the President advice and counsel as to how to spend this money, then I do say you have supermen, supermen because apparently in 4, 5, 6, 7 years we haven't been able to find out how to meet these problems in the Middle East. Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say the Communists were penetrating this area before the attack on the Suez?

Is there any more Communist penetration now?

Secretary DULLES. I pointed out, Senator, that the Communists and before them the Czars have been after this area for a hundred years.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Were you alarmed with Communist penetration in Egypt prior to the first week of October as you are now?

Secretary DULLES. No. There were defenses in the area which don't exist any more.

Senator HUMPHREY. Like what?

Secretary DULLES. Reasonably sound economies, balanced budgets which would enable orderly government to be preserved, revenues that would permit security forces to be maintained, positions that were held there by some of our allies which have since been swept away, those things have all changed.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, am I to understand that prior to November 1 our allies were in a strategic and a strong position in Jordan?

Secretary DULLES. I think their position began to disintegrate before then but had become much worse since the 1st of November.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, is it not true that the British command of the Jordan Arab Legion in Jordan had already been dissipated, disbanded, sent home?

Secretary DULLES. The British—it is true Glubb Pasha had been dismissed.

But it is also true that the British have a treaty with Jordan under which they had bases, and so forth, for which they paid. They have indicated now that they wish to consider with the Jordanians the future status of the treaty. That has only come about within the last few weeks.

Senator HUMPHREY. Am I to understand from your testimony that it is your view that the countries of the Middle East had relative economic strength and stability?

Secretary DULLES. Relative to what they have today; yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Relative to what they have today.

Secretary DULLES. What's happened has hurt most of them very badly.

Senator HUMPHREY. So that your main concern in this area is, really has been within the last 2 months.

Secretary DULLES. Well, what has happened in the last 2 months has been above all the thing which requires us, in my opinion, to alter some of our plans for the expenditure of this money, and to have certain expenditures which can be made in ways which have not been contemplated, and let me correct you again, Senator, I did not think I ever said that I thought that the Richards mission would obligate this money within the next 6 weeks or anything of that sort.

Senator HUMPHREY. What did you mean?

ADDITIONAL OBLIGATION TIME REQUESTED

Secretary DULLES. I said that they should be in a position to obligate some of it. But one of the things that I plead for most urgently is to have more time to obligate it so that we are not caught by this April 30 date.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, why is it then that in the light of your insistence upon this, and you make a very vigorous case for your point of view, in light of your insistence upon the Congress taking this action, why did you not instruct your ambassadors in the Middle East to consult with one another, call them into a central point, why did you not direct the program planners of the International

Cooperation Administration to review what, if any, new policies economic policies, and programs would be needed?

Why did you wait until this particular moment since you are not asking for new money now?

Is it true that you are not even asking for new authorization in terms of new money?

Secretary DULLES. That's right.

WERE UNITED STATES OFFICIALS IN MIDDLE EAST CONSULTED?

Senator HUMPHREY. Why then didn't you use what apparently is your deep concern by calling upon your official representatives in the area to present to you a tentative program that you could bring up here and talk to us about?

Secretary DULLES. One reason is that the problems of the area cannot be dealt with on that basis under present conditions by the heads of mission in the different countries. They do not know what the conflicting demands are, they do not estimate as well as can be done in Washington the threats that may come. Some of this money is not economic, but it is military aid.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand.

Secretary DULLES. This \$200 million as to which we want more discretion is not just economic aid. Many Senators seem to assume that. A good deal of it will probably have to be in the form of military equipment and supplies to help maintain—

Senator HUMPHREY. That doesn't strengthen the case in my mind.

Secretary DULLES. I am just saying to you that the situation is such that we may have to use some of this money to help these countries build up stable security forces of their own or else they will be taken over from within.

Senator HUMPHREY. Now, Mr. Secretary, you are saying to this committee that your top diplomatic representatives, your ambassadors and your International Cooperation Administration chiefs of mission in that area are not as well acquainted with the political, the economic, and the military developments in the area as some of our people are right here in Washington.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I beg your pardon, I did not say that. I said that they are not as well able to judge the overall threat and to try to estimate what the Soviet Communists, international Communists, will be doing in the area, they cannot judge that as well as we can here in Washington from all the information, from a hundred different places where it is brought together and assessed, and boiled down and we finally come to estimates of that sort. That cannot be done in the different areas. Each area can make a small contribution of its own but those small contributions coming from hundreds of local sources are what have to be brought here together and collated by the Central Intelligence Agency, and by our officials, our political officials here, and we finally come to estimates of that sort, and they are not able to make the estimates; and the kind of discretion we want here is discretion to deal with what may be those threats, and we do not fully know yet what those threats will amount to.

That is the reason why we have got to hold some of it back if we can and keep it as a kind of a war chest reserve to be used after we know how the opposition is going to develop its tactics here.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, pardon me, if you will, for not having too much faith in this procedure because that same kind of central Washington opinion and attitude did not seem to ascertain that there was going to be a major attack in the Middle East. Therefore, if the plans and policies which you want to pursue under this resolution are so vital, and I imagine they are, I wonder why there hasn't been a meeting of the people that are on the spot in the area with you, or with others whom you trust. You are going to send the Richards mission out there for a short tour. Are you telling this committee that you feel that a group of highly competent men under the able direction of one of our most distinguished former Members of Congress, is going to be able to do in 6 weeks what your field service officers, ICA personnel, and intelligence officers are not able to do in 6 months, a year or 2 years?

Secretary DULLES. I say that their judgment superimposed upon that, upon the efforts these other people, and combined with the information that we have in Washington, gives you the best practical way that I can think of of deciding how to meet the Communists in this struggle that is going on for this area.

And I did not ask you, because it would have been hopeless to ask you, to say that you thought we had anything like a perfect mechanism here. What I did say is that I believe we have more information here, a 'better' judgment here than if we delegate that to the local people in different countries.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I do hope for the good of all that there is a gathering up of the information from these men in the field because that is their reason for being there. When our Ambassador to Egypt testified before our committee yesterday he said that he had not been asked to prepare any particular plans or give information relating to economic assistance in the area of Egypt.

Secretary DULLES. Well, Senator, we are in kind of a dilemma, you know. If we go out to the field and ask people to prepare plans on the assumption that Congress is going to give us some authority, then we are criticized in Congress for taking it for granted. If we come to Congress first to get the authority before we exercise it then we seem to be criticized because we have not done it the other way around and I am bound to say I am perplexed to say what is the proper procedure.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, that is a good hypothetical case from a good lawyer, but the truth is that you haven't actually explained the situation, because the money is in the bank waiting for you to draw the checks. This isn't a matter of sending people into the field, fearing that Congress may criticize them for using funds that weren't authorized.

The programs and money are authorized, the money is not all spent, and you could well have your field people today obligating and expending this money, with flexibility, between now and the 1st of May.

So this hypothetical case, Mr. Secretary, is not the fact. It will be the fact after May 1, but not up until then. And I think it is fair for this committee to ask why the entire Foreign Service in the area that we are now so concerned about has not been alerted to the preparation of plans, programs, and policies that will make this resolution worthy, because this resolution in my mind is not a policy or a program.

It is an invitation to one, and it seems that we have a right to wonder what those policies and programs will be.

I have taken too much time here, I know, but these are highly important matters. I wanted to ask some questions about military assistance, which I will do in executive session. I want to know under what terms military assistance is to be granted.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST POLICIES

Senator HUMPHREY. May I just conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that I thoroughly agree with Senator Fulbright's statement this morning. I think it is absolutely imperative that this committee have a full-scale review of our policies in the Middle East to ascertain what those policies are. There has been one column after another by responsible respected political analysts who are not partisan, who have no ax to grind as to the failure of policies in the Middle East or the lack of those policies.

I think the question before this committee is not the question of personal friendship for Mr. Dulles or personal respect for him. I think the question before us involves the adequacy of the policies which we have pursued. I want to make it quite clear that I do not have faith in those policies. I do not think they have resulted in success or accomplishment. I think they have in fact resulted in the predicament in which we now find ourselves; I think we ought to know how the Secretary has carried out those policies and on what basis he arrived at the policies as a basis of diplomacy.

So I hope that we will pursue Senator Fulbright's request in due order. I respect the chairman's views by the way, that that should come up as a separate item.

ARMS FOR MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES

Chairman GREEN. Before asking the next questioner, I would like to read for the record a communication from Mr. Robert C. Hill, Assistant Secretary of State, dated January 24, as follows:

DEAR SENATOR GREEN: On January 15, 1957, during the joint hearings of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on House Joint Resolution 117 the Secretary was asked whether there was any State in the area covered by the joint resolution to which the United States had not given or sold arms during the past year. The following information supplements that given by the Secretary:

In fiscal year 1956 the United States Government neither provided arms on a grant basis nor sold arms to Afghanistan, Jordan, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen. An examination of munitions export licenses for the fiscal year 1956, however, reveals that relatively small commercial shipments of arms were made to all countries in the area covered by the joint resolution except Yemen.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT C. HILL, Assistant Secretary.

DEFINITION—INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Senator Kefauver, have you any questions you would like to ask?

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary, at the hearing on January 15 in colloquy with Senator Morse, you discussed the fact that under the resolution it did not—that it also covered any nation which was under control of international communism, that

the resolution referred to any nation that might be decided to be under the control of international communism, and you suggested, although you did not say so directly, that you did not consider at the present time that any Mideast nation would be so classified.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Can I ask you directly whether you would consider Egypt and Syria, or have you been asked that question, as coming within the definition of a nation controlled by international communism within the terms of this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. I would say we would not so consider them.

Senator KEFAUVER. But you did infer that the situation with them was not quite as clear as with reference to other nations?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. There are those who think there is danger of that happening, and that must be accepted as a possibility, I suppose.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, if they came a little bit closer to it and got over the brink or over the edge, who would make the decision as to whether they or some other nations were controlled by international communism?

Secretary DULLES. President Eisenhower.

Senator KEFAUVER. Would you be the chief adviser in connection with that?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would be a chief adviser. I think the Secretary of State is supposed to be a principal adviser of the President in the field of foreign relations. Of course he would also get information from the Central Intelligence Agency, and probably from the Defense Department.

WESTERN EUROPE OIL SUPPLY

Senator KEFAUVER. You said this morning in answer to Senator Wiley's question, and you stated before, that one of the principal necessities for this resolution is to protect the oil supply for Western Europe; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. And you have also said that the closing of the Suez Canal by Nasser was not an act that came within the contemplation of aggression as defined by this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Excuse me, I didn't hear that.

Senator KEFAUVER. You have also said that the closing of the Suez Canal by Colonel Nasser was not an act of aggression by a Communist-controlled state as is defined in this resolution.

Secretary DULLES. I think I said that, certainly I would say so.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, then, Mr. Secretary, it seems that the closing of the Canal did substantially cut off oil to Western Europe; did it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, coupled with the closing of the pipelines.

Senator KEFAUVER. So is it not possible and has it not happened that a state or states of the Middle East may be spurred on by Communist propaganda or coerced with Communist weapons without violating this resolution, without doing anything that would put this resolution into effect and would cut off, again cut off, oil for Western Europe?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, that could happen.

This resolution, I think, will reduce considerably the risk, but it is not guaranteed to eliminate them all.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, if the idea of the resolution is to stop the diminution of the supply of oil to Western Europe, and these nations by closing the Suez Canal and cutting the pipeline without violating the resolution or the terms of the proposed resolution would accomplish the same thing, would not they be able to do it again?

In other words, how would your resolution help in preventing the stoppage of the supply of oil to Western Europe?

Secretary DULLES. It will, I think, greatly reduce the likelihood of international communism getting control of this part of the world and subjecting the facilities of transit for oil and other goods to obstacles to passage through that part of the world.

Now, it does not guarantee. There are risks which still exist. But, if you can eliminate some risks, it is worthwhile doing so, even though you do not eliminate them all.

Senator KEFAUVER. Would you consider that international communism was responsible for the closing of the Suez or the closing of the pipeline which resulted in this oil catastrophe?

Secretary DULLES. No, not in the sense in which the word is used in this draft resolution.

Senator KEFAUVER. Then the resolution is not going to assure that there would be no repetition of the same condition you previously have had.

Secretary DULLES. Not completely, no. It will reduce the likelihood of it, but I don't guarantee that there could not be any recurrence of the closing of the canal for any one of a great many causes.

Senator KEFAUVER. Now, I take it—did you say that another purpose was to prevent this oil from getting into the hands of Soviet Russia or Communist countries?

Secretary DULLES. In the sense of their being in a position to control what became of it, yes; not in their hands in the sense that they are wanting to use it, because they are not in the market for oil. They are exporters of oil products.

Senator KEFAUVER. They do not need the oil; they do not have the pipelines or transportation to take it out of the Middle East; do they?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator KEFAUVER. They also have oil around the Caspian Sea and Baku which is more than they need themselves, and which they export.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, would they win friends in the Middle East, do you think, by destroying the market of the Middle Eastern nations for oil in Europe?

Secretary DULLES. No, I do not think that they would win friends, but their policy is not based upon winning friends. They are not winning friends in Hungary, are they?

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, it would seem to me that this present situation ought to—with the stoppage of oil, should not inure to the benefit of Soviet Russia; has it, so far as the Middle East is concerned?

Secretary DULLES. If they get control of the area, they are not going to be interested at all in the welfare of the people there. They will have in their hands an instrument which they can use to coerce, threaten, and greatly weaken, perhaps conquer, Western Europe.

POWER TO DECLARE WAR

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, I want to make it clear that I think some economic aid, particularly of the long-range and point-4 type, would be very helpful in strengthening these people and in preventing things that cause communism; but what, frankly, worries me about this resolution is that under the Constitution, I was elected a Senator on the basis of deciding, of having the prerogative of declaring, when the United States should be at war.

This resolution asks that that right be delegated really to people who are going to decide it on facts which may or may not be convincing enough to the Senate or to the Congress to put the Nation into war. We never have been able to get a direct answer from you whether the President would, if such circumstances came around—would come to the Congress and ask for a declaration of war.

Have you thought that matter over any further or can you give us any more direct answer?

Secretary DULLES. I thought I suggested that under those circumstances, the President would doubtless ask for a declaration that a state of war existed.

Senator KEFAUVER. That he would ask for a declaration that a state of war existed.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator KEFAUVER. But can you give us that as an assurance, that before the Armed Forces of this Nation will be used under circumstances which might bring about a substantial conflict, that the President would ask for a declaration that a state of war existed?

Secretary DULLES. Not prior to their use; no, sir. The whole purpose of this resolution is to make clear that the Armed Forces will be available to resist open armed aggression by a country controlled by international communism.

Now, if there is any doubt about that, I would say that would of itself be a very great disaster, because the people of the area would then feel that they had no protection against, or no sure protection against, a menace which then would seem to them to be overwhelming.

Senator KEFAUVER. At what stage in the armed conflict can you assure us the President would present the matter to Congress for its decision?

Secretary DULLES. As soon as it was apparent that it was something more than a border incident and might involve the activities which we normally associate with war. He may have to have special legal measures of one sort or another. He may have to appropriate more money. He may have to enlarge the Armed Forces of the United States.

As soon as it is apparent it is more than a border incident and develops into what might be called a war, surely Congress would then be called, because the President of the United States cannot carry on a war without the full support of the Congress.

SPOOFING OPERATIONS

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, in that connection, Mr. Secretary, could you envision any substantial conflict in the Middle East in which our troops might be used, which would not result in a general, all-out war between the Soviet Union and the United States?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir. I can regard what are sometimes called spoofing operations, which are designed to try to test us out, to see whether we really mean business or not, things like that could very well occur.

Senator KEFAUVER. Then these little border forays, and did you say "scooping operations"?

Secretary Dulles. "Spoofing." Spoofing, I think, is a technical word, is it not, Admiral?

Senator KEFAUVER. Is that "spoofing," is that a military word, "spoofing"?

I saw you refer to Admiral Radford. I did not know whether that was—

Secretary Dulles. It has a broader use than that, but—

Senator KEFAUVER. Just what is your definition of a "spoofing" operation?

Secretary Dulles. Well, a "spoofing" operation is an operation which is put on to fool a defender into thinking that he is encountering a major attack, and to see how he reacts to it, and to see whether he has got adequate defenses against it.

If it is found he does not react to it or that he does not have adequate defenses, then that affords a premise upon which more serious undertakings may be engaged. But the operation itself is exploratory and not designed to be itself a serious war effort.

Senator KEFAUVER. Then this spoofing operation or border clashes, forays, whatever you want to call them, would it be envisioned that our troops would be there to help repel the spoofing operation?

Secretary Dulles. No. I would think that where we would be most apt to be involved and where the testing would be more apt to come would be probably in air operations.

Senator KEFAUVER. In air ambushes?

Secretary Dulles. In the air.

QUESTION OF DELEGATION OF DETERMINATION REGARDING USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

Senator KEFAUVER. Is it contemplated that we will have airbases with planes manned by American airmen, in the Middle East?

Secretary Dulles. Well, we have bases already in parts of that area, and there are friendly fields available to us in the area, and it might very well be that there would be an invasion by air of the area of some of our friendly countries there, to see whether we reacted or not.

Senator KEFAUVER. Would it be the intention to react if there were Soviet planes doing that?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir, I would think if a Soviet plane started what looked like an airborne operation, that there would presumably be a reaction.

Senator KEFAUVER. Who would determine whether it was a friendly invasion, I mean just planes flying over or whether it was an armed invasion by air?

Secretary Dulles. That would be determined by the President.

Senator KEFAUVER. By the President.

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Would that be a determination that the matter would be delegated to the commanders of the Air Force in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. Under safeguards, yes.

Senator KEFAUVER. In other words, these men out there would have it within their power to substantially determine whether, when planes came over, Soviet planes came over, to determine whether it was hostile or whether it was not?

Secretary DULLES. The situation in that respect would be precisely the same as it is in the North Atlantic Treaty areas and as it is in the western Pacific, where that situation already exists.

Senator KEFAUVER. But in the North Atlantic Treaty, we have French, British, and a lot of others there with us; do we not?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we have different areas, but if there is an invasion of our area, the people who are there have a limited discretion to act.

The same way in the case of Japan, Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, Indochina.

Senator KEFAUVER. But in any event, whatever may be the situation, the area commander in the Middle East, the air commander, would have a certain right delegated to him to determine whether it was the type of air invasion that he should use American men and planes to combat?

Secretary DULLES. You can get more detail on that from Admiral Radford. What I would say is that it would create here precisely the same situation that already exists over a good many thousands of miles around the perimeter of the Soviet-Chinese Communist orbit.

Senator KEFAUVER. I am not talking about what exists somewhere else. I just want to know what is going to happen here.

Secretary DULLES. Well, as I say, you can get more detail from Admiral Radford. I do not know just exactly what the command instructions are, but it would be the same here as in the case elsewhere.

Senator KEFAUVER. All right, thank you, Mr. Secretary.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Chairman GREEN. Senator Langer?

Senator LANGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no more questions to ask the Secretary, but I should like to inquire if it would be in order for me now to make a motion.

Chairman GREEN. I do not think a motion is in order unless it relates directly to the hearing.

Senator MORSE. A parliamentary inquiry. Might we hear what the motion may be so we can rule on whether it is in order or not?

Chairman GREEN. I say unless it relates directly to this hearing.

SUGGESTION THAT GENERAL MAC ARTHUR TESTIFY

Senator LANGER. It does relate directly to it.

I move, Mr. Chairman, that before these two committees conclude these hearings, that Gen. Douglas MacArthur be invited to testify.

Chairman GREEN. I think that ought to be heard in executive session, and not in public session.

I think you will be convinced by the fact that a number of other Senators have made similar requests. If we granted them all, it would be a matter of serious consequence to the committee itself.

If you will bring the matter up later at a meeting of the committee, I will give you an opportunity to do so.

Senator LANGER. I might say, Mr. Chairman, I shall bring it up later, because I believe before these two committees conclude their hearings, that the Senator from North Dakota, at least, would like to hear the testimony of General Douglas MacArthur. I believe he is in possession of very vital testimony, and that at least, he should be invited to come.

I have not talked to him or with any of his representatives.

Chairman GREEN. Would you be willing to wait until the conclusion of these hearings?

Senator LANGER. You mean today?

Chairman GREEN. Before we adjourn, before we finally adjourn these hearings.

Senator LANGER. Well, I do not mind doing that, Mr. Chairman, but General MacArthur might want to make arrangements to be here.

Chairman GREEN. I will give you an opportunity to make your motion again later when we find out whether we are going to conclude these hearings today or not.

Senator HUMPHREY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman. Did I understand the chairman to say we would only hear Gen. Douglas MacArthur after the —

Chairman GREEN. I did not say it. The question now is whether we call him. That is what I understood the motion to be.

Senator HUMPHREY. But the decision being taken now does not preclude the opportunity to call General MacArthur?

Chairman GREEN. Certainly not.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it is an excellent suggestion.

Chairman GREEN. Personally, I am in favor of it, if I may express an opinion.

(The joint committees on January 28 voted to invite General MacArthur to appear before them to give his views. In reply to the invitation, General MacArthur sent a telegram to Senator Theodore Francis Green, chairman of the Joint Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, as follows:

I thank you so sincerely for your invitation. However, due to my complete severance from governmental affairs for the past 5 years, I feel that I could contribute nothing of sufficient authoritative value to assist the committee in its hearings. Please express to the members of both committees my deep appreciation of the compliment they have paid me by this invitation. To you, my dear Senator, as always, my personal respects and admiration.)

INTEREST OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS IN POSITION OF UNITED STATES CONGRESS

Senator Morse, you have some questions to ask?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, do you find in carrying on your diplomatic relations work as Secretary of State, that you are frequently handicapped in negotiations with representatives of foreign powers by statements made by those representatives to the effect that they cannot enter into agreements with our country until they first know the position of Congress on the issues involved in the proposed agreement?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, that view is quite often expressed in substance.

Senator MORSE. In your judgment is that part of the problem in Middle East diplomatic relations now, that some of the Middle East countries express concern to you as to what the position of the United States would be in case of a Russian attack?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Do you think, Mr. Secretary, that Russia has any doubt about our determination to meet with force any military aggression that she might commit upon the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. I think that there is doubt, having through some form of congressional action covered most of the areas, and this area now coming into question virtually for the first time as far as the United States position is concerned, I think that they might very well have doubt.

Of course the greatest concern, Senator, is that if the people in the area have doubt, then the Communists can get their will very often by not actually invading but by creating a fear of invasion so that the situation collapses from the inside.

Senator MORSE. Staying with the Russian position for a moment, keeping in mind the lesson that Russia ought to have learned in connection with Korea, the position that we have taken in connection with Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, not only our membership but sponsorship of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, do you know of any reason why either Russia or the countries of the Middle East should have any serious doubt as to our insistence on joining with other free nations in preventing war and protecting freedom where aggressively attacked?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I do think that they have such doubts, Senator, where it has not been resolved by congressional action, and by that I include treaties.

When you speak of Korea there, of course we acted under the United Nations Charter and were able to take that action under that charter only for the reason that at that particular moment the Soviets were boycotting the United Nations Security Council, so it was possible to have a vote there which would not have been possible had they been present so that they could veto action in the Security Council if there was an attack on the Middle East, and there would be no treaty and no congressional resolution to stand in the path.

Senator MORSE. In connection with southeast Asia, we answered the fear of those countries of possible Russian aggression with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. In the case of Europe, we answered the fears of our European allies with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

WHY NOT A MIDDLE EAST ALLIANCE?

Why should not we propose in the Middle East an alliance identical with the type of alliance that we entered into with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization rather than the modifications that we find in this type of an alliance?

Secretary DULLES. Because the area is so divided within itself that it would be very difficult to do so. The British who up to the present time have always taken the initiative in this area had a project known as MEDO—Middle East Defense Organization—which they worked

on very intensively for a considerable period of time back in 1952 and 1953, as I recall it was, but they were unable to make any progress there.

There is now the Baghdad Pact to which the British are parties, which involves the United Kingdom and the four northern nations. But that pact is very strongly opposed by other Arab countries in the area, and after very mature study and consideration, it was the view of the President not to recommend to the Congress at this time the United States joining the Baghdad Pact.

Senator MORSE. The type of pact that I have in mind is not the Baghdad Pact but a pact that at least calls for unity of action on the part of all these Middle Eastern countries that you testify have fear of a potential Russian aggression.

On that common ground, they ought to be able to join with us and other nations in a pact, that in case of attack by Russia against one of them, it would be considered an attack by Russia against all of them, as far as the signatories to the pact are concerned, thereby bringing into this program not the unilateral action of the United States but the combined action of other States that likewise have a great stake in the Middle East, including the Middle East countries themselves.

Would that not be a desirable approach to make to this problem, if we could get their agreement to go along with that kind of a pact comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization?

Secretary DULLES. It would be from our standpoint desirable, but I can assure you, Senator, it is not practicable at the present time. I would hope very much that matters would evolve in such a way. We have a somewhat similar situation perhaps in the Far East, if I might allude to that.

Logically you would have to gather in a single pact Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines. So far we have not been able to do it. When I first went out to that part of the world for the prior administration, we hoped that we would be able to do it at that time. That was in 1950 and 1951. But it has not been possible to bring these countries together.

Logically they should come together, but they are divided by feelings as between themselves so that we have had to deal with those 4 situations on the basis of the United States working with each of the 4. We have not been able to get the four to work together.

Senator MORSE. That is what puzzles me. We find ourselves in an international situation in the Middle East where apparently the only country that can function as the military savior in the minds of the Middle East countries is the United States, and I respectfully submit that it is puzzling millions of Americans, because, knowing a little bit about statistical sampling, I would judge that my mail on this matter to date is a pretty good sample of public opinion.

It is not limited to my own State. It comes from across the country. The American people, I respectfully say, are puzzled. My mail is not running 90 percent against the resolution; my mail is running better than 90 percent against the resolution, and they do not understand why this unilateral action on the part of the United States is called for. Therefore in fairness to my constituents and others that have written me, I would like to follow this line of questioning.

WESTERN EUROPE'S NEED OF MIDDLE EAST OIL

From your testimony the other day I am right, am I not, in the conclusion that Western Europe sorely needs the oil from the Arab countries? Without it, the economy of Western Europe might very well collapse or at least greatly suffer.

That is true; isn't it?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

WHY SHOULD UNITED STATES UNILATERALLY ENTER PACT WITH
MIDDLE EAST?

Senator MORSE. Then, Mr. Secretary, why should the United States enter into a unilateral pact with the Middle East countries, which this resolution in effect amounts to, placing in jeopardy the lives of American boys while the lives of boys of European countries are not being pledged to the same pact?

Secretary DULLES. Of course I would not agree that this resolution puts American lives in jeopardy. I think it makes peace more secure. Certainly the President would not have recommended this to the Congress if he did not judge that it made peace more secure.

Senator MORSE. I know that is your opinion and I respect it. But I also know that the language of the resolution says it empowers the President of the United States to send boys to the Middle East if he decides that is necessary to meet armed aggression by Russia, and if that factual situation develops, lives of American boys in fact are in jeopardy, and they are the only lives under this resolution that are placed in jeopardy as far as our allies are concerned, because they are under no obligation under this resolution to join us.

You may say you think they would, but there is no commitment that they shall, is there?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. So I come back to this question.

Does this pact not in effect mean that we not only seek by the resolution to guarantee the territorial integrity of the countries of the Middle East, but we guarantee the oil supply to Europe, and we back up our guaranty with the pledge of American boys to fight if necessary to carry out those two guaranties?

Secretary DULLES. I would not agree with that analysis of it, Senator. Where we anticipate that there is danger, where we anticipate that it can be deterred, then I believe it is a program of peace to take the action to deter.

Now when we take that action to deter, we have to take it in the light of the circumstances as they are. It would be very fine if we could bring together all of the nations of the Middle East in some pact. I say that has been tried.

The original British project for a Middle East Defense Organization was along those lines, but that collapsed. As it seems now I see no likelihood of being able to revive such a project.

In some cases we do take commitments without our allies going along with us. We did it in the four cases that I mentioned in the Pacific.

Senator MORSE. Let's take the language of the resolution. I will outline for you very quickly where you and I seem to separate in point

of view. We pledge military support in the case of a Russian attack on one of these countries. Russia attacks Syria. I assume under the pact we will keep our pledge. We send American boys to Syria to combat Russian forces.

Now, I am not satisfied with an answer that says, "Senator, I do not think that will happen."

I want to point out to you that, under the terms of this resolution, its purpose is to put Russia on notice that if it does happen, we will move in, and I certainly am not going to take the position of assuring the American people that Russia might not call our bluff.

Secretary DULLES. Might not what?

Senator MORSE. Might not call our bluff.

Secretary DULLES. Call our bluff?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. If this was a bluff, it would be a disaster. This is not in an area where you do any bluffing. But we have operated on the theory for some little time, and in relation to 42 other nations, that the best assurance of peace was to make it clear that nations could not be attacked and taken over one by one, and that the deterrent of saying to a potential aggressor, "If you try to attack country X, you will have me to deal with." That is a lot better than saying in effect, "If you attack country X, we will wait and see, and after you attack country Y we will wait and see."

Eventually that leads to a situation where we are inevitably drawn in. I think that the overall policy of this Nation during the last 10 years has been to operate on the other theory. We tried that theory during the First World War, we tried it during the Second World War, and I recall the debate that took place on the North Atlantic Treaty. I remember I was in the Senate at that time.

I remember the exchange of views which you and I had at that time, and I think we felt there, most of us, that, as Senator Vandenberg put it, the knockout admonition was the knowledge that, if they attacked, that we would come in, and he said, I remember, that he felt that even Hitler would have paused before that.

That is the theory on which we have been operating ever since under Democratic and Republican administrations.

I think it is a sound theory. So far, at least, it has worked wherever it has been applied, and I believe we should not leave this gap in the situation as one where there is a question at least as to whether or not we would react.

Senator MORSE. Yes, Mr. Secretary; I remember the NATO debate very well, and our exchange of points of view there.

I thought we finally reached the common understanding that when we signed the NATO Pact we recognized that an attack on any one of the signatories to the pact was an attack on all. You will remember I argued that the pact meant that we were under a clear moral obligation to militarily implement the pact. The record will show I said:

I want the people of my State to know when I vote for it that I consider myself in the future obligated to militarily implement it.

I hold the same view as to our obligations under this pact. If we pass this pact we are morally obligated to militarily implement it and to back it up with troops if necessary.

My difficulty with your point of view is simply this: You want me to accept the conclusion that you have reached that if we make this pledge for the use of American troops, that there will be little or no danger that we will have to use them.

My reply to that is, that all depends on what our allies will do, because I think we might very well find ourselves in the position where the desperate men in the Kremlin would force us to use the troops, because I think the viciousness of world communism is such that if pushed to the wall, they would be perfectly willing to throw the world into a new dark age to have their way.

What I seek to elicit from you this afternoon, if I can, is your point of view on this record as to what hope, if any, you think we might have of getting England, France, Germany, Italy, and the other countries of Europe whose oil supplies we are seeking in effect to guarantee by this resolution, to put up some manpower and pledge some manpower to stand by us if I might use the term, to call our bluff, if Russia followed the desperate course of starting a war, because I have never dismissed from my mind the possibility that Russia might risk a war if she thought that in terms of a hundred years communism would come out of that new dark age the survivor.

I supported NATO because NATO included allies. I supported SEATO because SEATO included allies. Here we are dealing with unilateral United States action in Middle Eastern countries, who I respectfully submit would not be very helpful as military allies in case of war in the Middle East.

UNITED STATES ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

I think the American people need to know what your position is in regard to any plans that the administration has for commitments to European nations whose oil supplies we are going to guarantee, who will immediately come in and be of assistance to us in any military action in the Middle East.

Do you think we could count on that assistance?

Secretary DULLES. I think it would quite possibly develop in that way. I think if there is a general war which develops, that it will probably involve not a limited area. When I say "a general war," I mean a general war between the United States and the Soviet Union. If that develops, it will probably develop all over the lot, and would involve allies both in Europe and in Asia.

I do not think that the situation would be strengthened at all at the present time if the countries to which you refer joined in some sort of a treaty.

Some of them at least are not very acceptable at the moment in that part of the world.

Others are busily engaged in trying to live up to their existing commitments in Europe, and are somewhat behind in that respect. Therefore I think that the idea that we can get substantial additional military strength out of Europe for the defense of the Middle East runs into two hurdles, the first of which is the necessity for keeping Europe defended and not to weaken that structure to save another, and the second one, the political problem, which is very considerable at the present time with regard to Western Europe.

Senator MORSE. I am interested in your comment that some of these European allies of ours are not in very good standing in the Middle East at the present time.

That troubles me, because does this not then amount to our stepping into the Middle East and picking up where France and England left off, but with a program that we hope will be more acceptable to Middle Eastern countries than the English or French programs were, but which nevertheless assumes the general responsibilities that England and France sought to exercise for some decades in the Middle East—with final failure on their part?

Secretary DULLES. The policies which the British and the French sought throughout this extended period which you referred to their exercising in that area were for a long time in the framework of a colonial problem.

COLONIALISM

The British, as you will recall, had sovereignty control over a large part of that area. The French had control of part of it, and before that you had the Ottoman Empire. I do not believe that the area can be strengthened very much at the present time by trying to bring in countries who are associated with that colonial period.

That may be a misjudgment of those countries, but these prejudices last for a considerable period of time, and certainly the last thing that we should do would be to go in and pick up the position of a colonial power in that part of the world. And in fact what we hope to do is to build up and strengthen those countries and their independence so that at least in that way certain types of dangers are eliminated.

We hope to eliminate in that way the danger from internal subversion and the like. But it is not by process of our derogating from the sovereignty or the authority of these countries. It is by helping to build them up.

Our approach is and must be quite different from that of a colonial power.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I certainly hold no brief for colonialism, even when it is exercised by parliamentary governments.

TOTALITARIANISM

But when you speak about building up the independence of these countries in the Middle East, with the possible exception of Lebanon, are we dealing with any countries that have a democratic form of government?

Will we not be strengthening Middle East totalitarianism of a dictator type?

Secretary DULLES. No. I think that we will be creating conditions which will promote evolution toward a greater measure of democracy.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that the aid and the military support that the resolution contemplates with Saudi Arabia is going to make Saudi Arabia more democratic?

Secretary DULLES. Of course, Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, and it may be a long time before Saudi Arabia changes from the status of a monarchy. But there are other countries in the area which are

moving toward a more democratic form of government. We have seen that development going forward in Turkey, and the situation in Egypt at least from a theoretical standpoint is quite different from what it was when you had an absolute monarchy in that area.

Senator MORSE. They have moved into a pretty vicious military dictatorship at the present time. I think you are right about Turkey. But I had the Library of Congress prepare for me, as a double check of my own knowledge of the situation, a synopsis of the form of government that exists in these countries and a résumé of the history of these countries, which I shall use later on the floor of the Senate. I will say I find nothing in this Library of Congress résumé that would make me very enthusiastic about the possibility of this resolution supporting any democracies in the Middle East.

It troubles me; I think it troubles many other people.

What we are going to be doing I fear is using our military aid and economic aid to entrench totalitarian governments already too much entrenched.

What we are seeking to do is help lead the peoples of the world toward a governmental system in which the dignity of the individual prevails, rather than a system in which dignity is suppressed by the dictatorship rule of the kind of totalitarian governments that exist in most of the Middle East. Therefore, I have great reservations on the observations made by you and the other spokesmen of the administration that some way, some how, this is going to strengthen independence in the Middle East.

I think it is going to strengthen, guarantee the protection of an oil supply, and I am willing to pay some price for that, but not at the cost of human freedom.

MIDDLE EAST OIL SUPPLY

So I turn to this matter of the oil supply, Mr. Secretary. Do you have an estimate as to the potential revenues of the oilfields of the Middle East, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrein, and Iran?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. You would like those figures, Senator?

Senator MORSE. I would like to know what your estimates are.

Secretary DULLES. They have been submitted to this committee but I have a copy of it here.

Senator MORSE. If they have been submitted we will put them in the record.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

(Estimates are included in the answers to questions submitted by Senator Fulbright on January 14. See p. 30.)

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I asked the staff to have the Library of Congress prepare for me the potential oil revenues of the Middle Eastern countries of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Bahrein, and Iran, and I ask to have the entire table put in the record.

(The following is the table prepared by the Library of Congress:)

Potential oil revenues, oil-producing states of the Near East

| | Production (in millions of metric tons) | | Reserves, 1955 (in thousand millions of metric tons) | Revenues (royalties) (in millions of dollars) | | Potential revenues, assuming 1955 rate of production and 1955 scale of royalties (in billions of dollars) |
|-------------------|---|-------|---|---|-------|---|
| | 1955 | 1954 | | 1955 | 1954 | |
| Kuwait..... | 54.8 | | 5.41 | 280.0 | | 27.6 |
| Saudi Arabia..... | 47.1 | | 5.0 | 280.0 | | 29.7 |
| Iraq..... | 33.2 | | 2.7 | 223.4 | | 18.2 |
| Qatar..... | 6.4 | | .2 | 36.8 | | 1.4 |
| Bahrain..... | 1.5 | | .03 | 8.5 | | .170 |
| Iran..... | 16.0 | | 3.05 | 86.8 | | 10.8 |
| Total..... | 158.0 | | 16.09 | 915.5 | | 98.4 |

NOTE.—The revenues from oil received by the oil-producing states of the Near East totaled \$915.5 million during 1955. Based on estimated reserves in 1955 and assuming no change in the price of oil and no change in the royalties per unit of oil produced, the potential revenues to all oil-producing countries of the Near East would total \$98.4 billion.

Source: 1955 reserves, production, and royalties from London Financial Times Oil Survey, June 28, 1956, and London Financial Times, Aug. 17, 1956.

Senator MORSE. The table shows, assuming the 1955 rate of production, the 1955 scale of royalties in billions of dollars. The potential revenues amount to \$98,400 million.

Secretary DULLES. That checks very closely with my figures.

Chairman GREEN. Are you asking the Secretary to respond to this?

Senator MORSE. No, I am asking at this point that this table be put in the record, and I am asking the Secretary if that is his understanding that that is roughly the evaluation of these oil revenues.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, that corresponds quite closely with our figures.

Senator MORSE. I happen to think that is a very important fact in connection with this resolution, both from the standpoint of the military and economic aid encompassed. Isn't it true that what we are really doing is making clear to Russia that we don't intend to stand by and let her through military aggression, get control of, in round numbers, \$98,400 million worth of oil revenues, without fighting?

Secretary DULLES. Of course if the Soviet took over this area there would not be any such oil revenues.

Those oil revenues would all disappear.

Senator MORSE. Well, she would have control of the oil.

Secretary DULLES. She would have control of the oil. She would be able to cut it off but she would not be able to replace the revenues.

Senator MORSE. What I am saying, Mr. Secretary, is that she would have a natural resource that has this potential revenue capability, which is mighty important to Western civilization as our economy operates.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MORSE. So what we are saying to Russia is that we don't propose to let you get control of these oil fields by military aggression without a fight.

Isn't that what this boils down to?

OTHER MIDDLE EAST ASSETS

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would not say that the only asset of the area is oil. There are many more.

Senator MORSE. I would not either.

Secretary DULLES. So if we are going to say anything to Russia, I think we would say something along the lines of what President Eisenhower said in his message to Congress.

He pointed out the tremendous values in the area in terms of its culture, religion, the holy places, the fact that it was a way of transit between Asia and Europe, and that the economies of many countries of Asia are largely dependent upon the canal, not in terms of oil, but in terms of their ordinary commerce.

It also involves the possible gateway to Africa. So if you are going to say something to the Russians, I certainly do not think we would put it quite as simply as you just put it, just in terms of oil.

Senator MORSE. I understand that point of view. I certainly want to make it clear that I think the greater value over and above the \$98 billion worth of oil happens to be human wealth involved in the abstract ideals of freedom involved.

QUESTION OF UNILATERAL AMERICAN ACTION

But we nevertheless are dealing in this resolution with the question as to whether or not we are going to use, unilaterally, American troops, if necessary, to protect from Russian attack the territorial integrity of any country where these great oil reserves are located, because we recognize how dependent on oil is western civilization, both in Europe and in our continent. Isn't that true?

Secretary DULLES. Partially true. Of course many of these countries do not have any oil at all you know. We are not limiting ourselves to oil countries. I think the issue is very much broader than that, Senator. It is to make clear in this remaining part of the world what we have made clear elsewhere, that the method of armed aggression is a method which is no longer tolerable, and a method which will no longer pay.

I think that the principle involved is very much broader than this particular area. It relates to the whole kind of a world that we are now trying to build.

Senator MORSE. But your major thesis, as I have followed you today, is that the time has come when the United States unilaterally should lay down this doctrine, even though we are providing the doctrine of economic protection to all the European countries whose economies you have testified are dependent upon this oil that we are going to protect.

Secretary DULLES. I testified that Soviet control of this area would put them in a position to exercise a very large measure of control over Western Europe; yes.

Senator MORSE. I want to say I would be much happier about the resolution if we had some indication from our European allies that they would join in it. And I am not greatly moved by the suggestion that maybe the Arab countries would not like it, because I think we have to find out from the Arab countries whether or not they are going to be allies or just beneficiaries, which is quite a different thing.

EFFECT ON ISRAEL

Before you turn to the next line of questioning, Mr. Secretary, I want to ask one other question about the nature of the forms of government that exist in the Middle East. Is it not true that Israel is really the only free state in the Middle East as we think of parliamentary freedom, in that it is in Israel that the dignity of the individual is protected by a bill of rights, and it is in Israel that we have freedom of the press, freedom of assemblage, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech. Yet under this resolution, Israel has to continue to look to the United Nations for help in the settlement of the political questions that threaten peace within the Middle East, and several of these Middle Eastern countries continue to make clear that if given the opportunity, they will wipe Israel off the map.

Yet we propose in the resolution to build them up materially.

My question, Mr. Secretary, is, are we not, under this resolution, once we build up those Middle East countries militarily, putting Israel in a weakened position as far as her relationships with these Middle East countries are concerned?

Secretary DULLES. I think quite the contrary, that Israel will be far safer under this program than if there is no such program. Indeed I feel that unless there are strong measures taken to assure that the Soviet Union will not dominate the area, that the peace within the area will hardly be obtainable.

We all know that it was the Soviet arms to Egypt which began at least a series of events which had led to serious trouble in the area, and the whole conduct of the Soviet Union throughout the last couple of years in particular—of course the story goes way back beyond that—has been to try to stir up trouble to put one country against another, because as I said very frankly to the Soviet Foreign Minister when we were together in New York last October, I think it was, "It seems to you a situation where you can with advantage fish in troubled waters. Therefore you are constantly trying to trouble the waters."

And anything we can do to calm the waters will I think benefit all the other countries of the area.

Otherwise I think they are going to be egged on one against the other to create trouble.

HANDLING INTRA-AREA QUARRELS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator MORSE. Would you, Mr. Secretary, oppose a new section to this resolution that would provide that if any Middle East country militarily attacked Israel or Israel in turn militarily attacked any Middle East country, we would likewise use armed force to prevent that threat to the peace?

Secretary DULLES. I would not be in favor of such an addition to the resolution, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Why not?

Secretary DULLES. Because I believe that the type of intra-area quarrel which does not involve directly international communism should be dealt with primarily by and through the United Nations, which I think is able to deal with that type of problem.

While I believe that the interests of the United States which are identified with the peace of the world justify taking this action to

give insurance against an outbreak there which probably would endanger world peace, I do not think that we should necessarily get into local controversies. Now when we had the Southeast Asia Treaty here before us, you will recall that whereas the treaty talked in the main body, talked about an attack by one country of the area against another, the United States wrote a reservation into the text of the treaty which said that the only such attack with which we were concerned would be an attack from communism, from Communist sources, and we did not want to get involved in the quarrels of the area.

You could have a fight theoretically at least between Pakistan and India about Kashmir, but we did not want to get involved in that kind of business, and I do not think we want to get involved in that kind of business here.

I believe the principle which we adopted and followed in the case of Southeast Asia is equally applicable here.

ARAB STATES-ISRAEL CONFLICT

Senator MORSE. I remember the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization situation very well, but I do not think the two cases are comparable.

Here you have the only republic in the Middle East, so I am informed and I think reliably, greatly concerned about what is going to happen if we pour arms into Egypt and into other Arab countries, when the leaders of those countries are adamantly refusing to agree to any peaceful procedures for mediation or arbitration of the political issues, and frequently for home consumption or what not are making very extreme statements about their intentions of eliminating Israel as a state in the Middle East.

Yet under this resolution we will undoubtedly pour arms into those Arab states, and I see nothing in the resolution that would prevent them from turning the guns toward Israel rather than toward Russia.

Secretary DULLES. The intention is not to pour arms into the Arab countries that surround Israel. The President has had authority in that respect for a good many years and he has not done it, and there is no reason I think to believe that he is going to change his policy in that respect at the present time.

Indeed I can assure you he does not plan to do so. He has had, as I say, the authority. I suggest, Senator, that when you think of such an amendment as you suggest, you should think of what it would amend. If that had been in force on the first of November it would have meant we would have been out there fighting Israel.

Senator MORSE. That would not bother me if what we are seeking to do is to prevent aggression against the peace. I would like to assume that the thesis you laid down in regard to the effect of this resolution on Russia might have had the same effect on Israel at that time, that is if the passage of a resolution and a pledge to use military force would stop Russia from attacking the Middle East, as you seem to believe. I have a hunch it would even more clearly prevent Israel from attacking an Arab state or vice versa, because you are certainly dealing with a great disparity in military power when you are talking about the disparity between Israel and the United States, and when you are talking about any disparity between the United States and Russia.

What I fear is that we need to watch out that Russia in the field of world propaganda, with her vicious techniques, does not fling us and maneuver us into a position where we look like an aggressor.

I would suggest that we ought to be consistent about this and make clear to Israel and to the Arab states that giving them the assistance that we will under this resolution carries with it, of course, the responsibility that they stop their warlike activities against each other, and that if they do not, we are going to consider them aggressors, as we would consider Russia.

Secretary Dulles. Senator, I hate to keep going back to the same theme so many times, but you say giving them all the assistance of this resolution.

As far as money is concerned, as I pointed out many times, this does not add \$1 to the money that is already available to, as you put it, pour into this region, not a dollar more.

Senator Morse. For this year?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir; and next year it will be another story. We will be before you with a program and its justification and it will either commend itself to you or not.

ESTIMATED COST AND DURATION OF THE PROGRAM

Senator Morse. That happens to be my next question, Mr. Secretary. What is your opinion as to how much this will cost per year, including the amounts you seek for the discretionary use of the President and the amounts over the discretionary amount, and for how many years is it your guess that this program will probably have to be continued?

May I supplement that, Mr. Secretary, by saying I think the American people through the press have the opinion today that all this administration is asking for is some flexibility in the use of funds already granted, and do not fully realize that once you get this principle established in this resolution, this is going to go on for years.

You say we will get a chance to look at it when the next budget comes up, but you know the workings of Congress as well as I do.

When this principle has been established under this resolution, you won't find very many Members of Congress or the Senate not voting whatever funds you request in another year to continue a program that you have authorized this year.

When we vote for this resolution we are voting for the expenditure, in my judgment—and the American people ought to be told so—of hundreds of millions of dollars for some years to come. I would like to know how many hundreds of millions you think it will take year by year, and for how long.

Secretary Dulles. I don't believe I can answer that question, Senator. We have appropriated several hundreds of millions of dollars for this area every year now for several years; and as I have said, when speaking in general about the Mutual Security Act, I think it may have to go on until there is a change in the character of the Government of the Soviet Union, until international communism is more or less dismantled.

Now I think that there has been evidence of very considerable developments in the last year particularly which indicate that that is not a goal which is wholly illusory, and that the situation can change, as

we have seen very dramatically within the Soviet Communist world.

But as the President pointed out in his inaugural address on the price of peace, I would not want to give anybody the illusion that peace is going to be bought cheaply.

WOULD RESOLUTION AUTHORIZE SUBSIDIES TO PRIVATE AMERICAN COMPANIES?

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, you keep speaking about greater flexibility being needed by the President in the exercise of his discretion in the use of \$200 million.

Could he under the resolution authorize subsidies to private American companies in the Middle East if in his judgment it would be desirable?

Secretary Dulles. No, sir; I think not. It is incredible to me he should do so.

Senator Morse. You don't think under the resolution that he would be authorized to help an American oil company to build any facility or roads or utilities that might be of assistance in its economic operation?

Secretary Dulles. No; I would not think so.

Senator Morse. Would you object to language in the resolution that would make perfectly clear that no such authority could be granted?

Secretary Dulles. There is no reason whatever that the resolution should not be clarified in that respect if it is thought necessary.

As I say, I do not think there is any more authority in that respect than is now existent in the present law.

I do not know whether he has that authority now or not, but I don't see reason to fear that because this resolution is passed, all of a sudden the President is going to do the kind of thing which we normally do not do under comparable authority in the past.

PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY POWERS

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, this morning you spoke about a hypothetical situation in which you might find a cablegram on your desk some morning asking for 5 or 10 million dollars to be immediately spent in the Middle East, and therefore you did not think that you should be required to submit to this committee and through it to the Congress any blueprint of the specific projects or programs for which the money is to be spent.

Does not the President have the authority in that kind of an emergency to exercise his emergency powers and then immediately advise the Congress of the steps that he has taken?

Secretary Dulles. Well, he does not have that authority in our opinion in adequate measure. That is the reason why we think that the discretionary fund ought to be somewhat increased. But I would like to say this, Senator.

I can assure you that in view of the critical situation which exists in the Middle East and which may continue for some time, as a result of the events which culminated from the fighting that took place in the area and all of the changes that took place there, this is a very dangerous spot in the world, and the President would I know want me

and others who are in the executive branch of the Government to keep in the closest possible touch with the Congress about how things are working under this, much more so I think than in the case of things that are working in the other parts of the world where we do not customarily do that, but this is a very special situation.

I can assure you and the members of this committee or the two committees that as information begins to come in, for example, from the Richards mission, that we will promptly and immediately lay any significant information that we have before the committees.

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that statement and I think the country will too. I may not agree with you in the final decision on the resolution, but I would be less than honest if I did not commend you for giving the American people that assurance.

I think it is one of the most important statements you have made in this hearing. But it leads me to ask you a question or two about the Presidential powers.

Do you think under the Constitution, Mr. Secretary, that after a President has ordered American boys into combat in some part of the world prior to a declaration of war, Congress has the constitutional authority to revoke that order?

Secretary Dulles. I would think that Congress could revoke any action that he had taken. I think that is a highly theoretical contingency, but I see no constitutional objection to it.

Senator Morse. It may not be so theoretical.

Secretary Dulles. Any act of Congress I assume can be repealed.

Senator Morse. You mean it would amount to a repeal of the resolution?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Therefore am I correct in interpreting your remark to mean that you hold to the point of view that the power of the Congress is beyond the power of the purse strings when it comes to the war sections of the Constitution and that the power vested in the Congress to declare war carries with it the power to rescind any act of the President that may lead to war?

Secretary Dulles. Well, I am not sure you can rescind an act of the President. The Congress can rescind any action that it has taken. Acts of the President when they have been taken, there is no way in the world to rescind them that I know of.

Senator Morse. Let's apply it to this situation. We pass the resolution. Russia commits an act which the President decides is an act of military aggression against a Middle East country. He orders American military forces, troops either naval or air, into action, against Russia or the forces that have crossed the border of this Arab State.

CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF CONGRESS

He then advises Congress that that is his course of action. Let's assume he then asks Congress for a declaration that a state of war exists.

Would Congress have the right in your opinion not only to refuse to grant his request but to pass a resolution directing the President to rescind his order for the use of American military forces?

Secretary Dulles. Well, you are getting me into realms of constitutional theory on the war powers that I have never delved into before, Senator, because they are so hypothetical.

Certainly Congress would be free not to declare that a state of war existed or not to declare a state of war.

Senator Morse. You agreed with me the other day on the constitutional doctrine that Congress and Congress alone has the power to declare war, and cannot delegate it. That being true, the opposite side of the coin must also be true that if the President follows a course of action that in the opinion of the Congress is going to involve us in a war and we think should be rescinded, does not Congress then have the constitutional power to ask the President to rescind his order, or must we then resort to another section of the Constitution to try to impeach the President?

Secretary Dulles. I just do not know what the answers are to those questions, Senator.

Senator Morse. I appreciate your discussing it with me.

It may be theoretical, it may be hypothetical, it may be speculative. I happen to think it has much to do with the heart of this resolution, because you think the Congress of the United States is confronted in this resolution with one of the great constitutional issues of our history, and I hope I get this clear as to what check we are going to have on this President or any other President, because again I say I am very interested in getting a look at this from the standpoint of our separation of powers and our system of checks and balances in carrying out my oath.

I was not just joking the other day when I said this resolution frightens me. It frightens me from the standpoint of its constitutional implications. I will go on to another question, Mr. Secretary.

SOVIET PROPAGANDA

Do you think that the passage of this resolution might put Russia in a position where, through her vicious propaganda technique, she might create the impression in some parts of the world the plausibility of her charges that we are seeking to inveigle her preparatory to conducting a preventive war against her?

Secretary Dulles. She has of course by her propaganda persuaded some people of that. She has been carrying on that propaganda for quite a long time but it has not prevented us from moving ahead to try to prevent the Soviet Union extending its area of influence in Communist China by the use of aggressive force.

Of course when you say to a country you can't strike out with armed force, I suppose they could always misrepresent that as being encirclement, but of course that is what the United Nations Charter says, and we would not need all this if it were not that the Soviet Union has got its veto power in the United Nations Security Council.

AMERICAN BASES

Senator Morse. Conceivably, Mr. Secretary, this could lead to more American bases or military installations in the Middle East, could it not, in close proximity to Russia?

Secretary DULLES. The resolution could lead to that, but there is no necessary relationship at all between the resolution and that.

Senator MORSE. I understand that.

Secretary DULLES. Today we have a relationship which could lead to bases in the area. There exists today an American base—it is not a military base but it is an American base—in Saudi Arabia.

We have no resolution, we have no treaty. There is no necessary connection between the two.

Senator MORSE. I understand that, but conceivably under the flexibility that you ask for, insofar as Presidential discretion is concerned, a President could negotiate with Iraq or Iran or Turkey or any other country encompassed in the resolution for a military installation close to the Russian border; couldn't he?

Secretary DULLES. We can do that now. This resolution does not add one iota to the President's authority to do that.

Senator MORSE. It adds to it in the sense that it gives him greater discretion and flexibility to do it without clearance.

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator MORSE. He has the authority to spend the money, and then he reports to us afterward how he spent it.

Secretary DULLES. He already has the authority to spend the money.

Senator MORSE. If he has that much flexibility now, why are you concerned about giving him more flexibility?

Secretary DULLES. I have been trying to explain that.

The principal reason is, Senator, that the events which have occurred within the last 2 months in effect have been so upsetting in the area, both economically and politically, that we believe that the money can be spent to better advantage if we are freed from some of the restrictions, and most notably from the restrictions which require that 80 percent be committed by the 1st of May.

Senator MORSE. But as to the particular projects he may in the future decide to spend it on, there is no change?

Secretary DULLES. We might want to change. As I say, there is nothing in the law which ties us down to any particular project at the present time. We gave some illustrative cases to the committees in executive session.

Those are not embodied in the law. They are not binding upon the President, and in that respect there is discretion today to change the projects. There is always discretion to change the projects up to the time when there is a definitive obligation.

RICHARDS MISSION

Senator MORSE. Yesterday at his press conference, Mr. Secretary, the President, and I quote him in effect, said that he could not tell until the Richards mission came back from the Middle East how the \$200 million would be spent, and I interpreted some of your remarks this morning to mean that you did not think that the money would be spent any differently than as originally programmed, except that you are asking for some flexibility in moving it from one project to another.

Is that a fair interpretation?

Secretary DULLES. From one project to another and from one time to another through the balance of this fiscal year.

Senator MORSE. But it is your position that the \$200 million will be spent pretty much as originally programmed, but the President gave the impression at least at his press conference yesterday, so a member of the press advised me, that he would await the return of the Richards mission to determine where and how the money would be spent.

Is there a difference between you and the President on that point?

Secretary DULLES. No, I do not think there is any difference between us on that point. The statement which I made was that I thought that as regards this fraction, roughly 25 percent of the money already appropriated as to which we want flexibility, that we would not want to make a final decision as to some at least of that money until after we had gotten the report or the views of the mission, the Richards mission.

Those might be communicated by cable when they are on the spot. Some of them might wait until we got back.

I can't foresee what that situation will be.

Senator MORSE. But you think it would be unwise for the Congress to wait to take action on this resolution until the Richards mission had made its survey in the Middle East and had come back and made its recommendations to you and the President, which in turn could be transmitted to the Congress in executive session of its committees?

Secretary DULLES. I have always said, Senator, in view of the unusual conditions here, I am sure we would be glad to keep appropriate committees of the Congress fully informed about developments there, economic and political, but all I can say is this: that unless this additional flexibility is given, it is almost certain that the money already appropriated will be spent along the lines which were contemplated a year ago, because there is not going to be time to take 2 or 3 months off now and make new plans, then to come back to Congress, then to get the authority.

The result is we will have to just go ahead for this year along the lines already mapped out, and that is not the best way to go ahead.

Some of the money at least I am sure can be spent to better advantage. I am also very sure that those who are working against us will be less sure of their ground if they don't quite know what we are going to do with all of our money.

POWER OF DECISION REGARDING USE OF MILITARY FORCES

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, you will recall at the time of the Formosa resolution debate some of us were very much concerned as to who would make the decision as to the use of American military forces. We had expressed in the debate great interest and concern that the decision might in effect be made by your office or might be made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by other diplomatic or military officials of our Government, and we were fearful about a resolution that would vest that amount of power in those officers.

The President issued a White House release on a Thursday afternoon of that week, as I recall, in which he gave to the Nation assurance that he, and he alone, would make the decision as to the use of American military forces.

Are you in a position to give an assurance to the Nation that that is true also under this resolution?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir; I am.

Senator Morse. Of course, it is true, is it not, that any President, whether it is this President or any other, must rely heavily for advice and information upon his Secretary of State and other officials of the foreign-policy division of the executive government and upon the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military leaders, so that, although he can be said to make the final decision, it must necessarily in the nature of events be a decision that is based heavily upon the good judgment or bad judgment of his subordinates?

Secretary Dulles. I suppose that any President takes advice on these matters. I assume that he would take advice not only of the persons you mentioned but Members of Congress when they were available and in whom he had confidence, because I think nobody would be so foolhardy as to want to get into a condition of warfare under circumstances where possibly the Congress or the country might not support it. That is just ordinary good commonsense that I think any President would exercise.

Senator Morse. I fully understand that, Mr. Secretary. I suggest that you, as a lawyer, well know what I am doing.

I am simply laying the foundations for future discussions in the debate to come with regard to the exercise of the power under this resolution.

No matter to what extent the President gives the assurance that he, and he alone, will make the decision, the decision, nevertheless, must necessarily be based very heavily upon the advice and consultation with his advisers both in the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“PREVENTIVE WAR”

Do you think there is any basis for the expressed fear that I am getting in our wires and letters that this may be a resolution that will lead us into a preventive war in the Middle East?

Secretary Dulles. I do not see how it could possibly lead to a so-called preventive war. Preventive war is a war where you make the first attack, on the theory that thereby you are anticipating somebody else's attack.

Now, in my opinion preventive war is debarred by the United Nations Charter, by practically every mutual security treaty we have made, and by the terms of this resolution.

In fact, the whole word “preventive war” conveys a strange notion, because I do not know how a war could be a preventive war.

It is a contradiction of terms. There is specified here as it is in the Charter of the United Nations, that the right to act militarily only comes into being after an armed attack occurs upon you, or upon any members who act collectively for their defense.

Senator Morse. Would you consider this problem with me from a standpoint of this hypothetical question? Speaking very hypothetically—you can use the names of countries but they can be X or Y as far as I am concerned—let's take Iran. Let's assume a condition develops in Iran where she had two governments really, a Communist and a non-Communist government. In other words, there was great turmoil and two governments were insisting upon their right to govern.

The Communist government asks the Soviet Union for help, as did the Kadar government of Hungary. The non-Communist government asks the United States for help under this resolution, which could be in chronology compared with what the Nagy government of Hungary sought when she wanted help.

What then, under this resolution?

You have an internal political situation, a civil war between two conflicting governments.

Do we go to war?

Secretary DULLES. I think if we came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was engaging in overt armed aggression against Iran, that the President would be authorized to act; yes.

Senator MORSE. We make the decision as to which—

Secretary DULLES. Of course, the facts as you have given them in this hypothetical case do not include all the facts. You would have to include a lot more facts before you came to any conclusion.

Senator MORSE. I understand that, but when you talk about a hypothetical case, you are trying to consider the basic principles that raise the issue. The issue I want to raise is whether or not this resolution might conceivably lead us into a fact situation in one of these Middle East countries where an internal political disorder or a civil war involving a contest between two governments, one Communist-dominated and the other not, places us under this resolution under the duty of coming to the assistance of the non-Communist government.

Secretary DULLES. Of course, that is exactly what we did in Korea, and we did not have any resolution then, either.

Senator MORSE. We did not have any resolution at all. Of course, you remember the next day I said we were at war when other people were talking about police action, and suggested we ought to take congressional action on it too.

I have never varied from that point of view. But your answer to my question is that under this hypothetical case I have put, we would decide whether or not under those facts and circumstances the situation involved aggression on the part of the Soviet Union itself?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. They are pretty good at subterfuge with their scheming volunteer systems and their support up to the border with their underlings and puppets doing the work across the border, so I respectfully submit I think it is pregnant with some very great dangers, which again I think make it so important that we tie it down to a requirement that a President come before us specifically at the time to get permission to risk the lives of American boys in that kind of an action, assuming that time permits.

Secretary DULLES. Of course, Senator, you know the whole world situation is pregnant with danger, and this kind of a resolution I don't think increases the danger; I think it diminishes it.

As I pointed out, the exact hypothetical case that you referred to occurred in Korea. There had been no prior resolution, and yet we got into war. And I do not think that you can say that making our position clear in advance creates these dangers or makes them more dangerous.

We are going to be faced with problems like that anyway, and passing a resolution does not bring that danger into being.

EFFECT OF RESOLUTION ON THE SOVIET UNION

Senator Morse. I recall your testimony the other day, and I was very much impressed with it, in which you pointed out that if we passed this resolution we could fully expect that Russia is going to see what she can do to counteract it. We cannot sit by and expect the Russians to say "Thank you."

Secretary Dulles. Yes.

Senator Morse. Since your testimony we have already seen pretty strong indications within the Soviet Union that she does not intend to ignore this.

It raises a question in my mind as to whether or not the passage of the resolution itself will not result in Russia speeding up aggressive action, speeding up her attempt to increase the tempo of an arms race in the Middle East, and speeding up her attempt to win away from us certain Arab States, and whether she will seek to increase dissension within the Middle East and possibly seek to create a war between Israel and an Arab country.

Are we not running some risk, Mr. Secretary, that this resolution itself may have those very causative effects?

Secretary Dulles. I do not think so. I recognize that is a matter of judgment, but I recall this. That every time when we have taken decisive action, the Soviets have made a hullabaloo about it and they have uttered threats about it, but once they were clear about what we were going to do, that has died away.

I recall when the North Atlantic Treaty was made; I recall when Turkey was brought into the North Atlantic Treaty; I recall when the Federal Republic of Germany was brought into the North Atlantic Treaty, those were three occasions where the Soviet went very far.

At the time of the bringing of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty, you may remember that the Soviet Union went so far as to denounce its treaties of so-called alliance with both Great Britain and France, in an effort to intimidate them, but we have never yet been intimidated, and I do not think this is a time to begin to be intimidated.

Senator Morse. You mentioned the other day that the Berlin lift is a case in point. There is a case on the other side; we did not out-bluff her in Korea.

Secretary Dulles. We did not what?

Senator Morse. We did not outbluff her in Korea. She fought us to a stalemate in Korea.

Secretary Dulles. I am afraid if we got into Korea, we might get into a political ground. I would rather keep out of it.

Senator Morse. You might, but I would not. I am very nonpolitical about it. I am very much concerned about that page of history. But my point is I respectfully submit it is a part answer to your allegation that if we pass this type of resolution you always stop Russia. I think history will record we did not stop her in Korea.

Secretary Dulles. I may perhaps be allowed, without seeming to be partisan, to quote from a speech that Mr. Adlai Stevenson made in Chicago in 1948, during the campaign.

He said there—talking about the Korean war—he said:

The men in the Kremlin thought that they would be unopposed.

That was his explanation of the Korean war, and he may have been right, he may have been wrong. I am just quoting him. I happen to think on that particular occasion he was right, and I think that it is very dangerous to create a situation where the men in the Kremlin think that they will be unopposed. If the fact is that we are going to oppose them, for goodness sakes, let's say so in advance so they don't miscalculate.

Senator MORSE. I am inclined to think that he was right, too, as I am inclined to think he is right on most things, although he is not infallible, along with the rest of us.

The point is whatever they thought, when the war broke out our course of action did not stop them from the position that they took in Korea, and we finally had to end that with what I think history will record as a very unfortunate stalemate armistice, but I will be willing to let history be the judge.

Secretary DULLES. Could I correct the record?

I said "1948". I meant 1952.

Senator MORSE. The record will stand corrected.

Now, Mr. Secretary, the phrase "the general area of China" as used in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 was construed by the executive branch to allow assistance to be given to countries all the way from Afghanistan to Japan.

THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Is this the kind of a general area of the Middle East which the President has in mind in this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. I made a statement, I think, in my first appearance here, I think on Monday of last week.

Senator MORSE. That is what I am referring to.

Secretary DULLES. On that, and I think I would like to just stand on that if I might.

Senator MORSE. That is what I want to direct your attention to. You made that statement and it is in the transcript of this hearing, but that does not make it a part of this resolution. Your testimony, or if we had the President's testimony here, would not make it part of the resolution or make it binding on anyone.

Do you have any objections to an amendment to this resolution that will specify the area that is actually covered by the resolution, rather than this broad term "the general area of the Middle East"?

Secretary DULLES. I would have no objection, I think, to listing the countries by name.

TREATY OBLIGATIONS

Senator MORSE. Section 2 of the resolution provides that the use of armed forces shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States.

What treaty obligations are referred to in the resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Practically all of our treaties, and, of course, the Charter of the United Nations is one, but our collective security treaties, such as the North Atlantic Treaty, provide by article I, that treaty does—I think most of them provide by article I—that we shall seek to settle all our disputes by peaceful means, and shall not use force against the political independence or territorial integrity of any country.

Senator Morse. What treaty, if any, do we have with Israel at the present time?

Secretary Dulles. We have none, so far as I am aware. We may have some commercial treaties, but I just do not know.

Senator Morse. Is there any contemplation that you might consider entering into a treaty with Israel to protect her territorial integrity and likewise offer the same treaty to any Arab State that might want to negotiate the same treaty with us?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir; I stated the United States position in that respect in an address I made on the 20th of August of 1955.

That was referred to by President Eisenhower in his address to the Congress of January 8 of this year as indicating the still existing United States policy in that respect.

And in that address I discussed that problem quite fully.

Senator Morse. Do you think, Mr. Secretary, that the offer of such a treaty to Israel and to the Arab States is a rather effective test of their good faith in working with us as allies under this resolution?

Secretary Dulles. I would not think there was any necessary connection between the two. Of course, the conditions which are outlined in that address referred to have not been met in terms of the working out of stable boundaries between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

It is very difficult to guarantee a situation where the boundaries are not stabilized.

Senator Morse. One of the problems that concerns me, Mr. Secretary, is that every time some Arab leader issues a public statement threatening the very existence of Israel, and then some Israeli leader replies in kind to the effect that they will meet force with force and they have the power, and they think they have already demonstrated it, to whip the Arab League, that we greatly increase the chances of trigger-happy leaders in that section of the world throwing the Middle East into war internally.

It would seem to me that we ought to have some assurance, and I would like your view on this, some assurance from the administration that it intends to press these countries for such a treaty arrangement as you outlined in the public statements you already referred to.

Is there such a plan on the part of the administration?

Secretary Dulles. We are constantly reemphasizing and pushing the general program which I outlined at that time. There has been a considerable setback of our hopes, and I do not know that such a program will become feasible in a matter of weeks or months.

But, as I pointed out earlier in my testimony, I think, I believe that if a situation can be created so that the international Communist influence in the area diminishes, then I think the prospects of moving in that direction are much greater, because as you indicated, there is the danger of pushing country against country and people against people, but that is primarily a policy of the international Communists who are very adept at that game and are playing it very vigorously in that part of the world.

I think that has got to be countered, and that the countering of the policy is an indispensable part of the program of moving toward a greater stability in the whole area.

PROTECTION OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, section 2 provides that armed forces may be used to protect the political independence of any such nation.

I would like to have your statement for the record as to how many of the following political entities would be considered under the resolution as politically independent: Cyprus, Aden, Kuwait, Oman, the neutral zone between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the Buraimi Oasis and Somaliland.

Do you think those territories are independent?

Secretary Dulles. That is quite a long list. In general I do not think the countries or the areas you listed enjoy political independence.

I suppose in the case of Somaliland you are referring to the Somaliland which is under trusteeship?

Senator Morse. Yes. Would they be covered by this resolution?

Secretary Dulles. I would think not. I would like to check back and perhaps correct the record here after I have seen the list again to study it more carefully, but my general impression is the areas you have mentioned are not areas which enjoy political independence.

Senator Morse. I want you to check it and I want you to make the record as you want to make it. But if they are not covered by the resolution, then do they not involve loopholes in the resolution whereby Russia might do great damage to our interests in the Middle East and still not run counter to the resolution?

(The Department of State reviewed the record and submitted no correction.)

Senator Morse. If she could stir up troubles in those areas she might without our intervention be able to stir up trouble in areas that would lose for us control of the oil.

Secretary Dulles. There is action that can be taken under the resolution which would cover the areas.

As I recall you referred to section 2 which deals with the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation requesting such aid.

Senator Morse. That is right.

Secretary Dulles. The other provisions of the resolution are broader in their application.

Senator Morse. They would not result in our going into any of these areas to meet any military situation that might be developed either by Russia or through puppet volunteer forces, I mean literally under the resolution.

There may be the intention of covering them, but literally they are not covered, are they?

Secretary Dulles. I do not think that an attack upon those areas is likely or that in many cases there does not exist already a deterrent there.

It is quite inconceivable to me that even the Soviet Union would make an open-armed attack upon a United Nations trust territory.

The other areas you mentioned are partially at least under the protection of the United Kingdom, and it has forces in those areas, so that while possibly there is a little gap there, I do not think it is a significant one, and I would not weigh the risk of a gap as against the risk of

putting the United States in the position of having to fight to protect nonindependent territories.

One of the problems that we faced in Indochina was that the countries there did not have genuine independence, and we always stipulated as a condition for any possible intervention by the United States that there must be political independence granted first, that we are not going to go in there and fight for what would appear to be colonialism.

I don't want to see the United States fighting for colonialism anywhere.

Senator Morse. I would suggest that you take a further look at the problem that I raise by this question, because it might be a basis for bringing in some of our European allies that have some interest in these territories. It might be a greater inducement on their part to participate with us in the resolution, and it might also thereby justify at least a rationale that might cause the Arab countries to accept their joining in the resolution. I would like very much, if we are going to do this, to see that we encompass the whole area that would be in danger, and that we also get the support of all other countries that have a vital interest there besides ourselves.

I turn to this hypothetical, Mr. Secretary.

Suppose Bulgaria should achieve a status like Yugoslavia. Suppose that the Soviet Union should try by force to reestablish Moscow control over Bulgaria, as in the case of Hungary.

Would the proposed resolution cover the situation?

Secretary Dulles. That is not in the area of the Middle East.

Senator Morse. We are certain then that as far as that part of the general area is concerned, there is no intention of using American troops to meet that kind of a situation?

Secretary Dulles. There is no intention to use American troops to meet the situation you describe, no.

DEFINITION OF MIDDLE EAST

Senator Morse. I raised it because, I repeat, until we get some language in the resolution that clearly bounds the general area of the Middle East, I am uncertain as to whether or not if trouble of this type developed in Bulgaria it could not be said that this is part of the general area of the Middle East, because the Middle East is not a technical term. It does not definitively refer to any area, shall I say, that is recognized in international law as a geographic entity.

One of the criticisms of the resolution is that you have not defined the bounds, shall I say, of the area you are going to defend. Suppose that Syria develops a government similar to Yugoslavia, and then suppose Moscow at a later date seeks to bring it under its complete domination, would the resolution apply?

Secretary Dulles. You mean if Syria, under a Tito type of government, is then subjected to armed attack by the Soviet Union?

Senator Morse. Yes.

Secretary Dulles. I think the resolution would apply.

Senator Morse. It would apply there?

Secretary Dulles. Yes.

Senator Morse. We would go then to the defense of a government that is a form of a Communist government but not under the domination of Moscow completely?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; as long as it is not dominated by international communism.

ADJOURNMENT

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Morse, may I ask a question?

Excuse the interruption.

Senator MORSE. I am delighted.

Chairman GREEN. Several members of the committee who want to ask additional questions or else ask questions for the first time have asked me how long the meeting will continue tonight.

Senator MORSE. I am willing to agree to any procedure you want to adopt.

Chairman GREEN. Have you any idea how much longer you would like?

Senator MORSE. I have about 15 questions, I think.

Why don't I desist for the evening and the other Senators ask their questions and we might renew it at a different time.

Chairman GREEN. May I ask a question of the Secretary.

How late are you willing to stay, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES Well, I would be glad to stay at this session until 7 o'clock or thereabouts. If it is going to go much beyond 7, then I think we should probably have an interruption for dinner.

Chairman GREEN. Would you be through by 7?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, why don't we enter into the understanding that I will withhold further questions until other Senators ask questions, and then I will finish mine at a later time tonight?

Chairman GREEN. I think we had better proceed in the regular order and let you finish first and then take the others in order.

Senator MORSE. I have asked questions for a long time.

I always try to be cooperative on these matters.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Secretary, would you be willing to go on tomorrow morning?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, tomorrow morning or tonight if need be, but tomorrow morning would probably be better.

Chairman GREEN. Would you prefer to stay on now or go on tomorrow morning?

Secretary DULLES. I am prepared to stay on now until 7 o'clock or 7:30 if there is a prospect of getting finished. If there is no prospect of getting finished then, I would suggest that I get back because there is a great deal of departmental business to be done and I have to spend some time in the State Department either tonight or tomorrow morning.

Chairman GREEN. I do not wish to hurry you unduly, Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I appreciate that.

Chairman GREEN. We will proceed now.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I make one remark here? That is, that Senator Mansfield did ask a considerable number of questions which I noticed have been answered in a written form by the State Department.

Senator Mansfield is not in the city tonight, but I do know that he would like very much to have the opportunity to ask some questions with regard to the answers that have been prepared by the State Department and presented here, and in any event I for one would

like to urge that he have the opportunity to ask the other questions he had in mind, and perhaps it might be convenient to plan to recess until tomorrow at such time as the Chair thought convenient.

Chairman GREEN. Do the other Senators of the committee who go after you or come ahead of you agree?

It is agreeable to the chairman.

Does anyone object? Do you object?

Senator MORSE. No, I do not object. I would like to make a suggestion, Mr. Chairman. The Secretary has been on the stand and he has been a very cooperative witness all day. I suggest that we recess now, that we take up at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, and that the other Senators that did not ask questions today be allowed to ask their questions first. When they have finished, I will complete these questions. I think there are about 15 that I want to ask for foundation purposes.

That is my suggestion.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I move that Senator Morse's proposal be acted upon by the committee.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Kennedy?

Senator KENNEDY. I move that Senator Morse's proposal be acted upon by the committee.

Senator LONG. I second it.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Secretary, is that agreeable to you? The general opinion is that we would like to adjourn now and come back tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Secretary DULLES. Yes; that is agreeable to me. I am so impressed with the urgency of this matter I do not want my convenience to be a cause of delay at all.

Of course, on the other hand there are some very significant matters that are going on at the United Nations on some aspects of this matter and I really need to give some attention to those.

Chairman GREEN. Would you rather continue now until 7 o'clock and then come back tomorrow at 10?

Secretary DULLES. I think if we are going to come back tomorrow, which seems indicated, that we might recess now, and let me do a little departmental work during the next couple of hours and then come back in the morning because I can hardly spare the time to go through the rest of today and then be here at 10 o'clock.

Chairman GREEN. We will adjourn now and reconvene tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Friday, January 25, 1957.)

THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST

FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Theodore Francis Green (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations) presiding.

Present: Senators Green (chairman) presiding, Wiley, Fulbright, Smith of New Jersey, Sparkman, Hickenlooper, Humphrey, Langer, Knowland, Morse, Aiken, Long, and Kennedy, of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senators Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Johnson of Texas, Smith of Maine, Stennis, Jackson, Barrett, Bush, and Ervin, of the Committee on Armed Services.

Also present: Adm. Arthur W. Radford, United States Navy, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; John B. Hollister, Director, International Cooperation Administration; Robert C. Hill, Assistant Secretary of State; and Carl W. McCordle, Assistant Secretary of State.

Chairman GREEN. The committee will please come to order.

I would like to announce now for the convenience of any members who may be leaving town that there will be a meeting in executive session Monday at 10 o'clock.

The Secretary has already consented to that time.

I hope that we can conclude his testimony this morning. He has given a great deal of time to us. He tells me he needs time for other duties. However, that must be left to the discretion of the questioners.

When we adjourned, Mr. Morse was questioning the witness and he may go on where he left off.

Mr. Morse?

DEFINITION OF "SECURE" AND "PROTECT"

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, in section 2 of the proposed resolution is provided that Armed Forces may be used to secure and protect nations in the Middle East.

What is the difference between the words "secure" and "protect," and could one of them be eliminated?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE—Resumed

Secretary DULLES. I think that the word "secure" is somewhat broader than the word "protect."

As I recall, both words were used in the Formosa resolution, and this resolution is in that respect patterned after the Formosa resolution.

"Protect" implies I think a purely defensive operation, whereas "secure" may involve, for example, an attack upon lines of communication or staging areas which are not actually within the area to be protected.

Senator MORSE. I thought that was the distinction you had in mind, which leads to my next question.

QUESTION OF PREVENTIVE WAR

Is the language of the resolution broad enough to allow the President to engage in a preventive war in order to secure the independence of some country in the Middle East?

You recall that in the Formosa resolution debate both within the committee on the part of a number, and on the floor on the part of a very small number of others, objections were raised to the plans to authorize a strike against the mainland of China if there was a concentration of Chinese military forces opposite Quemoy and the Matsus.

Some of us took the position that that authorized empowering the President to commit an act of preventive war.

If there is a concentration of Russian military might on Russian soil near the border we will say, of Iraq or Iran or Turkey, and our military advisers advise the President that they think it is preparatory to an attack on one of the Middle Eastern countries, does the word "secure" in the resolution give the President implied authority to order an attack on that concentration of Russian military might?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. In that respect then the resolution differs from what was contemplated in the Formosa resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I do not necessarily accept the interpretation of the Formosa resolution which you put upon it, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Do you deny that that was the testimony given in executive session of the committee at the time?

Secretary DULLES. I don't recall, but I would be greatly surprised if it was indicated that the United States would take the initiative in attacking when the area it was pledged to defend had not itself been attacked?

Senator MORSE. I want you to understand that I am completely impersonal about it, Mr. Secretary, but I have taken my fair share of misunderstanding over my position on the Formosa resolution.

I want this record to show what I said at the time.

One of my great objections to it was that the resolution would empower a strike against the mainland of China if there was a concentration of Chinese military forces opposite Quemoy and the Matsus. That is what I meant in my speech on the floor of the Senate when I said it involves the danger of a preventive war. I want to have it clear this time in a public hearing as to whether or not there is any intention on the part of this administration to authorize the President to order a strike against the concentration of military power outside the Middle East, prior to an actual act of war or aggression being committed against one of the countries involved in this resolution.

I think it is a pretty important question, and I would like to have your answer as to whether or not this resolution contemplates giving the President any such authority.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. I think that is quite clear from the resolution. It says that this action must be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations.

The Charter of the United Nations under article 51 is quite clear. There is no right, in the absence of Security Council direction, to use armed force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country, but there is the right, under article 51, of collective self-defense "if an armed attack occurs," and that is incorporated by reference in this resolution.

Senator MORSE. I raise this question this morning because throughout these hearings there has been frequent argument by analogy to the Formosa resolution, and as I have said many times, and repeat here this morning, the Formosa resolution cannot be understood from the reading of the language of the resolution alone.

The meaning of the resolution is dependent upon what the transcript of record contains as to interpretation of the resolution by the administration.

At that time we were not in a position in my judgment to publicly discuss that interpretation. Now that we have another resolution before us, I for one as a Member of the Senate do not propose to be caught in that position again, and that is why I have asked what I consider to be a very vital question in connection with this resolution.

It deals with this matter of preventive war.

Secretary DULLES. I have answered it clearly I think.

Senator MORSE. You have answered it and I am glad that you have answered it. I wish I could have gotten the same answer at the time the Formosa resolution was before us. My course of action might have been different.

COUNTRIES CONTROLLED BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Mr. Secretary, what countries in the world would now be considered by the State Department to be controlled by international communism?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I don't know that I can name them all offhand. I think I can make a pretty good effort at it.

Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, East Germany, so-called, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, the mainland of China, Tibet, the so-called Peoples Republic of Korea, the so-called Peoples Republic of Vietnam, Tannu Tuva, possibly one or two others, but I think that pretty well exhausts the list. Mongolia, if you treat Mongolia as an independent country, of which there is some doubt.

Senator MORSE. It is true, is it not, Mr. Secretary, that this threat of Russian domination—and I happen to believe there is a threat of Russian aggression, if they ever think aggression will best serve their purposes—consists of many parts of the world beside the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. I believe that the threat of international communism runs pretty much throughout the world, yes.

Senator MORSE. But we are not asking for a resolution authorizing the misuse of military power on the part of the President of the United States in other parts of the world, other than the action already taken in the Formosa area and now the Middle East area, because I suppose the State Department feels that existing alliances and treaties, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty, cover many of the other parts of the world where the threat exists.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; and I would mention also the Caracas Declaration which has been approved by the Congress dealing with international communism in this hemisphere.

IS UNILATERAL ACTION ADVISABLE?

Senator MORSE. But in all other parts of the world where this threat of Russian aggression must always be considered at least a possibility, we have followed a diplomatic course of action that has resulted in our alignment with allies, save and except in the Formosa area and the Middle East, where we propose to ask for this power to go it alone. Is that not true?

Secretary DULLES. No; we do not propose to go it alone. This action is action taken by the United States, and does not involve the process of treaty alliance. That does not mean that we would expect to go it alone. I would hope and believe that if there were an armed attack of the kind envisaged by the first sentence, I think it is, of section 2 of the resolution, that there would be action by the United Nations General Assembly, which would result in other nations also responding.

Of course there is the existing so-called Baghdad Treaty, which deals with much of this area, and that would presumably come into operation in the event of an armed attack threatening those four countries. We have our NATO alliance which covers Turkey, our SEATO alliance, which covers Pakistan, which are both part of this area, and I think it is quite unlikely that if this armed attack occurred we would not fight; go it alone.

POSITION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, dismissing for the moment the testimony you gave about the attitude of the Arab States toward some of our allies as one reason for not following my suggestion that our European allies would be asked to join in this resolution and commit their troops as well as our committing ourselves, what do you think the position of Great Britain and France would be if we suggested to them that they join in this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know what it would be, Senator. I do know that at the present time the British are cutting down their military commitments and their military strength throughout the world, and I doubt very much if they would be sympathetic to extending their military commitments at the present time.

The French, we know, are quite fully engaged as far as their military strength is concerned, in north Africa, which involves a subtraction, we hope temporary, from the normal force that would be required in Western Europe, and it is not realistic to believe, I think, that we would, in fact, gain very much in the way of military support in the area from either the British or the French under present conditions.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true, Mr. Secretary, that to put it mildly the British and the French are keenly disappointed in the course of action that we followed in the Middle East at the time of their invasion of the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; I think they would have liked us to support their invasion of the Middle East, but we did not feel we could do so consistently with our charter and treaty obligations.

Senator Morse. Do you think that that disappointment would reflect itself in an attitude of some lack of interest in case we should ask them to join us in this resolution?

Secretary Dulles. No; I do not think that would be an appreciable factor.

Senator Morse. Do you think the appreciable factor would be the fact that they are cutting down in their military outlay?

Secretary Dulles. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. You think that would be their attitude even though, as you have already testified and we know it to be the fact, the whole economy of England and France happens to be dependent upon maintenance of the oil supply from the Middle East to Western Europe?

Secretary Dulles. Well, it is a question, Senator, as to where their available force can best be deployed in the interest of general security, and they have very substantial commitments with reference to NATO, which the British are reviewing very carefully at the present time, and I do not know that it would be to their interest or ours to weaken considerably one area to try to plug up another.

There is just about a certain amount of plugging that any one of these countries can do, and they do not have the type of capacity which we have to use, you might call, a strategic reserve which through location at one spot can very largely protect others.

Our fleet in the Mediterranean has a very considerable potential in that respect with nothing comparable that is possessed by the other nations you speak of.

Senator Morse. Do you think, Mr. Secretary, that considering the fact that Great Britain and France recognize that we have vital economic interests also in maintaining these oil supply lines, due to the fact that if it is not maintained we would feel under some obligation to try to supply Great Britain and France with oil from our own reserves, that they are taking or would take the attitude in this instance "this is your problem of military defense and not ours; we will use our military forces elsewhere"?

Is that involved, do you think, in the possible British and French attitude on this?

Secretary Dulles. Well, I think they assume, and I think correctly assume, that we would, to the extent of our capacity, try to supply them with oil if the Middle East sources of supply or transportation were cut off. But of course, as you know, the limiting factor there is the transportation, and there is not adequate transportation available in the form of tankers to take care of the need adequately.

There is a very considerable shortage at the present time in terms of heavy oils, crude oils, in Europe, and transportation facilities are the primary bottleneck in that situation.

Senator Morse. Although, Mr. Secretary, the press of the country does not necessarily reflect the official position of the government of the country, I have had a little analysis made of the press attitude of France and England in recent weeks since this matter has arisen, and I think it is a fair interpretation to say at least this: that many of the editorials and many of the news comments are to the effect that this is our baby. We can clothe it. We helped give birth to this problem in the Middle East by not giving the

support to France and Great Britain that they thought they were entitled to at the time, and therefore they will follow a military hands-off policy and let the United States come in and save the situation, if necessary, militarily.

Do you think that is a fair reflection of the attitude of the Governments of France and Great Britain?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would think that is a fair reflection of the press comment, at least of a considerable section of the press.

Senator MORSE. I don't mean all of it; but I mean there is just enough of that—

Secretary DULLES Yes.

Senator MORSE. So that I don't think we can ignore that that has had a great impact on French and British public opinion.

Secretary DULLES. Yes; I think probably so.

Senator MORSE. I limit myself, I assure you, in the questions to a very few comments, but I think my questions yesterday indicated my great concern from the standpoint of American public opinion that we are assuming or expressing a willingness to assume this military burden without any assurance from Great Britain and France and the other countries whose oil we are going to save, pledging themselves in advance that they will come to our aid. I am very much concerned about that.

My mail shows the American people are, too, and I am not going to dismiss, Mr. Secretary, further consideration of revision of this resolution that at least includes some guaranties to the American people that American boys don't go over there alone.

SUGGESTED GUARANTIES

I am going to do my very best to find some common ground of agreement, if we can work out an agreement on the resolution, that will protect American vital interests in the Middle East. In fact, it is in the typewriter this morning and I will introduce it in the Senate this afternoon.

I have got to have in that resolution, as far as I am concerned, some guaranties as to the duty of the President, under my conception of our constitutional system, of coming to the Congress before boys are sent to the Middle East; some definite guaranty that there is no possible danger of its being used to start a preventive war, which was my primary objection to the Formosa resolution; and lastly, some assurance that we do not stand over there alone while we protect \$98,400 million estimated potential revenues in oil, the maximum benefits going to Western Europe, the economy of whose countries is entirely dependent upon that oil.

I just do not think we should assume the almost sole obligation of protecting that oil supply for allies who ought to be in there shoulder to shoulder with us; just because some of them may be a bit piqued over the fact that we insisted that the United Nations Charter be followed in their handling of a Middle East crisis.

I think we should work out differences with Great Britain and France and I want to, but I do not think we solve the problem historically by our assuming this burden while they stand on the sidelines with an attitude that it is our baby and we can clothe it.

Secretary DULLES. I hope, Senator—

Senator MORSE. That is the only speech I am going to make in this cross-examination, Mr. Secretary, but I thought it necessary to say I hope you understand the general structure of my observations.

Secretary DULLES. Could I just make one observation, Senator?

You have made a careful study I know as your statement indicates of the British and French press, but I hope before you commit yourself to the proposition that we ought to get the British and French soldiers there beside us in the Middle East, that you give very careful consideration to the reception that those soldiers would probably get if they went to the Middle East.

Senator MORSE. That bothers me.

Secretary DULLES. And personally as things are today—I hope they will change—personally if I were an American boy, as you put it, going to fight in the Middle East, I would rather not have a British and Frenchman, one on my right hand and one on my left. I think I would be a lot safer under different conditions than that.

Senator MORSE. That bothers me. I think you are right. I will tell you why I am bothered by it. A group of Arab dictators—because for the most part that is what these governments are—apparently are willing to have us come in and supply the economic aid and the military assistance to protect the oil lines from which they collect hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue in their sales to European countries, but they feel that they have us in an economic position apparently where they can say to us, "We are going to tell you who is going to protect this oil, and what countries can come in," and I do not like that, frankly.

I think the Arab States in turn have got to recognize the contribution we are making to their security and their defense, and that this is a problem of Western civilization against international communism. I think lots can be said on the other side of the proposition, Mr. Secretary, that just because the Arab States at the present time have no love and affection for the French and the British, therefore, we should let them call the shots as to how this defense is going to be maintained, because I certainly do not want Russia to get control of these oilfields, but it would be a rather shocking chapter in the history of the world if these Arab States had lived for about half a century under Communist control. It would be a terrible thing, but I speak about it as a hypothetical.

HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS

Let's assume it, fantastic as it is, for the moment, that the Arab world was Communist controlled. I think they would soon recognize the soundness of the position that I take, that they had better immediately join in the request that France and Great Britain and the United States and Italy and the other free nations of the world join in a common alliance with them, rather than to have them tell us who can and cannot come into that alliance.

Mr. Secretary, would this phrase in the resolution "controlled by international communism" embrace Yugoslavia and Poland?

Secretary DULLES. It certainly does not embrace Yugoslavia, and in my opinion it does not at the moment embrace Poland, although Poland is I would say walking a tightrope in that respect.

Senator MORSE. What do you think the situation would be if Bulgaria, in working out one of their manipulated deals with Moscow, should send thousands of Bulgarian volunteers into Syria at the request of a Communist bloc in Syria?

Would we consider that under the resolution that involved a threat to Syria and the resolution would apply?

Secretary DULLES. If they went in to Syria at the request of the Syrian Government, and if being in Syria they stayed there and did not attack any neighboring state, then the resolution, at least this section 2, sentence 2, would not apply.

Senator MORSE. Then if Russia did succeed by way of subversive penetration and political propaganda, in any of these countries such as Syria, in stirring up an internal Communist revolution in which some Communist regime would be quickly put into office and then immediately recognized by Soviet Russia, and if Soviet Russia then proceeded upon its invitation to supply either volunteers, military aid or economic aid, the resolution would not apply?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the provisions of section 2, sentence 2, would not apply.

Senator MORSE. Would any provision of the resolution apply?

Secretary DULLES. The provisions of section 1 with respect to "the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of international independence," that applies to the area generally.

The first sentence of section 2 applies to the area generally. I thought that you were making a point as to whether a military force could be used to prevent a subversive effort.

Senator MORSE. I have no question about the fact that we could engage in an economic race with Russia under my hypothetical, but my question is whether or not the President might proceed then to authorize the use of American forces to put down a Communist revolution within Syria, even though they had succeeded in establishing, even temporarily at least, a Soviet government, called on Russia for aid, and Russia was giving it aid both by way of volunteers and by way of economic aid.

There is no overt—we know it is subtle but we know there is no overt—evasion.

Secretary DULLES. I think I have covered that in my preceding testimony in answer to your question about a so-called preventive war, that by reference to article 51 of the charter it limits the possible use of the armed forces of the United States to cases where, to use the language of article 51, an armed attack occurs, and in the hypothetical case you give, no armed attack from a country controlled by international communism would have occurred.

Senator MORSE. Knowing that one of the most successful techniques of the Soviet Union is the technique of subterfuge and evasion and circumvention, I am trying to find out whether or not there is a great big hole in this resolution through which she can go if she is trying to get around it. If Russia concentrated on subversive activity and economic aid in a country such as Syria, tried to buy support in Syria to the extent of stirring up a revolution, which is an oft-repeated technique on her part, and if she succeeded, and then that new government called upon her for military aid and economic aid in order to strengthen and entrench itself, would this resolution apply as far as military force is concerned?

PURPOSES OF RESOLUTION

Secretary DULLES. No, sir, it would not, but I would comment that as far as closing that gap is concerned, there are in my opinion three ways to close the gap, both of which are invoked by this resolution.

The first is to eliminate the fear of overt attack, the second is to build up strong security forces, the third is to improve economic conditions.

I believe that those three ways are the only proper ways to combat a subversive effort of the type you referred to, and I think that if effectively used, they will suffice.

But I am absolutely opposed, and this resolution would oppose, the use of armed force to overthrow a government which itself does not invoke armed force.

I believe if you start to admit the principle that nations can use armed force to overthrow other governments they do not like or that they think may possibly have been subverted, you open the door to a world where war, and eventually global war, would be inevitable.

LANGUAGE OF THE RESOLUTION

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, the authority of section 3 may not be used unless the President determines that such use is important to the security of the United States.

Is there any significance in the fact that no such test is contained in section 2?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think so, because that is covered in effect by the preamble or declaration that the security of the United States is endangered by these various methods that are referred to.

Senator MORSE. No useful purpose at this point would be served in discussing the legal distinction between the whereas clause and the body of the resolution, but I thought it was important to get into the record your assurance that the provision of section 3 is clearly applied to cover also section 2 as far as the language, "when he determines that such use is important to the security of the United States," is concerned. That covers the entire resolution?

Secretary DULLES. The language was incorporated in section 3 because the language of section 3 is a pickup from section 401 of the Mutual Security Act, which says "may be used without regard to the other requirements of this act," and so forth, "when it determines such use is important to the security of the United States."

In view of the analogy between section 3 of this resolution and section 401, we used exactly the same language. That is the reason why it appears here.

Otherwise the resolution is controlled, I think, by the second preamble which imparts the idea of the security of the United States being involved.

MUST USE OF ARMED FORCE BE REQUESTED?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, under the resolution the President does not use the Armed Forces unless such use is requested by a nation.

Suppose the circumstances were such that a nation was unable to call for help?

There was a terrible political revolution of a nature that resulted in so much mass murder that there was not a government that could call for help. What would the President do?

Secretary DULLES. Well, then we would have to depend upon the request which had been made by or to that development, and I think that in most cases that the request will have been made before the things reach such a plight.

Senator MORSE. The fact is we could find at least some plea for assistance had been made by somebody of responsibility prior to death, such as was the case in Hungary. Their cries for help were heard over the radio for a good many hours before their radios were silenced.

Nevertheless, I thought it was important to get into the record the position of the administration, that if there would be one of these sudden attacks where a government was wiped out almost overnight, we would just simply take judicial notice that that is what happened and that they were being controlled by international communism, and move in. Is that a fair statement?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it is a fair statement in relation to a hypothetical case, which we do not think will exist.

Senator MORSE. The only way you can discuss the application of a resolution such as this is to use various hypothetical situations, isn't it?

Secretary DULLES. That is quite true, and I am not questioning the propriety of these hypothetical cases.

All I say is that it is not possible to draw any resolution or draw any treaty which meets every hypothetical case. I know in the report on the North Atlantic Treaty, it dealt there with certain hypothetical cases and indicated that the answers would not readily be found.

We have got that same problem in the North Atlantic Treaty where you could have one of the North Atlantic Treaty countries presumably taken over by international communism from within.

What would you do then?

Well, we felt that that hypothetical situation was sufficiently unlikely so that it was not dealt with by the North Atlantic Treaty. There are some of these hypothetical situations which can be conjured up—I do not use that in any derogatory sense—and they cannot all be dealt with by any treaty, any resolution or any language which the wit of man I think has yet devised.

Senator MORSE. That is why I thought as a matter of legislative history on this we should have this colloquy, because I interpret the intention of the administration to be that if a country is overrun by international communism against the will of the government existing at the time the overrunning started, we would consider the resolution applied, and move in.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

MEANING OF "OVERT ARMED AGGRESSION"

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, what is meant by the phrase "overt armed aggression"?

What would be the effect if the word "overt" were omitted?

Secretary DULLES. I don't think that that would change it at all. The purpose really there is to get at the situation which is dealt

with by article 51 of the United Nations Charter which uses the phrase "armed attack."

A case could be made perhaps for using the phrase "armed attack" instead of "overt aggression."

I think they mean the same thing.

EXISTING AUTHORIZATIONS

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, why in your opinion is the last sentence of section 3 of the resolution necessary?

Secretary Dulles. I will have to get some expert advice on that, Senator. This whole business of the Mutual Security Act and the Mutual Security Appropriations Act is so complicated and involved that I find myself unable to cope with some of its technicalities without some technical advice.

Will you excuse me a moment?

Senator Morse. I was in need of the same advice. That is why I am asking you.

Secretary Dulles. I am told that the purpose of that is to make clear that other existing authorizations are not canceled out by the authorizations contained in the first sentence of section 3.

DURATION OF RESOLUTION

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, the resolution is to expire when peace and security are reasonably assured.

Does this mean that the authority would continue until there has been a fundamental change of policy in the Kremlin?

What would be a likely description of the situation in the Middle East such as the President would determine that peace and security are reasonably assured, if it does not mean that it continues until there is a change of policy in the Kremlin?

Secretary Dulles. Well, you could have action by the United Nations which would be a replacement, an adequate replacement, of this resolution. In other words, if you had, for example, created the security forces that are contemplated by article 43 of the charter, or for example, if the Uniting for Peace Resolution which was adopted in 1950 by the Assembly were implemented as contemplated there by the assignment of contingents which the different member nations to the United Nations, perhaps if this present United Nations' emergency force that is in the area were built up and made semipermanent, any one of those contingencies would, I think, or could be a justification for a termination of this authority.

Senator Morse. I think so, too, without dwelling on it any great length. That is one reason why I am disappointed that the resolution does not deal and get commitments from the Arabs and the Israelis on the three great political problems that confront us in the Middle East, at least to the extent of using the resolution to get some agreement out of them for the creation of a buffer zone and the acceptance of a United Nations police force enhanced over what we now have, because we are dealing here not only with the threat of war caused by the Russians, but with the constant threat of war caused by the disputants within the Middle East. Why should not we try, in this resolution, to take the total problem, because it is peace we are trying to preserve.

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

We can get into as hot a war internally within the Middle East as we can with Russia. Why don't we try to enlarge the resolution to get some commitment on the part of the Arab States and Israel, giving them a lot of protection if they will agree to abide by a buffer state and if they will agree to accept the United Nations police force?

And I would like to see them using it so far as to get them to agree to submit to the peaceful procedures of the United Nations for these very troublesome political issues.

Will you permit one further supplementary remark, Mr. Secretary?

What is bothering me is that I think we have a war-threatening area in the Middle East caused by two situations which are not independent, because I think Russia is taking advantage of this internal situation.

She is doing everything she can to embarrass us.

Every indication we get is that she intends no immediate armed aggression, but she intends to cause us all the trouble she can. She always goes where we are the weakest, and we are weak over there because of this internal Middle East situation. Why should not we broaden this resolution to make it conditioned upon the Arabs and the Israelis agreeing to a certain course of action that will give the world some assurance that we won't wake up some morning and find them using the military and economic aid we supplied to fight each other?

Secretary DULLES. These are other problems, Senator, that you refer to, which are of course extremely important, and they are being dealt with very actively indeed at this very moment at the United Nations General Assembly.

I doubt very much, however, that we can usefully try to solve those problems through this resolution.

UNITED NATIONS ACTION

For one thing, the problems are moving a lot faster up in the United Nations than this resolution is moving here in Congress, and some of these things that you deal with, we have got to give the answers to within almost a matter of hours.

If we do suspend our action in the United Nations until this resolution is passed, and then use this resolution as a means of implementing these policies, I am afraid hostilities may break out in the area again even before we can deal with them.

Now these problems that you speak of are not problems which can be dealt with unilaterally by the United States. You speak about going it alone in relation to certain aspects of this matter.

Well, there are certain aspects of this matter where I think the United States has to make its own position clear in advance. I think if we do so, we will not in fact go it alone. But in relation to the problem of international communism, we cannot get effective action from the United Nations because of the veto power.

Therefore, this resolution deals with that part of the problem. But in relation to the problem of Palestine, that is and from the beginning has been essentially a United Nations problem.

It was United Nations action that created the State of Israel. It was United Nations negotiations that brought about the armistices. It is the United Nations which has the observers which are supervising the armistice lines. It is the United Nations which has an emergency force in the area today and which is dealing very actively with these problems about the buffer zones and things of that sort that you referred to.

To have just a United States position there would not be helpful.

We have got to work these things out I think largely through the United Nations. We are dealing with them every day at the United Nations, and I can assure you that before I come down here to these hearings, and the instant I get back to the State Department, I am concentrating on those problems. We are working now on a possible resolution that can be introduced. These things are making reasonably good progress, if we can get over a certain hump that we are at perhaps today.

I doubt very much if we can directly connect up this resolution with that situation to advantage.

Indirectly, as I have indicated, I think that the authority of this resolution will help us to solve those problems, certainly in their longer range. The immediate aspect of those problems must be dealt with within a matter of hours, perhaps, and this resolution cannot help us unfortunately in that respect.

But as you approach the longer range problems of the area, as you indicated they are being stirred up, fomented by international communism, Soviet propaganda and the like. As we can lift the fear and set in countercurrents to that in the area, I think the chance of a long-term solution of the Palestine problem is very much greater than it would be otherwise.

I think we have got to move, however, perhaps on parallel lines, with the United States speaking I hope with a united and strong voice through the President and the Congress, dealing with the international Communist aspect of the problem, and then working through our delegation at the United Nations on the more immediate aspects of the problem which deal with those particular problems which always have been and still are primarily a United Nations responsibility.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I do not propose to debate the matter at this occasion. I am very glad to have your view in the record. I would only make this observation: that I have no intention of slowing up action before the United Nations, but it seems to me that language such as I suggest within this resolution would supplement and strengthen the hand of our delegation to the United Nations.

CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDE

One of the reasons that you give for asking for this resolution in the first instance is that you find that the governments of the Middle East want some assurance as to what the congressional attitude is going to be in advance. They want to know what Congress is going to do. I think it is likewise very important that we get in here a statement of position of Congress in regard to the threat of war internally within the Middle East, and that they ought to have notice served on them in the resolution that if they resort to war among

themselves or seek to make use of the aid of the resolution for war within the Middle East, an attempt to wipe Israel off the map or an attempt on the part of Israel to conduct a war against Egypt, the resolution likewise applies, that we do not intend to stand by and see the oil reserves of the Middle East threatened either by an aggressive war conducted by Russia or a war conducted within the Middle East by Arab countries among each other or toward Israel.

That is the point I make, and I think if it is the congressional attitude you want, we ought to find out if that is the congressional attitude. I think it is. And we ought to express it so that they have notice that not only are we going to move against Russia, but they also have notice that we are going to protect those oil lines, supply lines, from war among themselves. That is my point of view.

CAUSE FOR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST SOVIET UNION

Mr. Secretary, if Syria became Communist controlled and attacked Iraq, would action by the President under the resolution be confined to the area of Syria and Iraq, or could it include action against the Soviet Union?

Secretary DULLES. I suppose that would depend upon whether the action in Syria was being aided and abetted from the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union was flying in, for example, volunteers, ammunition and the like, to supply the forces of Syria, then I think under the resolution it would be permissible to attack the Soviet flights that were so engaged, and perhaps the staging areas from which they came.

Senator MORSE. Just a redundancy: I want to make this very clear for the record. I understand your answer to mean that if Russia should resort to what we know is one of her common techniques, of either using satellites or puppets or volunteers, and you had a Communist regime in Syria, and at the request of that Communist regime Russia proceeded to supply either airplanes or other military aid or volunteers, we would then pierce the veil of subterfuge and say this is a concealed Russian attack, and we would then exercise the right under this resolution to proceed militarily against the Soviet Union itself.

Secretary DULLES. I do not think, Senator, that your restatement of my reply quite reflected what I said, certainly what I meant to say.

Senator MORSE. I want it to. Restate your position.

Secretary DULLES. I think what I indicated was that if the Soviet Union was taking a direct part in the military activities being conducted—now actually if there was an attack from Syria, I think in all probability that could be dealt with adequately by measures directed against Syria. But as I say, if there was an effective participation in the military operations that were taking place from another area controlled by international communism, then I think we might consider the possibility of action to interrupt that participation.

Senator MORSE. I tried to outline a case, Mr. Secretary, as close in my judgment as one could outline a case to the Korean situation.

I think history has already recorded that North Korea was supported by Russia, that the equipment came from there, and that the Chinese volunteers were backed by Russia. You know the course of action that was followed there.

This is not the place to go into the details as to why it was, although most people do not seem to know that at the time our military advisers kept advising us that, because we did not control the air, we were not in a position to use full military forces. But I have set up this analogy because I would like to know whether or not under this resolution, if Russia followed the same tactics that she followed in the Korean war, using Syria as her North Korea, we would take the position that unless she sent Russian troops themselves in or Russian manned planes themselves in, we would not consider that the resolution applied?

Secretary DULLES. I would have thought that the answer I had given covered that, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Repeat it for me, will you?

Secretary DULLES. I will ask you to repeat the question then or ask the reporter to repeat it?

Senator MORSE. No, I will make it more brief.

I will repeat my hypothetical case. Let's assume that Syria develops a Communist regime. She attacks Iraq. We are satisfied she is getting planes, military equipment and some volunteers, maybe Bulgarian volunteers or Russian volunteers, but she is getting volunteers, as Korea got Chinese volunteers.

We know that it is Russian-backed, but we cannot prove that Russia herself is conducting an act of military aggression. Does the resolution apply? Would we then attack Russia?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think that it would have to be judged by the degree of Soviet participation and by the need that there might be to extend the theater of operations in order to achieve the desired result.

I think it is very unlikely in the case that you give it would be necessary to extend the area of operations in order to achieve the desired result, because of the exposed position of Syria.

But any one of these situations would have to be judged largely militarily on the particular precise facts of the case. I don't think it is possible, within the compass of a hypothetical question, to include all the elements that would have to be taken into account.

I don't know whether Admiral Radford perhaps would like to contribute an answer to that one.

Admiral Radford suggests that you could not really duplicate the Korean situation in the case of Syria because there is no common border between Syria and any Soviet territory as there was in the case of North Korea.

Senator MORSE. Well, I might not be able to duplicate that fact, but I have in my hypothetical case duplicated every other significant fact. All I am trying to find out is whether or not the State Department and the White House and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in a position to tell us now whether or not, if Russia duplicates the pattern she followed in Korea, we are going to consider the resolution applicable. That is all I am asking for.

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think the point Admiral Radford made is that she cannot duplicate it in the case of Syria.

Senator MORSE. I understand. Let's assume that she does. I can take a map and show you there some other territory which if it also falls to Soviet revolutionary control you would have duplications.

If you want to add a few square miles add them to my hypothetical. I still want an answer if I can get it to my question. If you have a Korean situation again, does the resolution apply?

Secretary DULLES. I cannot answer that question, Senator, without knowing a great many more facts of the case, and of course a decision in that case would not be primarily a decision by the Secretary of State. It would be a decision by the President, and I do not think that I could anticipate what he would decide.

Senator MORSE. Suppose Russia did all the things to meet the Admiral's points? Suppose Russia does all those things by airlift?

Secretary DULLES. Does what?

Senator MORSE. Russia uses an airlift into Syria.

Secretary DULLES. I think that subject to other facts which might be governing, there would be an interception under those circumstances of the airlift.

Senator MORSE. And that would lead then to an attack on Russian bases on Russian soil?

Secretary DULLES. No, intercepted in the air.

Senator MORSE. Just limit our fighting to the air!

Secretary DULLES. We might, Senator. As I say, these situations, when they arise, are infinitely complex.

Senator MORSE. I understand that.

Secretary DULLES. And it is not possible to comprehend within the limits of even a fairly long hypothetical question all the elements which would be taken into account. Therefore a categorical answer is not possible.

Senator MORSE. I think you have given me an answer and I will let the record stand on your answer, with this observation: If we are going to get tough I think we should make it very clear to Russia we are going to be tough on subterfuges as well as overt action. That is why I earlier raised the question here about overt action, because the real military threat of Russia it seems to me still is her subterfuges and her manipulating of puppets and satellites and volunteers.

AIRBASES

Mr. Secretary, are there any limits to the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States under section 2?

Could such use include air action, naval action, the despatch of United States troops in advance of aggression, or could it include the building, for example, of new United States bases in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. It covers all forms of action, land, sea and air of course. The question of whether or not it involves bases in the area is not I think involved in this resolution.

As I pointed out, in some areas of the Middle East we already have certain air facilities, and in some parts we have foregone the opportunity to have them, for political reasons.

I do not think this resolution has any significant bearing on the question of bases.

Senator MORSE. Theoretically, couldn't the President, under the more flexible power you have asked for, use the \$200 million the first year to order the start of an airbase in Iraq? What would stop him?

Secretary DULLES. The President has that authority already. That does not depend on this resolution.

Senator MORSE. It does not depend on this resolution, but the flexibility that you give to this resolution puts him in a better position to go ahead without advising anybody about it, doesn't it?

Secretary DULLES. Well, if there was an intention to do that, which there is not, presumably it gives him a longer time to implement that intention.

Instead of having to do it by the 30th of April, he has until the 30th of June. But as I point out there is no such intention that I am aware of at the present time.

Senator MORSE. But you do want greater flexibility for him to make decisions in regard to the use of money for other projects that may, as you said yesterday, arise almost overnight with a cable that says "we need 5 million here" or "10 million there."

You want that flexibility?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Once you give that flexibility, you say there is no intention. If the intention did exist, the power would be there?

Secretary DULLES. As long as the Congress gave the President discretion for 9 months in which to do this, I would not think it would be too terrible to give the same discretion for 12 months. If it was bad for 9 months it should not have been done for 9 months.

Senator MORSE. I am not seeking to evaluate the power. I am seeking only to make the record clear as to the extent of the power.

DOES THE RESOLUTION INVOLVE COMMITMENTS?

Mr. Secretary, does the resolution commit the President to go to the aid of a country which asks for it after being attacked, or do we reserve the right to go or not to go?

Secretary DULLES. Under the resolution there is no committal.

Senator MORSE. Have any commitments been made to any particular country in the Middle East already?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. I mean as to military aid.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. Well, wait a minute. You mean the use of military United States forces?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator MORSE. Is there a danger, Mr. Secretary, that the joint resolution of the Middle East situation, when added to the Formosa resolution, will have a tendency to reduce the power of the President to respond quickly to emergencies in other parts of the world?

Secretary DULLES. Not in my opinion, no.

Senator MORSE. You don't think it might increase the danger of Red China and Red Russia in league deciding a two-pronged attack simultaneously?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. If they thought it was to their advantage to make a two-pronged attack, I am sure they would do it irrespective of this resolution.

I think they are less apt to do it if this resolution is passed.

POWER TO DECLARE WAR

Senator MORSE. Does the proposed resolution have the same effect as a delegation to the President of the congressional power to declare war?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. Not in practical effect?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think you have got to recognize if you talk about practicalities, that there exists, and has existed for a long time, a situation where war becomes a fact before Congress declares it. I recall—my memory goes back quite a ways—when I was still in my teens I was a secretary at the Hague Peace Conference, the second Hague Peace Conference, and there was a great deal of attention given there to matters of protocol in declaring war.

You had to give notice a certain number of days in advance and the other fellow had to answer it, and I remember the Chinese delegate there said, "Supposing I get notice that somebody wants to make war on me and we do not want to make war on them, what do we do?"

That was a question which perplexed very greatly the distinguished gentlemen at that conference. But at that time war was something like a prize fight. You had a date that was fixed and you weighed in and so forth.

Well, all of those niceties have disappeared in the succeeding half century, and we are confronted very much with a situation which is quite different I think from what the founders had in mind when they talked about declaring war. They were thinking in terms of the protocol and the etiquette of those times. But even then they were wise enough not to accept the original draft of the Constitution which said that the Congress should have power to make war, because they recognized that war might happen without congressional action, so they changed the word "make" to "declare."

The power of Congress to determine whether or not there is a war which vitally engages the interests of the United States has unfortunately passed, because the aggressor creates the state of war, and Congress is left with little to do but to declare that a state of war exists, which has in fact been what the Congress has done in the case of our wars during this century, except the Korean war, where no congressional action was taken.

Senator MORSE. I point out, Mr. Secretary, that the fact still remains, though, that in each instance we have declared war. We have declared it by recognizing that a state of war has been imposed upon us.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator MORSE. We have passed a formal declaration.

Secretary DULLES. This resolution would, of course, not in any way derogate from the power and authority of the Congress to declare that a state of war exists.

Senator MORSE. What I said is, do you think it is a matter of practical effect that the result is giving the President the power to declare war? I can imagine a hypothetical where we might deny it to the President, but once American boys started dying under the flag on a foreign battlefield I cannot imagine a Congress that would not declare war.

But the original action under such a resolution as this would, of course, be the action of the President in ordering troops in. We, in effect, then would just follow almost pro forma, it seems to me, with a declaration of war, which was created in fact by Presidential action; I am not saying wrongfully, but I am simply saying that that fact created it.

UNILATERAL ACTION

I think you can see, Mr. Secretary, by my questioning my concern about unilateral American action. That is why I mentioned Formosa and this resolution, because if Red China should strike under the Formosa resolution and Red Russia should strike under this resolution, as far as those two resolutions are concerned, we go it alone, except for the assistance we could get from the Arab States, which I respectfully submit would not be much.

And we would also be going it alone on the expectation and hope, and I think probably rightfully so, that Great Britain and France might in due course of time come in.

But suppose they did not? We have not in past history been fast in coming in ourselves when other nations were pleading. That is one of the things I don't like about the resolution, one of the reasons why I think we ought to include some language that gets some commitment out of nations whose oil lines we are protecting.

That is my observation and comment.

RESOLUTION VERSUS TREATY

Now, Mr. Secretary, if a commitment to assist a country under attack is made in a treaty, a two-thirds vote in the Senate is required for approval. This resolution could be passed by majority vote in each House. Does this mean that resolutions of this kind constitute a way of avoiding the obtaining of the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. We prefer, when the situation permits, to create a regional grouping or something of that sort to proceed by the treaty method, and in the case of the Formosa resolution, there was of course a treaty which had been signed, but had not yet been ratified, and because of the urgency of the situation we supplemented the treaty action which was a slower process by the resolution.

In the case here, as I have indicated by prior testimony, we have not seen a practical way at the present time of proceeding through the treaty method with bilateral arrangements.

We hope that that may come about, and that the situation may become such that we can bring together a group of countries through treaty action, and if so, we will do so.

But the reason for proceeding by resolution here is not in any sense to evade the two-thirds rule. Certainly I am very hopeful that this resolution will be adopted by more than a two-thirds vote. But it is because the circumstances of the case do not permit of action by the treaty route.

APPLICATION OF RESOLUTION TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL

Senator Morse. My last question, Mr. Secretary, is this. On the understanding that the resolution does not apply to an attack by Egypt on Israel or vice versa, unless Egypt or Israel is controlled by international communism, would the President, after enactment of the resolution, agree with our power to act in defense of Israel or Egypt against attack by one upon the other?

Secretary Dulles. That would depend I would think on a number of factors. Presumably there would be United Nations action in that contingency.

As I may have pointed out, we can rely much more upon United Nations action where international communism is not involved, because we do not have the veto power and obstructive tactics of the Soviet Union to the same extent in the United Nations.

We have declared by the Tripartite Declaration of 1951 I think it was, that in such a contingency as you describe we would seek to restore peace by action, I think the phrase is "within or without the United Nations."

We believe that under those circumstances action within the United Nations would be possible, and that that would be the preferred route to take. If it proved not to be possible, then other ways would have to be considered.

In the present case, as you know, one of the contingencies that you referred to happened, and it was dealt with and is being dealt with I think pretty effectively by the United Nations, and I see no reason to doubt that the United Nations route would be open and available in the contingency you describe, and that is of course the preferable way to go if it is the effective way.

Senator Morse. I raise this question, Mr. Secretary, because, may I say most respectfully, I think it is important that the administration make clear, and you are certainly doing it, that it does not propose to stand by and see the only free government in the whole Middle East wiped off the map of the Middle East by Arab war conducted against it, possibly using American economic aid and military assistance previously granted.

Because, although we have moved in after this Israeli attack, through the United Nations, I state most respectfully the strong feeling that we have to pay more heed to the longstanding provocations which resulted in the Israeli action.

I think when we are making this fight for world opinion, trying to convince people of southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world that we are standing for free governments, we should take a more positive course of action than we have in caring for the territorial integrity of the only free government in the Middle East. I hold no brief for its wrongs, but the fact remains that it is one of the political issues which greatly threaten the peace of the Middle East. I still think that, over and above a statement and testimony, there ought to be something in the resolution which serves notice on both the Arab States and Israel that we do not intend to permit them to conduct a hot war in the Middle East.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I personally want to thank you for your kind cooperation with me and my colleagues. I thank them, too. I have

followed this course of examination because it is pretty well known that I have a point of view on many phases of this, primarily on the constitutional phase, which is not shared by many of my colleagues; and therefore this point of view had not been brought out in the examination of others. That is why I have taken so much time, because I take pretty seriously the obligation I owe to the people of my State in making a record so they can judge where I stand.

I did it once before, and they rendered a judgment, and I intend to do it again.

Thank you very much.

Chairman GREEN. The next name on the list is Mr. Symington. He is absent.

Next is Mr. Aiken. Mr. Aiken, have you any questions?

COMMENT ON HEARINGS TO DATE

Senator AIKEN. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I shall not take up much time, but before asking any questions of the Secretary I would like to take about 1 minute to say that when the President's message first reached the Congress, I was skeptical as to the necessity for it, particularly the immediate necessity for considering it.

For that reason, I have attended nearly all of the hearings which have been held here the days that you have been on the stand in order to inform myself as much as possible on this very serious matter with which we are concerned.

I have been disappointed in the hearings at times, Mr. Secretary. It has appeared to me that at times the questioning has gone far beyond the point of constructive criticism or searching inquiry, and has assumed a character of harassment, embarrassment, and efforts to delay action on this resolution.

In fact, Mr. Secretary, I think one might well be pardoned if he came to the conclusion that there were a concerted effort to destroy you politically and personally.

I do not know what your own thoughts are on that. I do not know how sensitive you are. But one might well come to that conclusion.

For that reason, I do want to compliment you on the manner in which you have handled yourself over these several days you have been on the witness stand, and to congratulate you on having the patience, the courage and the physical ability to deal adequately with the questioning which has been thrown at you.

I would like to know, Mr. Secretary, if, after all these days during which you have been subjected to what some people might regard as an ordeal, you intend to yield to the suggestions which have been made here and to depart from the policy which had been laid down and the request which has been made of the Congress by the President. Have you had your mind changed as to the wisdom of the course which had been charted and which Congress has been asked to approve?

Secretary DULLES. Senator, we have gone through now the fourth full day, I think, of examination, and most of the questioning from either political side or both political sides, most of it has, I think, been constructive and fairly designed to bring out any weaknesses which may exist in this program.

NECESSITY OF THE PROGRAM

I am convinced as we have gone through this and as I have had to answer, as was quite proper, constructive questioning designed to test this program, I am more than ever convinced that it is a necessary program.

It does not do everything, of course. The President pointed that out when he first brought it here. There are a number of very great problems in the area that can be dealt with, not best by this resolution, but through the United Nations and in other ways.

But the nub of the problem as to whether or not we are going to stop international communism from taking over this area, that problem can only be dealt with by prompt, effective, and, I hope, largely unanimous voice of this country through the Congress.

Now, sometimes I feel that the, what is designed to be the, great impact of this resolution for peace and for freedom has been lost because we have gone too much into a great mass of detail. As I say, the present legislation dealing with this subject is a maze, and I cannot find my way through it without expert advice, not only on 1 hand but on 2 hands, sometimes behind me, too.

What is designed here is to put up a stop sign, and to do it in language which nobody can misunderstand.

When you begin to weave into these resolutions all sorts of things, references and cross-references to certain sections of certain acts of authority, and authorization, and appropriation, and all that kind of business, it loses its impact.

There is no doubt in my mind, whatsoever, but that if the Congress would join with the President in the declaration here that we intend to use the military and economic strength of the United States to the extent it is already authorized and appropriated, to stop international communism in this area, it will be stopped; and nothing that has happened here has shaken me at all in that conviction, which animated the President when he came before Congress as his first act since the Congress came into session, and which has animated me, I think, here.

And I do hope that it will be possible to recapture that spirit. I realize that it is necessary and proper to go into all these details; but after that has been done, let's end up by saying something which is decisive and which is understood and which is understandable, and don't let's try to weave into this resolution all of the refinements which perhaps mean something to those who are expert in this field, but which will destroy the effectiveness of it.

The effectiveness, as I say, depends upon the Congress joining with the President in putting up, as against this vital area, the most vital area, there is in the whole world, a stop sign that it is not going to be taken over by international communism.

That is the impact we want to give by this resolution, and none of the discussion about the details of it has shaken me in the slightest in my conviction that this is a necessary thing for the defense and security of the United States.

I discussed it briefly with the President last night, and he is just as strong as ever in his belief that this thing is necessary for peace and freedom in the world.

Senator AIKEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Your answer, then, is that 4 days of questioning have not caused you to doubt the wisdom of the course which has been charted and which has been proposed to Congress?

Secretary DULLES. On the contrary, it has reinforced my conviction.

Senator AIKEN. And the questioning has not caused you to consider that perhaps it might be better to follow along with some of the other countries into whatever predicament they might lead us; that the United States should still be the leader in this endeavor to restore lasting peace in the Mideast, and to maintain lasting peace in the world?

Secretary DULLES. Senator, the regrettable fact is that the United States is the only country which can do this job, and one thing or another has created impediments of, I think, a very serious nature against the job being done by countries which historically in the past have been perhaps in a position to do it, and if it is going to be done we have got to do it.

We cannot wait our action upon action by others or the creation of a different climate which would make the participation by others more acceptable than it now is. If we are going to pursue that course, the area is going to be gone before we are in a position to act.

Senator AIKEN. Do you still intend to continue an impartial attitude toward all the Mideastern nations, not giving one nation preference above another?

IMPARTIAL FRIENDSHIP FOR MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONS

Secretary DULLES. Our policy and practice has been one of impartial friendship for the nations of the area, and a desire to preserve and develop the independence of them all, and to avoid the use by any of them of aggressive tactics against the other. That has been our impartial attitude toward this area, and that attitude will be continued.

Senator AIKEN. After 4 days of questioning, do you still believe that the course advocated is in the interest of peace, peace in the Mid East, that it is the best course? I realize that is a reiteration of an earlier question, but is it your belief?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. This is the only course that I know of which gives a reasonable degree of probability that international communism will not get control of this area. If international communism does get control of this area, then I think that we will be faced by the inevitability of a world war under circumstances where the outcome will be far from certain.

Senator AIKEN. Do you believe it will be more conducive to peace, as I believe has been suggested, if we secured pledges from Britain and France that they would cooperate in whatever endeavors we might make in the Mid East situation?

Secretary DULLES. I am afraid that that would not add much, Senator, for two reasons.

At the moment, the presence of British and French forces in the area would not be welcome or, indeed, acceptable. Indeed, the United Nations has just been through a process of getting British and French forces out of the area.

The second reason is a very practical one, quite apart from the area, which is that we cannot leave Western Europe denuded of strength,

and whatever strength is available by the British and French outside of their other commitments will, I think, be needed and more advantageously used in other areas than the Middle East.

ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM

Senator Aiken. Do you believe, Mr. Secretary, that a fair settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem is possible?

Secretary Dulles. I do. Emotions run very high on that matter, and they run higher today than they have perhaps at any time since 1948-49, when there was active fighting in the area; and when emotion rules, reasonable settlements are difficult to obtain.

But inherently, I believe the problem is soluble along the lines of the statement which I made on August 26, 1958; and while the prospects of such a settlement, in terms of time, are not promising at the moment, I believe that as the emotions subside, a settlement along those lines will be possible, particularly and perhaps only if we can drive Soviet Communist influence out of the area.

As long as that is there stirring things up, it becomes very difficult, and I believe that this resolution and the policy it embodies, when implemented, will be the thing which is indispensable to create the climate which will permit of a permanent settlement of the Palestine problem.

THE EFFECTS OF DELAY

Senator Aiken. Finally, Mr. Secretary, do you believe that a delay of weeks or months in acting upon this resolution would weaken the United States' position in the Mideast, or anywhere else in the world, for that matter?

Secretary Dulles. I believe that delay beyond what is absolutely necessary to achieve a full understanding of the resolution by the Congress—and I realize that there is no emergency so great that Congress should be asked to act without knowing what it is doing—but delay beyond that, will make our problem infinitely more difficult.

The activities of the Communists, their propaganda, their acts in the area, are very intensive at the present time. We have no clear program for combatting them because we are to a very considerable extent holding our efforts in abeyance so as not to seem to anticipate congressional action.

If I recall, at the time, I think, of the Greek-Turkish situation, which was somewhat comparable, in 1947, the President then came to the Congress with a program which at that time involved what was looked upon as a startling new policy. He enunciated for the first time the principle that it is dangerous to the security of the United States if international communism gets control, by direct or indirect aggression, of any other state, and called for an appropriation of \$400 million.

That was dealt with by the Congress at that time in approximately 3 weeks, including public hearings, closed sessions, and the like.

As I say, it involved a startling and, at the time, new policy, and the new appropriation or authorization of \$400 million.

I believe that since the present program involves an extension of the policy then first enunciated, since it does not involve any authorization or appropriation of new money whatsoever, and since the situa-

tion is extremely urgent, that the Congress will, I hope, find a way to deal with this thing promptly, because every day's unnecessary delay creates difficulties in finding an ultimate satisfactory solution and will increase the ultimate cost and risk to the United States.

"WHITE PAPER" ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator AIKEN. Yesterday, Mr. Secretary, the committee was advised that a resolution would be offered or a motion made requesting you to submit to the Congress white papers on the Mideast situation.

Can you give us any idea as to how long it would take to prepare such white papers?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it could not be done adequately for many months, and the proposal involves almost insuperable difficulties.

The vital aspects of this matter are involved in highly confidential telegrams, communications at the very highest level between the different governments. The getting of the consent of other governments to the publication of any such things would be not only a very slow process, but I think under present circumstances an impossible task, because I do not think there would be a desire on the part of any head of government to have those things published at the present time.

I can think of nothing that would more damage the relations between our countries than to go through that process at the present time.

It was said that past policies had wounded the relations between the United States, Britain, and France. No doubt but what past policies, and I would suggest that perhaps it was the past policies of others as much as the past policies of ourselves, have somewhat impaired that relationship. But that is in process of being remedied at the present time.

This would reopen all the old wounds, and I can think of nothing that would so irreparably damage the relations between these three countries as to go through the process which has been suggested. I cannot imagine any responsible suggestion to that effect.

Senator AIKEN. Then, Mr. Secretary, would you say that postponing action on this resolution until white papers could be compiled and published would in effect be an indefinite delay?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. A very indefinite delay.

Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Secretary.

I want to reiterate that when the President's message first came up to the Hill, I was skeptical as to the necessity for complying with the request, particularly that part which related to the economic aid for the Middle Eastern countries.

I will say that my skepticism was largely blown away when Mr. Bulganin and Chou En-Lai issued their blast at you and the United States and particularly the request which has been made of the Congress.

COMMENTS ON SECRETARY DULLES' TESTIMONY

I want to say that the manner in which you have handled yourself and have kept your temper, have answered questions clearly and freely over the last 4 days, has wafted away the rest of the skepticism

which Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Chou might have left to me; and that so far as I am concerned, I believe there should be some amendments to this resolution, some have already been suggested, and that I am ready to vote on the matter at any time.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Bush, have you some questions to ask?

Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Vermont has really covered the questions which I had in mind, almost exactly, so that I will not repeat them or propose the questions which I had intended to propose in somewhat different language.

But I do want to congratulate the Senator from Vermont in bringing out the points which he has brought out here in the last 10 minutes, and I especially wish to associate myself with his remarks concerning the Secretary of State as to how he has conducted himself and conducted the case for this resolution, because I believe he has made a very excellent case for it.

And I also share the hope of Senator Aiken that this committee will expedite action on this resolution right now. I think too much delay from here in could have a harmful effect, and it seems to me quite clear that we do have a very large measure of approval for this resolution in both Houses and, therefore, the committee should seek in every way to expedite action on it as much as possible.

I have no other questions.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you.

Mr. Long, have you some questions?

**STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENT, THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO SEND
THE ARMED FORCES OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES**

Senator LONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. Secretary, I have here a document prepared by the State Department some years ago at a time, I believe, when you were in the United States Senate—The Power of the President To Send the Armed Forces Outside the United States. It was prepared for a joint committee similar to this, the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, sitting together at that time, examining the policy of the President sending troops, I believe that was, the troops to Europe proposal under the North Atlantic Treaty.

So far as I can see from that document, the position of the State Department was at that time that there was no limitation whatever upon the power of the President to send troops outside the United States.

Reading from page 2 of that document, I believe that the three paragraphs there pretty well set down the all-inclusive view of the State Department on that matter. It says:

The power to declare war which is vested in the Congress by the Constitution does not impair the authority of the President, in the absence of a declaration of war, to do all that may be needful as the Commander in Chief to repel invasion, to repress insurrection, and to use the Armed Forces for defense of the United States.

And it cites the Prize cases.

Since the Constitution was adopted there have been at least 125 incidents in which the President, without congressional authorization and in the absence of a declaration of war, has ordered the Armed Forces to take action or maintain

positions abroad. These incidents range from the war against the Barbary pirates in Jefferson's time to the occupation of Iceland under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In many instances of this character the President has acted in accordance with the general opinion of Congress or has sought congressional ratification later. Many such instances, however, have not been referred to Congress at all.

While the most numerous class of these incidents is that involving the protection of American property or American citizens in foreign lands, many of them, such as the intervention in Texas in 1845 and in Mexico in 1917, intervention in Panama in 1903 and 1904, the intervention for the dispatch of troops to Iceland in 1941, are not concerned with the interests of individual citizens but with the general defense of the United States or the protection of some national interest or some concern of American foreign policy.

My question is: Is that still the position of the State Department, or would you want to reconsider that position?

Secretary DULLES. I would think that was still the position, broadly speaking, of the State Department. I have not had occasion to review that particular paper, but as you read it, it seems to me to be an accurate historical summary.

Senator LONG. Well, of course, it had been my view that unless there is some expression to the contrary, even a change of administration does not mean that the foreign policy of the United States or the attitude of the Executive toward the legislative branch of the Government has necessarily changed, and I would appreciate it if you would have this document reconsidered, and if you would let us know if that is still the view of the State Department or, if not, what is the view of the State Department with regard to the power of the President to send Armed Forces outside the United States.

Secretary DULLES. I would say this, Senator, that whatever the views of the State Department on that subject may be, the most important thing is what the views of the President are, because he is the man who either acts or does not act.

Senator LONG. I was under the impression that the State Department spoke for the President in this matter, and that you are testifying here as his spokesman, that you are reflecting his views and what the President feels about this matter.

Secretary DULLES. On the general philosophy of acting with or without congressional sanction, the attitude of Presidents has historically differed, and I think it is fair to say that in the light of my judgment, at least, whatever the constitutional view may be, President Eisenhower is very reluctant to use the Armed Forces of the United States in a way which could engage the United States in war unless he has the authority of the Congress.

And I think, frankly, that the President, President Eisenhower, is more scrupulous, holds that view more strongly, perhaps, than some other Presidents have done.

There is and always has been, I think, an area under our Constitution which is not wholly clear, and where there is a sort of a twilight zone; and within that twilight zone, different Presidents often take different approaches, and I think that is an historical fact and that it influences the situation, irrespective of the views of one or another lawyer as to what is the precise constitutional position.

Senator LONG. Yes. I think it would be well if we understand just exactly what the position of the executive branch is with regard to this matter; whether the executive branch takes the position that was taken in

1951, that the President does have the power to send the troops with or without congressional authorization. And I believe it would be well for this committee to know that as early as possible.

You mentioned the urgency of this matter. If the President has the authority to send the troops anyway, then the matter is not as urgent as it is if he has not the power, and I would be curious to know what is the view of the executive department of the Government on this matter today. Is it the same as it was in 1951?

Secretary Dulles. Well, as that memorandum you read me points out, the cases in which the power had been so used, I think in no case have been those which involved or threatened to involve the United States in what could be a major war.

Senator Long. Well, when President Truman sent those troops into Korea, that was threatening to involve us in a major war, and we were certainly taking a risk on that occasion; and my impression is some of the others could have involved us in a major war, as I so regarded it. The landing of our troops on Iceland could have involved us in a major war if the Germans and Italians had regarded it in that light, as an intervention in that war.

Secretary Dulles. Senator, I hope the resolution is not going to get bogged down into a constitutional discussion as to whether or not President Truman was justified in sending American troops into Korea. It would take a long while to settle that one; and, indeed, nothing that the Congress can do can itself settle it except as an expression of opinion.

Senator Long. All I am asking you, Mr. Secretary, is to answer a question that previous Secretaries had to answer, and that is, what is the power of the President to send forces outside of the United States?

If you do not care to answer the question, you can just tell me, and I will go on to the next question.

NEED FOR JOINT EXECUTIVE-CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Secretary Dulles. Well, I suggest that the question cannot, in relation to the present situation, be answered in the light of any such opinion. Now, the President used the Armed Forces of the United States to get Americans out of the Middle East during this recent time—no doubt about his power to do that. It was airplanes, the Air Force of the United States, and naval craft of the United States, that took Americans out of the Middle East during that period of danger. There is no question about that.

The question, I think, that needs to be considered, and which is not touched upon at all in the memorandum you talk about, is: What is the gravity in any particular situation, what is the risk that it may involve a major war?

And when you contemplate action which may involve a major war, the President feels, President Eisenhower feels, rightly or wrongly, that he does not want to assume the sole responsibility in that respect; and also, which is a very practical matter, that a good many people abroad who are not experts on the United States Constitution, are impressed far more if the Congress has spoken and it is not just the President.

As was pointed out here, there are a good many Executive declarations already by Presidents of the United States in reference to this area. They do not carry the punch which is needed, because the punch which is needed is joint action by the President and the Congress; and it is going to achieve peace if you do it that way, and it may not achieve peace if you do not do it that way. And that question, sir, is not answered by any legal opinion.

WHAT IS PRESENT EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT'S OPINION ON PRESIDENT'S POWER TO SEND TROOPS?

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, all I am going to ask you at this moment does not have anything to do with the wisdom or unwisdom of sending troops or the wisdom or unwisdom of President Truman in sending troops to Korea, anything of that sort. All I am asking you to enlighten me on is just the question of the attitude of the executive department of this Government on whether the President does have the power to send the troops without a congressional authorization.

Here is a State Department document which says it is the position of the executive department that he does have the power. That is all I am asking you about, and I am asking you, does he have the power to send the troops without an authorization?

Secretary DULLES. I would not be prepared to answer that question in the abstract, because—

Senator LONG. Let me ask you this question, then: Did President Roosevelt have the right to put troops on Iceland during World War II?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know.

Senator LONG. I am sure you have given some thought to the matter.

Secretary DULLES. No, I have never given thought to that one.

Senator LONG. In your judgment, did President Jefferson have the right to send American forces against the Barbary pirates?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know, sir.

Senator LONG. In your judgment, did President Truman have any right to send American forces or any power to send American forces into Korea?

Secretary DULLES. I never studied that as a lawyer.

Senator LONG. Never considered it?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator LONG. Would you be so kind as to favor us with a documented statement, after consideration of this pamphlet here which purports to state the views of the executive branch of the Government on this question, whether that reflects the views today or, if not, what are the views of the executive branch of the Government on that issue today?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I, of course, would respond to any desire of this committee in this respect. I point out that any such a resurvey of that matter would take a very considerable period of time, in my opinion, and I do not think it is relevant to this resolution.

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, one of the difficulties I find is that these questions and hearings are sometimes prolonged when I cannot get an answer to what I believe is a simple question. Sometimes I find

that by reading a nationwide magazine, I seem to get more information than I do by coming to a secret session of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Secretary DULLES. That is quite possible, Senator. But the answer to the question you put—it is a question which has been debated since this Nation was founded, and nobody has yet found a precise and clear and comprehensive answer to it; and if we are not going to pass this resolution until somebody has found the answer to that question, then we had better just table the resolution and forget about it.

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, here is a document in which the previous Secretary of State was willing to go on record that he thinks these are the powers of the President, and he gave this same joint committee such a document where the President proposed to send troops to Europe.

And what I am asking you is, does this state your position? Is this your opinion, or is this not your opinion? And if I understand your answer, your answer is "I haven't even thought about these matters." Is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. I said I had not given a legal opinion, given legal thought as a lawyer, to the three cases you put to me. You put to me three concrete cases and asked me whether I thought in those particular cases the President had or had not the power.

I said to you that as a constitutional lawyer, I never studied the question. And I do not think, sir, that it is incumbent upon me to study those questions.

Senator LONG. That is what is involved in this resolution, is it not, the sending of troops outside the United States?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator LONG. Doesn't this resolution state that upon request, the President is authorized to send troops outside the United States?

Secretary DULLES. He is authorized to use troops outside the United States, which is quite a different matter.

Senator LONG. How are the troops outside the United States if you do not send them?

Secretary DULLES. The troops are already there. Sending the troops there does not require this resolution. We have today the forces in the Mediterranean, we have forces in Europe, which would be the forces that would be relied upon. These forces are already out.

This question which was dealt with there, as to the power to send forces outside the United States, is not involved at all in this resolution. They are already there.

Senator LONG. Are they in Iran?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator LONG. Iraq?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator LONG. Israel?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator LONG. Saudi Arabia?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir, but they are outside the United States.

Senator LONG. Well, they are not in the area where the fighting is involved, at least where I understand the fighting would be involved, in this resolution. I am not asking you to give me information which someone else cannot dispute, but I am asking you to give me the views,

the opinion and the attitude of the executive branch of Government and the State Department on this issue; and what I want to know is whether we are going to be able to get it.

Secretary DULLES. Well, if the question which you put is the right of the President to send troops outside the United States, which is what I understand is dealt with there, the answer to that is quite clear: He has the power, he has used the power, and the forces are outside the United States.

Senator LONG. The real point I have in mind is whether he has the authority to send them into combat in a combat zone.

Secretary DULLES. In my opinion, that depends entirely upon the nature of the combat. If it is going to involve a major war, that is one thing. If it involves sending them in to rescue Americans, as was done 2 months ago, then he clearly has it.

You cannot answer that question in the abstract, Senator.

Senator LONG. Would you reconsider this document prepared for the same joint committees in 1951; and I would hope you would give this your own consideration, and favor us with a statement of whether that is your view or, if not, wherein that differs with your views?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I will be glad to consider that. I do not know how much of a labor that involves or how quickly I can do it. This apparently—I am not familiar with the document—is a document which I imagine was prepared at considerable length and involved a historical review of a great many cases, you mentioned some hundred cases—

Senator LONG. One hundred twenty-five cases.

Secretary DULLES. One hundred twenty-five cases.

Now, to review all of those 125 cases and see if we agree with the views of the administration of 1951—

Senator LONG. I imagine you would find there are still a great many of the same lawyers who were there when this document was prepared. I would imagine you would agree with that?

Secretary DULLES. They have. I thought you asked me for my views.

Senator LONG. You have some legal help over there?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, we have lots of lawyers there, and if one of their personal opinions will satisfy you, I will produce it.

Senator LONG. If you will pass it on to us, whether you agree with that opinion or whether you do not agree, I believe that will help us.

Secretary DULLES. I cannot do that, sir, without myself making a constitutional study, which I just do not have the time to do here today. I do not believe that perhaps there is adequate appreciation of the very heavy responsibility that I have to carry in making political decisions at the present time, and I just do not have the possibility of absenting myself from those tasks for several days to make a constitutional study of what is one of the most difficult, intricate and debatable points in American constitutional history.

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, you complained about these hearings being prolonged, if I understand the effect of what you were saying a few moments ago, at least by inference.

I have just one question: Is it still the position of the State Department that troops can be sent? That was my note.

That question, in my judgment, could have been answered "Yes" or "No."

Secretary DULLES. I did answer it. I said they not only can be sent; they have been sent.

Senator LONG. Well, now, if I understand correctly, then, this document does reflect the views of the State Department insofar as the Secretary of State is concerned?

Secretary DULLES. Well, you are talking about a long document which I am not familiar with. If you ask the question—

Senator LONG. I read to you the part which I had in mind.

Secretary DULLES. If you ask the question whether, in my opinion, the President of the United States has the power to send troops outside the United States, the answer is, "Yes."

Senator LONG. Into a combat zone?

Secretary DULLES. Now, that is another matter. It all depends on what the combat zone is and what the prior action of the Congress has been.

Senator LONG. Well, I cited the ones I had in mind, and I understood you would like to consider those, such as the war against the Barbary pirates, the case in Korea, and others. I thought the President does have the power. I also believe that the President wants to use the power, that it is wise to consult the Congress. And I believe there we are in agreement.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. I believe, and I am frank to tell you that in my opinion, when President Truman felt that the national interest of the United States required that troops should be sent to Korea when fighting broke out there, it would have been wiser to have asked Congress to pass a resolution and go on record either with him or against him, so we would know exactly where we stood. And I assume you would agree with that view?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. My guess is if that had been done at that time, it would have affected the view of many Senators. I know of one, and perhaps more than one member of the Senate, who at that time would have voted against the resolution. Nevertheless, we have something of a different matter here, because we are asked to give this a prior approval without knowing just what the action would be.

(The Department of State subsequently indicated that no additional written statement is being submitted on this subject.)

COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

Now, here is a second matter I would like to pursue. You have gone on record in favor of collective defense; and I have seen some of your television broadcasts, as well as your appearances before this committee, stating that that is the cheapest and most effective and most economical way to defend yourself and to defend any area.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Yet you feel that the principle of collective defense should be abandoned in this instance, if I understand it.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. I believe we should develop collective defense just as rapidly as we can; but I pointed out, in answer to a previous question, the situation, for example, which exists in the western Pacific, where all the logic of the case would indicate that there should be a combined arrangement between the United States,

Japan, Korea, Philippines, and the Republic of China, but where the emotions involved are such that it has not yet been possible to do that.

So what is the result? The result is that we have acted bilaterally with each 1 of those 5 areas. We do not wait until the emotions which divide the area can subside where to wait would vitally endanger the interests of the United States and give the Communists a grip on that area of vital importance.

Now, that does not mean we do not believe in collective security, but it does mean that we do not advocate insecurity unless we can get it on a collective basis. We want to get security.

The best way to get it is on the broadest collective base possible. Of course, that is through the United Nations, and we get a measure of it in that way.

I would certainly hope that there would be United Nations action of some kind if there was an attack such as is looked upon as a possibility by this resolution. As I say, there would probably be a veto in the Security Council, almost surely would be. There might then be action by the General Assembly which would have the force of a recommendation, and I hope that many people would follow that recommendation.

And we do not by any means give up our search for collective security. But, as I say, until it can be achieved on an ideal basis, we just do not sit by and do nothing, because we cannot afford that measure of insecurity.

EFFECT ON WESTERN EUROPE

Senator LONG. The statement has been made, and I am not sure whether it was made by the President or someone else—I have seen it made by someone—that if this area should fall, with the oil reserves which are in this area, Western Europe would fall.

Do you agree with that view?

Secretary DULLES. I think that Western Europe would certainly be gravely jeopardized, and might very well succumb to Communist domination without a war, because the ability of the Soviet Union under those circumstances to control the economic life of Western Europe would be so great that they would virtually hold that life within their grasp.

Senator LONG. In other words, you feel that the control of the oil resources of this area in the hands of the Soviet Union or some power dominated by the Soviet Union would place a more or less stranglehold upon Western Europe insofar as their oil requirements are concerned?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir, if that happened within, say, the next few years. I suppose that we can look forward ultimately to the development of atomic energy to a degree which would supplant oil as a source of power. But that is quite a long ways off.

We have had a transition from a coal economy to an oil economy. We can see, looking down the road ahead, that there may be a further transition from an oil economy to an atomic energy economy. But that is not going to be a commercial reality to the extent required, for quite a few years.

Nobody can foresee exactly how long it might be, but I would say it would be optimistic to say it would be a decade.

Senator LONG. While I do not necessarily agree—

Chairman GREEN. Excuse the interruption. I had hoped we might be able to adjourn this hearing at half-past 12. It is obviously impossible to do so.

If we adjourn now, Mr. Secretary, could you come back this afternoon?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Chairman GREEN. What time would you suggest?

Secretary DULLES. Two o'clock.

Chairman GREEN. We will adjourn until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the committees adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p. m., of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(Present: Senators Green (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations) presiding, Wiley, Fulbright, Smith of New Jersey, Sparkman, Hickenlooper, Langer, Knowland, Morse, Aiken, Long, and Kennedy, of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senators Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Johnson of Texas, Smith of Maine, Stennis, Jackson, Barrett, and Ervin, of the Committee on Armed Services.)

FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

Chairman GREEN. The meeting will please come to order.

Mr. Long, do you want to proceed with questioning?

Senator LONG. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have supported some bipartisan foreign policy and from time to time as I came here I found myself as one of the members of the bipartisan opposition to the bipartisan foreign program.

Now so far as I can determine, most of this foreign aid program, starting with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the aid to Europe program, which was an economic program in the beginning, was based on the idea that we should build up the strength of those countries, realizing that their freedom and their security is important to us. That was a mutual security treaty in the full sense of the word.

In line with our discussion it seems to me that it is even more important to those nations that the Near East should stay out of Russian control than it would be for the United States.

Do you agree with that?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

NEED FOR ALLIES

Senator LONG. One reason I feel that way is that the oil there is essential to their economies at this time and it is not essential to ours. We are pretty much self-sufficient as far as the oil resources are concerned.

You have said that you believe that their presence would not be welcomed in the event that a fight broke out in that area, but in the event that that should lead to hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union, in other words in the event that that should develop

into an all-out war, would you object to having their assistance in that event?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. We would feel entitled to it under the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty and SEATO. And I might add, and the United Nations Charter.

Senator LONG. Yes. The terms of the North Atlantic Treaty are to the effect that an attack on one is an attack on all, the theory being that we are all in this thing together.

Would it not be helpful if we could have assurances from the other nations similar to the assurance that we seek to give others, that in the event that we are involved in a major war in protecting an interest which is as much theirs as ours, that they would be with us and see this thing through with us.

Secretary DULLES. I believe that such an assurance would be useful. The question of the form in which it is expressed raises some problems, and I am not quite clear as to how we can do it to advantage at this time.

I do think that as you put it, if this thing leads to a general war or anything of that sort, we should be able to count on them. I think we can count on them. I think that the existing arrangements we have with each other already assure that.

Senator LONG. After we have spent a large number of billions of dollars—I don't have the latest figure, my recollection is about \$17 billion in economic aid and I suppose more than \$30 billion in military aid for the Western European area by now—wouldn't it seem rather tragic that after sending all of our weapons to those countries, not all of it, a great portion of our weapons and a large portion of our defense funds there, that if we should become involved in a war defending their economic interests, that all of those arms and weapons and resources should be neutral while we had to struggle it out with the greatest military power aside from the United States on the earth?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think that that should be or will be the case, Senator.

Senator LONG. It would be tragic if it should happen; wouldn't it?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator LONG. From our point of view, we would have given so much of our arms and weapons and resources and have to fight without the benefit of all those resources while those whom we had helped and built up remained neutral?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES' OPINION OF RESOLUTION

Senator LONG. Are you in a position to assure us that our intervention would be welcomed by all of these countries of the Near East to whom this resolution would apply?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. Of course "intervention" is not a word that is quite descriptive of what we plan, and has undesirable connotations, but from the standpoint of whether or not we would be requested to give the aid that is contemplated here, particularly in the way of military assistance, we do not yet know whether that would be something, that request would be made by all of the countries of the area or not.

Senator LONG. If I understand correctly, you feel that certain countries of the Near East would request assurances which this resolution would support?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. You are not in a position to assure us that all the countries of this area would welcome this resolution or welcome such an assurance?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; not at the present time.

We have good grounds to hope that they may, but that will require a degree of education as to the purpose of the resolution largely to counteract the misinterpretation of the resolution which is going on today in those countries.

WESTERN EUROPE

Senator LONG. Wouldn't it seem, just as well, that European countries that are allies of the United States whose economic interest is here involved should give a similar assurance by similar resolution, or perhaps in treaty with the United States, that if they are requested to help preserve the independence of these Middle Eastern nations, they will too respond. Wouldn't it seem in order for those people to do the same thing that we propose to do here?

Secretary DULLES. Of course, the United Kingdom already has the Baghdad Treaty arrangement, but actually that is not operating very vigorously at the present time because so far since the attack on Egypt, the Baghdad Pact Asian countries have not been willing to have meetings with the British partners. We hope and believe that situation will change.

In any event, there is that treaty relationship which covers the four northern countries and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom also has a defensive treaty arrangement with Jordan which, however, is subject to notice from Jordan that they may want to cancel it out. It also of course has protective arrangements with other areas in the Middle East, some of the areas that were referred to yesterday by, I think, Senator Morse.

He listed some of the dependent areas which do involve the British, so that there are a number of tie-ins already into the area through the arrangements that the United Kingdom has with some of the countries.

As I say, some of the arrangements are weakening at the present time, and whether to attempt to rebuild them would be a proper exercise now or not I would not want to judge.

Senator LONG. Would it be a correct statement to say that the United Kingdom has certain commitments by treaty in that area, but that there are serious doubts whether the United Kingdom will honor those treaty commitments?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator LONG. Or whether the Arab countries will honor their commitments.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I have no doubt that the United Kingdom will honor their commitments. They have a fine record in that respect. The question is whether or not their presence in the area would be welcomed or would be an asset under present conditions. That is the question.

Senator LONG. Of course, the presence of someone in an area usually depends upon circumstances. My impression of the Egyptian situation is that Nasser did not desire Russian troops on his soil, but if he could not beat Britain without the troops there he would be glad to have them.

My guess would be that the situation would be similar with regard to Iraq or Iran.

Wouldn't that seem rather logical?

Secretary DULLES. I would think so, and I think if circumstances changed in the sense that you suggest, certainly their attitude would change with it.

Senator LONG. There are a lot of Frenchmen who do not care to have American troops on their soil now, but they welcomed us back during World War II. They were happy to have us.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. I would hope that we might find some way of getting assurance from our allies in Europe that they will commit themselves to come to our aid in the event that we become embroiled in a major war as a result of trying to protect their economic interests, which are even paramount to ours in that area.

Of course, I realize that it is desirable for us that we go first.

USE OF \$200 MILLION

Now with regard to the economic phases of this program, can you give us in executive session or elsewhere on a confidential basis or however you wish to classify it, a breakdown of the manner in which this additional economic aid would be dispensed and the way in which it would be used?

Secretary DULLES. I don't think I can do that, sir, because the whole purpose of giving greater discretion with respect to \$200 million of the funds already available is to be able to do things that we do not now foresee, or at least do not now want to commit ourselves to do.

If I were able to tell you how this \$200 million would be spent, there would be no need at all to ask for greater discretion for the area.

We could deal with it under our present authority. It is the fact that we don't know, and we need to have some substantial fund which we can use in unexpected ways to meet what may be unexpected moves by hostile forces.

It is that element which leads us to ask for a greater flexibility as regards the \$200 million.

Senator LONG. It seems to me that that would relate primarily to the military phases of the program.

I can understand that someone may be immediately endangered and you might wish to shift over a large amount of weapons and ammunition to fortify the nation endangered.

Would the same answer be correct with regard to the economic phases of the program?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; if by "economic" you mean nonmilitary.

Senator LONG. Nonmilitary, yes.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

ASWAN DAM

Senator LONG. Just as an example, we have heard a lot of talk about this controversial Aswan Dam proposal.

Could the Aswan Dam be built under this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know whether it could be or not, but I can assure you it will not be. There is already, you know, a unanimous request by the Appropriations Committee that we should not do anything on the Aswan Dam without further consultation with that committee, and I indicated that we would not do anything without consultation with the committee, and you can take it as assured that there is no concealed purpose here to help build Aswan Dam.

OTHER ECONOMIC PROJECTS

Senator LONG. Concerning other projects of great magnitude running into tens of millions of dollars, could those commitments be made under this resolution without a prior notice and authorization by the Congress?

Secretary DULLES. The total fund now appropriated for the area, some \$750 million, can all be used without any prior reference to the Congress.

Senator LONG. Would this additional fund be available on that basis?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, the same basis as the rest.

Senator LONG. Do I understand that that \$750 million for economic aid is already available in this area?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. \$750 million?

Secretary DULLES. I think that includes the military assistance as well as economic.

Senator LONG. How much of it would you say is the economic part?

Secretary DULLES. Roughly it would be about a 50-50 split between the military and economic.

Senator LONG. About \$300 million to \$345 million?

Secretary DULLES. Something like that; yes, sir.

IS AID FOR TURKEY PROPOSED?

Senator LONG. Does this program envisage additional economic aid to Turkey?

Secretary DULLES. That would be a possibility. Of course—

Senator LONG. Turkey is already a full-scale ally of the United States, and I believe one of our best ones.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. We are committed to go to the defense of Turkey in the event she is attacked. I believe we do have a considerable economic aid program for Turkey.

Does this envisage expanding that program?

Secretary DULLES. I would prefer not to answer those questions in open session, Senator. It is our rule in general not to talk about a particular country's program in open session.

Senator LONG. I don't have in mind involving you in discussion of the figures. I understand the problem. There is a diplomatic point

of view there. I have in mind the question of whether or not this envisages additional aid for that particular country.

Secretary DULLES. I am afraid I could not go that far in open session.

AID FOR EGYPT?

Senator LONG. Very well. Does this envisage additional economic aid for Egypt?

Secretary DULLES. You see, if I answer these questions, it either gives rise to perhaps undue expectations or undue disappointments.

Senator LONG. That is one thing that concerns me about this resolution. As somebody else pointed out previously, Mr. Secretary, some of these Arab dictators down there are going to read this resolution and say "You promised us all this money and where is it?"

Secretary DULLES. Senator, I have been saying quite often I think all the moneys have been found, all the moneys are appropriated. We are not asking for \$1 more than was asked for last July.

Senator LONG. You want additional flexibility?

Secretary DULLES. All we want is some additional flexibility with regard to a relatively small part of it.

Senator LONG. And you prefer not to say whether or not this would mean additional aid for Egypt?

Secretary DULLES. I think it is unwise to discuss particular countries in open session, yes. I did say, I am quite willing to say, and I have said that we do not have concealed in this plan any purpose of helping build the Aswan Dam or anything of that size or of that character.

Senator LONG. The point that occurs to me, Mr. Secretary, is that when you are ever able to conclude negotiations over the Suez Canal, along with our allies and our friends, our associates in that area, Egypt will undoubtedly expect to receive much larger revenues from the Suez Canal than she has received before, and it occurs to me that with the additional revenues that she will probably receive as a result of the settlement of the Suez Canal issue, when it is settled, her need for our economic aid would be substantially less.

Isn't that likely?

Secretary DULLES. I would think it was likely, yes, as they get more money out of the Suez Canal, if they do.

Of course I don't know how much more they will get out of the canal because there are quite some problems in relation to the canal. If the canal is going to continue to be a main dependence for the transportation of oil, it will have to be widened and deepened, and presumably out of the tolls there will have to be set aside a fund to accomplish that.

Now, in the long run, that will be to the advantage of Egypt, because if the canal is widened and deepened there will be presumably more traffic in it, more tolls paid. But that direct financial benefit may not come for a period of 5 years or more.

Senator LONG. A mere raising of the toll would bring great additional revenues into Egypt, would it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; but we do not expect that the situation will be such that Egypt can freely raise the tolls just at her own volition. That is one of the points which needs to be covered, but the Egyptians have indicated that they would accept an arrangement whereby the

scale of tolls would be a matter for discussion between the Government of Egypt and the principal users of the canal, and they would not demand a unilateral right to put on any tolls that they thought the traffic would bear.

Senator LONG. That is what you are negotiating for?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. My impression just from the press reports of the negotiations over the Suez prior to the time that the invasion occurred, and I wish you would correct me in regard to the figures, was that Egypt has only been receiving about ten to twelve million dollars from the use of the Suez Canal, and that Nasser felt that if he was able to take over the canal Egypt could realize about \$50 million in revenue by receiving the full revenue that had been going to the Suez Canal Company.

Those figures are rough, and perhaps you could give me more precise information.

Secretary DULLES. As I recall, the figure of about \$10 million is approximately right as to what they had been receiving out of the operations of the canal, that is as straight profit, you might say.

Of course, there are a good many indirect benefits that they got out of the operation of the canal through tourist expenditures and the visits of the crews on shore and things of that sort.

There may have been an estimate that they could raise that up to \$50 million a year, but my opinion is that that is an exaggerated estimate.

SUEZ CANAL COMPANY

Senator LONG. My original impression of that issue was that Egypt was proposing to raise the tolls. Subsequently, I have been informed that Egypt was proposing rather to seize the canal company without compensation to the stockholders, the effect of which would have been to have caused Egypt to receive the full revenues of the canal, which would have otherwise been distributed in dividends, and that that would have yielded her somewhere around \$50 million in revenue, as against the \$10 million she was receiving.

Can you inform me whether or not that is correct?

Secretary DULLES. There was never an Egyptian intention to seize the properties of the Suez Canal Company without compensation.

Egypt always offered to pay compensation. The compensation that she offered was on the basis of the value of the shares on the Paris Bourse immediately preceding its seizure. Those values reflected what you might call the asset value of the company at that time and perhaps did not adequately capitalize the earning value of the shares, which was in part due to the fact that the concession only had about 10 years further to run.

When Egypt takes care of the compensation due for the seizure of the canal from the shareholders, which presumably will be a charge on the future tolls, then she could probably increase her income fairly substantially but again I point out that that probably will not happen right away because the first responsibility is going to be to pay off the shareholders of the company. That can be done to a considerable extent through liquid assets.

The company has considerable liquid assets which can be used to pay the bulk of what may be found to be due to the shareholders.

There will probably be other assets however which they cannot turn into cash, such as the working assets in Egypt, and there there will have to be found a way to pay off the shareholders in that respect.

And there is some controversy as to what the proper basis of evaluation is, but I would think that there will probably be some portion of the revenues at least from the canal which will have to go to that for a period of several years at least until they are paid off.

Senator LONG. In any event, would it not appear that the canal in the hands of Egypt and used by Egypt could bring in enough sufficient additional revenue so that Egypt might not require economic aid from the United States?

Secretary DULLES. That could be. Certainly it could be as you look ahead over a period of years.

SAUDI ARABIA

Senator LONG. Yes. Now with regard to Saudi Arabia, which is one of the countries in that area, do you have any knowledge of the amount of annual revenue from oil royalties and payments by American oil companies to the Government of Saudi Arabia?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. I think we put a statement on that into the record. I can check it back.

(See answers to questions raised by Senator Fulbright, p. 30, and chart submitted by Senator Morse, p. 262.)

Secretary DULLES. In 1956 it was approximately \$288 million.

Senator LONG. \$288 million?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. There has been a decline of about 27 percent at the present time.

Senator LONG. You say it has declined since 1956 or it was a decline reflected in 1956?

Secretary DULLES. The decline started in 1956, although I do not know that it was felt in 1956, because as I pointed out, there is a lag between the royalty payments and the production and shipment of oil, so that while the oil production went down in 1956, I think that the reduction in receipts only became effective in this year.

Senator LONG. Assuming that the money from oil payments is well spent, and recognizing the fact that Saudi Arabia's population is only about 6½ million people, do you see any need of economic aid to Saudi Arabia, a nation of 6½ million people receiving payment from our oil companies of almost \$300 million each year?

The only basis upon which I could see that we should intervene with economic aid would be an attempt to impose our own good judgment upon that government as to how it should dispense the vast revenues available to it.

Secretary DULLES. Again, sir, I would much prefer not to discuss in open session particular country programs, but I would like to say this, if I might, Senator, because you see all these questions were gone into last year at the time when the Mutual Security Act was adopted and the authorizing appropriation took place.

I would hope it would not be necessary at this time to reargue all of the provisions of the existing law. It is not as though we were asking for any more money. All we are asking for is exactly what Congress has already authorized and appropriated for the area, and all of these factors that you mentioned were considered when the Congress authorized and appropriated about \$750 million for this area last year.

Senator LONG. I understand you want more flexibility in the right to spend more money in this area, and I would be curious to know whether you have anything in mind in terms of additional expenditure of funds for Saudi Arabia.

If you cannot reply here, perhaps you might be able to furnish it to us in executive session. I am sure you know that I do not have that information at this time, and I would like to know it. I assume then that the same answer would apply to Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. You see, Senator, as I say, all this money has been appropriated, all this thing was gone through. I said we wanted more flexibility, but I said that we wanted more flexibility because we wanted to have a fund here which we could use for purposes which we do not now anticipate.

Therefore I don't really see that I can help much along this line of inquiry, because the extent that it was already gone through, that is water over the dam or money over the dam.

To the extent that we ask for new discretion, the only reason we ask for it is to be able to do things which, in the light of the intensive conflict which is taking place there, will give us a position to do things which we cannot now foresee.

Therefore the fact they are unforeseeable automatically makes it very difficult for me to answer these questions, even in executive session.

EXPENSE INVOLVED IN CLOSING OF SUEZ CANAL

Senator LONG. Have you given or made any suggestions that this Nation might be willing to pay the economic expense of the closing of the Suez Canal insofar as European nations were concerned, or assume any portion of that burden?

Secretary DULLES. I have never heard the suggestion seriously made in those terms. Of course the financial strain that was placed particularly upon the pound sterling has created demands primarily through the International Monetary Fund and through the World Bank which in turn throw some burden upon the United States, some considerable burden upon the United States.

But it is for the International Monetary Fund to meet the kind of situation which has arisen, and that kind of possibility was contemplated when the fund was set up.

UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Senator LONG. What is the percentage of contribution of the United States to the International Monetary Fund?

I presume you would give the same answer about the World Bank.

Secretary DULLES. I don't believe we can answer that question here, Senator. That is more or less in the area of the Secretary of the Treasury. I can find it out easily enough, but—

Senator LONG. Could you supply it for the record? I would like to know that answer both as regards the International Monetary Fund and also the World Bank.

Secretary DULLES. I think perhaps I misspoke myself, if I said the World Bank. I meant the Export-Import Bank.

Senator LONG. The Export-Import Bank is entirely American funds?

Secretary DULLES. That is entirely American, and a credit has been opened up there which is secured by collateral in the amount I believe of \$500 million. That would be used to finance exports from the United States to the United Kingdom.

Then in the case of the military fund, perhaps the answer you want can be found in the fact that we paid in on account of our subscription to the fund approximately an additional \$1 billion in recent weeks.

Senator LONG. An additional \$1 billion?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. The International Monetary Fund?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Is that to help relieve the economic problems of Western Europe as a result of the Suez crisis?

Secretary DULLES. It was to meet the drawings that were made or in prospect from the United Kingdom as a member of the fund.

(The Department of State subsequently submitted the following information concerning the United States contribution to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund:)

The United States subscription to the capital of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is \$3,175 million or 35.08 percent of the total capital of \$8,050.5 million. The United States has paid in \$635 million of its capital subscription. The United States holds 30.47 percent of the voting power within the organization.

The United States quota in the International Monetary Fund is \$2,750 million (\$687.5 million in gold and the balance in noninterest demand notes) or 31.43 percent of the combined quotas of the member countries of \$8,750.5 million. The United States holds 27.20 percent of the votes on any issue before the organization.

The United States and other members of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development make no annual contributions to the organizations; the expenses for the organizations are met out of income from current operations.

SUEZ CANAL

Senator LONG. Have you suggested on occasion or discussed a proposal whereby this Nation, by means of economic aid, either to Near Eastern countries or to Western Europe, would assume the economic burden of the seizure of the Suez Canal?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator LONG. Either directly or indirectly?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OIL PRICES

Senator LONG. I am sure you realize that some increase in the price of oil in that area would very much reduce the need of economic aid by the countries of the Near East who have oil. Can you supply for me the Persian Gulf price of oil?

Secretary DULLES. I can supply it, yes.

Senator LONG. Perhaps someone of your staff might have it available now?

Secretary DULLES. We don't have it here with us, Senator.

(The following information was subsequently submitted for the record:)

The FOB price of crude oil posted as of January 25, 1957 for Persian Gulf lifting ports is as follows for the grades indicated:

| Source | Price per barrel | API gravity |
|-------------------------------|------------------|-------------|
| Saudi Arabia, Ras Tanura..... | \$1.03 | 34.0-34.9 |
| Iran, Bandar Mashur..... | 1.01 | 34.0-34.9 |
| Iraq, Fao..... | 1.87 | 30.0-30.9 |
| Kuwait..... | 1.72 | 31.0-31.9 |
| Qatar, Umm Said..... | 2.10 | 41.0-41.9 |

Source: Petroleum Week, January 25, 1957.

Senator LONG. Doesn't the price of oil in the Persian Gulf as compared to the price of oil at the Gulf of Mexico or the price of oil in the exports in the Western Hemisphere have a lot to do with the economic problems of this entire area?

Secretary DULLES. That may well be the case, but I am not an expert on those matters myself, and would not want to make an answer.

Senator LONG. I am sure you know that one of the problems that your Department has been concerned with on these trade bills has been the efforts of American producers to reduce the importation of foreign oil which has been imported even in spite of the tariffs that this country has.

I am sure you know that they produce it at a far lesser price than we do here in this country and also in Venezuela and elsewhere?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Now it occurred to me that if those people should raise the price of oil somewhat, as far as the oil-producing countries are concerned, they would not need any economic aid.

They could take care of it by themselves.

Does that seem possible?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know. I am not an expert at all on the economics of oil. It is a very intricate business and these interconnecting price arrangements are complicated. I just don't know. You will have to get somebody who is more technically competent than I am if you wish to go into that problem.

But again, as I say, Senator, we are not asking for any more money than Congress saw fit to appropriate last year.

Senator LONG. That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

VIEWS OF PRESIDENT HOOVER

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I have a letter here from President Hoover, a very brief one, 1 page, and in view of the fact that I have repeatedly stated what his position was, I would like to read this letter into the record.

Chairman GREEN. Very well.

Senator WILEY. It is dated "New York, January 22, 1957. Waldorf-Astoria Towers."

Hon. ALEXANDER WILEY,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I am in receipt of your request of the 23d instant for my views on President Eisenhower's proposal that the United States should use its military forces to aid the Middle East States to repel any military aggression.

I certainly support this proposal, together with continued economic aid to the region. It is my understanding that no additional funds are being requested from the Congress in this proposal. The President, is, however, requesting additional flexibility in administering the funds which have been already authorized and appropriated in the present fiscal year.

In view of the rapidly changing situation in the area and the unforeseen circumstances which may unavoidably arise, it seems to me necessary that the President should be given every opportunity to expend these funds to the greatest advantage in the present emergency.

THE INCREASED DANGERS

The dangers of irresponsible action by the Soviet Government have increased. A long world experience shows that when governments begin to weaken from the discontent of their people, they too often take to the old Machiavellian doctrine of diverting the minds of their discontented people by more vigorous international action.

History shows that the weakening of the French revolutionary government through discontent of the people and the differences in the directorate gave rise to the Napoleonic wars.

The discontent of the people and the weakening of the czarist government of Russia and the imperial government of Austria contributed to the origins of World War I. Later on the weakening of the Russian Government gave rise to militant communism.

The weakening of the Italian Government and the discontents of their people after World War I gave rise to the militant fascism. Discontent and weakening of the Wehrmacht Republic in Germany was followed by the militant Nazis.

There can be no doubt as to the discontent and the internal weakening of the Soviet Government. It is therefore essential to the peace of the world that the Soviet Government should be under no misapprehension as to our position with respect to any military aggression which they might contemplate in the Middle East.

Yours faithfully,

HERBERT HOOVER.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO EMPLOY ARMED FORCES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Jackson, do you have any questions?

Senator JACKSON. Yes, I have a few.

For a moment I would like to pursue part of the line of questioning by Senator Long with reference to the constitutional power of the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States outside of the United States.

Is it your opinion—and I do not like to be repetitious and if I can get a short, brief answer time will be saved—that the President has the authority to send troops in connection with the purposes of utilizing those troops in the Middle East as outlined in this resolution, without congressional action?

Secretary DULLES. To send troops into the area?

Senator JACKSON. To send troops to carry out the purposes of this resolution without such authority approved or authorized by the Congress?

In other words, could you carry out what you have in mind as stated in this resolution, could the President carry it out, without the congressional action you have requested of the Congress?

Secretary DULLES. I can't give you a short answer to that, Senator. I will try to make it reasonably short.

Senator JACKSON. I just want your opinion.

Secretary DULLES. I beg your pardon?

Senator JACKSON. I would just like to have your opinion if I could.

Secretary DULLES. As I said to Senator Long, I do not think you can give an opinion on a state of facts which must be very largely hypothetical.

Senator JACKSON. Well, this is not hypothetical.

I think the danger you said is real. Now certainly you are a lawyer, Mr. Dulles, and I want to be fair with you, but do you request legislation of Congress before obtaining a legal opinion?

In other words, do you proceed to simply ask Congress for legislation when you need it or don't need it?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. You do?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; and for a very important reason indeed, the same reason that President Wilson gave when he asked for authority to arm the ships of the United States.

He said he believed he had that authority but he believed that if there was a clear manifestation of the will of Congress it would accomplish a purpose which could not be accomplished—

Senator JACKSON. I am not trying to be antagonistic, I may want to vote with you, but we have been here for 4 days. There has been a lot of talk about utilizing a lot of time.

I have been here 4 days and have had about 20 minutes. I think we could get some clear-cut answers. I think it is probably a good idea, even though the President does have the authority, that Congress approve it.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. But why can't we say yes or no?

Why do we have to just go round and round and round and not get a clear-cut answer?

Chairman GREEN. The witness is not obliged to say yes or no to a question.

Senator JACKSON. Obviously he is not because we have not had very many.

Mr. Secretary, in the resolution it says that Congress is authorizing the President to use the Armed Forces.

The logical inference is the use of the word "authorizes" is that the President does not have the authority.

Now is that a fair deduction?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

SUGGESTED USE OF "APPROVE" OR "CONCUR" INSTEAD OF "AUTHORIZE"

Senator JACKSON. Why don't you use "approve" or "concur in the use of"?

Secretary DULLES. Because, Senator Jackson, we are dealing here with an area of constitutional doubt which has existed for 150 years or more, and I can't settle that doubt by my opinion.

I am not presumptuous enough to think that the doubts of 150 years which have baffled the greatest constitutional lawyers throughout the life of this Nation can be answered by me. The point of the resolution is this, Senator: that there are times and occasions when, irrespective of constitutional doubts, irrespective of just where the division of powers lies, it is vital that the President and the Congress should speak clearly with one voice.

This is one of those occasions. I referred to the fact that Woodrow Wilson asked the Congress for authority to arm ships. He said he thought he had it, but it would be far more effective if the Congress would join.

At that time the Congress did not join and we quickly got into war. There was a filibuster against it.

When President Eisenhower came here seeking the Formosa resolution, he said that he thought that he might have the power, but that the resolution would be effective if we would speak together.

Now that is the spirit which animates this resolution, Senator.

Senator JACKSON. Would you be willing then, Mr. Secretary, to go as far as Woodrow Wilson, to use that as an example, and would you say that you think Mr. Eisenhower has the power but it would be better to get the approval? Would you go that far in your opinion?

Secretary DULLES. I'm prepared to say he may have the power.

Senator JACKSON. You won't go as far as Woodrow Wilson?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I think frankly it would be a lot better for the future power of the President if you would say that he probably at least has the power but it would be better to get the approval. Most of us would be glad to vote immediately on this, or a lot of us would. But it is proving so difficult to get clear-cut answers on these questions.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, I have in my time been a lawyer, and still technically am. But I am not functioning in this position as Secretary of State as a lawyer. I am functioning as a political adviser to the President in the field of foreign affairs, and from that standpoint the answer to your question is clear that it is extremely important, indeed essential, that Congress and the President should unite to say this. I would say that if this gets bogged down in a constitutional debate about a matter which has baffled this country for 150 years, I don't think that that is going to be serving the best interests of our country. I don't think this question needs to be debated or resolved at this time, and I am quite sure it will not be resolved, because whatever I say or you say, debate will go on.

Senator JACKSON. You might weaken the power of the President, Mr. Secretary. There may be an area we have not covered in the world where we need to employ the Armed Forces immediately and, because Congress has not authorized it, he would not be able to act. Have you thought of it from that standpoint?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Then wouldn't it be better if you want to uphold the hand of the President, to say that he does have the power, but it would be better, and I agree with you, I think it would be better, that Congress approve it. But I believe when you take the position that maybe he does or maybe he does not have power, then the future power of the President may be weakened. We are living in an atomic age.

Secretary DULLES. People have been saying for 150 years maybe he does, maybe he doesn't, but we seem to get along pretty well.

Senator JACKSON. If you want to join in that kind of a debate that's fine. I want to ask you this other question in that connection. Did you have anyone in the State Department in your Legal Department render an opinion on this point before you drafted the resolution?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. So you just went right ahead and used the language "authorize" instead of "approve" or "concur in." You wouldn't approve of that kind of language, in lieu of "authorization"?

In other words you want to establish by legislation a precedent that the President doesn't have authority. You use the word "authorize" which is certainly a clear indication that he doesn't have it. If you use the word "approve" or if you use the word "concur" it would indicate that he already has the power but that we are showing to the world that we have the concurrence of the Congress and the President in the presentation of our position.

Secretary DULLES. If the word could be found here which would more clearly meet the views of both those who think he has the power and those who think he hasn't it, I would certainly not object to that word.

SUBVERSION, THE GREATEST IMMEDIATE DANGER TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator JACKSON. What is the immediate threat to the area? Is it military aggression or is it subversion, in order of priority, of importance?

Secretary DULLES. I would say I think that subversion is the greatest immediate danger in the area, although the military danger is not to be ignored, because there exists ample military power, and I suppose that when it is employed, it will be employed to take us by surprise. Therefore we can't assume that we will know in advance. So I would say on the basis of what I know about the situation, that the greatest danger is subversion.

Senator JACKSON. As a matter of fact, if a nation or one of the countries in the Middle East that is being subverted, decided they don't want our help, we are pretty helpless, are we not? Under this resolution or any resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. We can't very well stop a nation from being subverted if it wants to be subverted.

Senator JACKSON. But isn't it true that most of the difficulty with reference to subversion stems from the conflict between Israel and Egypt, the closing of the canal and the refugee problem?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. I think that the danger comes from primarily the activities of the agents of international communism, and in part of the area at least from the menace of open armed attack.

Senator JACKSON. But isn't it true that the Russians started moving into Egypt in connection with their supply of arms to aid Egypt in building up their military establishment, for whatever purpose they may desire to use that military establishment?

Secretary DULLES. I am not sure what your question is.

Senator JACKSON. I am asking you isn't it a fact that the reason why the Russians are in Egypt is because of the deal made between Egypt and the Soviet Union in connection with their arms aid program and economic support as a part of that effort?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know whether—you say the Soviet Union is in Egypt. It has some influence in Egypt I suppose.

Senator JACKSON. Aren't there quite a number of Russian technicians in Egypt at the present time?

Secretary DULLES. Not many. I think we would prefer to discuss that in closed session.

Senator JACKSON. That is perfectly all right. I wasn't asking for numbers. I just asked it generally.

Mr. Secretary, what is the nature of the subversion? Is it that the Moslems are succumbing to Marxist-Leninist philosophy? Do they understand the doctrine and are they becoming good Communist theologians, or what is it?

Secretary DULLES. No; it is primarily propaganda to the effect that the West has colonial traditions and colonial purposes, and they can get their freedom and independence better if they will cuddle up to the Soviet Union.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, you feel that their propaganda efforts are the primary cause of whatever subversion is taking place in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. I would say that that is the most important single instrument of subversion, the propaganda. Then, of course, selling arms at a reasonably cheap price on credit is something else which wins them friends and enables them to bring some technicians into the country.

UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO COUNTER SOVIET PROPAGANDA

Senator JACKSON. What are we doing to deal with this propaganda barrage in the area, and what can we do?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we are carrying on propaganda of our own, and attempting to portray to the people of the area the danger of close association with the Soviet Union. In that connection we try to give a picture of what is going on in Hungary as a consequence of a close association with the Soviet Union, and we can counter to a very considerable degree the propaganda which is being carried on by the Soviet Communists.

Senator JACKSON. Have we made any effort, Mr. Secretary, to tell the people in the Middle East what the Soviets are doing in the Moslem Republics of the U. S. S. R., to their culture and to their religion?

Secretary DULLES. I assume so, but you would have to ask the USIA for details about that.

Senator JACKSON. But isn't this quite important? Isn't it a fact that the Soviets have destroyed the Moslem sacred places and their religion for the most part in the Soviet Union?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; it is important.

Senator JACKSON. Why is it that we are not doing the job of making it clear to the people of the Middle East that if they come under Soviet influence, they are going to lose their Moslem religion?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I didn't say we were not doing it.

Senator JACKSON. Are we doing it?

Secretary DULLES. I think we are, but I do not run the United States Information Agency any more. That is a separate independent agency.

Senator JACKSON. I know. Is there anyone here that can answer the question?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Could you supply it to the committee? I think this is a pretty crucial item close to the heart of the whole Middle East controversy. And you haven't been advised about that?

Secretary DULLES. Only in general terms. I discussed the whole general situation the other day with the Director of the Bureau, and before that with his predecessor, and they are making a very great effort in that general direction. I didn't get into the details of precisely what they are doing, but I am assuming they are doing a competent job.

[No additional information was received from the executive branch on this point.]

HOW WILL ECONOMIC AID FUNDS BE SPENT?

Senator JACKSON. As far as I am concerned, I haven't a question in my mind about giving the President the authority to draw a military line out there. But isn't it possible for the Department in connection with the economic aid which is a troublesome problem for some of us to give some indication in executive session as to how they will spend the money that they have already appropriated for some of these projects?

In other words, I realize you can't indicate all of them, but can you give us some general line as to how you hope to use it? Certainly there must be some evidence within the Department of State by now which would make it possible for us to know in a general way what you are going to use the money for.

Chairman GREEN. May I state that the Secretary has consented to meet with the committee in executive session next Monday morning at 10 o'clock in the room of the Armed Services Committee. That is room 212 of this building.

Senator JACKSON. For what purpose? I just asked if he can give this information. I am not asking that he give the information in public. I am just wondering if he can give it to us in executive session.

Secretary DULLES. We can give a general idea as to how the money appropriated for the area, the bulk of it, is being spent. As I pointed out, there has been appropriated for the area under the present law about \$750 million. Much of that is in prospect of being programmed or obligated at the present time, and I think that the Director of the International Cooperation Administration will be able to give you at that time in closed session an idea as to how the money is generally being spent.

Senator JACKSON. Could you also give us some information as to how you will use the money if the restrictions are removed that you have requested in this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. I don't think I can do very much along that line, Senator, because as I say, the whole reason for getting greater discretion is to be able to spend the money for purposes that we do not now know about.

Senator JACKSON. How could you ever arrive at the \$200 million figure if you have no idea, absolutely no idea, as to how you are going to utilize it?

I just don't understand it.

Secretary DULLES. I think the record shows that the original proposal of the President asked for a general discretion with respect to all of the moneys allocated to this area. That was in the resolution as I brought it down here on the second of January and read it to the

members of the Foreign Relations Committee and to many members of the Armed Services Committee. After having done that, there was a feeling that there should be some top limit put on it, and that it should not apply to all the money. And the figure of \$200 million was picked as something which seemed reasonable, about 25 percent of the money. It didn't involve a great deal in terms of the total program, and we did not think that there would be objection if a limit of that size was put upon the increased discretionary fund. It was never arrived at as a scientific figure.

RICHARDS MISSION

Senator JACKSON. Do you have any policy that you are going to lay down to guide the team headed by Mr. Richards. He is a very capable individual who has the respect I know of men of both parties. Is he going to be given a policy or some kind of a yardstick when he makes this expedition to the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. I made a pretty full statement yesterday on the record, Senator. I'd be glad to do it again if you wish.

Senator JACKSON. No; that is not necessary. Could you just answer me will there be a program or a policy that he is to pursue?

Secretary DULLES. There will be a policy; yes.

Senator JACKSON. And you have advised the committee of what that policy is?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. I can advise you now. The policy will be to do what is necessary to meet the threat of international communism in each of these countries. In each country it varies.

Senator JACKSON. That surely is a specific directive. That could cover anything, couldn't it?

Secretary DULLES. It could cover most anything; yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. So, we haven't any yardstick or anything to follow. In other words, if we need to build some more Moslem temples and that would help, we would do that under that program.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. That can be done now you understand.

Senator JACKSON. Maybe we ought to revise the whole economic aid program.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, possibly that. There will be a general review of this whole business.

Senator JACKSON. Because if you give me that kind of an answer and I don't think you are trying to be facetious, why maybe we had better take you at your word.

Secretary DULLES. And what?

Senator JACKSON. That is that you might feel that you should go ahead and build more Moslem temples if that would be helpful.

Secretary DULLES. I don't exclude that as a possibility at all. Why should we? If it is going to help to develop a religion and a culture of a country, that is one of the things we do. We build lots of things in different parts of the world.

USE OF GROUND FORCES

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, do you still feel that you will not have to employ the ground forces of the United States to implement this program, this policy?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think so.

Senator JACKSON. Do you agree with General MacArthur, who testified at the MacArthur hearings--and I would like to read this statement in connection with his testimony on the Korean affair:

General MACARTHUR. I believe that it is the greatest possible mistake in the use of the armed forces of a nation to try to draw the lines of demarcation between ground troops and air troops and navy troops. They are an integrated team. At one place you may need the preponderance of one element or the other, but the force that we apply should be based upon a complete integration of the potential of those three forces. It is impossible to make such a simplification in my opinion.

You will recall that when I asked this question the first or second day of the hearings, that you indicated that--I have the answer here.

Chairman. You stated that the ground forces would not have to be used, and I asked a question--

Senator JACKSON. In other words I take it that you are going to rely on naval and air power to implement this.

Secretary DULLES. Primarily, I think.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. So that there is reasonable certainty here that when we approve this resolution, we will not be called upon to approve action that would involve the use of ground forces of the United States?

Secretary DULLES. I would prefer to use the word that was used "probability."

Senator JACKSON. You said primarily.

Now what if the Russians moved troops in by air into Syria or any of these countries that they are going to support, and they are coming in at the request of that country. What would we do about it?

Secretary DULLES. That again, sir, is a question I have already answered. I'd be glad to answer it again. I answered it just this morning very fully, I think, in reply to Senator Morse.

Senator JACKSON. I think the record was changed on that or some revision made afterwards. That is why I would like to ask that question again.

Secretary DULLES. I have not changed the record.

Senator JACKSON. I understood there was something changed. I didn't say you had. I wanted to get that part of it cleared up.

Secretary DULLES. If the movement of troops did not involve itself a hostile action, and if the troops when they arrived stay in the countries to which they are invited, that would not call for action under this resolution.

Senator JACKSON. How would you determine whether it would be a hostile act?

Secretary DULLES. That is determined by the action of the government itself. If it invites them in, then they do not come in as aggressors.

Senator JACKSON. So that if Soviet troops are moved into any of these countries in the Middle East by invitation, then this resolution would not be used, that is that part of it.

Secretary DULLES. That part of it would not be used, no.

Senator JACKSON. That part of it authorizing the President to employ Armed Forces of the United States?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Capelhart is not here, I believe. I will call on Mr. Barrett. Do you have any questions?

ALLOCATION OF FUNDS IN MIDDLE EAST

Senator BARRETT. Mr. Secretary, I have one question.

As I understand it, you have testified here that approximately \$325 million presently available might be used for economic aid in this area, and I think you further testified that roughly about \$66 million is available without any strings attached and it has complete flexibility. Am I correct in that statement?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. You are correct in the first part of it, that is that there has been appropriated for this area under present law about \$750 million, and I indicated that roughly half of it is I believe for economic purposes and half of it for military purposes.

Now there was testimony given by Mr. Hollister yesterday with respect to the \$100 million discretionary fund, which indicated that while all but \$7 million of that has either been programmed or is in the process of being programmed, that technically there is only about \$25 million of it which is actually programmed. The balance is in the process of being programmed, the allocation of which is under consideration amounts to \$66 million.

The total of those 2 items is such as to leave a balance available for new programs of \$7 million.

Senator BARRETT. The \$66 million has been committed, is that right?

Secretary DULLES. Not legally committed, no, sir, but there are charges against it which are developing and which are planned to be taken care of, such as additional funds required for Hungarian refugees. That itself is going to be a pretty substantial item, and probably will use up between in the neighborhood of perhaps \$40 million to \$50 million of that fund.

Senator BARRETT. So the sum total of the situation then is that only about \$7 million is available from funds presently appropriated for economic aid in that area?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator BARRETT. That are uncommitted?

Secretary DULLES. I am speaking now about the status of the \$100 million discretionary fund which is provided for by section 401 (b) of the act.

Senator BARRETT. That's right.

Secretary DULLES. Of that there is either appropriated or we are contemplating the appropriation for specific and now known purposes of about \$93 million, leaving about \$7 million free.

Senator BARRETT. And you figure that the other funds in the economic program do not have the flexibility that you desire for this program.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, up to the extent of roughly 25 percent we would like more flexibility.

Senator BARRETT. The point of it is that you don't know exactly the amount that you anticipate using for economic as against military assistance in this area at present?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. I think it might be a fair guess that it might go on a 50-50 basis, but that would be a very rough estimate indeed.

Senator BARRETT. Has there been any objection heretofore to giving you roughly \$100 million on a discretionary basis in the previous appropriation bills, authorization bills?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. I believe there have been Senators who have objected but the action of Congress has been to appropriate.

Senator BARRETT. So what you are doing here in this legislation is something that has been the practice heretofore?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator BARRETT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Kennedy, have you some questions?

WHY DID THE UNITED STATES NOT JOIN THE BAGHDAD PACT?

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Secretary, why did the United States not join the Baghdad Pact when it was formed?

Secretary DULLES. You say why did it not?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, sir.

Secretary DULLES. Because in our opinion it was too controversial as among Arab countries, and we had friendly countries like Saudi Arabia with whom we had long had very close associations where the United States has an airbase or a field, and there was very strong feeling in some of the countries against the Baghdad Pact, that it was a divisive force in that respect, and that for such reasons we did not think it wise to cast in our lot with part of the countries of the area in terms of a pact which was divisive.

Senator KENNEDY. Wasn't it partly a recognition that many of the countries of the Middle East are dependent for their welfare upon other countries, such as the Iraqis upon the Syrians, the Saudis upon the Egyptians, in order to get their oil to the west, and that therefore the United States should not attempt to divide these countries but rather should work to bring them together. Is that an accurate statement?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Why do you feel that a similar situation does not prevail today?

Secretary DULLES. I believe that it does prevail today in the sense of there being a need to try to bring the countries of the area together.

There is some prospect that that is occurring, and the United States is as a friend of both countries trying to promote that.

Certainly it is our purpose to try to create unity within the area because that will greatly facilitate the kind of anti-Communist program that we have in mind here.

QUESTION OF LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET MILITARY INVASION OF IRAN OR TURKEY

Senator KENNEDY. As I understood it, earlier you stated that while it was always a possibility, you did not think it a probability that the Soviet Union would march across into Turkey or into Iran in order to conquer the Middle East by military force in that manner. Is that not correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. It must always be accepted as a possibility when there exists the power and the capacity to use it suddenly and where the possessor of that power is not restrained by any moral scruples.

Senator KENNEDY. Based on your experience, is it not also probable that if an invasion of that type would take place, it would take place in a worldwide way, certainly in Western Europe, and that it would not be an invasion by military force in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. That is true, Senator, unless they think that they can move in that area without starting up a general war. If they felt that they could pick off one country and another there by military force, and that there would be no particular reaction to it, then I would not by any means put it beyond them to try that.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you feel that one of the major arguments for this legislation is that there is some doubt in the Russian mind that the United States would not go to war if there were an invasion of Iran—we have commitments already with Turkey and Pakistan—but if an invasion of Iran took place, that the United States would not take military action?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. You feel if the Iranians brought a case to the Security Council and it was vetoed by the Soviet Union, that the United States would then feel inhibited from taking an action to come to the support of the Iranians?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think we might feel inhibited, but I think the Russians would feel we might be inhibited.

Senator KENNEDY. At present we have commitments of mutual assistance with the Turks and with the Pakistanis. In addition, Mr. Allen in May 1955, said that we, the United States, would be strongly opposed to the side which started a war, and would be favorably disposed to that side which proved its desire to maintain peace.

In addition, we established a liaison with the Baghdad Pact in which Iran is a member, and then you asserted April 3, 1956, that the United States forces might be utilized in the Middle East "without congressional authority in the event of an emergency."

And then, on April 9, Secretary Hagerty pledged the United States to oppose aggression within the Middle East, within constitutional means, to assist a victim of aggression.

In addition, we established, in 1956, military liaison with the Baghdad Pact.

Then on November 14, President Eisenhower stated the United States would oppose through the United Nations any Soviet military intervention in the Middle East.

Then November 29, we reaffirmed the support of the Baghdad Pact and warned that a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.

Now, in view of our action in the case of South Korea, do you seriously believe, in view of this long record of interest, our intimate ties with Iran through military assistance, that there is any doubt in the mind of the Soviet Union that the United States would not regard an intervention by them as a direct threat to our security and take military action?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I don't claim to be able to read their minds, but I think that unless and until the Congress has spoken as well as the President, that they might very well entertain such doubts.

And I know this, Senator, that the people of Iran certainly feel those doubts.

WOULD THIS RESOLUTION ACCENTUATE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST?

Senator KENNEDY. Well now, moving away from that, then the second danger, of course, is this mentioned in the bill, which is a nation controlled by international communism.

I understand you to say there was no nation which you considered today was so dominated.

Secretary DULLES. No nation—

Senator KENNEDY. In the Middle East.

Secretary DULLES. No nation in the Middle East; yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. One of the reasons we did not join the Baghdad Pact was, of course, the feeling of the Egyptians and Syrians and others that it would divide the Middle East; that is what you said; was it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir, and the Saudis, too.

Senator KENNEDY. Accepting the fact that we have made it fairly clear to the Soviet Union that if they marched in we would take action, either under the United Nations or other commitments we may have had in the Middle East; recognizing that, as of today, international communism is not in control of any country in the Middle East; and recognizing that the United States and the prestige of the United States up to recently had gone up as a result of our action in the United Nations in October, do you feel that the situation was so desperate, that the Soviet Union was so ignorant of our real intentions in regard to the Middle East, that a proposal such as this, which is bound to split countries of the Middle East to some degree, is more beneficial than it will be harmful in securing the Middle East from communism?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. I do not think that this proposal is going to split the area. I think it is going to be a means of drawing the area together.

Now, some of the other measures we talked about, to which you referred, such as joining the Baghdad Pact, would have had that effect. I do not think this resolution—and its implementation may lead to the disclosure of differences which already exist—I do not think it will accentuate any differences.

I think, on the contrary, it will lead certainly in the long run to ironing out those differences.

IRAQ'S GREATEST DANGER

Senator KENNEDY. Do you think the greatest danger to Iraq is through direct military conquest by a Communist-controlled country in the Middle East, of which you say today there is none; or is it from propaganda, from the Egyptians and others, to the effect that the Iraqis are tools of the West and tools of imperialism and colonialism?

Secretary DULLES. I think the greatest danger to Iraq at the present time is Communist activities which are being carried out under the cover of the propaganda to which you refer.

Senator KENNEDY. Does not this proposal exacerbate that? Or do you think it assists the Iraqis, when it is directed against them in addition to the economic and military phases, and we are already carrying out activities in those two fields? It is the guaranty that is going to cause the great difficulty, it would seem to me, considering the fact there are no Communist-controlled countries at this time.

PROBABLE REACTIONS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA

Do you not think that we are contributing to the danger of Iraq from the Communists rather than aiding them?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. And I can assure you that is not the opinion of the Government of Iraq, who are strongly supporting the program outlined by this resolution.

Senator KENNEDY. To be more specific on this point, if Syria invaded Iraq, if the Syrians are not now under the control of the Communists, would there not have to be a substantial change in the Middle East before this resolution could come into play to be of assistance to the Iraqis? Is there not far more danger to Iraq internally, in an association with us of this nature, than there is danger that Syria or another enemy will attack them militarily?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir, I do not think there is any danger to them whatsoever in negotiating with us. They do feel that their arrangements with the United Kingdom may in some respects temporarily be a liability, but they do not feel action under this resolution would be a liability whatever.

Senator KENNEDY. I have just one more question.

What do you expect Mr. Nasser's reaction and Syria's reaction will be if the United States is successful in securing closer ties with some of these countries in the Middle East, particularly those not now in the Baghdad Pact?

Do you feel it will have the reaction of moving closer to the Soviet Union, or what is your feeling on that?

Secretary DULLES. I think it is very difficult to predict. It may move them closer to the Soviet Union. It may also move them closer to us.

There is one aspect of this thing I would like to mention, if I might, which is the incentive to the Soviet Union to try to take over a government such as that of Syria. I would rather call it country X.

Now, if they feel that, having gotten control of country X, they can then use that as a spearhead for attacks upon non-Communist neighbors, that creates a very considerable incentive to try to take it over.

Senator KENNEDY. You mean military attacks?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

If, however, they realize that it is not a practical possibility because of this resolution, then their incentive to try to take over a country X is very much reduced. Country X is much safer than it would be otherwise.

Senator KENNEDY. That is, if we accept your thesis that the great danger is the danger of military aggression rather than subversion.

Secretary DULLES. Well, if there was a possibility of aggression through a stooge government, then I think that possibility would be eagerly availed of by the Soviet Union, just as they used the Government of North Korea as the instrument of aggression against the Republic of Korea.

Now, if you make clear that if they should get control of country X they would not be able to use that effectively to attack its neighbors, overthrow their government, and in that way gradually get control of the whole area, then I think we have excluded one possibility of the Soviet Union gaining control of the area.

Senator KENNEDY. Of course, the question really is which you determine is the greatest danger to the integrity of these countries involved: the danger of military aggression, which the Soviet Union has not used except in the case of Korea, or the danger of seizure internally, using internal groups.

WILL RESOLUTION RESULT IN SOME MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES DRAWING CLOSER TO RUSSIA?

One more question: Is it not a fact that Colonel Nasser, who you have indicated here you do not feel is a Communist or Communist-dominated, moved closer to the Soviet Union and received arms as a result of the United States failure to give him arms after the Gaza raid in the spring of 1955? As a result of the acceptance of this proposal by some of the Middle Eastern countries, is it not possible that Colonel Nasser, even if he does not desire to do so, may feel himself driven to engage in closer ties with the Soviet Union, in order to maintain his military position in relationship, not only to Israel, but to other Arab countries who are becoming more closely tied with the United States? Would this not be the case not only with Egypt but also Syria, to name two, both of which are vital to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as well as to the West?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think that this resolution will appreciably affect their moving in that direction. I think that that might come about through other causes, but I doubt very much if this resolution would be a material factor in that.

Senator KENNEDY. If we are successful in developing closer ties with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, obviously they are going to feel themselves more isolated. Is it not likely, as they did in the case after we refused them arms, that they will feel that the Soviet Union is their only friend? They obviously have had friendly feelings toward the Russians since October.

Is this not increasing the dangers which caused us to hold back from joining the Baghdad Pact? Is this not occurring at a time when the situation was developing rather favorably toward us in many elements?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think so, Senator.

One of the factors which led us to make this recommendation, the President to make in his address, was the very urgent, almost desperate, plea which we received from a number of countries in the area that, unless we were prepared to do something like this, they saw no hope of staving off a rather early collapse and takeover by international communism, and we evaluated those—

DANGER FROM EXTERNAL AGGRESSION OR INTERNAL WEAKNESS

Senator KENNEDY. Since you have stated that none of these countries was under the control of international communism, they could not have suggested that the great danger to them was an outright aggression against them.

Was not their danger more internal than external, danger that there would be a seizure of power as happened in Egypt?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think you can make any absolute, clear-cut distinction between the danger from external aggression and the internal weakness, because it is a fact that countries which are subject to a great and overwhelming power from without, against which they see no defense, that then their internal defenses tend to crumble, the people who are friendly to freedom become weaker, less courageous, less daring; the Communists within the country become more bold. And I believe that Europe might well have succumbed to Communist influence if over these past 10 years it had felt defenseless against Soviet armed attack.

Now, you may say there never was any real danger that there would be Soviet armed attack against Western Europe. Perhaps so. Perhaps there was no such danger. But the people who feel naked and exposed to such danger are far more vulnerable to being taken over from the inside.

And we ourselves would not feel comfortable if we did not have the Armed Forces of the United States to protect and defend us, and you can imagine how much weaker countries who are closer to the Soviet Union, how they feel when they are defenseless against this mighty power which they know will be used unscrupulously, and the sense of weakness that exists under those conditions is something which contributes very greatly to the ability of the Communists to take over from inside.

So I do not think you can make a clear-cut distinction between the danger from external attack and the danger from internal subversion, because the danger of internal subversion becomes very much greater if there is danger, exposure to external attack.

Senator KENNEDY. It is difficult for us in a public session to develop an appreciation of your feelings as to how strong the feeling in the Middle East was that such a resolution was essential. I would agree if there was a widespread, genuine desire for a closer tie with the United States, that the argument is very strong for it, and I would assume that probably you would expand on that.

EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY

I just want to ask one more question. Do you feel Congress is an equal partner in the formulation of foreign policy with the President, if not in its implementation and administration?

Secretary DULLES. Not in relation to what is called oftentimes the current conduct of foreign affairs, and I think that the President has initiative. When it comes to major grave decisions which may involve war or peace, there should be certainly a very close cooperation and partnership between the President and the Congress, because

nowadays these great efforts, fiscal or military, cannot be pursued without the good will and support and confidence of the Congress.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you think it would be a disaster for the United States Congress to reject this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir, an unmitigated disaster.

Senator KENNEDY. Has Congress any alternative but to accept this resolution, even if we feel the resolution were a mistake and its adoption at this time were a mistake, in view of the fact that the prestige—

Secretary DULLES. Well, you say any other course. I do not think that—of course it has legally. You are not talking about legally now?

Senator KENNEDY. The question is whether greater damage would be done to the United States by rejecting this resolution and therefore repudiating the President's leadership, or whether we are not obliged, even if we think it is wrong, to accept it because the President's prestige or the United States' prestige is so involved.

EXECUTIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS

The question is, to be more specific, were any members of the Congress, the Foreign Affairs Committee or Armed Services Committee, consulted prior to the release of this proposal? If they were not consulted, then actually do we have any alternative, or do we, in this particular regard, have any contribution to make to the development of a policy in this area?

Secretary DULLES. They were consulted to this extent, Senator, that the general policy of the United States and the views of Congress in relation to it are, I think, very well known. There has been frequent consultation about that between the executive branch of Government and the congressional leaders.

As I pointed out, the basic policy that is enunciated here is policy which has been enunciated many times by Congress with great unanimity in relation to other situation. There was, therefore, nothing new about this as there was, for example, when President Truman made his message about the Greek-Turkey policy. That was proposing something which was really new, and about which there had been no particular consultation between the President and the Congress.

This does not involve anything other than applying to a new situation a basic policy which the Congress has applied many times, and which we had good reason to believe they still adhered to.

Therefore, I would think that in that sense, there has been a full consultation. Now, that applies to the military aspect of the matter, and I have not heard anybody raise any serious question as to the desirability of making our position clear.

Some people think it is clear already, so it doesn't need to be repeated. Some people think the President can do it alone. But as far as making our position clear in one way or another, there seems to be very little objection to that.

On the economic side, as I say, we are not asking at the present time for any new money. All we are suggesting is, in view of the recent developments which could not have been foreseen, and the new intensity of the struggle going on there, that of the presently available funds, about 25 percent should be given a greater flexibility.

So I do not think that there was any question of the President confronting the Congress with anything which was new or startling or putting them in a particularly difficult position.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

CONGRESS' DUTY OF APPRAISAL

Chairman GREEN. Senator Ervin?

Senator ERVIN. As I construe your last remarks, you say it is the duty of Congress to pass this resolution even though Congress may come to the conclusion that, as a result of the hearing, such action is both militarily and economically unwise.

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think the Congress would have to appraise the overall consequences of failure to pass some such resolution. If the Congress felt on net balance that the international position of the United States would gain by not passing the resolution, naturally they would be free, it would be their duty, not to pass it.

My own estimate is that very clearly that would gravely damage the position of the United States, but that is merely my estimate, and I am not now a Member of the Senate.

MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES REQUESTING ACTION

Senator ERVIN. You spoke of some countries which have come to you and made a desperate plea for action of this kind. Are you at liberty to divulge the identity of those countries in this hearing?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the ones that I can mention are the northern countries, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan.

BAGHDAD PACT

Senator ERVIN. Pakistan and Persia—how many countries are parties to the Baghdad Pact?

Secretary DULLES. Five.

Senator ERVIN. Five. Which are those countries?

Secretary DULLES. The four I mentioned, and the United Kingdom.

Senator ERVIN. Which are they?

Secretary DULLES. Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan.

Senator ERVIN. In other words, of the entire border, the Baghdad Pact has been signed by all of the nations on the border of Soviet Russia, has it not?

Secretary DULLES. These four have signed it.

Senator ERVIN. And what does the Baghdad Pact obligate the signatories to do?

Secretary DULLES. To cooperate in their mutual defense. I do not have the precise language here, but that is the gist of it.

Senator ERVIN. It is a mutual assistance pact in the case of an attack?

Secretary DULLES. It is a collective security arrangement.

Senator ERVIN. Well, if the United States were to join the Baghdad Pact, you are sure of that aid in the event of armed invasion by Russia in this area of Turkey and Pakistan, of the military assistance of Iran and Iraq and Pakistan and Turkey and the United Kingdom; are you not?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the pact members are committed in any event, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. Well, you are not assured of that in the case of the Middle Eastern countries.

Secretary DULLES. You mean if some of the nonmember countries are attacked?

Senator ERVIN. That is right. In other words, with reference to Syria or with reference to Jordan or with reference to Israel or with reference to Egypt or Yemen, any of these other Middle East countries.

Secretary DULLES. No; the pact does not cover that.

Senator ERVIN. So we do have a way in which we could get at least 5 allies to assist us with military aid in that area by joining the Baghdad Pact; is that not correct?

Secretary DULLES. No. If we joined the Baghdad Pact, it would not operate in any way to protect these other countries that you mentioned.

Senator ERVIN. I know, but it would operate to give us military assistance in protecting all of the countries which lie along the border of Soviet Russia.

Secretary DULLES. We already have that. They are already committed to that.

Senator ERVIN. Yes. But we are not.

Secretary DULLES. No; we are not committed to it.

Senator ERVIN. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. But they are.

Senator ERVIN. Now, would it not give a sense of security to Iran and Iraq and Pakistan and Turkey for us to join the Baghdad Pact?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, it would, but it would also do some other things.

Senator ERVIN. Well, I know. I realize we are decent people. In other words, we do not join the Baghdad Pact where we would have at least 4 or 5 allies up next to the border of Soviet Russia, for fear that we might offend somebody who is not willing to stand with the free world in Armageddon; is that not the reason?

Secretary DULLES. Whether or not we join the Baghdad Pact, the Baghdad countries are now obligated to cooperate in their mutual defense.

Senator ERVIN. But they would not—yes, a Soviet attack, but not an attack by a Soviet satellite farther down in the Middle East.

Secretary DULLES. They are obligated to cooperate only for their own defense.

Senator ERVIN. I am not talking about us joining now. Are any of these countries obligated to come to the assistance of Israel, for example, if it were attacked by Syria, aided and abetted by Soviet Russia?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; and if we joined the pact, that would be exactly the same situation.

Senator ERVIN. I know it. But the point I am making is that the reason you do not recommend that the Senate should ratify the Baghdad Pact and thereby acquire as allies all of the nations bordering on the boundaries of Russia, is because you are afraid we are going to offend some of the other countries in the Middle East, which have not taken a stand on the side of the free world. Is that not so?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. If that is not the reason you do not recommend that we ratify the Baghdad Pact, please tell me what it is.

Secretary DULLES. It is because, Senator, those countries are already obligated to cooperate in their mutual defense and that obligation stands whether or not we join the pact. We would have it. They would be our allies, assuming they live up to the pact, which we must assume.

Senator ERVIN. If they are attacked, they would be our allies.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

DEFENSE OF IRAN

Senator ERVIN. But are we obligated under a mutual security pact which obligates us to go to the defense of Iran in the event it is attacked by Russia?

Secretary DULLES. I beg your pardon, I did not get the question.

Senator ERVIN. Does the United States have any treaty or agreement by which it is obligated to go to the assistance of Iran in the event Iran is invaded by Soviet forces?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator ERVIN. Well, would it not give a sense of security to Iran for us to make that kind of an agreement with it, either by joining the Baghdad Pact or by making a separate agreement?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the point I am trying to make—

Senator ERVIN. Would it not? I ask you a simple question which I think you can answer "yes" or "no," although you are not compelled to do so.

Secretary DULLES. Would you ask the question again, sir?

Senator ERVIN. My question is this: Would it not give a sense of security to Iran if we were to enter into an agreement with it, either by ratifying the Baghdad Pact or by entering into a separate agreement that we would go to its assistance in case of its invasion by Soviet Russia?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. Well, why do we not do it?

Secretary DULLES. If I understood your question right, you said either by joining the pact or in some other way. This resolution is the way to do it.

Senator ERVIN. I am asking you why we do not do that.

Secretary DULLES. We are—under this resolution we would do it.

Senator ERVIN. I am not talking about the resolution. You want to take into the resolution a whole lot of other matters which you say are very troublesome. I want to know why we do not take and enter into a mutual assistance pact with Iran, which is on the border of Russia, and thereby give Iran a sense of security that we will come to aid them in the event of invasion by the armed forces of Russia.

Secretary DULLES. That would solve the problem of Iran, but it wouldn't solve any other problems.

Senator ERVIN. It would solve the problem, though, that Soviet Russia could not make an armed attack on any part of the Middle East without invading either Turkey or Iran or Pakistan; would it not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir, because they can fly.

Senator ERVIN. Well, they can fly, yes, sir, but they would have to fly over those countries.

Secretary DULLES. And they also have boats.

Senator ERVIN. Yes, sir. But they would have to bring their boats down over an ocean where our Navy is stationed, would they not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And they would have to bring them through the Bosphorus, where Turkey is.

Secretary DULLES. An agreement with Iran would not cover in any sense the problem of what to do if the fleet comes through the Bosphorus to attack Egypt or Syria.

QUESTION OF JOINING THE BAGHDAD PACT

Senator ERVIN. And also, if we were bound by the Baghdad Pact, we would be permitted to put our Air Forces in those countries to attack the Russians when they did the flying, would we not?

Secretary DULLES. No. There is nothing in the pact which gives that right.

Senator ERVIN. Well, do you not guess they would give it to us if they had countries attacking them? Do you have any misapprehension as to whether Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan would give us permission to station our Air Forces in that area in the event they were attacked by Russia?

Secretary DULLES. I think their willingness to do that would be quite independent of whether or not we joined the pact.

Senator ERVIN. That is exactly what I am talking about.

Secretary DULLES. We do not have to join the pact to get that, you see.

Senator ERVIN. So I come back to my original question, Mr. Secretary, and I think it is also a very simple question: The reason we do not join the Baghdad Pact and line ourselves up with the countries which have already manifested their willingness to stand by the free world at any possible Armageddon with Russia, is because we are afraid that we will anger or irritate some other countries in the Middle East which have not been willing to stand up beside the free world; is that not true?

ARAB POLITICS

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. We have announced in no uncertain terms our support for the Baghdad Pact countries. It is true that we do not want to become involved in Arab politics, which the Baghdad Pact is also involved in.

Senator ERVIN. Absolutely. And that is what you will get us embroiled in under this resolution.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. It just keeps us out of being embroiled in it.

Senator ERVIN. You were asked a number of times what expenditures you proposed to make of the \$200 million in the event—or in the release from restrictions, and you suggested only one, and that was this: You suggested it might partly be used, in part, to bolster the security forces of each individual nation of the Middle East, of the individual nations of the Middle East, so that their government might

not be overturned by internal forces; did you not? Did you not state that, make that suggestion?

Secretary DULLES. I said one of the purposes would be to sustain the internal security forces of these countries; yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. So that their governments could be stabilized against internal forces; did you not use those terms?

Secretary DULLES. I think so; yes.

Senator ERVIN. Yes.

So that would put us having Uncle Sam sticking his nose in all of the nations of the Middle East in order to maintain the status quo; would it not? And if that would not mess us up in Arab politics, what would it do?

Secretary DULLES. I think that to maintain a government which is strong enough not to be overthrown by subversion is not to become involved in Arab politics.

Senator ERVIN. Well, it certainly is taking the side of that government against the side of the people of that country which do not want that government; is it not?

MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

Secretary DULLES. I think to maintain security forces, to maintain law and order in the country, is something which is entirely appropriate for us to assist in. We are doing that all around the world.

Senator ERVIN. You could do that by strengthening the internal forces, that is, the security forces, of those nations, so that they could prevent their own people from overthrowing those governments; could you not?

Secretary DULLES. I do not believe that the kind of internal security forces we are trying to build up here would be used against the general will of the people unless it is stirred up and organized by international communism. That is the great danger, and if that is the purpose of it, then we want to have forces to resist them.

Senator ERVIN. Well, still, Mr. Secretary, you tell me that you do not think you are interfering with the politics of a country, that the United States would be interfering in the politics of a country and the Arab politics, if it happened to be an Arab country, if it used money which belonged to the taxpayers of the United States to strengthen the security forces of those countries so they could prevent the people of those countries from overthrowing the government? You do not think that would be any involvement in Arab politics if it happened to be an Arab country where that was done?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. Let me illustrate.

You have got pretty substantial security forces in Egypt. Those did not prevent the change of the Government of Egypt from Naguib to Nasser.

Senator ERVIN. Well, that is beside the point.

You are not proposing, are you, to go in there and use some of this aid to strengthen Nasser's internal forces, his internal security forces, are you? I say you do not propose to take some of this money, if this restriction is taken off, to go into Egypt to strengthen the security forces of Nasser; do you?

Secretary DULLES. We have no present plans to do that; no.

Senator ERVIN. Well, you could make it if we pass this resolution; you could do it tomorrow, could you not?

Secretary DULLES. You could do it tomorrow whether or not you pass this resolution.

Senator ERVIN. Well, you are not at liberty to give me an assurance that the American taxpayers will not be supporting the Nasser government within a few months if we pass this resolution in its present form; are you?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I cannot give you any assurances as to what will be done.

REQUEST FOR FLEXIBILITY IN USE OF ADDITIONAL \$200 MILLION

Senator ERVIN. In other words, if we pass this resolution in its present form, it is quite possible that some of the money which you will get, the \$200 million, will be used to assist in the support of the Nasser government in Egypt; is that not possible?

Secretary DULLES. If you are talking about possibilities, it is conceivable, yes; but let me make clear, Senator, that already there has been authorized and appropriated to the use of the President \$750 million, any part of which can be used for that purpose. And passing this resolution does not alter that situation by one iota.

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Secretary, that is what puzzles me.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. When you have all of that money that you can devote to such purposes, why do you want us to untie the strings of a paltry \$250 million more? That is one thing which has puzzled me.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, I have said here so many times that it really is wearisome, that we are not asking for \$200 million more.

Senator ERVIN. I understand that. I understand that. I have heard that about 40 or 50 times.

Secretary DULLES. And you just said yourself, "Why do you want \$200 million more?"

Senator ERVIN. No, I did not ask you about \$200 million more. I asked you, if you had that much money—just wait a minute. I asked you, if you had that much money that you can devote to those purposes, why you were asking us to take the strings off that \$200 million more, making \$200 million more available to be spent by you as one who was footloose and fancy free?

In other words, you have got the money already that you can use for these purposes, without any legislation, have you not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, but they can be used more usefully if we spend them under freedom from some of the present restrictions.

Senator ERVIN. For example, under section 201 of the Mutual Assistance Act, you have \$250 million that you can spend for assistance—I quote—

for assistance, designed to promote the economic development of free Asia, the Middle East, and Africa based on self-help and mutual cooperation of friendly nations, and to maintain economic and political stability in those areas.

That is so, is it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; and you have got—

Senator ERVIN. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. Excuse me. Could I answer on that?

Senator ERVIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary DULLES. Because it enables me to illustrate just exactly what we had in mind.

Senator ERVIN. I understood you—excuse me just a moment. I understood your primary answer was yes, and you want to explain, or was that not your primary answer?

Secretary DULLES. I wanted to explain the status of that \$250 million.

Senator ERVIN. Let me understand what your answer is, whether it is "Yes" or "No," and then you can explain. That is the way we used to do it in the court house.

Chairman GREEN. It has already been ruled here a number of times that we cannot require a witness to say "Yes" or "No."

Senator ERVIN. No, sir. I was just inquiring, Mr. Chairman, whether that was his answer. I am not asking him to answer "Yes" or "No." I am just asking him whether that was his answer.

Secretary DULLES. If there was what?

Senator ERVIN. If your answer was "Yes" to that question.

Secretary DULLES. I have forgotten the question now.

Senator ERVIN. Well, I asked you, in brief, if you did not have under section 201 of the Mutual Assistance Act \$250 million that you could use for any of these purposes for which you want \$200 million additional unleashed.

Secretary DULLES. The answer to that is "No."

Senator ERVIN. No.

All right; go ahead and explain that.

Secretary DULLES. Now may I explain why the answer is "No"?

Senator ERVIN. No. You said you wanted to give some explanation.

Secretary DULLES. Yes; I do.

Senator ERVIN. All right.

Secretary DULLES. We already have negotiations for the use of that fund in 4 countries, 2 of which are not within the Middle East area, but the conclusion of these negotiations will not probably take place as early as the 30th of April.

If that does not happen, if that is not concluded until after the 30th of April, then there would be no further part of that fund that could be available for use during the balance of the fiscal year.

Senator ERVIN. But it is not obligated at the present time.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; that is the whole point. If it were obligated at the present time, then that would meet, to some extent, at least, the 80-percent requirement, and then we would have more money available.

Now, in order to obligate it by the 30th of April, you would have to rush the negotiations, you might have to make improvident commitments, and we think we should have more time to do some of this business and to get the most value for the taxpayer.

Senator ERVIN. Well, you would be at perfect liberty, under the law as it now stands, to use that money up until the 30th of April for any emergency conditions in the Middle East, would you not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; and that leaves us uncovered to meet emergency situations between the 30th of April and the 30th of June.

ARAB POLITICS AND THE BAGHDAD PACT

Senator ERVIN. Yes, sir. I thought it was so urgent that—well, let me ask you another question.

I believe you admitted at length that the reason you did not ratify the Baghdad Pact or you do not favor our ratifying it was because of Arab politics in other sections of the Middle East.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Now, is that not our main trouble in the Middle East now, that we have tried to appease Arab politicians?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

REMOVAL OF BRITISH TROOPS FROM SUEZ CANAL AREA

Senator ERVIN. Well, I will ask you if in 1954, England did not have 85,000 troops stationed in the Suez Canal area, keeping guard over the Suez Canal, and assuring that it would be used as a waterway for all the vessels of the earth—except Israel, I did not mean that.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And the English entered into an agreement to remove those troops from Egypt largely at the insistence of the United States, did they not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Well, did not the State Department keep reminding the English that it would be desirable for them to move their troops because of the difficulty of maintaining a base in a country against the desires of that country?

Secretary DULLES. When we were consulted by the British, we indicated that in our opinion a base was not very much use if it was in hostile territory.

Senator ERVIN. Yes.

Well, in other words, the British consulted you, and you told them you thought it would be a good thing for them to get those soldiers out of the Suez Canal area, did you not? Is that not so?

Secretary DULLES. I didn't hear you.

Senator ERVIN. I say when you were consulted on that proposition by the British, you told the British that you thought it would be a good thing for the British to remove those troops from the Suez Canal area?

Secretary DULLES. We said that we doubted the situation was of much value under the then conditions, where the troops were being harassed, attacked, assassinated and, indeed, I recall that they had 80,000 troops there in the latter part of 1952, and they were in sufficient danger that they had to move 8,000 more troops in to protect the 80,000 that were there, during the spring of 1953.

Senator ERVIN. Well, did you not state to the British, in substance, when you were consulted by them, that you thought it would be a good thing for the British to move those troops out of the Suez area?

Secretary DULLES. No, we never went that far.

Senator ERVIN. Well, did you do it in substance?

Secretary DULLES. We told them in substance what I have already said.

Senator ERVIN. And that was that you did not think they could very well maintain a base in Egypt with a country as hostile as it was?

Secretary DULLES. That what?

Senator ERVIN. You told them that you did not think it was very wise for them to undertake to maintain that base in Egypt when the Egyptians were as hostile as they were to the British?

Secretary DULLES. We said that, in substance; yes.

Senator ERVIN. Well, that is what I thought.

SEIZURE OF SUEZ CANAL

Now, it was 13 days after the last contingents of those British troops moved until Nasser seized the Suez Canal; was it not?

Secretary DULLES. Well, there some of those elements that were still at the base after the seizure of the canal. I do not recall just what numbers there were. Some of them were technicians, but there were at least several hundred of them there.

Senator ERVIN. Well, the British moved out of the Suez in order to appease the Egyptians?

Secretary DULLES. In order to appease them?

Senator ERVIN. Or at least to make them happy.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Well, why were they moved out?

Secretary DULLES. Because it was a military liability in the strip.

Senator ERVIN. So it is a military liability to have troops there?

Secretary DULLES. It is a military liability to have troops in hostile territory. We always take the position, as far as the United States is concerned, that we would not try to keep bases in countries where the population was hostile, because we consider that a military liability rather than an asset.

Senator ERVIN. Well, there is one thing certain, as far as the Suez Canal is concerned, it stayed open as long as the troops were there, for the commerce of the world, with the exception of Israel.

Secretary DULLES. That is true, but I do not know if there is any necessary connection between the two. The canal stayed open until the British made an attack upon Egypt.

Senator ERVIN. But you say it is not a fair inference for me to draw that those troops were removed from the Suez Canal to appease the Egyptians?

Secretary DULLES. That is not a fair inference; no, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Well, anyway, as a result of decisions, the Suez Canal is in a situation where we had to go into the United Nations and vote with Soviet Russia against our allies and in favor of Colonel Nasser; did we not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Well, we did do that; did we not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. We voted with Soviet Russia, did we not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. The Soviet Union voted with us, which is quite a different matter.

Senator ERVIN. That is what I would call a difference without a distinction.

Secretary DULLES. Well, if the United States introduces a resolution and it is a United States resolution, and if perchance the Soviet Union votes for it, we cannot stop them, but we did not support the Soviet Union.

Senator ERVIN. Anyway, as a result of whoever caused anything, as a result of that the prestige of our two principal allies was largely destroyed, and Colonel Nasser was made a hero of the Arabs, was he not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. It did not have that result?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Either one of them?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. It did not affect the standing of either the British or the French in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. Well, now you are asking another question. The answer is "yes; it did affect the standing."

Senator ERVIN. Well, it impaired their prestige; if you want to split hairs on words, you would concede that, would you not?

Secretary DULLES. It impaired it in some areas; yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Yes, sir.

And it also tended to increase the stature of Colonel Nasser among the Arabs; did it not?

Secretary DULLES. I doubt that very much.

Senator ERVIN. Well now, Mr. Secretary, while I may be sort of vigorous in my examination, I can assure you that I do not intend to do you any injury personally or politically, but I am trying to get information so as to enable me to vote in an intelligent manner on this.

PURPOSES OF RESOLUTION

Am I right in drawing the inference that this resolution is now proposed for the purpose, the primary purpose, of preventing an armed invasion of the Middle East by the Soviet forces themselves?

Secretary DULLES. That is one of its purposes. Its purpose is also to prevent the area being taken over by subversion.

Senator ERVIN. Yes, sir.

Now, excluding the provision insofar as it is directed against an actual armed attack by Soviet Russia, this resolution grants to the President, so far as Congress is empowered under the Constitution to do so, carte blanche authority for the President to commit the Armed Forces of the United States to combat at some indefinite time in the future, at some undesignated point in the Middle East, against some undetermined enemy; is that not so?

Secretary DULLES. The enemy is determined.

Senator ERVIN. Who is the enemy?

Secretary DULLES. International communism.

Senator ERVIN. But you say that none of the countries in the Middle East now is controlled by international communism.

Secretary DULLES. Not now, no.

Senator ERVIN. But it would leave that question to be determined solely by the President sometime in the future; would it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

WESTERN EUROPE'S DEPENDENCY ON MIDDLE EAST OIL

Senator ERVIN. Are there not 15 nations of Europe outside the Iron Curtain which are primarily dependent upon this oil from the Middle East, the continued flow of the oil, for their economic welfare and their military strength?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And the combined populations of those 15 countries exceed that of the United States, do they not?

Secretary DULLES. I believe so; yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And this resolution provides, in substance, that the United States is going to assume the responsibility for taking the action suggested by the resolution, without ever having called upon any of those 15 nations to contribute a single man from their manpower or a single penny from their treasuries to the carrying out of the defense of the Middle East. Is that not so?

Secretary DULLES. Well, as I pointed out, the United Kingdom has obligations of various kinds in the area.

Senator ERVIN. Yes, sir. But they would be under no direct obligation under this resolution; their obligation would be to the Baghdad Pact or some other countries.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And you say it would be unwise for us to make any effort before we pass this resolution to attempt to secure a pledge from any of these 15 other nations to assist us in the task which this resolution imposes upon us?

Secretary DULLES. I think that would be unwise.

MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES' PLEA FOR PROMISE OF ASSISTANCE

Senator ERVIN. One other question. I just want to understand the full implications of this resolution.

You said that these nations came to you with a desperate plea; and I presume, would I be very far wrong in assuming, that is a desperate plea, the same kind of desperate plea I had to make to my banker the other day when I figured up my income tax from the last year and I found out I had not paid all that was due? It was financial assistance; was it not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Was it military assistance primarily?

Secretary DULLES. It was primarily to know that the United States would help to defend them if they were attacked by Soviet Russia.

REQUEST FOR RELEASE OF RESTRICTIONS ON \$200 MILLION

Senator ERVIN. Now, Mr. Secretary, you use the argument here that to justify the release of the \$200 million from restrictions, that you have already appropriated that money and it is making no additional calls for no additional outlays during this fiscal year.

Now, if we vote this money that way, next year will you not say, "Well, you have already embarked upon this policy by your vote last year, and you have laid the foundations for the bridge; therefore, you have got to go ahead and build the bridge?"

Secretary DULLES. I do not know what we will say at that time, Senator. I hope we will say whatever needs to be said for the security of the United States.

Senator ERVIN. Well, the chances are you will make that argument, will you not?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know.

Senator ERVIN. In other words, if we take and give you the \$200 million to spend in a manner that is fancy free, in a sense, next year the President has already announced he wants at least \$200 million more for each of the next 2 fiscal years, has he not?

Secretary DULLES. He what?

Senator ERVIN. The President announced in his speech that he would want \$200 million more of the same kind of unfettered funds for the 2 following fiscal years, did he not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And so next fiscal, if we vote it this time, next fiscal year we will be charged with having—you will say we will have to vote for it again because "you established the policy," will you not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Well now, the truth of it is, Mr. Secretary, if we vote this resolution, with the last clause in it, clause 3, about the economic aid, it will be implied from it, will it not, that the United States is pledging itself to continue to grant economic aid to the Middle East to the last echo of Gabriel's horn before it becomes silent?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Well, the implication would be that we will be obligating ourselves to continue economic aid far into the future; will we not?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. There would be no implication at all?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Well, Mr. Secretary, if that is true, why did you tell me the other day when just about three of us were left, that one of the reasons you wanted clause 3 in there was so that it would give assurance to the Arabs, or rather, to the Middle East—you did not restrict it to Arabs—to the Middle East that we were concerned about their economic plight?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, I hope we always will be concerned about their economic plight.

Senator ERVIN. Your construction of this resolution is that we will only say we are concerned about their economic plight for this fiscal year?

Secretary DULLES. Well, there is a difference, Senator, between this fiscal year and the year when Gabriel blows his horn, unless you have more information than I have.

Senator ERVIN. Well, as far as you can see at the present time, Mr. Secretary, are you not going to continue to urge the granting of \$750 million of aid to the Middle East until just about the time that Gabriel starts tooting on his horn?

Secretary DULLES. I doubt it very much.

Senator ERVIN. I believe in giving military aid to our friends and, frankly, I am not sold on this proposition of giving military aid to Communist nations in the hope they will not become more commu-

nistic, or on the proposition of paying neutralists to be neutral. So I will vote for any kind of economic aid for our friends.

But I will ask you if our economic aid does not cause us a terrible lot of difficulty with the people we are trying to help?

For example, to make it concrete, I read in yesterday afternoon's paper where one of the potentates of one of these countries, who, according to the press and the best information I can get, is receiving \$300 million in royalties, is en route to this country for the purpose of asking us to extend to him \$200 million of foreign aid.

Now, if he comes here and asks for that aid and we do not grant it, will he not become somewhat irritated?

Secretary DULLES. I don't know, Senator, what is in his mind.

IS THIS AN INVITATION TO REQUEST ECONOMIC AID?

Senator ERVIN. Well, is this not an open invitation, this resolution, the third section, an open invitation to the nations of the Middle East to come to Uncle Sam and say, "We want some aid, economic aid"?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think that this resolution is any more an invitation in that respect than the Mutual Security Act is.

Senator ERVIN. I agree with you perfectly. But I just wondered about pouring the oil, the Mideast oil, on troubled waters that the Soviets are fishing in.

If these nations come over here, one of them comes, and asks for \$200 million, and we do not grant it, you do not think he will be displeased, the potentate of that country?

Secretary DULLES. Senator, we have gotten pretty hardened to that kind of thing by now. Almost everybody asks—

Senator ERVIN. I know; maybe we are hardened, but is that potentate hardened to it?

Secretary DULLES. Almost everybody asks more than they get.

Senator ERVIN. This man, this potentate, according to the dispatch, had never received any economic aid before.

Now, do you think that he would be welcomed up here and turned down on this proposition?

Secretary DULLES. I think, Senator, that perhaps you are attaching too much importance to a speculative story.

Senator ERVIN. Well, I am asking a hypothetical question. I am asking you a question based on that story. Are any of these countries very much pleased when we refuse their request for foreign aid?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator ERVIN. And suppose this potentate comes over here and gets his \$200 million, or thereabouts, any substantial amount; then the other countries, if we do not give them in proportion will not like it, either, will they?

Secretary DULLES. I do not know.

Senator ERVIN. You don't?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator ERVIN. Don't you have some idea about it? It would seem like, with your long experience—

Secretary DULLES. I expect I could if I stopped to speculate about all sorts of things, but I have got too many things to do.

Senator ERVIN. Well, Mr. Secretary, the State Department has been dishing out a lot of foreign aid for a long time, and I think they ought to have had enough experience for you to give me an opinion on that.

I will ask you if it promotes international good will for us to invite countries to come here and ask for foreign aid and then give some of them more than others?

Secretary DULLES. We give so-called foreign aid, Senator, not to get good will, not to get gratitude, but to try to produce results which are in the interests of the United States.

Senator ERVIN. Well, those results which are in the interests of the United States include as a byproduct the good will of those nations, would it not?

Secretary DULLES. We hope so; yes.

Senator ERVIN. So that is one of the purposes, is it not, among others?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. I thought so.

Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you here on your patience, and say that I asked all of my questions in good faith. This is a serious matter with me. It is a serious matter with my constituents; because my constituents, like most other Americans, are paying pretty heavy taxes, and I think they are entitled to know something about what they are going to do with their money, and whether it is going to produce any good results.

But bypassing that, I want to compliment you on your patience.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you very much, Senator.

Chairman GREEN. Has our distinguished colleague finished?

Senator ERVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say this, though. I stayed here, I listened to everybody, I listened to every mumbling word, and being at the foot of the totem pole, I waited a long time.

Chairman GREEN. That concludes the going through this list of 30 members, half of the Armed Services Committee and half of the Foreign Relations Committee. Each one, each member, has had two opportunities to ask the Secretary of State such questions as he thought were appropriate. The Secretary has been here for 4 days now, and he will come again next Monday to take up again another series of questions with the members of these 2 committees in executive session.

I want to make one exception. I can't say all 30 have had 2 opportunities because there is a gentleman here who sought to have an opportunity this morning and was caught in a railway wreck and could not get here. I am going to ask, and give him the opportunity now to make up for that lost opportunity, if the Secretary is willing enough to stay a little longer so that he may have his second opportunity.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; I hope very much that I can be back by 5 o'clock, because I have got a very important engagement there.

YEMEN'S RECEIPT OF SOVIET ARMS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary. I will do my very best to get you out of here well before 5 o'clock.

I said the other day that I had read somewhere or heard somewhere that Yemen had received \$8½ million worth of Soviet arms from

Czechoslovakia. I ask your consent to include in the record a report by Dallas Townsend on the January 10 CBS World News Roundup.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

[8 a. m. World News Roundup, January 10, 1957]

A report from Cairo says the Arab Kingdom of Yemen has joined the parade of Arab nations getting arms from the Soviet bloc.

An official Yemenite source says his country made an arms deal with Czechoslovakia after western governments refused to supply the weapons. Another Yemenite source says the 8.5 (million) dollars worth of the Czech arms already have reached the little desert kingdom on the Arabian Peninsula's southwest coast. The Yemenites claim they need the new arms to oppose alleged British aggression and for internal security. The exact types of the weapons have not been disclosed.

The above was compiled and delivered by Dallas Townsend; apparently it was compiled from wire-service reports.

(Also see New York Times article, p. 110.)

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PROGRAM

I also want to acknowledge the receipt of the answers to the 16 questions and to express my thanks for the thoroughness with which they were answered. If I may, I wish to ask you, and Mr. Hollister as well, a few more questions on the economic aspects of this particular proposal.

Mr. Secretary, do I understand correctly that the executive branch will be prepared to supply a witness for an executive session who will be able to tell us in detail how the authority sought in section 3 of the resolution will be used?

Secretary DULLES. No; I think we can only give you a general indication of how it might be used but as I pointed out here earlier, Senator, the principal purpose of having that flexibility is to be able to meet contingencies which may arise which we cannot now foresee. The purpose is really to take that \$200 million out of what would otherwise be regular programming because we think that there may be, or we should be prepared to meet, emergency situations if we must that we do not now foresee because they are unpredictable. It would be very difficult for us to give other than hypothetical illustrations of the kind of situation that might arise and where we would want to use it.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, I take it then that in view of all the circumstances you will do the best you can at that time to give us as clear a picture as possible.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

AID FOR THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator MANSFIELD. Now the term "the general area of the Middle East" would include the Near East, parts of Asia and parts of Africa as those terms are used in the Mutual Security Act of 1954; would it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. In calculating the \$700 million figure which you say has already been appropriated for fiscal 1957 for use in the general area of the Middle East, it is necessary to decide which countries are included in that area; is it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. What is the total of the funds appropriated for prior fiscal years for use in the general area of the Middle East which remain unexpended? Maybe Mr. Hollister can answer that.

Secretary DULLES. I would have to ask Mr. Hollister to answer those questions.

Mr. HOLLISTER. I would have to get that. It is a new request; it is something I haven't available here.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would you be able to furnish an answer to the committee Monday morning?

Mr. HOLLISTER. What you want is the amount appropriated for those areas. Money is never appropriated for particular countries.

Senator MANSFIELD. No. This is the money for the general area of the Middle East. And there have been funds appropriated for "the general area of the Middle East."

Mr. HOLLISTER. It will all have to be, it will be specific countries. We can get that because that will be obligated money already. We can get that for you exactly.

Senator MANSFIELD. I am not as much interested in specific countries as I am in the funds expended in what has come to be described as the general area of the Middle East.

Mr. HOLLISTER. What you want is, as I understand it, funds which have been obligated for those countries which fall in this area but have not yet been expended.

Senator MANSFIELD. No. What I want is the amount of funds which have been expended in prior years, what is the situation this year, and how much of this year's, to get back to the latter part of your answer, remains unexpended?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Would you like the total figure for 10 years, ever since the end of the war that has been expended in this area?

Senator MANSFIELD. No, let's say for the last 3 years, including the obligated amounts which are not expended.

Mr. HOLLISTER. We can get that. I say you want the expended and not obligated in the last 3 years?

Senator MANSFIELD. Expended, obligated and what is left which is unobligated.

(The following two tables were subsequently submitted:)

Military assistance accomplishments,¹ by fiscal year, fiscal year 1954 to fiscal year 1956—For general area of Middle East

[In millions of dollars]

| Fiscal year | Accomplished during period | Balance of programs to be accomplished |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| 1954..... | 248.5 | 417.7 |
| 1955..... | 185.5 | 302.8 |
| 1956..... | 285.4 | 406.7 |
| Subtotal (1954-56)..... | 609.4 | 406.7 |
| 1957 (through September 1958)..... | 57.9 | 359.4 |
| Total..... | 757.3 | 359.4 |

¹ In general, represents deliveries of end items and services rendered.

NOTE.—Obligations by country not available.

Nonmilitary assistance program for the general area of the Middle East, obligations, expenditures, and unexpended for fiscal years, 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1957

[In millions of dollars]

| Fiscal year | Obligations | Expenditures | Unexpended |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|------------|
| 1954..... | \$269.7 | \$176.3 | \$242.7 |
| 1955..... | 330.4 | 248.0 | 331.1 |
| 1956..... | 325.5 | 260.4 | 306.2 |
| 1957 to date: | | | |
| 1957 programs..... | 120.6 | 23.8 | 330.6 |
| Prior-year funds Nov. 30, 1956..... | | 108.1 | 288.1 |

¹ Represents obligations through Dec. 31, 1956.

² Represents expenditures through Nov. 30, 1956.

³ Represents the unexpended balances as of June 30, 1956, of funds totaling \$343.4 million firmly or tentatively programmed to date in fiscal year 1957 for the general area of the Middle East.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is the executive branch prepared to give in detail partly in public session and partly in executive session on a country by country basis the proposed aid programs for countries in the general area of the Middle East for the balance of the current fiscal year?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Senator, we can give you what the congressional presentation was with respect to each one of those countries. We can give you what we consider now as firm commitments for those different countries, and we can give you what we think, what we call tentative commitments, those which we may have to expend for and we may not, depending upon how things develop.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, that's good enough. Could you give us that information by Monday, too?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I think so.

(The information supplied, all of which is of a classified nature, is on file at the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

SECTION 3 OF RESOLUTION NEEDED TO EXTEND OBLIGATION TIME

Senator MANSFIELD. Am I correct in saying that the gist of the replies to my questions of last week on the availability of funds for the Middle East was that although it is true that there is plenty of money available for the Middle East, it is doubtful whether enough of the money can be obligated prior to April 30, 1957, as is required by section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act of 1957?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes, sir.

OBLIGATION OF FUNDS

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it fair to say that although there is some possibility of having to disregard sections 105, 141, 142, 201, and 303 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended, the greatest need for section 3 of the resolution in your opinion is the need to be able to disregard section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1957?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is that correct, Mr. Secretary? That is the April 30 date.

Secretary DULLES. I am not sufficiently familiar with the other sections you quoted to identify them but I think I would agree with what Mr. Hollister said.

Senator MANSFIELD. Section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act of 1957 provides:

Except for the appropriation entitled special Presidential fund not more than 20 per centum of any appropriation item made available by this Act shall be obligated and/or reserved during the last two months of the fiscal year.

Was section 105 proposed by the executive branch?

Mr. HOLLISTER. No, sir. As a matter of fact, Senator, can I clear that up?

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. HOLLISTER. We asked, if you will remember, the executive branch asked that rather than be limited to the provision that not more than 20 percent may be obligated in the last 2 months, we asked specifically that we be permitted to extend 25 percent of our funds over on a 15 months' basis so they would not have to be obligated until the end of September. That was granted to us by this committee, that is the Foreign Relations Committee. It passed the Senate and the House and it was in the authorization bill. It was in the appropriation act that that was removed and instead of leaving the restriction the way it had been before, the restriction is now applied to every single one of our appropriation funds which makes it harder than ever to do our job. Prior to that time the 20 percent limitation was on the whole fund. Now that 20 percent limitation is applicable to each one of the appropriation funds.

Senator MANSFIELD. Does the executive branch believe that section 105 is a wise provision ordinarily?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I would not want to answer that without consulting others. I personally do not think so.

Senator MANSFIELD. Did you object to section 105 when the Appropriations Committee put it in?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. What would be an acceptable version of section 105 in the opinion of the executive branch? In other words, what do you think should be done?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I personally, Senator, would feel that the provisions that we requested last year were very wise and very sound. I think it was a great mistake in spending the large sums of money that we spend, and going into project activities the way we have to in many countries, that we be forced, knowing if we don't get our money allowed until after the close of the fiscal year, that we are forced within the next 8 or 9 months to do all the negotiations that has to be done with the different countries, and work things out in every way so that we can get our money obligated within that time limit. I think it is very much better for an orderly carrying on of these programs that we be given a longer time rather than lesser time in which to do our obligating.

Senator MANSFIELD. A 15 to 18 months' period?

Mr. HOLLISTER. For some of the funds, not for all of them. It would relieve pressure on the whole establishment, it would mean that at the time of year when we are trying to make our presentation to the Congress, and planning for the coming year, we are not compelled at times to use up our manpower in trying to force obligations through when we have activities in 50 or 60 countries, and the communication with different countries is so difficult and frankly the

business habits of some of the countries we deal with are somewhat slipshod.

SECTION 401 (B) FUNDS

Secretary MANSFIELD. Now, Mr. Hollister, is it correct that section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act does not apply to the \$100 million Presidential fund appropriated for section 401 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, that \$100 million may be obligated in May and June of this year.

Mr. HOLLISTER. It may be obligated any time; yes, sir. That is relieved from that limitation.

Senator MANSFIELD. How much of the \$100 million under section 401 (b), the Presidential funds have been used so far?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Well, that depends upon what you mean by used, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. How much has been obligated?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Practically none of it has been obligated. However, the President has authorized the use of \$37.8 million for various purposes.

Senator MANSFIELD. How much has been reserved?

Mr. HOLLISTER. We don't use the term reserved the way they do in the military appropriation. In order to use that fund at all, the President makes a determination and those determinations are prepared in my office and approved by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Budget and they go to the President, and then they come back and we consider that as a setting aside of that money even though it may not as yet be obligated.

Now no one has raised the question yet as to whether a Presidential determination could be revoked but I see no reason why it could not be. The money is not obligated until some kind of a contract is made with some country or some organization to use that money.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is there any program for the future?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Most of that money we have our eyes on in some way or another. Now that does not mean that we could not put aside some of those things that we are talking about and use this money in an emergency in the Middle East. But as I think the Senator knows, we present our program as well as we can see it. The committees look it over, the Congress finally passes a bill, and as we look at it when the money is finally appropriated we are pretty tightly programmed. There is not much spare.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it true that section 401 (b) funds could be saved by using funds from outside section 401 (b) under the authority of section 401 (a) ?

Mr. HOLLISTER. In some cases, that can be done.

Senator MANSFIELD. If you transferred the existing obligations against the section 401 (b) account to other accounts by using the corresponding amount of the authority of section 401 (a), and with respect to future emergency programs employ the same procedure, how much of the original \$100 million under section 401 (b), the Presidential fund, that is, could be preserved for use in making obligations in May and June?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I hope the Senator will give me a day or so to make that computation.

Senator MANSFIELD. Could you do that?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I could do that; yes, sir.

(The following information was subsequently submitted:)

Maximum amount of funds available under section 401 (b) which could be preserved for use for Middle East and other urgent requirements in May and June 1957

| | |
|--|--------------------------|
| Appropriation | \$100,000,000 |
| Presidential determinations made or in process as of Jan. 31, 1958 | \$37,770,000 |
| Less: Unexpended determinations which could, under exceptional procedures, be transferred to other accounts under sec. 401 (a) | 32,762,000 |
| Net expenditures not subject to transfer | ¹ \$5,017,000 |
| Balance | 94,983,000 |

¹ Sec. 522 (f) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, may conceivably permit the transfer of expenditures of \$5,017,000 already made in this account to other appropriations, thereby making the entire \$100 million available. However, a transfer of charges of this nature would appear to be in conflict with congressional intent in view of the following quotation which appears in S. Rept. 2278 of June 19, 1956, regarding sec. 522 (f): "It is not to be used as an additional kind of transferability."

Senator MANSFIELD. What is the total amount of obligations which might need to be made in May and June and which cannot be so obligated due to section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act. Since section 105 can be avoided by using 401 (b) funds does this not mean that a substantial part of the section 105 problem can be met in this way through the transferring of funds?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I am afraid I didn't follow that completely, Senator, but if you will give me those series of questions I will try to see that they get answered.

I would rather not answer them offhand without studying them because they get a little complicated.

Senator MANSFIELD. I know and I would rather have accurate answers but whatever you can answer offhand I wish you would, Mr. Hollister.

(The following information was submitted:)

Possible obligation requirements in May and June 1957, which would exceed amount authorized under sec. 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act, 1957

[In millions of dollars]

| | Possible May-June 1957, obligation requirements | Maximum possible under sec. 105 | Excess over amount possible under sec. 105 |
|-----------------------|---|---------------------------------|--|
| Sec. 201 | \$160.0 | \$50.0 | \$100.0 |
| DS, NEA | 57.5 | 33.5 | 24.0 |
| Palestine refugees | 27.8 | 9.0 | 18.8 |
| Technical cooperation | 33.5 | 27.3 | 6.2 |
| Total | | | 149.0 |

CAN SECTION 105 BE AVOIDED BY SAVING SECTION 401 (b) FUNDS FOR OBLIGATION IN MAY AND JUNE 1957?

Section 105 cannot be avoided by saving section 401 (b) funds for obligation in May and June. For programs in the general area of the Middle East alone

It is estimated that in May and June we may need to obligate \$149 million more than would be permitted under the appropriations available for that area. In addition, program requirements outside the Middle East area, plus additional requirements that are likely to arise during the remainder of fiscal year 1957 which would require obligations to be incurred in May and June, are expected to fully utilize the funds available in section 401 (b).

RATE OF OBLIGATION OF FUNDS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Why has the rate of obligations been so slow that section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act becomes a problem?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Well, Senator, I am very glad to say that the rate of obligation this year has very much increased over last year. In fact, I think I would have to verify these figures, but I think with respect to nonmilitary appropriations we had almost twice as much obligated at the close of December as we had the year before. The obligation is a slow process, as you can well imagine, and I have tried to point out to you and it is one of the hardest things I have to try to push everybody to get things through so that we can get our obligations earlier in the year. You see, they cannot start until we have our money available.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Hollister, will section 105 be a problem in obligating and reserving military assistance funds?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I would rather have someone else answer that, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. Will you get the answer for that?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes. I should say it is not like the same problem. And unless a very substantial change is made in programming it would not be a problem. With us, you see, we have so many different countries and so many different things happening that we may have to move very fast from one area to another.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, that is true, and I think you ought to be allowed a little time to give a sufficiently good answer.

(Subsequently the following information was submitted:)

EFFECT OF SECTION 105 OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1957, ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The provision of section 105, Public Law 853, has an adverse effect on the military assistance program wherein it creates undue and unnecessary pressures for early obligation and reservations of funds which inevitably lead either to hasty action or delay of program implementation. The limitation moves the pressure for last minute obligation from June 30 to April 30, thus worsening the situation by forcing program implementation action into a 10-month year. In fiscal year 1957 the limitation will be especially difficult, particularly in view of caution being taken in the implementation of the military assistance program for the Middle East and as a result of studies being made by the Department of Defense.

SUSPENDED MIDDLE EASTERN AID PROGRAMS

Senator MANSFIELD. In what Middle Eastern countries have aid programs been suspended?

Mr. HOLLISTER. For the time being there has been no activity in Egypt, Jordan, Israel. When I say no activity, no new things have been started. There the local country activities have gone forward, with the locals. In other words everything has not stopped com-

pletely, but as far as our staff's activity is concerned that has been stopped because they have all been evacuated except a few keymen.

Senator MANSFIELD. And is it true Syria has refused technical assistance?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I wouldn't know. Syria hasn't had any technical assistance since I have been conducting this work, and I understand that Syria has not officially requested technical assistance.

Senator MANSFIELD. I see.

Is it fair to say that section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act may interfere with the carrying out of the programs and objectives which the Congress has approved in the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. How much emergency aid had the United States given to Iran when the Mossadegh government was overthrown?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I would have to check that, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. Will you furnish the committee with that information?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I would be very glad. There is a long report on that that has just been made by one of the committees in the House.

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. HOLLISTER. And there has been a GAO report on that, but I will get anything that you want.

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes. Now the United States—

Mr. HOLLISTER. Except I think perhaps you had better be more specific. As I remember what you asked was the amount of aid furnished at the time the Mossadegh government was overthrown.

Senator MANSFIELD. Was overthrown, because there was some propping up at that time and I think that the information is available and could be furnished to the committee, especially in view of the fact that a House committee has issued a report which was not very enthusiastic about the aid program in that country over the past several years before your time.

Mr. HOLLISTER. The only reason I asked if perhaps you would be more specific was because you say "was furnished at the time it was overthrown." I suppose there was some furnished prior to that, some afterward. The overthrow, as I remember it, came rather fast. I suppose you would like, say, about a 3-year spread of that as of that time?

Senator MANSFIELD. No; say, give us a 6-month spread, 3 months before it was overthrown and 3 months after it was overthrown.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Would you want expenditures or obligations or allocations?

You see you can—

Senator MANSFIELD. Expenditures.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Well, an expenditure wouldn't give you very much what you want, I don't believe, Senator, because you might make a promise to do something, and the expenditure—

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Hollister, when you make an expenditure you put out the money and that is what I want to find out.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes, but the expenditure usually comes as a result of obligations made some months before and negotiations which have been entered into months before that.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is ordinarily the case, but I imagine in the case of this particular instance that a lot of things were done in a hurry because perhaps they had to be done very quickly to achieve results.

Mr. HOLLISTER. That is what I also wanted to get at. You probably wanted the budget support in the way of ready money, isn't it something of that kind?

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes; that's right.

(The following information was subsequently submitted for the record :)

MUTUAL SECURITY EXPENDITURES FOR BUDGETARY SUPPORT TO IRAN DURING
PERIOD JUNE 1-NOVEMBER 30, 1953

Prior to the fall of the Mossadegh government on August 19, 1953, no mutual security expenditures were made for budget support to Iran. From August 19, 1953, to November 30, 1953, information available in Washington indicates that no expenditures were made for such purposes. However, \$20 million was expended during December 1953.

AID RECEIVED BY LIBYA

Senator MANSFIELD. Now, Mr. Hollister, the United States has an airbase in Libya.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Does Libya get aid from the United Kingdom?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I think so, Senator. In fact, I know they do but the amount, if we do know it, it might be something we would rather retain for executive session. They do get aid.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would this resolution assist in helping Libya if aid from the United Kingdom were halted?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Libya is within the area of the resolution.

Senator MANSFIELD. The answer is "Yes."

Mr. HOLLISTER. The answer is it could be given.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Mansfield, will you suspend your questioning for a moment? The Secretary has been here all day and he is anxious to leave.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question and then I had a few questions of the Secretary. I was trying to save the Secretary's time and energy by getting these off first.

Chairman GREEN. So far as you are concerned, may the Secretary leave? I mean have you no more questions to ask him now?

Senator MANSFIELD. I have a few questions to ask him.

Chairman GREEN. You have some more?

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes; very few.

Chairman GREEN. Will you ask them very promptly?

CAN MIDDLE EAST SITUATION BE HANDLED WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF
SECTION 3?

Senator MANSFIELD. If the authority of section 3 of the resolution is not provided, do we run the risk of not being able to deal adequately with the situation in the Middle East? I will transfer that and ask the Secretary that question.

Mr. HOLLISTER. I think we would both answer "Yes."

Senator MANSFIELD. If we were to grant the authority of section 3, what risk is there that foreign aid funds will be spent unwisely?

Secretary DULLES. If we do not—

Senator MANSFIELD. Would it be spent unwisely if we were to grant what you ask in section 3 of the proposed resolution; that is to hurry it up?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I think, Senator, that there is danger that they will be spent less wisely for the reason that there has occurred this war, these hostilities, the economic crisis in the area, just a few days ago almost, and I believe that there is an unusual reason this year for having greater flexibility. I do not now go into the general question of flexibility but I think this year there is a very special reason.

Senator MANSFIELD. I see.

I hope, Mr. Secretary, that you understand that one of the factors which is bothering a good many members of the committee is the fact that what we seem to be considering is not a policy but perhaps a prelude or the beginning of the policy, because some of us think that the basic difficulty such as the Suez Canal question, the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Soviet arms traffic, and other matters are basic to this area and unless they are met, handled and perhaps solved there isn't much prospect that a resolution of this kind will accomplish the results which we all ardently desire.

Secretary DULLES. I understand that concern, and it is a very natural and proper concern. I think the administration shares that same concern. But we have not felt it appropriate to include those matters in this particular resolution because they are in the main being worked out, for the time being at least, under the auspices of the United Nations.

ASSISTANCE ON A REQUEST BASIS

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I will cut my questions short and ask just one more:

If we act on a request basis, what will prevent the Soviet Union from doing the same, as say, if Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Jordan or some other country requested them to give them the same kind of assistance that we are contemplating under this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Well, they can always make such a request, yes. Whether or not this resolution is passed.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is true.

But if they made such a request, and the Soviet Union did give them the kind of assistance which they requested, there is nothing, of course, in this resolution which would be able to stop them, to hinder them or to prevent them from doing what they desired.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

Chairman GREEN. That concludes this hearing.

(Whereupon at 4:45 p. m. the hearing was adjourned.)

PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST

MONDAY, JANUARY 28, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D. C.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The committees met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Theodore Francis Green (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations) presiding.

Present: Senators Green (chairman) presiding, Wiley, Fulbright, Smith of New Jersey, Sparkman, Hickenlooper, Humphrey, Langer, Mansfield, Knowland, Aiken, Long, and Kennedy of the committee on Foreign Relations.

Senators Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Saltonstall, Byrd, Johnson of Texas, Flanders, Smith of Maine, Symington, Bush, Jackson, Barrett, and Ervin, of the Committee on Armed Services.

Also present: Senator Clark;

John B. Hollister, Director, International Cooperation Administration; Robert G. Barnes, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State; Robert C. Hill, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State; Roderic L. O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State; William C. Burdett, Special Assistant, Bureau of Near East and African Affairs, Department of State; John Ohly, Deputy Director, ICA; Guilford Jameson, Deputy Director, Congressional Relations, ICA; Albert E. Farwell, Program Officer, O/NESA, ICA; Norman Burns, O/NESA, ICA; Rear Adm. Charles K. Bergin, USN, Director NESA (Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA); and Capt. W. C. Mott, USN, Office of Chairman, JCS.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GREEN

Chairman GREEN. The meeting will please come to order.

Secretary Dulles has come before the committees this morning to deal with subjects in connection with the President's Middle East proposal which could not be considered suitably in open session.

Before Mr. Dulles makes any statement, however, I wish to outline in general terms the schedule which I hope to follow this week.

Since I understand Mr. Dulles will not be available this afternoon, I propose at the end of this morning's session we adjourn until 2:30 p. m., at which time the joint committee will reconvene here to consider matters of procedure, and so forth.

We must decide, for example, whether we wish to invite additional witnesses to appear before this committee. There are also several motions which I understand may be made at that time, including one by Senator Fulbright, which he has shown me.

Tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock we will convene again in executive session to hear the testimony of Admiral Radford. If it should be necessary for Mr. Dulles to return later in the week, it may be that we can work out a mutually agreeable time.

As for procedure this morning, I suggest that Mr. Dulles make such statement as he wishes, and that we then proceed on the basis of seniority to ask such questions as the members may have.

I do ask that members limit their questions as much as possible in order that we all may have an equal chance.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Dulles. Mr. Chairman, I thought it might save the time of the committee, perhaps, if I made at this point a statement with respect to the \$200 million of flexibility which is sought, a statement which would be somewhat more full and perhaps more explanatory than a statement which I felt I could make before the open session of the committee.

With respect to the \$200 million of flexibility sought by section 3 of the pending joint resolution, I want to explain somewhat more fully than in open session why we cannot now specify the uses to which this portion, about 25 percent, of the appropriated funds may be applied.

Its uses might indeed be the same as were contemplated at the time of the justification made to the Congress last year. It is, however, likely that better uses will be found for at least an appreciable part, if not for all, of the \$200 million, because of the important developments which have occurred in the Middle East within recent weeks and, of course, since the presentation to Congress made during the first half of last year.

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HOSTILITIES

(1) The hostilities in Egypt have had consequences which will seriously affect the economies and governmental budgets of several countries of the area. There has been a cutting off of royalties, taxes, and tolls on the production and transportation of oil; a widespread dislocation of commerce and an interruption of tourism.

The full nature and extent of the impact of all this upon the affected countries and their governments is not yet clearly apparent. Because taxes, royalties, and the like, are paid only after the production which gave rise to these payments, these governments have up to the present time been receiving considerable payments with respect to production and shipments which took place prior to the outbreak of hostilities and the consequent interruption. Thus, only now is the full economic and fiscal impact beginning to be felt.

(2) The United Kingdom, which during many decades has exercised much influence in the Middle East area, has been expending there substantial sums for security purposes. At the present time the United Kingdom is making a reappraisal of its external fiscal commitments, particularly in terms of security.

[Deleted.]

The situation with respect to the Middle East recalls that which was presented in 1947 with reference to Greece when, as President Truman pointed out to the Congress:

Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.

Any reduction of commitments by the United Kingdom in relation to the Middle East will almost certainly create new problems, but we cannot yet know just what these problems will be.

(3) There is an additional new factor which is at work. Over a period of several hundred years, the British have been the largest commercial trading nation all through the Middle East. This has extended to banking, insurance, commerce, and transportation. These activities became an integral part of the economies of these countries. One of the unfortunate results of the recent hostilities has been an emotional resistance in some of these countries to British activities of all kinds.

Some substantial economic dislocation is bound to follow. It is too early to assess the effect of this development, but it must be borne in mind that it will have a depressant effect on the economic, and consequent political, stability of these countries.

We hope that relations between the United Kingdom and these nations will improve so that commercial relations may return to the normal pattern. But in the meantime, there will be a shock in some countries, which, if unmitigated, will affect their ability to resist subversion.

SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA

(4) The Soviet Union is greatly intensifying its own activities in the area in relation to propaganda, military assistance, infiltration of technicians, and subversive activities. Also, it is holding out hopes of economic aid and in general seeking to create a dependence of the Middle East upon the Soviet and Chinese Communist bloc.

[Deleted.]

Also, we believe the Soviet rulers should know that they may have to meet the unexpected from us, and that they cannot now know in advance precisely what we will do. If they know all in advance, they can confidently make their plans to circumvent our plans.

These new developments have created economic, political and security problems in addition to those which already existed and which the fiscal year 1957 mutual-security program was designed to meet. It is these new situations which give rise to the request for additional flexibility with respect to \$200 million of the funds appropriated for this area last year.

DIFFICULTIES REQUIRING ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY

We have sufficient funds available for the balance of the fiscal year. The President has general authority in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, with respect to the use of these funds.

It is highly doubtful, however, whether we can meet these new situations largely with loans, as required in the present law. There are also certain aspects of our bilateral agreements to which countries of

this area object, and in some instances there may not be time to negotiate such an agreement.

Finally, these new problems cannot be satisfactorily met if we must obligate funds by April 30. It is with respect to these difficulties, and only these, that we seek the additional flexibility with respect to \$200 million of present funds.

This authority is set forth very clearly in the draft of section 3 prepared by the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee and circulated last week by Senator Green.

While, as I have said, we cannot now list new projects, I recall and repeat the statement which I made at the public hearing, that significant uses of the already appropriated funds, other than as now contemplated, which might be recommended by the Richards Mission, would be promptly brought to the knowledge of these committees.

Thank you.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON. In view of the fact that I discussed this last statement, particularly, at some length with the Secretary, I wonder if I might be accorded an opportunity to ask him a question with regard to that last statement at this point.

Chairman GREEN. Is there any objection on the part of the members?

If not, you may proceed.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, would you read your last paragraph again, please, for the information of the members?

REVIEW BY CONGRESS OF RICHARDS MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

Secretary DULLES. While, as I have said, we cannot now list new projects, I recall and repeat the statement which I made at the public hearing, that significant uses of already appropriated funds other than as now contemplated, which might be recommended by the Richards Mission, will be promptly brought to the knowledge of these committees.

Senator JOHNSON. These committees?

Secretary DULLES. Committees.

Senator JOHNSON. Now, Mr. Secretary, would there be any objection on your part—there is a lot of suspicion and doubt, and there could be some partisanship, I hope not, in this whole picture—would there be any objection on your part to saying in this resolution that the allocations recommended by the Richards Mission under this new authority would be transmitted to the respective committees of the Congress, both the House and the Senate, and that finalized action would not take place for 10 days, say, until they had an opportunity to look at it?

I do not mean they would exercise a veto power. I do not mean to have to come back here and get their agreement again, but give them ample opportunity to see, so that this idea that you could make a commitment of a billion dollars on some big irrigation project out there, which will involve the Congress for 20 years can be dispelled.

When you get those recommendations and when you determine whether they are justified or not, you finally are going to reach a decision in the matter. Once you make that decision, what would be

wrong with transmitting that information to the two committees through your Assistant Secretary or even bring it up yourself, and letting that information stay there for 10 days before the commitment is finalized?

If there is great objection to it, no doubt the Congress would communicate it to you. You could take another look at it. If you were of the same opinion still, of course, you would have the authority.

Secretary DULLES. Certainly there is no objection in principle to that, Senator. Whether the mechanics of it would work or not, I would want to check.

What would you think, John?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Well, so far as final commitment is concerned, it would take a little time, anyway, to make a real obligation, so the time element is there, would not be a difficult one.

Senator JOHNSON. I see a great deal of concern expressed by a substantial number of Members of both Houses from time to time about what we are going to do about closing down military projects, or what we are going to do about building post office projects, or what we are going to do about this or that under some authority given to the Executive, and the fear it will be abused, because it has been abused, it has been abused by Presidents representing my party, and we are all aware of it.

Now, many times that doubt is dispelled by just a simple provision that the administration bring its allocation before the Congress and the appropriate committees be permitted to look at it before they are finalized, and I see nothing that would prevent it, and I see every reason in the world why it should be done.

I would not think it would take any authority away from you. If you were of the same opinion still, you could proceed to act. On the other hand, it would give Congress a chance to say "Stop, look and listen."

If you would be willing to do that, I think it would be very helpful.

Secretary Dulles. As you know, Senator, the practice which has prevailed up until now in relation to these appropriations, which for these purposes total some \$4 billion, is that at the time of the presentation in connection with the enactment of the legislation, we give illustrative projects to the Congress to indicate the probable way in which those funds will be spent; and, having done that, the money is allocated to areas roughly in line with those justifications, and there is then no further presentation to Congress of specific projects.

Now, I would not want to commit myself at this juncture to this altered procedure in relation to future legislation, because I think that ought to be considered on its merits and perhaps gone into more thoroughly than is practical at this particular juncture, where we are acting to meet an emergency situation.

I would like to see whether we could work out with your staff perhaps some language which would roughly give effect to what you have in mind. Of course, in a good many of those things the procedure is reflected in an understanding between the Executive and the Congress which is embodied in the reports of the committees, and perhaps that would be the more practical way to work here, rather than to try to embody it actually in the law itself.

But I understand what you are getting at, and certainly there is every desire on my part, and I am sure on the President's part, to do

anything which is compatible with the effective handling of these situations, which will give Congress greater confidence in what we are doing and dispel suspicion as to whether we are making the best possible use of the money.

That is an objective which certainly I think we seek as much as anybody in Congress. It is obviously in the common interest, and I sympathize totally with the general approach which your statement reflects; and, as you see, I have responded to it.

Now, the question of how we translate that into a working practice takes perhaps a little more thought than I can give it here this morning, but I would be quite willing to have it studied.

You know, this whole business of the mechanics of this thing is to me just a complete maze. There are so many sections, and you read one section and you think you know what the answer is, and then you find there is another section in another part of the law or something in the appropriations act which seems to cut across what is in the authorizing act. I cannot move in this area without having several experts at my hand to tell me what the law really means. It has a long history.

But I would think something of this sort can be worked out; and I can assure you, Senator, that if it is going to help to get this legislation through promptly, and with substantial support, that we will try very hard to meet your views in that respect.

Senator JOHNSON. I have no indication that there has been any disposition on the part of the President or the State Department not to give Congress full information and keep them informed, let them have full knowledge of everything as they do it, even before that.

Now it seems to me—first I will say that I will ask the staff to prepare appropriate language for the resolution to cover what I have in mind, and appropriate comments for the report, and submit them to you shortly.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON. Secondly, I would like to point out this: There is a feeling that Congress is being asked to give a blank check and to cast a vote or resolution for projects which they will know nothing about; that there will be undertaken, without their knowledge, commitments to be made covering many years in the future, without their having a chance to even express themselves on it.

It seems to me that you would eliminate all of that argument and you would give to the Members of the Congress who support this resolution substantial backing so that they could take the position that, while they might not be able to veto it as in the Aswan Dam case, they could certainly express themselves, perhaps, with some effectiveness.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary; and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Secretary, will you proceed.

Secretary DULLES. I beg your pardon!

Chairman GREEN. I thought you had some matters you would like to bring up before us.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Chairman GREEN. You have not.

Senator Russell, do you have any questions?

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, sir, 1 or 2.

UNITED KINGDOM EXPENDITURES IN THE AREA

Mr. Secretary, you this morning referred, as you have in the public hearings, to the fact that the United Kingdom has been spending considerable sums in this area.

Can you give the committees some idea of the approximate total each year that the United Kingdom has been spending in the areas which would be affected by this resolution?

Mr. Secretary, if you wish to submit that later, it would be quite all right with me.

Secretary DULLES. It would not be easy to give a dependable figure, because those figures are partly included in the United Kingdom defense budget and do not appear as isolated items.

Now we do know, of course, of the figure of \$35 million on the Jordan subsidy. [Deleted.]

There has been substantial military assistance given particularly to Iraq, a member of the Baghdad Pact.

The British, up until recently, indeed until the recent hostilities, have still been providing some technicians at the Suez base, helping to keep it in condition so that they could reoccupy it under the terms of the treaty if they were allowed to do so.

But an adequate breakdown of these figures in dollars would be extremely difficult at the present time. [Deleted.]

Senator RUSSELL. Well, we do definitely know about the 33 or 34 million dollars in Jordan.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. I believe the British have announced they were not going to carry that any longer.

One thing which, I think, has caused a good deal of confusion about these hearings has been the fact that you see so many statements in the press that these countries do not want this money—of course, I am frank to say they would take it if they thought that we would give it to them. However, 2 or 3 of the nations, Egypt and Saudi Arabi, and perhaps another one, had already agreed to assume that payment, those payments to Jordan heretofore made by England.

Do you think that is a bona fide agreement that they will live up to, or do they expect us to really pick up the tab somewhere along the line? [Deleted.]

It would seem to me to be rather a paradox that we would be voting large sums of aid to countries that were able to extend substantial sums to another country. That was one of the reasons why I asked the question.

[Deleted.]

SOVIET AID IN THE AREA

I happened to hear Mr. Irving R. Levine talking from Moscow the other day. I guess they sold him a bill of goods. He said they had information that the Russians were encouraging these people to accept this aid.

Do you think that is just Russian propaganda they sold Mr. Levine?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator RUSSELL. The Russians heretofore have not embarked on much of a program of grants, have they, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator RUSSELL. It has been loans all the way through.

Do we have any intelligence as to the extent, the magnitude, of their program up to now? Let us say in the Middle East, do we have any idea about how many dollars they have loaned down there?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, we do have. I would think that [deleted] would give you an idea of the general order of magnitude on it. I could probably supply more detailed figures, but it is somewhere in that general range.

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, looking at this thing in its broader aspects, how does it happen that the Russians by lending [deleted] could cause so much trouble that it destroys the effect of our giving away \$2 or \$3 billion in the same area and bring demands that we enlarge the program? What is so effective about this Russian business which enables them, by lending a little money, to undo what we have done by giving much larger sums, and requiring us to do much more?

They are always threatening to do what we are doing but they only sell or make loans. Why can we not do something like following their program and see if we can elicit more support from these states?

Secretary DULLES. Senator, I have never contemplated or favored anything like sort of a matching program, or because the Russians were going to offer some, that we were going to offer something more.

[Deleted.]

Senator RUSSELL. Well, it may not be in this instance, if you will pardon me, but we have had it dinned into us constantly about this whole aid program, about India and everything else, that the Russians were moving in, and that has been used as justification for a long time for continuing and increasing the American program, and at times it has been rather persuasive.

Secretary DULLES. The main thrust of international communism is not in terms of getting strength and extending itself by giving aid to these countries, which they do only rarely and in special circumstances. It is that they make their greatest gain and become the greatest menace when they are dealing with a situation which is deteriorating in terms of the ability of a government to maintain order.

If you have a general breakdown in an economy, that is the thing which gives the Russians their greatest opportunity, and they do not get their greatest opportunity by offering money.

SOVIET UNION CONSIDERED OVEREXTENDED

In my opinion, the Soviet Union is very considerably overextended at the present time, and in fact is not prepared to do much.

Senator RUSSELL. That is what Mr. Levine said.

Secretary DULLES. Many thought if we would not give Egypt the Aswan Dam, the Russians would. I was always skeptical about that. I thought they might promise that, but I never believed they would do it, because they are very much overextended themselves, and they are under great pressures from their satellite countries and, indeed, from their own people.

Therefore, I do not think the Soviet Union would gain greatly by itself offering substantial help, although it might use that as a lure, as a diversion.

The great danger in the area is that there will be such a collapse of orderly government and the maintenance of adequate security forces,

that then international communism can move in and take over by subversive tactics, which offers the Soviet Union much greater opportunities than any opportunity it can buy through loans or grants.

Senator RUSSELL. King Saud of Saudi Arabia is on his way here. Of course, I rather gather from what you have testified, as well as from other sources, that due to his enlightened self-interest he is probably about the best friend we have got in this area who has any strength at all. He, of course, is an absolute monarch there.

I think it is true, is it not, Mr. Secretary, that the King's purse is the actual treasury in Saudi Arabia?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. That is correct.

You talk about these countries of where we have got to make up the losses in taxes and royalties. Do you think it is going to be necessary to give him any money out of these funds?

[Deleted.]

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, this whole program has been presented to us as being of a very emergency nature. It has been handled as if it were an extraordinary emergency.

Have you any intelligence that there has been any imminent threat of armed Soviet aggression anywhere in this area? Have intelligence agencies presented any information at all which would indicate that Russia was likely to make any military movement in this Middle East area?

Secretary DULLES. No, we have no such information. But we know that the people in the north are afraid of it. The stationing of Soviet forces, and the like, is such that they always could attack with practically no notice.

The stationing of their forces has not altered materially. It has been the same for some time.

ECONOMIC SITUATION GREATEST DANGER

Senator RUSSELL. So the danger in the area arises more from the economic situation which has been created by the recent military activities than from any other reason? It is more of an economic threat internally which creates internal subversion, than it is military?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. I have several times indicated my belief that it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between the military threat and the internal subversion, because countries which feel under the menace of an overwhelming military threat—

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Secretary DULLES (continuing). Tend to be weaker in their resistant quality.

Senator RUSSELL. I am aware that that is an important factor in the situation.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator RUSSELL. In the event this program is adopted, and you change the character of the expenditures that are made of funds which have already been appropriated, do we gain any advantage other than the good will of these people? Do we get any assurances of cooperation in settling the many perplexing problems of this area, which I think we all realize must be settled before we can ever have any economic improvement there, other than a temporary shot in the arm of American dollars?

Do you think there is any hope that this program will be a vehicle which will help us to better relations between the Israelis and the Arabs, and that will temper down Colonel Nasser's imperialistic views as expressed in his book *The Revolution*?

I would not have paid any attention to *The Revolution* if I had not read Mein Kampf once. Hitler gave us a blueprint, and Nasser has now given us his blueprint of what he has in mind.

Do you hope to alter those conditions materially with this program at a reasonably early date?

Secretary Dulles. We certainly hope to alter them, and I think that this kind of a program is the only effective approach to their alteration. You say "at a reasonably early date." I wouldn't.

Senator Russell. Well, we have been playing now with the situation for several years at great expense, and if you are going to change the nature of the program and probably fix the pattern for increased expenditures, I am interested to know whether this is going to get at the real disease. This is really just a little poultice you are putting on the cancer.

I want to know what chance is there of getting the cancer out? Are we getting ready to operate to get these matters settled?

Secretary Dulles. Well, we are making what we hope will be considerable progress right now at the United Nations. I do not want to forecast what is going to come out there. It still is hanging in the scales.

But, I think that there is a prospect that the situation which will emerge from the United Nations debate will be somewhat improved over that which existed prior to the outbreak last November. I do not want to be held to be a prophet in that respect, because these things are just hanging in the balance in New York.

Senator Russell. Mr. Secretary, these questions grow out of my great concern that we have had here a program of aid for many years to responsible people like the British, whom I regard as being very skilled in the art of government, and highly responsible people.

But we have loaned them billions and given them other millions, and they are laying to withdraw from different areas. We are asked to assume more and more. And Lord Sandys or Mr. Sandys—I do not know whether he has got a title or not.

Secretary Dulles. Mister.

Senator Russell. Well, he may get "His Lordship" after he gets back from his trip. He is over here now to tell us about the troubles which force them to continue weakening themselves militarily, and it seems to me that instead of creating a hope that we could abandon this whole program which I have at times supported, that the further we go with these economic grants and activities, we wind up by increasing the burden on us instead of reducing it.

We thought that we were—at least when we approved NATO and other pacts we were so told—going to have a great system where we would have vast military strength. We poured out millions down there in the Far East to try to get some strength and stability down there.

But it seems instead of ever turning out to where we can decrease these expenditures, that everything we do tends to increase them, to where people of foreign countries feel that they have a vested interest in the Treasury of the United States, indeed, in the income of the

American taxpayer, that grows rather than reduces. I have almost reached the conclusion that the whole thing is hopeless.

Even when Russia is being weakened by the disintegration of their ties with the satellite states we have to step up the foreign-aid program by \$400 million in a budget which was prepared before this came about. A man would be naive indeed to not realize that through the pending resolution we are going to bring about increases over the next several years in the sums which we must spend in the Middle East.

SPLIT OF AID EXPENDITURES

Secretary Dulles. Well, we may, Senator, have to spend more sums in the Middle East. I think we will be able to spend less sums in some other places. These things fluctuate.

As you know, during the early years, most of the expenditures were in Europe, and very little was done in the Far East and very little was done in the Middle East. Then expenditures in Europe went down; the Far East situation came up, and there are very heavy expenditures at the present time going on in the Far East.

The centers of trouble shift, but there has not been in recent years any trend toward increasing total expenditures.

Senator Russell. Well, it changes its shape and form, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Dulles. Yes.

Senator Russell. But the expenditures are still there.

Of course, after we got the economy of Europe restored by the so-called Marshall plan, we shifted over to a yearly military assistance program which is almost as large in money as the economic program. And now it seems that that is being dissipated. At least the British are telling us very frankly they are going to have to cut their armed forces; and instead of Britannia ruling the waves, they have got only a small naval establishment, selling their carriers all over the world—to the Argentine and Brazil—and still further reducing strength.

So if we do not assume it in the form of aid, we are going to have to assume it in military appropriations for our own Military Establishment, it seems to me, unless we are going to get in a much weaker position in the free world.

Secretary Dulles. I think we must accept the fact that in the great sweep of history, nations rise and fall, grow stronger, grow weaker, and I think that we are in a period of history where the United States is growing stronger. Some other nations, although they cannot be discounted by any means, are growing weaker.

Certainly, I think we can rejoice that we are not among the nations which are growing weaker. I recall, you will all recall, George Washington's Farewell Address where he said that "the United States, at no distant day, a great nation."

Well, we have become a great nation, and as we become a great nation our responsibilities inevitably expand, and that is a trend of history which I think, as far as its broad outlines are concerned, we can rejoice at. We can be very glad that our Nation is becoming a great nation. Certainly we would not want to be in a declining phase.

Senator Russell. Well, we did not become great by following Washington's advice. If anyone wanted us to keep out of foreign alliances

and entanglements, Washington did. He did not suggest the plans we are now adopting to achieve and maintain greatness. He advised us to leave foreign countries alone and attend to our own business. That was about the strongest paragraph—

Secretary Dulles. He said "no alliances except for temporary purposes."

Senator RUSSELL (continuing). In his Farewell Address.

Secretary Dulles. It has been my privilege to negotiate quite a few of these treaties, and I have put every single treaty that I negotiated, going back to the Anzus Treaty, the Philippine Treaty, and other treaties, on a 1-year basis, because I believe in the advice of George Washington. I think, with the world fluctuating as it is, that we should not be bound irrevocably for a long period of years to nations whose interests may diverge from ours, conceivably. The result is that the Philippine Treaty, the Anzus Treaty, the Republic of Korea Treaty, the Republic of China Treaty, all these treaties that I have had anything to do with, are subject to a 1-year termination clause, just because I believed in the precept that you have referred to here.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, I am frank to say, at one time I was almost convinced his advice was outmoded by changing conditions. I have now changed my mind and come to the conclusion we made a terrible mistake in not taking it literally.

These 1-year treaties you are referring to may have that advantage, but they have a disadvantage when we get to spending \$200 or \$300 million in a country, and they can tell us to get out of a country at the end of a year, and we have no right to stay there, and it is a pretty expensive stay.

Mr. Chairman, I am taking too long a period of time. I am getting down to philosophy instead of questions, so I yield to you.

Chairman GREEN. Before proceeding with calling the names on the list, you realize there are 30 names, and that the Secretary of State cannot be here this afternoon because of other engagements, and no other time has been agreed upon yet, should he be asked to be recalled.

We will excuse anyone from asking questions who does not feel impelled to do so, in the hope that the questions will be made as succinct as possible.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I make an inquiry? Will Admiral Radford be here this afternoon, or are we having an afternoon session?

Chairman GREEN. We are having a meeting at 2:30, but the Secretary will not be here.

Mr. Saltonstall. Any questions?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Just two, I think, Mr. Chairman, very briefly.

Mr. Secretary, the other day when you were testifying, and this is a request to clarify some language, I think one of the provisions in this bill which bothers a lot of my colleagues and bothers myself is on page 8, line 4, the clause "without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulations."

WAIVER OF RESTRICTIONS IN MUTUAL SECURITY ACT

Now you testified, in answer to a question of mine the other day, that there were 3 restrictions contained in the Mutual Security Act which you wanted to be able to waive, and as I understood it, only 3; and if

those 3 could be waived, then you were satisfied to go forward with the \$200 million under the other provisions of the act, the Mutual Security Act.

The first one was the restriction on dates for the money to be obligated, that is, 80 percent before May 1. Am I correct in that?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And the second one, the percentage on loans rather than grants.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And the third one, on military assistance to comply with section 142 of the Mutual Security Act, is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And if those three could be waived then there are no other laws or regulations under which you could not proceed to carry out what you want to do under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask you, with relation to section 142 of the Mutual Security Act, that section (a) is concerned with military agreements and utilization of military problems, and (b) is with relation to the terms and conditions of the money which is given, and how it is to be used.

My question is this: With relation to that, it is not necessary, insofar as this resolution is concerned, to change the provisions with relation to counterpart funds, is it?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that the money which is on a grant basis could be worked out on counterpart funds, the same as it is now; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that that would eliminate clause (b) of section 142.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. I made a statement before you came in, Senator, in which I indicated that it would be acceptable to us to take a draft which had been worked out by the staff here—

Senator SALTONSTALL. I have not seen it.

Secretary DULLES (continuing). Which covers that and limits it to 401 (a)—it brings it under 401 (a), which is the present discretionary clause.

The actual objections that we have are found in 142 (a), not 142 (b).

Senator SALTONSTALL. I see. Then there is a draft already worked out to carry out those thoughts.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Then I will not question you further on that.

Just two other questions, very briefly: Am I right in remembering that you believed that Pakistan might come within this general area of the Middle East?

[Deleted.]

Senator SALTONSTALL. Have you any comments to make in this executive session concerning the news which came out yesterday regarding the actions of India in West Pakistan with relation to how they might affect what you want to do under this joint resolution?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. Our military understanding with Pakistan would not be extended beyond what is already expressed in the Southeast Asia Security Treaty, and as I think I mentioned at one point in my open testimony, we limited our obligation under that treaty to aggression from a Communist source, just as we propose to do here, for the very purpose of avoiding embroilment in what might be a controversy between India and Pakistan.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And just one last question:

One remark you made this morning disturbed me a little because of the ulterior effects that it might have.

[Deleted.]

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Have you finished?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes, sir.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Fulbright? Any questions?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes, a few.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to say in advance that I realize many of these questions are very complex, and there is plenty of room for sincere and honest men to differ on the interpretation of the significance of particular policies.

UNITED STATES ARMS PROGRAM IN PAKISTAN

For example, I well recall that when the Pakistan arms program was first proposed to the Congress, although I believe it was concluded before—it did not require any agreement by Congress—we were notified about it, that I objected to it and I so stated, both in committee in the presence of State Department representatives, and I also stated that on the floor.

And I think if I could sum it up, we simply interpret the facts as we see them. I imagine we see many of the same facts, at least those made public, in a different manner.

In all fairness, I think that the extent of the arms program in Pakistan was a mistake, and I think the present tension growing up there may well dramatically prove that.

With that introduction, I wanted to ask 1 or 2 questions.

It is your theory that an overwhelming military force in a neighboring country weakens the country internally, but what example of that can you give us? I do not quite follow that.

[Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. Has the Government of Iran officially endorsed this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. Iran has endorsed the President's proposal.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you feel that Turkey is an example which bears out your theory? Turkey has long subsisted there next door to Russia and often was subjected to threats by Russia, but she seemed only to become stronger internally every time Russia threatened to take the straits or to interfere in her right to control the straits, didn't she?

I think Turkey would be an example contrary to your theory. Long before there was a NATO guaranty Turkey stood her ground in the

face of Russian threats for many, many years, and she did not collapse nor did she become a satellite.

On the contrary, she became the sturdiest of opponents to Russian imperialism without any guarantees from this country or anyone for a long time.

Britain stood behind her to some extent, but we did not.

I think there may be something in that argument, but I think there is definitely another side to this military aspect of the program such as Pakistan.

Don't you think now that India is more afraid of Pakistan and Afghanistan is more afraid of Pakistan than they are of Russia?

[Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. So that by pouring in great quantities of arms we create local problems that may cause more immediate outbreak of hostilities than if we refrain from putting in arms in a country like Pakistan, don't we?

Secretary DULLES. No, I do not think so because of course we couple any such arms with very specific stipulations against their aggressive use.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think anyone has confidence in such a stipulation, or to put it another way, you had such a stipulation, understanding, with regard to arms under NATO given to France, but were those arms used in north Africa or were they used in the Suez?

Did they abide by any such stipulation?

[Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think anyone has any confidence that anyone else is going to abide by it? If they get into a war, do you really believe that Saudi Arabia, for example, would not use her arms against Israel or anybody else that she was warring with, because of a stipulation she gave you?

Secretary DULLES. I think that they would all heed the fact that such a violation would tend to align us with the other side. I indicated when I was at New Delhi that if in violation of agreement Pakistan should use its arms against India, then India could count upon our support being with India rather than with Pakistan. I think that is a factor which is very much to be taken into account.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Has that reconciled India to your arms program with Pakistan?

Secretary DULLES. It mitigates their opposition, yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. They are still as opposed as they could possibly be, aren't they? They do denounce it nearly every day, don't they?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. India would much prefer that Pakistan was completely without armament.

[Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. In regard to your point that you are going to give arms which are useful only for defense, can you describe to the committee what kind of arms you contemplate? I did not know there were any arms that could be used only in defense and not offensively.

What would be the kind of arms?

Secretary DULLES. I think I am not an expert on arms, Senator, but to illustrate, a tank, for example, which is delivered on the eastern seaboard of Saudi Arabia, which has not got the facilities to move

through the sand and deserts to get to Israel would be I suppose a defensive weapon as far as Israel is concerned.

Senator FULBRIGHT. So that you think a tank is an instrument that can be used only for defensive purposes?

Secretary DULLES. If it is a tank which can't go through hundreds of miles of desert, then I think it is, yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What would prevent it being put on a ship and shipped around to whatever that port is on the Gulf of Aqaba? Do you really think we should consider tanks as purely defensive and do you think the Israelis will consider that, or anybody else, as a purely defensive weapon?

Secretary DULLES. It is also I suppose theoretically possible to conceive of an offensive use, but that is getting lost I think in a rather dialectical debate.

There is made a practical working distinction between so-called offensive and defensive weapons. Now that can't always be literally applied to every conceivable contingency.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This idea that you advance that we need this \$200 million with flexibility so that the Soviets will not know what we are going to do with it, what kind of a program do you contemplate that would fall within that category?

I wondered what you have in mind that you think would deceive the Soviets?

Secretary DULLES. As I said, if I knew exactly what we were going to do with it, then it would not be necessary to ask for this discretion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't believe that is quite responsive. You said the other day it was very important that you not telegraph your punches and that the Soviets not know what you are going to do with the \$200 million.

I merely ask you what did you have in mind when you said that, what type of program or what kind of activities in which it was important that they not know about it, or that it was to be a secret operation.

[Deleted.]

UNITED STATES AID PROGRAM IN IRAN

Senator FULBRIGHT. With regard to Iran, Mr. Secretary, are you familiar with a recent report from the Committee on Government Operations of the House commenting upon the administration of our aid program in Iran?

Secretary DULLES. I understand there was a report. I don't recall whether it was adopted by the committee or not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are you familiar with what that report states about our program in Iran?

Secretary DULLES. I beg your pardon?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are you familiar with what that report states about our program in Iran?

Secretary DULLES. No, I have never read it myself.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I read the report and rather than read the report I would like to read just a paragraph from an article by Mr. Southwick, commenting on it. He says—

The committee had cited what is called the shocking handling of \$25 million in aid to Iran in a cavalier freewheeling casual fashion.

There is a good deal more about that but I read the report. Don't you think with that kind of a report facing us that there is some obli-

gation upon the Senate committee to seek to establish more efficient administration of distribution of our money in Iran?

Do you think we should ignore such a criticism of our program?

Secretary DULLES. I would assume that such a report would be evaluated in connection with next year's mutual security program.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Why not evaluate it with this \$200 million? It is a very substantial amount.

You don't think we should subject this additional money to administrative procedures which result in that kind of criticism of it, do you?

Secretary DULLES. I am curious why you say apply it to the \$200 million. I would suggest to be logical you would have to apply it to the \$4 billion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I agree, but this is the first step. That raises the question it seems to me if you can justify this and this committee accepts the principle that you seek to apply to \$200 million, there is no logical reason why we should not apply it to the 4 billion when you bring in the mutual-aid bill.

If this is good, if it is efficient, if it is justifiable for \$200 million, why isn't it justifiable for 4 billion? Why couldn't you do a much better job with 4 billion, free of any restrictions?

Secretary DULLES. Because we do not need that much free of restrictions, Senator. You may recall when President Truman came in connection with the so-called Greek-Turkish aid program, he asked for and promptly got \$100 million free of all restrictions of law. He did not ask for billions of dollars; he asked for \$100 million for that particular situation, and Congress quickly granted it to him.

Senator FULBRIGHT. There are a great many factual distinctions between both the actual fighting that was going on between Yugoslavia and Greece and also in Formosa. I don't see that on the facts either of those are analogous to the present situation. They were limited, narrow in scope, and the objective was quite well understood.

I confess I still am not clear in my mind what you intend to do with this \$200 million. You made a statement the other day that raises questions in my mind rather than settling them, when you said in response to a question by the Senator from Texas, you said one illustration of why you needed this was that you might get a cablegram which requested 5 or 10 million dollars to hold the situation overnight.

For the life of me, I can't think of a situation which would require that kind of action within the general area of traditional State Department activities. [Deleted.]

Secretary DULLES. The particular kind of flexibility which we seek here is in my opinion required by the fact that conditions have greatly changed in the last few months.

I would think it stands to reason, Senator, that a program which is mapped out prior to a war, prior to an economic crisis, prior to a decline in influence in the area of a great nation would not necessarily be the best program to carry out under present conditions.

As I say, if the Senate and Congress in its wisdom insists that we move ahead without taking account of these recent developments, then we have no choice but to do it.

We do believe that when there has been a cataclysmic change within a few weeks, that some adjustment of the program is probably desirable.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't think the two necessarily follow. Some adjustment could well be justified without giving complete and unrestricted use. I think we will all agree that as conditions change we should adjust to it, but that is not the same as saying there should be no restrictions, no information to the Legislature with regard to these funds.

What I keep coming back to is that this committee and this Congress did not initiate this program.

You initiated it. You come and ask us to participate in it; to bear part of the responsibility at least, but so far I do not think we have been given a commensurate amount of information upon which we can judge the validity of the proposal.

I think that the burden is upon you. If we had initiated it and we were attacking your program out of hand, I think you might feel perhaps you were mistreated, but after all, you initiated the whole matter. You asked us to share the responsibility, and yet I am unable to get a very good idea what this responsibility is for, what you intend to do with this. I can think of no circumstance that would require you to furnish \$ or 10 million dollars overnight.

I know of no program that has ever been sponsored by the State Department on any such basis. They are usually the result of very long, careful consideration.

Now they sometimes go astray in administration, but I never heard of our engaging in that kind of activity in the State Department, although we may have in military affairs.

It is true military affairs are quite different. I am sure they do that sort of thing. I am still at a loss to know what it is you wish to disregard in the restrictions of the present law that you are asking for in section 3.

[Deleted.]

The truth of the matter is all of those oil countries have very good credit. They can borrow money, can't they?

Secretary DULLES. That is the reason, Senator, we are not asking for any more money.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would you agree that we should change our policies from one of grants to a policy only of loans in this area?

[Deleted.]

Would you agree to a principle being inserted in this resolution that this money should be only for loans and not grants?

Secretary DULLES. No; I would not agree to that. I do not see why. Senator, just because a situation has become much worse economically that we should make our requirements more rigid than they were before.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you know whether or not the Soviets make grants to these nations or not?

Secretary DULLES. I have already testified to that, Senator. Do you want me to testify again?

Senator FULBRIGHT. No, I did not know you had.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, I have said several times that as far as I know they do it in terms of loans.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is fairly evident they have been successful with their loan policy, isn't it, relatively speaking?

Secretary DULLES. I do not know what you call successful.

Senator Fulbright. I have understood that they have considerable support in Syria, in Egypt, in Afghanistan, and such aid as they have given has been on a loan basis, which would indicate that perhaps loans may have some virtues that grants don't have?

Secretary Dulles. We make loans too.

Senator Fulbright. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that your estimate, your evaluation of the conditions in the Middle East last year were accurate, and that events have sustained the wisdom of your judgment?

Secretary Dulles. I don't recall what evaluation you refer to.

CONDITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN FEBRUARY 1956

Senator Fulbright. I would like to refresh your memory.

On February the 24th you appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee in open session for the purpose of reporting upon conditions in the Middle East. It was called for that purpose, as I recall. That was the expressed purpose of it.

The following exchange took place in the course of that hearing. I asked you—we were discussing the Russians. You said:

The Russians are willing to preempt the whole world, Senator. They are not unique in relation to this area. They would take over the United States if given the chance.

I said:

Unfortunately they seem to be making progress, and especially in the Middle East, do they not?

You responded with this statement:

I do not think so. I think they have made very little progress in the last few years, and the proof of it is that at this very moment in Moscow they are having to revise their whole program. If we had to go through such a revision and change of our whole program now they are undergoing it would be advertised all over the world that we had failed. The fact is they have failed and they have got to revise new policies.

Senator Knowland. What was the date of that?

Senator Fulbright. February 24, 1956.

Senator Knowland. Last year?

Senator Fulbright. It was an open hearing in the caucus room. I remember it quite well. My next remark quoted from these hearings, which have been printed and are available, was:

Do you think this last meeting would indicate or that the speeches of Khrushchev and the other leaders in the Russian Government would indicate a failure in their foreign policy?

You responded: "Absolutely, sir."

I said:

I would be most interested to hear why you think they indicate that.

Then you responded in a long statement which I would be glad to read if the committee is interested, but on the other hand I don't care to take the time, but you give various reasons.

Would you consider that your judgment of the situation has been validated by the events of the last year?

Secretary Dulles. I would consider that was a reasonably correct estimate of the situation as events then were.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Secretary, I think that points up our difference perhaps better than anything I can say. I simply think you were completely wrong in your evaluation of events which were well-known to everybody. Why you misjudged it of course I don't know, but I did not, and I submit that events since then have not borne you out.

Secretary DULLES. I did not attempt in that statement to forecast the future. I was describing the situation as it then was, and I said that up to that time the Soviet Union had made very little progress in the Middle East, and I think that was a correct statement.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I accept that. This was subsequent to the arms deal with Egypt. This was in the midst of your negotiations with Egypt over the Aswan Dam. It was at that time or shortly thereafter that you came before our committee urging us to approve or at least you told us about the Aswan Dam and giving its merits. I think you actually had the money in hand to make a \$56 million grant, but I submit that you did not evaluate the conditions as of that time. You were busying yourself and the Department seeking to offset the obvious penetration of the Middle East by Russia beginning the preceding September when they made the arms deal.

Now in this same meeting, I believe, or at another meeting I asked you had you protested to Russia and Egypt at the time of the Geneva summit meeting about the proposed arms deal with Egypt, and as I recall it, and I am sure my memory is correct, you said "No," you had not mentioned it to Russia at the Geneva summit meeting. Yet when they made that meeting, you and the British became interested in the Aswan Dam.

Now I do not understand now why you felt that they had made no progress in the Middle East.

Having that doubt about your judgment in that case raises a doubt about it now with regard to what the present situation is, and the only purpose of my motion is that I think the committee is entitled to have some confirmation of your estimate of the conditions in the Middle East. That is the only purpose.

If you have the evidence that will confirm it, that will make a lot of difference. As I said the other day, I don't feel that I should accept this estimate, in view of the past experiences with your evaluation of conditions, without further hearings and without some evidence that the facts justify this proposal in the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, that is all.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Byrd?

Mr. Smith of New Jersey?

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Just a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dulles, I was not here when the meeting opened. I had a meeting of the Labor Committee for a few minutes, and I understood that you made some comment on this interlined draft that we have before us, slight changes in the resolution.

Do I understand you approve those changes?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. I made comment on the revision of section 3, and indicated its acceptability.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Section 3 is acceptable?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. But not section 2?

Secretary DULLES. I did not comment on that.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I want to be careful not to ask you to repeat anything that you have already testified to. I don't want to tire you out by asking the same questions over and over again.

HOUSE RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST

The next question I want to ask you is, Are you reasonably satisfied with the form of the House resolution that is about to be debated in the House?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Can we look to that as a form that would be acceptable?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. The section 3 is substantially the section redrafted by the staff of this committee.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That is about the same as the House?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. That is what the House committee has adopted, and the other significant change is the introduction of the phrase that "the authority here granted shall be carried out to the greatest extent deemed practicable by the President through the United Nations."

That is acceptable to the President and the administration.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That is in the House version?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

FEELING OF OTHER COUNTRIES TOWARD RESOLUTION

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Now I am not quite clear, Mr. Secretary, about your testimony the other day concerning the British and French situation.

Do the British and French at the present time approve of our approach to this resolution or aren't you in contact with them on that?

Secretary DULLES. We have had contact with them on it. I believe that both governments are very hopeful that this resolution will be quickly adopted. [Deleted.]

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I understood that was the case. I had talked to some British friends but I was not quite sure.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Smith; we did not hear everything. What were the two countries?

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Britain and France.

I want to go to the next step, the Arab countries over there.

Do we feel, with the exception of Syria and Egypt, the Arab countries approve of our position in this Middle East resolution?

They would be likely to look to us for help in case they were in danger?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir, and we are not at all sure that even Egypt and Syria object. We understand that their views will be more fully conveyed to us by King Saud when he arrives here on the basis of the talks which he had before he left.

There has been so far no official rejection of it by the Egyptians or the Syrians.

[Deleted.]

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Secretary, I feel that these inter-relationships of the Arabs are so important to this whole picture that that is another justification for prompt action by us of the resolution.

I wanted to bring that out because I feel very strongly. I must have a complete understanding so far as I can from the administration as to what these issues are, and how we can help by backing the administration up in trying to bring about a picture where the Arab world is backing us in this approach.

I won't ask any more questions now, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. You have concluded?

Mr. Sparkman?

CHANGES CONTEMPLATED IN MUTUAL AID PROGRAM

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I will be very brief. I note the three things that you want removed from the present laws as they affect our mutual aid program. The first one is the April 30 deadline. It seems to me that is perfectly reasonable and not subject to any questions.

The next one is on the percentage on loans.

Now in what way? Would you just lift the percentage completely or just leave it entirely to the discretion of the President as to whether he would make loans or grants?

Secretary DULLES. As regards the \$200 million, yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, that is what I mean.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. And on the third one, military assistance be relieved from some of those restrictions of section 142 (a), I assume that would be necessary if we were actually going to move military equipment into those countries in case of an aggressive attack.

Would it need to be free of those restrictions just for lending military assistance to those countries?

Secretary DULLES. Senator, are you asking whether 142 (a) would apply or whether 142 (a) is objectionable?

Senator SPARKMAN. As I understand it, you want to be relieved from 2 or 3 different restrictions in there?

Secretary DULLES. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. In section 142 (a)?

Secretary DULLES. They are principally contained in section 142 (a).

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. For example, the agreement that the other country will contribute to the defensive strength and so forth of the free world.

The use of that phrase "The free world" has connotations in that part of the world which principally seem to, in their mind, refer to Britain and France, and it looks as though this in an agreement they would devote their economic strength to helping Britain and France.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is that the principal reason?

You feel it is a feeling directed toward Britain and France that would cause them to hesitate to go into that kind of an agreement?

Secretary DULLES. It is partly that. It is partly also the fact that they consider that these provisions are pretty vague. They are extremely sensitive about their own sovereignty, and do not want to be accused of having bartered away their own sovereignty in order to get this assistance.

For instance, this article 10 "permits continuous observation and review by United States representatives of the program of assistance," and so forth.

Well, they say "that permits you to go like spies all through our country. It is the kind of thing which we did not allow the Soviets to do when they gave us arms and we don't think we should do it in your case."

We run up against a whole gamut of suspicions. Countries which are recently freed from colonialism have these suspicions to a much greater extent than countries that have long been free.

These provisions were drawn up, I think, in 1951 with primary relation to Europe, and they just do not fit the situation in the Middle East at the present time.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I see that occasions might arise when perhaps projects might be desirable that are not contemplated under the Mutual Security Act. [Deleted.]

Let me say this: I believe you know that I have strongly supported the economic aid program in the past and, I think, by all means there ought to be an economic aid program in the Middle East. Personally, I believe that it ought to be coupled with such military programs as we provide.

I personally would like to see it continue as 1 package and not be broken into 2 parts, but the thing that has concerned me, and I think it has concerned a great many people all over the country, is a feeling that has grown up that there is so much uncertainty attached to the type of program that you would seek to put into operation under this economic aid that you seek, a blank check, as they refer to it.

Is it anticipated that the program would differ greatly from the program that is going on now in those different countries?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. In the statement which I read here at the opening—

Senator SPARKMAN. If you covered it I won't ask you to go back, but I was not able to be here at that time.

NEED FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN MIDDLE EAST AID

Secretary DULLES. I said it might be the uses would be the same as were contemplated at the time of justification by the Congress last year, but that in view of the drastic change in some situations, I said I thought it was probable some better uses could be found for at least some of the money, and that particularly we ought to have more time in which to make our commitments.

Senator SPARKMAN. Isn't the basic need economically there for programs and projects that will enable the people of that country to develop their own resources, perhaps over a period of many years, and thereby raise their standard of living?

Secretary DULLES. That is the basic need, and certainly that aspect of the matter ought not, I think, to be ignored in favor of short-term situations.

On the other hand, you may face a crisis in some of these situations that can only be dealt with by some short-term aid of a kind which was not contemplated last year.

We would try, of course, to hold that to a very minimum, but the situation is so chaotic there, threatens to disintegrate at such a rapid rate, that I think we should have some flexibilities to deal with those contingencies.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I have a good many other questions that I would like to ask, but I have had a call to come to my office and I am going to have to go.

[Deleted.]

I am sorry that I must go.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Johnson of Texas.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, I have two matters that the committee will be confronted with shortly that I should like to have you give thought to and perhaps get your acquiescence or your recommendation or your views.

First of all, the matter I brought up earlier in the morning. I have had the legislative counsel, in cooperation with the staff of the committee, prepare an amendment that I believe would be suitable which I believe would be in keeping with your general intentions in this matter, will not violate the views of the Executive with regard to reporting to Congress, as explained in his veto message of July 16, 1956, would clear out a lot of this doubt that exists, and I should like to read it to you and ask that you have your people study it and maybe give me any comment that you have.

"Add the following new sentence at the end of section 3."

I want to particularly call attention to the distinguished minority leader and the chairman of the minority conference to this language, because both of them have participated in the past in asking for reports to the appropriate committees and that the Executive come into agreement with the committees. I make the distinction here that I do not ask that the committee agree to what the Executive does because of the very strong views held by the Executive both under Democratic administrations and under Republican administrations.

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW TO PRECEDE PROPOSED EXPENDITURE

Add the following new sentence to the end of section 3:

None of the authorities contained in this section shall be used until 15 days after the appropriate committees of the Congress have been furnished a report showing the object of proposed expenditure and the country within which it is proposed to use such authority.

Senator KNOWLAND. Where does that go, Senator?

Senator JOHNSON. At the end of section 3.

Now, Mr. Secretary, it is my intention to have that apply only to the \$200 million. I am not talking about what has previously been authorized and appropriated, but only to the \$200 million that you are asking that the wraps be taken off of.

Secretary DULLES. That is right.

Senator JOHNSON. And as a result of that request, the doubt has been created that perhaps you are going to undertake great international developments on the Nile, and while here at home the leaders in your party have required us to report every garage lease that is made in San Francisco to the committee and come in agreement with them, yet we are coming along here and giving carte blanche authority to spent \$200 million and perhaps initiate expenditures that could run to \$200 billion without any knowledge of what they might be.

In the private conversations I have had with you, I do not think I break any confidence when I say that you have no intention of making any allotments in secrecy, and that when the recommendations come in, it is your intention to bring them to the committee anyway.

I think if we adopted this language, that each person in both Houses would be in a much better position to say to their people then that "we voted for it not just because we do have faith in the President and the Secretary of State" although I want to make it abundantly clear that I do have—"but that before they make any commitment based on their judgment, it will be submitted to the Congress. I will have a full opportunity to talk for 15 days if I want to and alarm and alert the people of the Nation about this monstrosity that is about to be undertaken."

In my opinion that not only strengthens the case of the administration and strengthens your hand, in view of the intentions you have expressed, but it certainly makes it much more palatable to the Members of Congress who have spoken so long and loud about blank checks.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator yield there?

Senator BUSH. Will the Senator yield there?

Senator JOHNSON. I will first yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Senator SALTONSTALL. It is not absolutely clear in my mind though I think it may be clear. That \$200 million in section 3, the Secretary has testified I think twice that it is to be used for military as well as economic purposes. Does the Senator's amendment apply to military uses as well?

Senator JOHNSON. It does.

I yield to my friend from Connecticut.

Senator BUSH. Does the Senator's amendment indicate that approval at this end of the avenue is required?

Senator JOHNSON. Not in the least.

Senator BUSH. It is purely an informative proposition?

Senator JOHNSON. Exactly; for this reason: The Senator from Texas is not one who objects to approval being required. He has supported that principle. He has supported his delightful friend from California when he seconded the motion I believe, Senator Knowland, to require a Democratic administration to bring forward every contract involving as much as \$10,000, and to come in agreement with the appropriate committees.

A Democratic President vetoed that on the ground that it was interfering with his constitutional authority.

Subsequently that language in effect became law because it was put on as a rider to another piece of legislation that he could not very well veto.

Last year the Congress passed bill H. R. 9803 that authorized certain construction at military installations and for other purposes, and the President vetoed that bill, and he vetoed it on the ground that it was an encroachment upon the authority of the Executive.

But I call to the attention of the committees some very significant language which the Senator from Texas has borne in mind in drafting this amendment, which was included in the Presidential message, and I quote:

I am persuaded that the true purpose of the Congress in the enactment of both of these provisions was to exercise a close and full legislative oversight of important programs of the Department of Defense. This purpose can be properly attained by requiring timely reports from the Executive. Such reports would provide the Congress with the basis for any further legislative action it may find necessary.

There he set a standard, there he pointed to the way. There he set up the guideposts. It seems almost that he must have had this thing in mind when he pointed out to us what we could do that would not encroach on his authority, and at the same time would not put us in the very untenable position of just voting \$200 million without any knowledge of what might happen.

We may not always have this President, we may not always have this Secretary of State, we may not always have the people who make these recommendations.

All this amendment proposes to do is to say what in effect the Secretary said in response to Senator Morse's statement the other day. It will be his purpose when the Richards mission makes its recommendation, or any other mission that makes it, when he reaches his conclusions on it, to bring that information to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

Now we just say in the resolution that that will be done. I hope that the Secretary can enthusiastically embrace this, because I think it improves it. I think it improves it from the administration's standpoint, and certainly I think it would be much more palatable to Members of Congress.

Mr. Secretary, I should like to have any comment you may care to make on it.

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator JOHNSON. Yes, I yield.

Senator WILEY. My understanding from the testimony as I have listened to it day after day is that in the Middle East we are meeting situations, may have to meet situations that will call for a quick determination in relation to the utilization of funds in various ways, the same ways that were suggested even by Benjamin Franklin in the days of the Revolution that he use funds.

After all, we are fighting for our very existence, unless we are all fooled about the seriousness of the Middle East.

If it is as serious as we are informed that it is, quick action will have to be taken, funds will have to be used not simply in buying machinery for war but in giving economic assistance. [Deleted.]

I am wondering whether the Senator had in mind anything of that character?

Senator JOHNSON. I certainly did. I had in mind what the President must have had in mind when he said that he proposed to await the recommendations of this mission that would take at least 6 weeks. I am saying 15 days.

The President is waiting 6 weeks before he makes any recommendations in the matter. The Secretary of State has testified time and time again that our normal diplomatic machinery is not sufficient to determine, (a), our course of action, (b), the extent of our aid, (c), the type of projects. For that reason he is taking very unusual steps to send former Chairman Richards and others to that area some time in the future, perhaps in the next 2 or 3 weeks I hope, when we can get this measure passed.

I do not think, I cannot visualize any economic or military project, and I do not believe that our military authorities or our diplomatic authorities could visualize anyone that would not permit the Congress to consider or at least have knowledge of for a period of 2 weeks.

The President said that if he intends to use the authority given him to employ troops, that if Congress is in session that he plans to come and tell the Congress about it immediately.

If it is not, that he will get the Congress in session.

I am not one who is in a position to say that the conduct of our foreign policy, either under the past administration or under this administration, has been one of bungling and ineptitude. It is mighty easy to criticize.

Mr. Secretary, I think you have made mistakes just as I have made mistakes, and perhaps am making one now.

We are not infallible. But I do not know if I had been Secretary of State or if I had named the Secretary of State that the results would have been any better than they have been under your administration.

It is not the purpose of this amendment to reflect on the administration nor to hogtie—nor to hamstring.

The purpose of it is to make it more digestible and acceptable to 160 million people.

Very frankly, the people of my State who have felt pretty strongly about internationalism, most of my mail indicates that they are somewhat frightened by what they have read, and I would like for them to know that their 2 Senators are not going to read about 1 of these great projects for the development of the Nile in the newspapers without having any knowledge about it and that they and their grandchildren are going to be committed to pay for it to the tune of several billion dollars.

I don't think they are going to, not if you are Secretary of State and even though we have a Republican President.

I don't agree that that is best for the country, I don't want you to understand me as saying that, but we have it and we are apparently going to have it for 4 years and I would be for this even if we had a Democratic President. I was for it when Truman was President, I was for it even for \$10,000. I was for it even when Senator Bridges and Senator Knowland said before you can spend over \$10,000 on leases, that you come back and not report to the committee but come in to agreement.

Now, the President objects to that language and I can understand why he does, although I would still support that. I don't think he would support it. I am a practical man, I am a realist, but I think we can do the same thing that he suggests here in his veto message.

"The purpose can be properly attained by requiring timely reports from the Executive," and that is what this amendment proposes to do, and I would like to have the Secretary's reiteration of his intentions in the matter as well as his views on this particular amendment which he has not seen until just now.

Secretary DULLES. Senator, I am glad to reiterate my intentions in the matter. It is in the statement which I first read and I reaffirm it now.

As far as the language of this goes and as to the desirability of carrying it out through a provision in the joint resolution as against an understanding which would be arrived at between the Executive and these committees or reflected in the report, and in view of the possible constitutional aspects involved to which you have alluded, I would prefer not to make any definitive statement about this particular draft at this particular time, but I will do so very promptly.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DULLES. May I add I also appreciate very highly indeed, Senator, the personal remarks which you were good enough to make?

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, I want to point out that I have tried to bear in mind the constitutional aspects, and although several times the Congress has passed language unanimously requiring the Executive to come in agreement with the committee, that I have purposely avoided employing that language because of the views of the Executive.

I have tried to follow the advice of the President to require a timely report, and in the light of that most material modification, I hope that it will not take you too long to reach a conclusion on it, and I hope that that conclusion may be a favorable one.

Secretary DULLES. I think you can appreciate, Senator, in view of the fact that this touches on the Presidency, that I would not want to comment on it without consulting with the President.

Senator JOHNSON. I understand.

Now I should like to have the attention of the Senator from Arkansas if I may, as well as the Secretary.

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION LEADING UP TO PRESENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

The Senator from Arkansas has a motion pending before the committee which I assume we will vote on later in the day or at the earliest opportunity, and that motion reads in part—it is a request to the Secretary of State.

I shall read it to the Secretary of State.

The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services sitting jointly to consider Senate Joint Resolution 19, a joint resolution proposed by the President relative to the Middle East situation, requests that they be supplied with such documents, telegrams, memorandums, and exhibits as will provide a full and fair understanding of the present situation in the Middle East, with particular reference to the period beginning January 1952.

The committees desire such information as soon as possible but they will not delay action on Senate Joint Resolution 19 pending receipt of such information. The Committee on Foreign Relations will undertake to provide suitable storage of classified material and access to such material will be restricted to the members of the staffs of the two committees. It will be returned to the executive branch within a reasonable time.

Mr. Chairman, when that motion was made and I was asked to express an opinion on it, speaking solely for myself I said that I saw no reason why the Department of State or any other department should not welcome enthusiastically and eagerly an opportunity to review any program or any plans past or present with the appropriate congressional committees at any time.

However, I would not support a motion to do so prior to action on this resolution.

It is my understanding that the Senator from Arkansas does not expect his motion to have that effect; is that correct?

Senator FULBRIGHT. I will say to the Senator that personally I would still wish to have it prior to voting on this resolution, but that recognizing the situation of the committee, I expect to make the motion as indicated by the Senator from Texas and that I concede it would be a futile gesture to ask the committees to delay consideration of the Resolution 19, as the Senator has stated.

Senator JOHNSON. I wonder if the Senator from Arkansas will take that motion and after the word "request" consider eliminating the following language, and I should like for the Secretary to follow me if he has a copy of the motion.

Secretary DULLES. I do not have a copy, I am sorry to say, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON. I wonder if the clerk would supply you with one. The present language of the motion says:

Request that they be supplied with such documents, telegrams, memoranda, and exhibits as will provide a full and fair understanding of the present situation in the Middle East.

Now I should like to strike all of that language and provide this in lieu thereof:

Request that the Department provide a thoroughly documented chronological statement of all the events with particular reference to the period beginning in January 1952 that have contributed significantly to the present situation in the Middle East.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield at that point?

Senator JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. The only observation I would like to make to the distinguished majority leader at this time, I merely think it points up the difficulty that the committee is facing. I would hope that the Senator from Arkansas would not put his motion until we had completed the action on the current resolution, because at that time it is entirely possible that we might want to extend this some and not limit it merely to the period from 1952.

I do not know quite why he picks that particular year. For instance, since these hearings have commenced I learned as a Senator for the first time that in 1946 or thereabouts, or 1945, a letter had been given to King Ibn Saud by the previous administration guaranteeing to protect him against occupation.

I have no particular objection to that having been done by executive agreement, but at least as a Member of the Senate I had no knowledge of that fact, and I might want to extend this to go back a few more years beyond 1952.

Senator JOHNSON. The Senator from Texas has no pride of authorship in any date, whether it is January 1952 or January 1942.

The point the Senator from Texas wants to get at is he feels that this might be misconstrued as an attempt to require the B. & O. Railroad to take all of its private cars and cart everything down here from the State Department and the Congress to store it, and I do not think that is the intent of the motion.

I was hopeful that the Senator from Arkansas and the Secretary together would agree that the language proposed by the Senator from Texas would be preferable to the language now in the motion, and then if the Senator from California or any other Senator wants to change the amendment as modified by the Senator from Texas, of course that will be up to them and the pleasure of the committee.

Senator KNOWLAND. The Senator from California was merely suggesting that for the very reasons as have been pointed out that we are now occupying time with this resolution, that if we could put that aside until we had completed action on the current resolution, then we could go into just how far we wanted this historic review to go, how much ground we wanted it to cover.

Senator JOHNSON. I think the Senator will find the Secretary of State is not going to be here this afternoon.

No. 2, that Senator Fulbright plans to call up his motion before.

Chairman GREEN. May I read a statement?

We are having two sessions today. One was to hear the Secretary bring up points which he had in mind, and I do not know, I suppose we can sit here as long as he cares to.

This afternoon he will not be present and we are going to take up business of the committee at half past 2.

Would not that be a more appropriate time to bring up this matter?

Senator JOHNSON. It would not at all. I do not understand that this committee is limited to matters only that the Secretary desires to bring up, No. 1.

No. 2, I want the Secretary's view on this language today because he is not going to be here this afternoon.

No. 3, I think I am perfectly within my rights to ask him that question.

Chairman GREEN. Certainly you are.

Senator JOHNSON. First of all, I would like to have the reaction of the Senator from Arkansas.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I have no desire to burden the Secretary or the State Department with vast amounts of documents.

I will say to the Senator that this language is modeled after the language of the Senator from Georgia at the time of the MacArthur affair and that was an intelligent committee and a well-run hearing.

Senator RUSSELL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Everybody agrees with that. That is the reason for this language. It at that time did not prove to be embarrassing as I understand it, so that while it is not my language, I am copying the precedent that the Senator from Georgia on that committee set.

However, the objective the Senator is seeking is quite all right with me. I don't wish to be burdened down with unnecessary documents either. There always arises the difficult question of just what significance and so on, but we will have that anyway and I presume the committee at any time can request, if they think that there is something they need in addition, they can make such a request.

I would assume that is understood, that we will not fall out about the furnishing of a document. So I am perfectly willing if there is any advantage to that.

I do have considerable confidence in the procedure followed before.

That was the only reason for this and I would be content with either one.

Senator JOHNSON. Would the Senator accept that modification then and we could have that understanding to pick up such support as it might bring?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Either language, either this or the Senator's suggestion?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would you read in full the language?

Senator JOHNSON. I just want to get his views and the Secretary's views.

There is no intention to pass anything. I thought the purpose of the Secretary's appearance was to give the members his views in response to matters they had in mind. This is very important to the Senator from Texas and he would like to have his views on it.

Senator RUSSELL. I have no objection to that.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would it be possible to read the resolution?

Senator JOHNSON. I submitted my copy to the Secretary.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Could I ask the Senator from Texas, it is quite clear that he does not intend by this language to exclude the furnishing of classified material. It would not have that effect.

As far as the character of the material it would be the same.

Senator JOHNSON. It certainly would not. The purpose of the language I think would eliminate the impression that the committee was asking for bales of files which would denude the State Department, and have every single document pertaining to all this, and it would be a rather unreasonable request to make of him.

I hope that this is reasonable.

Now in response to the question of the Senator from Massachusetts, the present language is—

that they be supplied with such documents, telegrams, memoranda and exhibits that will provide a fair, full understanding of the present situation in the Middle East, with particular reference to the period beginning in January 1952.

That language is stricken and the following is substituted:

The State Department will provide a thoroughly documented chronological statement of all the events with particular reference to the period beginning in January 1952 that have contributed significantly to the present situation—in that period.

Now if you want to change the dates on it you can decide whether you want to change the language.

It is not a matter of most vital importance, but I would like to have an expression before he left because he won't be available this afternoon.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Are you suggesting that we vote on this now?

Senator JOHNSON. I have attempted to make abundantly clear to all members that I have not asked for anything except a comment from the Secretary as to whether or not this improves the language.

I made clear to Senator Russell I did not want to vote. I wanted

Senator Fulbright to be aware of the attempt to improve it, and I want Secretary Dulles to be aware of it and have his comments, if I may.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Thank you.

STATE DEPARTMENT APPROVAL OF RESOLUTION IN PRESENT FORM

Secretary Dulles. Mr. Chairman, as far as the State Department is concerned, I think that we would welcome the opportunity to make such a chronological documented report as now suggested. It would not be feasible in my opinion to comply with the resolution as first suggested, for the reason that perhaps the most significant of the material in this whole case is quite personal correspondence which has occurred between certain heads of governments during this period, and there is a rule of international practice that such correspondence should not be made available other than to the recipient without mutual consent.

[Deleted.]

Secretary Dulles. Also because it involves in many cases reference to third countries which ought not be made public even to members of these committees at this time.

[Deleted.]

Secretary Dulles. I discussed the matter with President Eisenhower. He said that he would not be willing to have his personal correspondence made available in the form indicated by the original resolution.

So I think there would be perhaps insuperable obstacles to the original resolution.

I believe, however, that the purpose which is sought to be achieved can be achieved within the compass of the resolution suggested by the Senator from Texas, and I may say that as far as the State Department is concerned, we would be very happy to comply with it.

EXTENT OF RESOLUTION

We have accepted in this situation a very large measure of criticism which we think it is better to endure rather than to publish events and circumstances which in our opinion would gravely prejudice for the future relations with our very good allies, the British and the French. We would still expect to pursue that policy even under the resolution of the Senator from Texas, which I assume would not require necessarily the disclosure of details which could not be disclosed without injuring the security of the United States.

But I believe that in the main what the Senator from Texas has in mind can be achieved under the form of resolution which he proposes, and subject only to the qualifications I have suggested, the State Department would be very happy to cooperate with such a resolution.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator RUSSELL. Will the Senator yield to me for one moment?

Senator JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I want to make just a brief observation.

PRIVILEGED INFORMATION

This has been a matter of controversy since the earliest days of the Republic between Congress and the executive branch as to how far the Congress can call on the President for information.

It was first signalized I believe by the decision *Marbury v. Madison* in the administration of President Madison. I am perfectly willing to improve this procedure, but I do not want my vote on this amendment to be taken as complete acceptance of a theory that the Executive has the sole control over documents of such vast importance as are involved in this matter.

I just merely wish to make that reservation for the record so that in any future case if any matter comes up you can't point to this as a precedent to contend that I am bound by it.

Of course we have absolutely no power to force the President to disclose anything he does not want to disclose, and the conversations that he has with foreign ambassadors have generally been considered matters of the highest privilege, but so far as the respective rights of the legislative and the executive branches are concerned to have information that is available to the other, as a matter of general policy it must be determined in my judgment on the basis of every individual case and every document that is involved.

Senator JOHNSON. I share the views expressed by the Senator from Georgia and I think that neither under the Fulbright original resolution nor as it is proposed to be modified, would that question enter into it, because the Fulbright resolution says "such documents, telegrams, memoranda and exhibits as will provide a fair and full understanding," and as I understand it, it would not require the presentation of every bit of personal conversation or personal correspondence that the President might have had.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Chairman GREEN. This meeting this morning was supposed to be to hear the Secretary of State answer questions which you might have to ask him and so he might volunteer information which he might want us to have.

This afternoon's meeting is called so that we may take action on this and other matters which may come before us, and anything that is stated here, elicited for the purpose of acting this afternoon, is quite in order, but I don't think we should act at this meeting, in fairness to those who are absent.

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask an observation or ask the Senator from Texas to yield if he has the floor?

Senator JOHNSON. First I yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

MEANING OF LANGUAGE

Senator FULBRIGHT. I want to correct an understanding now. I am not at all sure that I can accept the implication of the Secretary's interpretation of this language when it says "of course make no details available."

If he interprets "thoroughly documented" to mean or not to mean that we would be entitled to any of the basic proof of his conclusions, of course I cannot agree on that.

The two difficult things to interpret are what does "fair, full understanding" require in that language and what does "thoroughly documented" mean?

If it means that we are not entitled to any of it because of details or any of the basic proof of relationship, that would not be satisfactory at all.

I am not interested in just a generalized statement relative to their policy. We have had that.

Senator JOHNSON. If I may answer the Senator, as far as the purpose of the Senator from Texas is concerned, it is my purpose to give the State Department an opportunity to put together the facts as they see them that would either explain or, you might say, justify their policies as requested to do so by the Senator's remarks.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not understand quite what the Secretary meant when he said he could not supply the details.

Senator JOHNSON. I understood the Secretary to say that it was correspondence between the governments and perhaps between the President and the heads of state of other governments that they would not make available.

Senator KNOWLAND. Will the Senator yield?

I think the whole basic matter hinges on the fact as to whether those documents are significant in character on the development of our foreign policy, and I for one am not willing to let the State Department and the President take the abusive criticism if because of our obligation to foreign countries, Great Britain, France or any other country, significant data has to be eliminated which if available would put an entirely different light on the subject matter. That is why I felt that this matter had better be debated more fully this afternoon, because I think there are some very basic issues involved here.

Senator JOHNSON. I am not attempting to prolong debate, the Senator understands, and I will be prepared to discuss it at such length as anybody may desire this afternoon.

I am trying to yield to this friend and to this friend and to the Senator from California.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would the Senator yield?

Senator JOHNSON. Yes.

Chairman GREEN. Action on this matter will be taken at our meeting this afternoon.

Now as I understand it, the Secretary is asked to make any observations which he may care to on these drafts which have been proposed and which have been brought up now in advance.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Is it my understanding—and I thank the Senator for yielding and the chairman for making it possible for me to make this brief statement of my understanding—it is my understanding that while the Secretary is present that he put emphasis on the word "significant," significant documents, and he has explained why he thinks some of the possibly significant documents may not be available.

I agree with the Senator from Georgia that we have got to interpret the word "significant" for ourselves with each document, get the generalized statement of what the Secretary thinks is significant when the time comes when we see it.

I would hope that the Secretary would make as clear to us as is possible now if he has not already done so as to how he interprets the word "significant."

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Secretary, would you care to make any further statement?

Secretary DULLES. I would like to see again the draft of the Senator from Texas.

DOCUMENTS WHICH COULD BE FURNISHED

I think that we could consistently with what I have said supply a statement of the events which have contributed significantly to the present situation. I do not interpret the word "events" as necessarily meaning the text or details of correspondence.

Senator GREEN. Is there anything else you wish to say before we adjourn?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, are we going to adjourn now?

Chairman GREEN. The Secretary will not be here this afternoon.

Senator KNOWLAND. I was hoping that I might have not more than 2 minutes to raise one question here with the Secretary before he got away.

Secretary DULLES. I can wait here, Senator, until 1:30 if that is the desire of the committee.

QUESTION OF RETURN OF SECRETARY DULLES

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may the Senator from Missouri ask the Chair is the plan to have the Secretary return at a mutually convenient time for him and the committee for further questioning in executive session?

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Secretary, can you make that conveniently, or can you do it whether it is convenient or not?

Secretary DULLES. I will try to do so. I realize the tremendous, perhaps overriding importance of this particular matter at this particular time. Of course the committee will also appreciate that there are many responsibilities which devolve upon me, there are critical aspects of this situation being dealt with at the present time in New York before the United Nations.

We are having the visit here of King Saud this week. I am in the dilemma of wanting to give every possible moment to accelerating the passage of this resolution, while at the same time there are some other things which would be gravely jeopardized if I do not give them some attention.

At least I feel that I must be available for a considerable period of King Saud's visit.

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion? That the Chair might ascertain from each Senator about how long they think they would take and then find when the Secretary can come back and complete this.

Chairman GREEN. I think the objection to that is it is impossible to estimate how long the discussion may be.

Secretary DULLES. Will you permit me to make a suggestion? I have answered quite a lot of questions and I think the record will show that. If there were particular questions which remained to

be answered, would it be possible perhaps to reduce those to writing and let me answer them in writing?

Senator Mansfield, for example, submitted a number of questions in writing which I answered in writing. I think the Senator from Arkansas also submitted a number of questions in writing which we answered. That process might perhaps accelerate the situation and spare a little bit of my time, because many of these answers can in fact be given as well by assistants of mine, although they of course should be given under my responsibility.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I think we have to recognize the Secretary does have a very heavy week here ahead of him. Since there are other witnesses that we will want to hear, and since their testimony will be evaluated in the light of the testimony of the Secretary, it appears to me that we might satisfy any personal wishes we may have as to further interrogation by going ahead with some other witnesses, and then at a later date after this important visit of King Saud and some other matters that the Secretary has to take care of, have been completed, call him back just before we get ready to vote upon the resolution.

In this way we would be able to hear from others that may be called before the committee, and still not deny any Senator the right to question the Secretary at a later date following other testimony.

Chairman GREEN. There are several drafts already that have been presented or suggested and they ought to be discussed by the committee it seems to me before we ask the Secretary his opinion on their relative value at a formal meeting.

Senator HUMPHREY. I don't know whether a motion is necessary on this but since we will, I imagine, want to hear from Admiral Radford, Mr. Hollister and some others, if we could let a few days go by where we listen to other witnesses and do our own work here in reference to these resolutions and then call on the Secretary again, we may satisfy everyone and still not inconvenience anyone.

If there is no objection to that, it seems to me we might expedite the business along those lines.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, that would be entirely satisfactory with me.

Senator RUSSELL. Will the Senator from California yield?

The majority leader and the minority leader have great responsibilities that do not devolve upon the rank and file of the Senate. It so happens the Senate is not in session today and the Senator from California said he had some brief statements he wishes to make.

I am sure nobody here would object to the Senator from California proceeding out of order in the time that we have.

The Secretary says he can stay here.

Senator KNOWLAND. I don't think it will take as much as 5 minutes. I will forego the questions I have but there is a matter of clarification.

Chairman GREEN. The chairman of this meeting is willing to sit here patiently and hear the Senator from California or any other Senator bring up any matters he has in mind.

Senator RUSSELL. We have no session of the Senate today and I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from California be permitted to proceed out of order.

Chairman GREEN. Do you want to speak on this matter now?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Chairman GREEN. Unanimous consent is asked.

Any objection?

If not, you may proceed.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, I am going to foreclose some questions I had, but there is one matter of clarification which I think for the committee record should be cleared up.

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT ON BRITISH AND FRENCH TROOPS

I was in the public hearing the other day when the question arose as to British and French troops in the Middle Eastern area. I think I thoroughly understood your statement in the context of which it was given, namely, that because of developments growing out of the Suez and the Middle Eastern situation, from a public opinion point of view in the Middle East and in relation to the countries of the Middle East, it would be inadvisable to have British and French troops associated with us in that area of the world under present conditions.

I think the members of the committee that were here understood it, in the same sense that the United Nations, when I was in New York as one of the American delegation, made it clear that they thought it was inadvisable to have British and French troops included in the emergency force going to the Middle East in connection with the Suez situation.

But because of some implications that were put on your statement by troublemakers abroad who almost tried to indicate that there might have been lack of faith in British troops as fighting men or French troops as fighting men, which I know and I think every member of this committee knows is not a fact, I thought for the purpose of this record that the Secretary might like to clarify the record.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

I am very happy to clarify the record.

I may say that immediately following the hearing to which you refer, and when I learned through my press officer that this had been picked up and misinterpreted, I authorized the issuance of a statement from the State Department to the effect that this was not intended to reflect in the slightest upon the valor and training and discipline of the British and French military forces, which we regard as among the very best in the world and upon which we would gladly depend if we were in any fighting war.

I spoke as I did precisely in relation to the present situation, particularly in Egypt, where due to the fact that the British and the French forces had been there as enemies fighting Arabs, and were being or had recently been withdrawn pursuant to the United Nations decision, anything indicating that they would be brought back under these present conditions would not be useful. The same reasoning led the United Nations itself, as you have pointed out, not to include British and French in the United Nations emergency force which is in Egypt at the present time.

I think also if the record is examined—and I am only referring to it by recollection, I have not myself seen the text—it will be seen that I spoke of "at the present time."

Certainly we hope very much that those conditions will rapidly change, and indeed they do not prevail throughout the whole of the

area at the present time, I am glad to say. But there are parts of the area where at the moment, due to the fact that the British and French forces have been in there as hostile forces, their reintroduction at this time or the suggestion that they would be reintroduced would not promote the purposes of this resolution.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, I wish to thank you for making the statement to the committee because I was concerned in reading some of the despatches from both London and Paris which indicated some people who appeared to be provocateurs were seeking to drive a wedge between the British, the French, and ourselves by trying to take this out of context.

VALOR OF BRITISH AND FRENCH TROOPS

I think every American recognizes both the valor and the fighting qualities of both the British and the French troops. They were our allies in Europe; they were our stout allies in World War I and World War II; and it would be, I think, a grave injustice to the relationships between our several nations if by taking the Secretary's statement out of context it made trouble between our countries when his statement solely related to the same type of situation that made the United Nations determine that it would be imprudent at this time to use British and French troops in the emergency force in the Suez area and in the Middle Eastern area.

Secretary DULLES. I agree entirely, Senator, and I am very glad you gave me the opportunity to clear it up on the record of this meeting.

Senator KNOWLAND. Thank you, that is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee for making the unanimous consent request.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for attending.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Senator SYMINGTON. Before the chairman adjourns the meeting I would appreciate the opportunity of being heard. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Missouri would like to respectfully request again, is there an opportunity going to come to the other Senators to question the Secretary of State in executive hearing?

Chairman GREEN. I think perhaps another time would be just as well to begin where we left off today.

Senator RUSSELL. I assume, Mr. Chairman, that is what you would do.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Senator from Minnesota I thought had a constructive suggestion, but in any case in order to be in a position to tell my constituents about the matter in a broad way as to whether the Senator from Missouri was going to have an opportunity to question the Secretary of State—

Chairman GREEN. I agree with the Senator.

The meeting will resume at 2:30 this afternoon in executive session.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. of the same day in executive session.)

THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST

TUESDAY, JANUARY 29, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D. C.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The committees met, pursuant to recess, at 10:45 a. m., in room 212 Senate Office Building, Senator Theodore Francis Green (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations) presiding.

Present: Senators Green (presiding), Fulbright, Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Kennedy, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Langer, Knowland, Aiken, and Capehart.

Senators Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Johnson, Kefauver, Ervin, Saltonstall, Bridges, Flanders, Smith of Maine, Case, Bush, and Barrett.

Also present: Rear Adm. C. K. Bergin, USN, OASD (ISA) director NESA region; Col. J. M. Whitfield, USAF, OASD (ISA); Capt. W. C. Mott, USN, military assistant to Admiral Radford; Capt. Ray M. Pitts, USN, special assistant to Chairman, JCS; and Robert G. Barnes, special assistant, Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State.

Chairman GREEN. Admiral, before you proceed I would like to make a statement myself. I want to announce to the members of the committee that last night Senator Russell, Senator Saltonstall, Senator Wiley, and I met in accordance with your instructions and agreed to invite the following witnesses to appear before the committee: Ambassador George A. Wadsworth, United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; former Ambassador Jefferson Caffery; Ambassador Henry Byroade, United States Ambassador to the Union of South Africa, formerly United States Ambassador to Egypt.

Your committee felt that each of these witnesses had special qualifications to enable him to assist us in our consideration of this resolution.

In addition, in accordance with the action of the joint committee yesterday, Assistant Secretary Douglas MacArthur has been invited to appear before us.

PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION

Our witness this morning is Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States.

We are very glad to hear from you, Admiral.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Chairman GREEN. Certainly.

Senator JOHNSON. Will this testimony be censored and then released?

Chairman GREEN. Yes; is that agreeable to you, Admiral?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, one procedural point on that. I completely agree that the admiral should have the right to censor his own testimony, but the understanding would be the same, I assume, as in the MacArthur hearings, that the original testimony, however, will remain locked up in the files of the committee uncensored.

Senator RUSSELL. That has always been the case as I understand it, that the original record is kept in the secret files of the committee with all classified papers, and the discussion only would be related to that which would be related to the press, television, radio, and other media of communication.

Senator MORSE. I understand that but I want to be sure it is the committee's understanding and the witness' understanding.

Chairman GREEN. Is there a meeting of minds on this?

Admiral RADFORD. It is satisfactory to me, sir.

Chairman GREEN. Then will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF ADM. ARTHUR W. RADFORD, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral RADFORD. Mr. Chairman, I have no prepared statement. I urge the passage of this resolution. I think it would, from a purely military standpoint, contribute in part to the solution of some of the very difficult problems in the Middle Eastern area. It would tend also to stabilize a situation which I think without this action will get much worse.

I suggest I now make myself available to answer specific questions from the members of the committee.

Chairman GREEN. Then we will proceed as you suggest and let such of the members of the committee as desire question you in order of seniority. Senator Russell, have you any questions?

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator RUSSELL. Admiral, do you have any definite opinion as to the scope and the extent of military assistance programs that might properly be employed in this area?

Admiral RADFORD. You mean as a result of this resolution?

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, sir; and under the existing law. I do not believe we have any really comprehensive military-aid program at the present time in this area.

Admiral RADFORD. Under our present program, in this general area of the Middle East, we include Greece and Turkey and they both have large programs.

Senator RUSSELL. They have rather been overlooked in this discussion.

Admiral RADFORD. Then we have Pakistan in this general area, and that program is quite large.

[Deleted.]

One of our difficulties in working on these military-aid programs with individual countries is the fact that we cannot say, "We will come in to help you at a particular time and way."

We can't sit down and plan with them for an actual or a supposed situation where they are attacked. If we can sit down and talk with them, then perhaps we can persuade them to build their forces on an agreed plan. In many cases this should result in less expense to both of us. This is particularly true in the case of airpower. Many countries, for instance, are anxious to have the latest jet fighters. We feel in most cases that they could not properly utilize and maintain jet aircraft.

If they are assured of our assistance, then we can persuade them perhaps to build their forces to fit in with that assistance, and in general not give them the equipment which is so expensive.

[Deleted.]

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET ATTACK ON MIDDLE EAST

Senator RUSSELL. I believe that we are furnishing some arms now to Iran, to Saudi Arabia, and to Iraq; is that right?

Admiral RADFORD. We have a grant-aid program to Iran, a grant-aid program to Iraq, but we have had only reimbursable aid going to Saudi Arabia.

Senator RUSSELL. Is that program designed to give these people military strength that would be of real value to the free world in the event of a third world war, or is that primarily based on internal stability or looking to conditions of stability internally?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, first the consideration is to generate forces in friendly countries that can maintain internal security. The second is to give them in some cases a limited capability to resist Communist aggression.

[Deleted.]

Senator RUSSELL. The Russians may strike tonight, Admiral, but I personally have no fears of any overt Russian aggression in this period.

Admiral RADFORD. In Iran?

Senator RUSSELL. Yes.

Admiral RADFORD. I don't either.

[Deleted.]

Senator RUSSELL. Of course, Turkey does have considerable military strength. I think it is about the only bargain that we have gotten out of this whole program is Turkey's armed forces.

I have no doubt about their willingness to fight or their loyalty and determination to fight in the event of any all-out war.

[Deleted.]

DANGER OF ARMS RACE IN MIDDLE EAST

Senator RUSSELL. Admiral, in case this situation down there does not work out as you contemplate, the Russians do not cease their arms sales or whatever they are to this area, and we reannounce our military aid program, we are in an arms race there.

I realize this is a little out of your field, but I know that you are one of the chief advisers to the President and to the Secretary of State, and in constant touch with them.

Do you feel that we have exhausted every possibility of getting the United Nations to mobilize world opinion against an arms race in this area?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, I don't think so.

POWER OF WORLD OPINION

Senator RUSSELL. However tough the Soviet may talk, they are somewhat susceptible to world opinion. When the man in the street all over the world criticizes them they seem to get word back mighty quick and sometimes reverse themselves.

Admiral RADFORD. I think there will be a very marked reaction against the Russians and the Syrians and the Egyptians if they persist in building up armed forces.

I think the uncommitted Arab countries will be inclined to consider that in case this arms buildup goes on with Russian help in Syria and Egypt that world opinion will condemn it. I also think world opinion a powerful factor. I assume we will continue to make every effort in the United Nations to bring pressure of world opinion against the Communist supply of arms to the area.

Senator RUSSELL. But won't we dull that opinion if we participate in it and start out giving a great many arms now to match them? Won't the rest of the world just step back and say "Well, that is just another one of these power contests between Russia and the United States?"

It seems to me we have overlooked something.

Admiral RADFORD. I don't feel that our arms programs will be materially stepped up in these countries.

[Deleted.]

INCREASE IN THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT

Senator RUSSELL. I ask this question as one who approves giving the President the approval of the Congress to resisting Russian aggression by arms in this area if they move. At the present time I believe there are some 43 countries that we already have such commitments to, are there not, under NATO, SEATO, and ANZUS, and the Rio Pact?

Admiral RADFORD. I think I heard the Secretary of State say that we have bilateral or multilateral arrangements with 42 countries.

Senator RUSSELL. This will greatly increase that, and it comes at a time when we are told that the British are unable to carry on further there, and we read in the press that the British are planning to greatly reduce their military machine.

They are even talking about withdrawing from Germany if they do not make the Germans pay for the troops there.

I am not opposed to that. I think that we made a terrible mistake in reducing the amount that the Germans contribute to the upkeep of our troops there. That is one of the serious mistakes that we have made, but nevertheless for various reasons they are reducing their strength.

Do you think that we can live up to all of these commitments everywhere with our present armed strength, the strength that is presented to the Congress in the present budget in this year?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir; I would think so unless the situation changes very much for the worse. [Deleted.]

We have no present plans to station any large forces in the Middle East.

Senator RUSSELL. I understand; but we propose to pledge our word of honor there.

If forces are not stationed there, we would have to get them there.
Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator RUSSELL. All right sir. I certainly do not want us to get drawn into a great mess of Koreas all over the world where I think they would bleed us white and we would not accomplish a thing except to become weaker. You are then satisfied with the military establishment that is contemplated in the President's budget as being completely adequate to enable us to carry out all our worldwide commitments?

Admiral RADFORD. At this time; yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. I do not want to take all the time, Mr. Chairman. I have a number of other questions but I am sure the other Senators will ask most of them.

PROCEDURAL MATTER

Chairman GREEN. I thank you.

Before going on I would like to make a statement, not because of the questions we have just heard, but on general principles.

There are 30 Senators to ask questions, and it would be very unfortunate if they asked the same question over and over again. I hope that the questions that are asked as we go down the list may be new questions, and that they may have some definite purpose in mind.

I have been calculating in my mind if each questioner should take an hour and we sat 2 hours each morning and 2 hours more in the afternoon, which is unlikely, for 5 days a week, we would not get through in a week. I doubt very much whether the information that we got in answer to questions over so long a period would be worthwhile.

If those who ask questions could familiarize themselves with what the witness has already testified, and sought to supplement that information with additional detailed information we would stand a better chance of getting a profitable investigation.

This is not in any way an effort to limit any Senator from answering any such questions as he wishes to.

No doubt the admiral is sympathetic with that point of view.

I next call on Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I shall try to meet, as I have in the past, all constructive suggestions made by the chairman.

NEED FOR THE RESOLUTION

Admiral, not being a military man myself, and always profiting by the cross-questioning of Senator Russell, I shall stay away from that field.

You are a specialist. I assume you have consulted not only with the best military brains in this country but also with the leaders of the countries in the Near East and our allies.

Is it in the interest and the security of the United States and the free world that this resolution be passed?

Admiral RADFORD. Senator, I most emphatically do feel that way. Senator WILEY. Will you tell us why?

Admiral RADFORD. I feel from the military standpoint that we will be able to cooperate and plan with the military leaders of the friendly countries of the Middle East and help them to assure stability in their own countries. We will at the same time counter this great feeling of fear that exists in some of those countries that a Communist buildup of arms in the area cannot or will not be met.

[Deleted.]

The resolution will have a great stabilizing effect.

STOPPING SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator WILEY. When you say it stabilizes, you mean that it would keep the Kremlin away from the oil of the Middle East and away from Africa and the vital materials there?

Admiral RADFORD. It will prevent the Communists from taking over the Middle East. It will be one of the ways that we can prevent them. The resolution will solve only part of the problem, but it will certainly help a great deal in the solution to the whole problem.

Senator WILEY. As a military man is it your conviction that if the Communists did take the Middle East, with its oil, and obtained a passageway to Africa whence we get a lot of our vital materials, that coup would result in a most serious danger to the life of this Nation?

Admiral RADFORD. I cannot think of anything more dangerous, because I am sure in those circumstances Western Europe, the alliances in Western Europe, NATO, would be seriously crippled. I think that there would be a good chance of the Communists taking over Western Europe in time through sheer economic strangulation. In other words, if the Communists controlled the oil of the Middle East, they could in effect control the economy of Europe.

Senator WILEY. Is it true that the Western Hemisphere has only about one-third of the vital strategic materials in adequate supply?

Admiral RADFORD. I could not answer that. I am not sure. If you mean is the Western Hemisphere self-sustaining—

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Admiral RADFORD (continuing). In case of a world war; no.

Senator WILEY. Is that the reason that we cannot let Africa go to the Kremlin?

MEETING THE COMMUNIST THREAT

Admiral RADFORD. I think the most important reason, Senator, is that the Communists hope to communize the world without a world war. Our greatest problem in this situation of so-called cold war is to prevent such a victory for communism.

In other words, we have to meet these Communist problems and threats in various areas to keep them from taking them over without a war. If a global war should come, the pattern might be short and extremely destructive. It might not be like the wars in the past where you had to have long lines of communication bringing in materials from all over the world. In other words, you might have to fight the war to a decision with what you had when you started. But the big thing is in the case of the Middle East, if the Communists control the oil of the Middle East, two things will happen.

One, they will exercise control over the economy of Western Europe, which is most important from our standpoint, and they will also have

access to Africa, and the chances are they can gradually communize all of Africa.

Now if they should get all of Africa and all of Western Europe, then we are in a very bad situation.

Senator WILEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

(Procedural discussion deleted.)

HOUSE AMENDMENTS TO THE JOINT RESOLUTION

Senator SALTONSTALL. From a military point of view, are you satisfied with the recommendations or the additions that the House committee made to the original resolution as submitted?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator SALTONSTALL. My second question is, you have now the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. You have on it, it is my understanding, a full battalion of marines fully equipped and ready to go at a moment's notice.

The 6th Fleet is ready to go at a moment's notice with full armament and manpower and all that goes with readiness, and airplanes.

Is it your intention from a military point of view to put any more of our fleet or Army or Air Force in that area?

Admiral RADFORD. No important addition. We would not at the present time contemplate reenforcing the 6th Fleet. [Deleted.]

We have no plans to increase our forces in the Middle East in any material way.

[Deleted.]

SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MIDDLE EAST

Senator SALTONSTALL. What is our best information as to the value in dollars of the equipment that the Russians directly or indirectly have put into Egypt, Syria, and these other Arab countries?

Admiral RADFORD. It is hard to figure dollar values because the Russians can adjust the prices on their equipment, and I do not have those figures before me. [Deleted.] But I would say by our standards and our prices that they have delivered probably in the neighborhood of 250 to 300 million dollars worth of equipment to Egypt and Syria combined.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Admiral; and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Procedural discussion deleted.]

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Fulbright?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Admiral, if I understood your last question, about in the neighborhood of \$250 million, which of course we understand is the way you have to translate it if we delivered arms, that is about what Russia has put into Syria and Egypt; is that right?

Admiral RADFORD. I said 250 to 300 million.

[Deleted.]

EFFECT OF BRITISH ACTIONS ON UNITED STATES DEFENSE BUDGET

Senator FULBRIGHT. You said a moment ago that you were satisfied with the present budget as far as the Defense Department is concerned.

Is that based upon the assumption that Great Britain will continue to bear the same burden now that she is in Europe and the Middle East, if any, and in the Far East?

Admiral RADFORD. To a certain extent. The British contributions in the Far East and the Middle East do not affect our budget too much.

I would say that any considerable change in the British position in Western Europe or contributions to NATO might affect our budget, but at the present time I don't think it would affect the 1958 budget.

[Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would you have any opinion about whether it is better for our defense not to have the British in the Middle East?

Admiral RADFORD. My own feeling, the British are always fine people to have on your side in a fight. They have temporarily at least, by their actions in Suez, destroyed their usefulness to a large extent in the Middle East at this time, and they are not well received anywhere in the Middle East. [Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then you do not view that with any particular concern?

Admiral RADFORD. Not from a strictly military standpoint, no, sir.
[Deleted.]

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO PAKISTAN

Senator FULBRIGHT. If you had it to do over again would you recommend a military-aid program to Pakistan on the same scale as it has been developed?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir; I would.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What would be the cost to the United States of the next 5 years in military and economic aid of maintaining Pakistani forces at the level we are now urging them to maintain?

Admiral RADFORD. I could not answer that question offhand, sir, and I do not know whether I have the annual figures or not.

EFFECT OF SOVIET ARMS SALE TO MIDDLE EAST

Senator FULBRIGHT. You said in answer to Senator Russell, I believe, and I hope I do not misquote you because my memory may be faulty, that if Russia continues to sell arms to Egypt and Syria, they would become Communist-dominated countries, is that right?

Admiral RADFORD. I think that is a reasonable assumption because they will have such close relationships, they send people to Russia for training, they take a great many technicians, they become dependent on the Russians for spare parts, and the longer this goes on, the closer their relationships would have to be.

[Deleted.]

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET ASSISTANCE

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think that it would be fair to say that Pakistan is a United States dominated country?

Admiral RADFORD. No, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Why not?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, I am sure from my contacts with them that we do not dominate them. [Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. How do you distinguish what we do in Pakistan and to a lesser degree in Iran and Iraq from what the Russians are doing in Egypt and Syria?

Admiral RADFORD. Just the difference between our form of government and the Communists. I mean they go out deliberately to subvert these people and install a Communist-controlled government subservient to Moscow.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Aren't you going into the motives?

I mean, the actual physical actions are practically the same. I don't think we are seeking to aid them with the same motive as the Russians.

What is actually being done by us is almost the same as what the Russians are doing, isn't it?

Admiral RADFORD. I don't feel that way, Senator.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Leaving out the motives and purposes with which we do it?

Admiral RADFORD. I don't feel that we do in fact exercise the same influence that the Russians can in a satellite government, or that we attempt to.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I hope we do not. I just wondered who would be considered responsible for starting an arms race in the area?

Admiral RADFORD. Senator, I think if you talk about the arms race, we should examine its genesis. I have the very firm feeling that the Communists started the arms race when they attacked us in Korea. Certainly before that attack we had been reducing our military forces.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I certainly would agree with that. I can go back further than that probably. They never did disarm after World War II.

Admiral RADFORD. No.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am trying to see what we can say to people who say "Well, you are doing exactly the same thing they are. How can you complain about it." I am confident somebody will say this about it. I am trying to see what the answers are if there are any.

[Deleted].

Senator SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator yield for one question?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS WITH EGYPT

Senator SALTONSTALL. Admiral, have you any knowledge that we ever broke any agreements for furnishing arms to Nasser? I say that because he told three of my colleagues and myself that the reason he went over into the Russian armament was that we did not live up to our agreements with him.

Admiral RADFORD. I do not think that is right, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I assumed it was not correct.

Admiral RADFORD. No, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Your answer is we never broke any agreements that you know of?

Admiral RADFORD. Not that I know of; no, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Senator.

COMPARISON TO FORMOSA SITUATION

Senator FULBRIGHT. Admiral Radford, in what respects is the military situation in the Middle East like the situation prior to the passage of the Formosa resolution?

Admiral RADFORD. I would say that in this particular instance the danger of overt aggression is not quite so far advanced. We have a little more time to take steps to prevent or deter actual outbreak of hostilities than we did in the Formosa resolution.

We were almost confronted there with an outbreak of fighting.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is fair to say there is not near the urgency here for the military defensive posture?

Admiral RADFORD. I think the urgency is of a different kind but is nevertheless real. The urgency here is reassurance to some of these countries who are unstable in their internal political situation. By the reassurance they would get from the passage of this resolution, we would do a lot to stabilize them.

[Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. Did Israel buy its arms from us?

Admiral RADFORD. We never have had a grant-in-aid program.

[Deleted.]

DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

Senator FULBRIGHT. What do we mean when we say aggressors? Take a situation. If Mexico had a Communist regime and Russia put 500 bombers into Mexico, and you knew they were building up and would have 5,000 in a year or two and maybe 10,000 in another year, how would you feel about your responsibility to protect this country?

You would sit here and debate it in the United Nations, would you?

Admiral RADFORD. No. I think I would let the statesmen and diplomats and the Congress work through the U. N.

[Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. This question of aggression is a very difficult one; isn't it?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am not being critical. I am only pointing out that it is not as simple as it looks to apply this resolution or any other resolution in a situation like this.

Admiral RADFORD. No; it will always be very complicated.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And the application of it is going to be very difficult.

I have great sympathy with your position because fundamentally yours is a predominantly military position and it is up to the civilian arm to try to prevent our coming to the point where we have to use force.

Admiral RADFORD. That is right.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I realize that, but you do help us at least take away a little of the fog and the misunderstanding that applies to terms which we use with such ease.

[Deleted.]

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you favor supporting the United Nations emergency force in the Middle East?

Admiral RADFORD. I think it is a step in the right direction.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think our policy should be to strengthen it?

Admiral RADFORD. You mean add to the numbers and the contributions that they now have from various countries?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Do you feel that we should look forward to keeping it there for a long time, so that it would be a real police force in that area?

Admiral RADFORD. I think that I look forward to it being there for a long time.

I am not sure that it is a very effective force as it now stands.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What could we do to make it more effective?

Admiral RADFORD. I think in time the training that they will get under the supervision of General Burns and Canadian officers and some of the countries, the Scandinavian countries' officers, that it will become a fairly good police force.

How good it is will depend on how fast the individual contributions are rotated.

In other words, if they are conscripts and they are rotated too quickly, they won't ever get very good.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you have any ideas as to how we can help it become better?

Admiral RADFORD. We are doing a great deal.

We are giving them logistic support. I don't know of any particular way that we are in a position to improve it directly. We can only make suggestions as to the term of service.

EXEMPTION FROM PROVISIONS OF MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1954

Senator FULBRIGHT. Can you give us any concrete examples of situations which may require disregarding provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as would be authorized by section 3 of this resolution?

Admiral RADFORD. It is really not in my field. I suppose that there might be some emergencies, there would be emergencies arising out there that might be met quickly if this authorization were made.

[Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. Under this resolution, in administering the military program, you are released from any requirement to get an agreement from the recipients of the arms such as an agreement about using them for purposes of aggression, aren't you?

Admiral RADFORD. I did not realize that. You mean under section 3?

Senator FULBRIGHT. It releases you, doesn't it, from the requirement to make agreements with the recipient of arms. Therefore you can give military assistance anywhere you like without any agreement that it shall not be used aggressively or against anybody else?

Admiral RADFORD. If it is, Senator—and I did not really know—I don't see any particular reason for using that authority.

Senator FULBRIGHT. As far as you are concerned, you don't need any exemption from the restrictions of that section?

Admiral RADFORD. About the use of arms?

Senator FULBRIGHT. About the use of arms.

Admiral RADFORD. I cannot foresee any reason for that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This is my last question.

Section 105 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 provides—

that the President shall be satisfied that military assistance will not be used to undertake any active aggression against any nation.

Since the Arab States have sworn that Israel must be eliminated, and since Israel has just attacked Egypt, how can any military aid be given to either the Arab States or Israel unless the President uses his existing authority under section 401 of the Mutual Security Act or the additional authority proposed in section 3 of the resolution to disregard the requirement of the law that military aid shall not be used for aggression?

Admiral RADFORD. He always has had this authority under this one paragraph to give limited assistance without that restriction.

[Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. If section 105 applies, you could not give aid to Iraq in good conscience, could you?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, they have to promise, I mean they have promised that they will not use our arms in an aggressive war.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But section 3 of course will relieve you of any necessity of that?

Admiral RADFORD. We will have to be very careful about any use of that authority.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Admiral, thank you for your attendance. Will you be here tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock?

Admiral RADFORD. I will plan to, yes, sir.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 30, 1957.)

Chairman GREEN. I would like to make a few remarks at this point. I would like to thank Senator Smith for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Radford for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Flanders for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Kefauver for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Byrd for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Saltonstall for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Aiken for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Long for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Mansfield for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Humphrey for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Wiley for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Aiken for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Long for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Mansfield for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Humphrey for his cooperation in this matter. I would like to thank Senator Wiley for his cooperation in this matter.

THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D. C.
EXECUTIVE SESSION

The committees met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Theodore Francis Green (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations) presiding.

Present: Senators Green (chairman) presiding, Wiley, Fulbright, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Humphrey, Mansfield, Aiken, Long, and Kennedy, of the Committee on Foreign Relations;

Senators Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Saltonstall, Byrd, Flanders, Kefauver, Smith (Maine), Bush and Barrett, of the Committee on Armed Services.

Also present: Capt. W. C. Mott, USN, military assistant to Admiral Radford; Capt. Ray M. Pitts, USN, special assistant to chairman, JCS; Rear Adm. C. K. Bergin, USN, Director NESA region, OASD/ISA; Col. J. M. Whitfield, USAF, OASD/ISA; and Robert G. Barnes, special assistant for mutual security affairs, Department of State.

Chairman GREEN. We will now proceed with the questioning of Admiral Radford.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ARTHUR W. RADFORD, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF—Resumed

Mr. Smith of New Jersey.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I am prepared to go ahead.

I assume you are testifying here primarily on section 2 of this resolution and not section 1, not the economic side; is that correct?

Admiral RADFORD. Primarily; yes, sir.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Or are you prepared to testify on both?

Admiral RADFORD. In a general way, I could.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I think I will question you first on the military, if I may.

Admiral RADFORD. All right, sir.

SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I want to question you further about some statements you made yesterday about the buildup in Syria at the present time. You mentioned the many hundreds of millions of dollars, I think, that Russia has provided to build up Syria's military

position. I assume that Egypt also could get help if she wanted similar help.

Admiral RADFORD. I testified yesterday, Senator, that from my recollection, the military hardware supplied by Russia to Middle Eastern countries [deleted], was between \$250 and \$300 million.

I looked it up after the meeting, and the figures we have, the total hardware supplied by Russia to the Middle East countries at cheap prices—in other words, a dollar figure doesn't always mean too much, because they manipulate their prices—we carry as \$328 million.

[Deleted.]

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. What is our attitude toward this situation? Apparently, from the language of this resolution, there is nothing here which authorizes the President to do anything about it. It just goes on, and we have to sit and watch it until there is aggression of some sort which this resolution might apply to, until some nation is attacked which wants our assistance. Is that the way you read the section?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

I did say yesterday that, in my opinion, if this resolution is passed and it is thus made perfectly evident that we are going to back up countries who might be attacked by a Communist-controlled country [deleted] the Russians will be inclined to review their programs, and so will the countries they are supplying with arms. The countries supplied by Russia would receive advance notice from the terms of this resolution that if they become controlled by international communism and attack free countries in the area, we will, on request, come to the aid of the free nations.

In other words, the impact of this resolution would be to make the Communists stop and review their own programs. Perhaps they will decide it is no longer worth their while to build up armed forces in the area. I would hope that would be one effect of this resolution.

However, that would be their decision and not ours.

[Deleted.]

EFFECT OF PASSAGE OF RESOLUTION ON SITUATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I want you to give us an appraisal of what you think the effect of our passing this resolution promptly will be on that whole situation in the Arab countries.

Admiral RADFORD. My feeling is that the passage of this resolution will stabilize the situation to the extent that it will prevent the Communist bloc from initiating hostilities against some of the Arab countries either directly or through the establishment of a satellite in the area.

[Deleted.]

It is an extremely complicated background.

If we adopt the policies that are permitted by this resolution, it is my feeling that the United States efforts will stabilize the governments that are now determined to remain free from Communist control; [deleted] and I think we can reasonably hope that some of the other Arab countries which [deleted] have not yet openly taken a stand against the activities of international communism will be encouraged to do so.

[Deleted.]

DEVELOPMENTS TO DETERMINE FUTURE MOVES

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Our moves, then, would be determined by what developed, and you could not say today our movement would be in this direction or that direction.

Admiral RADFORD. No. We will have to adjust our movements to the circumstances as they develop.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Then you would want to see the so-called \$200 million fund, wherever it is derived from, sufficiently flexible so that it could be used by the President depending on what happened today or tomorrow or the next day. Is that correct?

Admiral RADFORD. I think so.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. And we would not dare say today what assistance ought to be given to this country or that country?

Admiral RADFORD. No, sir.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. It would be given to the area where it seemed to be needed.

Admiral RADFORD. That is right.

QUESTION OF ARMS FOR ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Well now, the resolution has two parts to it that have interested me. It starts off by stating that the President is authorized to undertake military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Then it goes on to the part about employing the Armed Forces.

This first military assistance matter interests me a great deal. I would like to ask you this: Do you think, if Israel should come along and ask for a military assistance program of hardware and so on, that we should deal with that?

The reason I ask that is because I am asked constantly why we do not get Israel arms, and I said we are seeking to avoid an arms race between the Israeli and Arab forces in the area.

Now, this seems to authorize the giving of assistance to either Arabs or Israel if they ask for it.

Admiral RADFORD. It would. But actually, as I understand it, the President already has that authority under the present Mutual Security legislation. But we have avoided giving any grant aid to Israel. Nor have we given any grant aid to the countries adjacent to Israel, that is, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, or Egypt. We have simply tried to reduce the tensions in those countries.

[Deleted.]

In the past, and I assume in the future, we would avoid a buildup of arms in the immediate Israel-Jordan-Syria-Egypt area for the simple reason that if we gave to one side, there would be great pressure to build up on the other side, and this would cause trouble.

So the whole problem out there is going to take time to solve. The exact movement and procedures I don't think can be forecast with any degree of accuracy at this time.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would the Senator yield for one question on that point?

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Very glad to.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Is it for that reason, broadly speaking, Admiral Radford, as you have been testifying, that no specific mention in this resolution concerning the Suez Canal problem or the Israel-

Arab problem should be included as a specific part of the resolution?

What you are saying is that you want to leave it wide open because the conditions are so changing; is that correct?

Admiral RADFORD. It would be, in my opinion, very, very difficult to introduce the Suez problem or the Arab-Israeli problem into a resolution of this type without almost defeating your purpose in advance.

In other words, I don't know how you could word something that wouldn't antagonize either the Jews or the Arabs, and they would have to take a firm stand right away, and you would be almost blocked.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I thank the Senator.

Admiral RADFORD. This resolution is designed to handle one part of the Middle East problem, I think from the reception it has received out in the Middle East, it will do what we hope it will do, because it is not specifically directed at the Suez and Arab-Israeli disputes. [Deleted.]

RESOLUTION AIMED AT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

This resolution is directed at the Communist infiltration into the Middle East. The Arabs, because of their religion, [deleted] are anti-Communists, so no Arab countries can very well take exception to a resolution aimed at preventing communism from absorbing them and, incidentally, their religion.

They may wait and see how it is implemented, but at the moment this resolution should not antagonize either the Arabs or the Jews in any way because of the broad terms in which it is written.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. It is fair to add, also, then, that we do recognize at the present time both the Arab-Israel problem and the Suez problem are before the United Nations, and we are backing up the United Nations and hoping to help them to solve that problem if possible?

PROBLEMS BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

Admiral RADFORD. I listened to all the Secretary's testimony, and of course I have heard the United Nations aspect discussed at other times. My understanding is that this resolution is supposed to take care of the Communist problem in the Middle East; and the Arab-Israeli problem, which includes the Suez problem, will be taken care of through the United Nations. At least we will make great efforts in that direction through the United Nations.

I think that together, through this resolution and the efforts of the United Nations, we can be hopeful. But, it is going to take time.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Then it would not be proper, as has been suggested in some quarters, that we bypass the Israel-Arab issue or we bypass the Suez issue, and that those things ought to be included in this resolution?

Admiral RADFORD. No, sir.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I am in accord with what you have said. I want to make it clear. So many people have said to me, "Why do you leave out these other questions?"

Admiral RADFORD. In the first place, I do not know how you could write up a resolution which included the Arab-Israeli, Suez problem which would not antagonize and freeze some of these countries into

a rigid position before we ever started. That would defeat the whole thing.

We can tackle the Communist infiltration problem with this resolution and pursue the solutions to the other problems through the United Nations. I don't know of any other way you can do it at this time, with the feelings that exist out there in the Middle East.

[Deleted.]

QUESTION OF AN ARMS RACE WITH RUSSIA

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Do you feel there is any danger we are going to precipitate an arms race with Russia by our approach; that we will be aiding some countries there which we seem to feel are on our side; and that Russia will be building up the others?

Admiral RADFORD. That is a possibility, if the Russians want to keep going. But I would like to point out that the Russian military problem in the Middle East is a pretty tough one. They do not have, in the case of Egypt and Syria, any contiguous boundaries. Their communications with these countries have to be by air or by sea.

In the case of air, they have to overfly Turkish, Iranian, or Greek territory, or Yugoslav territory, unless they fly out, in a roundabout way, over Albania and down over the Mediterranean, but it makes a much longer flight. So communicationswise, the air is not so good.

Their transports cannot carry very heavy loads and take this roundabout way.

Sea communications through the Dardanelles are subject to interruption.

[Deleted.]

If we take the stand which is outlined in this resolution, and the Russians know that that is our policy, my own feeling is that they will be inclined to pull in their horns, because it is a losing game for them.

Now, that is something you cannot predict.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Will the Senator yield for just one inquiry in connection with that?

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I will be glad to yield.

[Deleted.]

RICHARDS MISSION

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Admiral, Secretary Dulles told us that so far as the economic aid was required in the area, we would be awaiting the report of the Richards mission which is going over to study that.

Is the Richards mission also going to study the military side of this, or are the Joint Chiefs working on their own, irrespective entirely, as of today, of the Richards mission?

Admiral RADFORD. As far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, we have pretty firm military programs going in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq.

[Deleted.]

I talked to Mr. Richards the other day, and he does want a military representative to go along with him. So far we have not decided who it would be.

His committee will undoubtedly be hearing about military requirements at every stop, so he has to be ready to discuss it.

But from the military point of view, my own guess is that there would be no major change in the immediate future.

[Deleted.]

ADequate MILITARY ASSISTANCE INFORMATION

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Then you feel that on the military assistance side, you have got enough information for any military program you might have to launch there?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes. And I feel our program probably can be made firm much easier than the economics program can.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Then it is fair to say you are not awaiting any conclusions of the Richards commission so far as the military critical situation is concerned, put it that way.

Admiral RADFORD. Well, we may get some information from them, and we will be represented on the mission.

[Deleted.]

Senator FLANDERS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, is it proper for me to yield to my colleagues for these questions? I am very happy to unless I am violating the rules.

Chairman GREEN. We will have to proceed in order. It is only fair to those other Senators waiting a long while to go on.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I will be glad to yield to Senator Flanders.

Chairman GREEN. He will have his turn.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. You would rather he wait his turn. Then I will continue with my questions.

IMPORTANCE OF SUEZ CANAL

Admiral Radford, how important is the Suez Canal today in our own United States naval strategy in this business, and how rapidly are we going to be able to clear the Suez? I am not talking about the settlement now of the Suez controversy, but I am talking about the actual clearing of the canal, and how necessary it is actually for your actual military and naval operations.

Admiral RADFORD. The most important aspect of the Suez Canal, I would say, is that its closure cuts off or greatly reduces the oil supplies to our allies in NATO.

In case the Suez were permanently closed, the great problem from a military point of view would be the readiness of the NATO countries to conduct military operations. That readiness is related to their POL, their petroleum supplies, their air force, their jet fuel, their ships, as well as their industry.

The Suez Canal from the military point of view is also very important to the United States forces. It has an effect on our air and naval forces, because we get a good deal of petroleum products from the Middle East for direct consumption in the area.

[Deleted.]

EXISTING MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. We probably have military assistance arrangements with all of the countries in the Baghdad Pact, do we not? Certainly with Turkey and Pakistan we have those—

Admiral RADFORD. We do.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey (continuing). And then Iran and Iraq.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir; we have them with all the countries of the Baghdad Pact.

[Deleted.]

IMPACT ON SOVIET UNION OF EVENTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Let me ask you another question. To what extent, if any, have the events in Hungary and Poland rendered the Soviet Union less capable of undertaking military action in the Middle East? Is it true, for example, that the Soviets have counted heavily on satellite forces, and that they are rather held up because of this unrest in Poland and Hungary?

Admiral RADFORD. I think the events in Poland and Hungary have had, and will have an increasingly greater impact on Soviet policies and actions in the Middle East, and, in fact, all around the world. What they have found out; first, their satellite forces are not reliable. That realization is going to give them great food for thought when it comes to the equipment that they give some of these satellite forces. I feel certain they are going to be a little more careful about giving satellite forces the latest weapons and aircraft.

The other thing is, the events in Hungary and Poland may force the Russian Government to take action in the economic field to raise the standard of living in their satellites. This would cost them plenty in effort, and in money. That would reduce their money and other efforts available for work in the Middle East.

In other words, the events in Poland and Hungary, in my opinion, will have a great impact on their Middle Eastern plans, and will assist us in carrying out the plan that this resolution envisages.

IMPORTANCE OF MIDDLE EAST OIL

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I think I have asked you this question before: What is the degree of importance of Middle East oil to the military operations of the United States forces and to the NATO forces? I think you answered that a minute ago.

Admiral RADFORD. I think I did. The Middle East oil is the oil reserve of the world for the next hundred years.

[Deleted.]

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am through.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you, Senator Smith.

Mr. Hickenlooper?

RUSSIA'S SATELLITES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Admiral, if the satellite countries pull farther away from Russia and Hungary is able to set up, let's say, a Polish-type government, that is, move in that direction, what effect, from a military standpoint, would you think that might have on Russia's Middle Eastern operations? Would it tend to minimize them or lessen them?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, I would say that it will give them a very tough problem nearer at home, a problem that they will have to devote a lot of attention to, which in turn would take the heat off the Middle East.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does it-----

Admiral RADFORD. It would tend to take it off.

RUSSIA'S ENLARGED ACTIVITIES OF LAST FEW YEARS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does it still seem to be a part either of Russian strategy or programing, that they are very hesitant to go into adventures in countries with which they are not contiguous?

Admiral RADFORD. I think in the last couple of years, the last 3 years, particularly since the death of Stalin, that they suddenly became more bold in operating in countries which were not contiguous. They have enlarged their activities in that respect in the last 3 years by economic- and military-aid programs in noncontiguous countries.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is from a propaganda standpoint, is it not, internal subversion or something of that kind?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, they have been quite active in talking about economic aid, loans, and military equipment. They have enlarged their efforts. I think now they are going to take a long look at that policy and be more careful.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Have you finished?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Flanders?

SYRIA'S INCOME FROM OIL

Senator FLANDERS. Admiral, getting back to this question of oil—I do not have the pipeline map before me, I have one in my pocket atlas—does Syria get something out of, under normal conditions, the transporting of oil in the pipelines across her country?

Admiral RADFORD. You mean in the way of income?

Senator FLANDERS. Income.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, they do.

Senator FLANDERS. Do you know whether it is a substantial part of their national income?

Admiral RADFORD. I am quite certain that it is a substantial part. [Deleted.]

I do not have the figures. I know it is a substantial part of their income.

Senator FLANDERS. So that there is that steady pressure on the Syrian situation-----

Admiral RADFORD. Yes.

Senator FLANDERS (continuing). Of the failure of their normal income.

Admiral RADFORD. The only reason I think it is not acute at this time is that the Russians are helping them. We do not know whether they are helping them in other than the military-equipment field, but the chances are they would help them economically if they got in a pinch.

[Deleted.]

Senator FLANDERS. The other pipelines from the oil areas in Iraq and the Persian Gulf cross, as I remember, Saudi Arabia—northern Saudi Arabia—and into Palestine; is that not the location of them?

Admiral RADFORD. I have all the pipelines on this map.

Senator FLANDERS. Oh, yes.

Admiral RADFORD. I might say I find here in this table that the Syrian loss of their oil revenue amounts to a decline of 11 percent in their total revenue, so it is not as substantial as I thought.

Senator FLANDERS. Not as important as it might be.

Admiral RADFORD. No, sir.

LOCATION OF OIL PIPELINES

Senator FLANDERS. Well now, the pipeline across Saudi Arabia comes from the Kuwait and the—

Admiral RADFORD. No, sir. The Kuwait oil comes out through the Persian Gulf in tankers.

Senator FLANDERS. Oh, yes. There is no pipeline.

Admiral RADFORD. The so-called tapline, that lower red line—

Senator FLANDERS. Yes.

Admiral RADFORD (continuing). Starts down near Dhahran and runs up through Jordan and Syria to a terminus in Lebanon. It crosses the corner of Syria right near the Israel border. It does not go through Israel.

Senator FLANDERS. There is no pipeline with a port at Israel which does not cross, then, Syria or Jordan?

Admiral RADFORD. Not at present. The pipeline which is shown there originating in this oilfield coming down through Syria and Jordan, crosses the tapline and goes into a port in Israel. It is not shown in that chart, but it actually goes through Israel.

That pipeline has not been carrying oil since 1949. The Arabs would not send oil through Israel. So that pipeline has been cut off for other reasons, but it also has been blown up. It was blown up since this thing started, so it is inoperative, although the damage is not extensive.

The Israelis are building right now a 6-inch pipeline from Elath on the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, to Haifa.

Senator FLANDERS. That would be entirely in their own territory?

Admiral RADFORD. That would be entirely in territory they hold now.

[Deleted.]

Senator FLANDERS. There is then, practically speaking, no way of getting oil from that oil-producing area about and above the Persian Gulf, free of interference of the Arab nations?

Admiral RADFORD. Not if they want to interfere.

Senator FLANDERS. Except around the Cape of Good Hope.

[Deleted.]

Senator FLANDERS. Then the whole supply of the Persian Gulf-Iranian-Iraq oil supply, is dependent on the cooperation of the Arab nations?

Admiral RADFORD. At the moment, that is correct.

Senator FLANDERS. Yes.

Those are all the questions I wanted to ask, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. You have concluded.

Mrs. Smith of Maine.

INTEGRATION OF MILITARY POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Senator SMITH of Maine. Admiral Radford, the late Secretary Forrestal said to me many times that one of our greatest weaknesses was the lack of integration of our military and foreign policies. I remember that that was the very theme on which he based his support of the unification of the armed services.

Can you assure this committee that there is full integration of military policy and foreign policy on the proposal before us?

Admiral RADFORD. I am sure I can, Mrs. Smith.

Senator SMITH of Maine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that is all.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Mansfield, any questions?

STATUS OF AIRBASE AT DHAHIRAN

Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral, I know that you carry a grave responsibility at the present time, and that if the Eisenhower doctrine is approved, your responsibility will be increased manifold.

What is the status of the airbase which we are now operating in Dhahran?

Admiral RADFORD. The lease, our lease expired, I think it was last June 15, and we have had an extension, I believe it is, for 1 year. But the negotiations as to a continuance of the lease have not been concluded.

Senator MANSFIELD. I assume that that will be one of the matters discussed with King Saud.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. If my memory serves me correctly, TWA has a stopping-off point at Dhahran. Does it pay anything toward the upkeep of that field or is it allowed to come in on a gratis basis?

Admiral RADFORD. I believe—I am assuming this is correct—I think they pay a landing fee, probably, to the Saudi Arabian Government, because it is used as a commercial field not only by TWA, but it is used by the Aramco planes and some other local airlines.

I think the Saudi Arabians have a local airline. It would doubt that the airline operations, commercial airline operations, pay much for the maintenance of it.

[Deleted.]

Senator MANSFIELD. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral.

PROGRESS ON CLEARANCE OF SUEZ CANAL

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Aiken, any questions?

Senator AIKEN. Yes, just 1 or 2.

You indicated that the clearance of the canal was proceeding faster than scheduled, and faster than the political settlement of matters relating to the canal is proceeding.

Admiral RADFORD. Well, I think—

Senator AIKEN. Do you know, is progress being made in the settlement of the payment of tolls on the canal once it is cleared?

Admiral RADFORD. Maybe you misunderstood me. I know that the political settlement has not been made. I do not know how fast it is going.

I am sure that efforts in that direction are being pursued with great vigor in the United Nations by ourselves and by all the other countries which have an interest in it.

Senator AIKEN. But unless a settlement as to the payment of tolls is reached before the canal is opened for shipping, are we not likely to find ourselves faced with another crisis?

Admiral RADFORD. I think so. Of course, there are other factors to consider besides mere clearance of a channel. In the first place, all of the operating equipment of the canal, or a good deal of it, was destroyed. Most of the obstructions in the canal were the tugs and the pilot boats and floating equipment that was used in the maintenance and operation of the canal. All that has to be replaced.

[Deleted.]

In addition to the question of tolls, you have the question of who is going to operate the canal. I mean whether there is going to be any supervisory authority or not.

[Deleted.]

Senator AIKEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you.

Mr. Bush?

LOCATION OF RUSSIAN MILITARY BASES

Senator BUSH. Admiral, do the Russians have any military bases at the northern tier close to this area which can be identified on that map there?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, they have, of course, their strong forces in this area here in Bulgaria and Rumania. Then they have their principal threat to the Middle East in this area between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. They have a number of airbases there.

This boundary line here between Turkey and Russia is almost like the line in Korea. The Turkish forces and the Russian forces are very close together right along that boundary, and there are large Russian forces in this whole area.

They have some air bases and forces in this area over in here [indicating], but they are not as heavily concentrated in here [indicating].

Senator BUSH. [Deleted.]

POTENTIAL DANGER TO UNITED STATES BASES

Now then, if this Middle East situation should deteriorate substantially, would it not very greatly endanger the existence of our bases? In other words, if the Arab world became inflamed against us, against the West, as it might, I should think, in the event of a collapse of the Middle East situation, would it not really endanger the very existence of our bases in north Africa?

Admiral RADFORD. We would have trouble; we would have to defend them.

Senator BUSH. Yes.

So that, likewise, is it not true that the supply of oil from the Middle East to the West is very important, if not essential, to the existence of these bases, the operation of these bases, in North Africa?

Admiral RADFORD. Well—

Senator BUSH. How are they fueled?

Admiral RADFORD. Of course, they can be supplied from North America.

Senator BUSH. They can?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir. The United States bases could be supplied from North America.

[Deleted.]

Senator BUSH. I have no other questions, thank you, sir.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Long?

Senator LONG. Admiral Radford, perhaps you have covered this, but I did not hear it.

EFFECT OF RESOLUTION ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES

Do you have in mind changing the disposition of the American forces [deleted] in the event that this resolution is passed, or do you have in mind keeping the disposition pretty much the same as it is now?

Admiral RADFORD. We don't anticipate any requirement for redeployment as a result of the passage of this resolution.

[Deleted.]

Senator LONG. If the Russians run into Turkish troops in there, they will have some trouble. I know, just based on what I saw when I was in Turkey, I came away with great admiration for the caliber of the Turkish troops. I think perhaps they are some of the greatest fighting men in the world.

This generation is the only one that hasn't been at war constantly. If I recall, Turkey was at war constantly, either at civil war or with other countries, for 700 years, and I believe their fighting capacity is still there.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

[Deleted.]

MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS

Senator LONG. We have not done badly with development of the submarine-launched guided missile, have we? I mean our forces have been making headway with it.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, they have made headway. The Navy has been working on it for several years, and they do have a pretty good weapon which can be launched from a submarine. We assume the Russians will have the equivalent capability, and the Navy is making great efforts to counter that menace.

We are not under any illusions about the seriousness of it.

Senator LONG. Yes.

DETECTION SERVICES

I understand you have made great progress also in your detection devices to detect submarines.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Could you just give us some information on that? I am not trying to elicit secret information.

Admiral RADFORD. I think I would have to almost leave it that we have made great progress, because I don't keep up with the details on that.

I know the Navy has made tremendous progress since World War II in underwater detection, in solving some of the basic problems, and they hope to make still more.

INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE SUGGESTED

Senator LONG. It occurred to me that in connection with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization responsibilities particularly, it would be a good idea to experiment with an international brigade. I recall the record of a special service force in World War II. I had the pleasure of being connected or at least working with them. I was an amphibious officer at that time, working on an LCT.

That unit impressed me more than any fighting unit I saw in the theater where I was in Europe. I never had the pleasure of working with the Marines, but this special service force seemed to me to be one of the most elite and best fighting units I have ever seen.

Do you have any recollection or any knowledge of the record of that unit during World War II?

Admiral RADFORD. I don't know. What was it, Senator?

Senator LONG. Special Service Force.

Admiral RADFORD. Was it composed--was it a combat unit?

Senator LONG. It was a unit composed of Americans, Canadians, and Norwegians. It was an international unit, but it was trained by this country.

[Deleted]

I just wonder if there is a possibility of our developing 1 or 2 elite international units in connection with our responsibilities overseas.

Admiral RADFORD. Well, Senator, it has been given a great deal of thought.

[Deleted.]

There are many pros and cons to an international unit in peacetime, and the recommendations of the military generally have been against the formation of combat units in peacetime.

[Deleted.]

Senator LONG. Thank you very much.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Barrett?

Senator BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to direct 1 or 2 questions to the admiral.

Admiral Radford, you stated a moment ago that you had every reason to believe that Russia might withdraw from the Middle East, from the military standpoint, if this resolution were approved.

RUSSIAN INFILTRATION IN MIDDLE EAST

Now, in view of the fact they spent some \$225 or \$230 million over there giving assistance to Syria, Egypt, and Yemen, I would like to ask you this question: Has the military intelligence investigated the situation to determine what effect Russia might have through infiltration and subversion by spending an equivalent sum of money in that area if they did abandon their—

Admiral RADFORD. I am afraid you maybe got the wrong impression. I do not expect the Russians to quit overnight on this thing. I think the process of convincing them that they made a mistake in trying to move in there militarily is going to take time.

In other words, they will, I hope, come to the conclusion, that it is not a worthwhile effort on the military side.

As far as their money contribution is concerned, I do not think that has hurt them very much, because they have delivered equipment they

are replacing in their own armed forces. It is sort of excess equipment, so they probably haven't lost too much in that way.

The subversive effort that you speak about is going on and has been going on, and will undoubtedly continue to go on. It is one of the worst problems in solving the Middle East situation.

Senator BARRETT. Yes. Of course, I think it is. [Deleted.] And furthermore, since they are experts in this subversive field, it would seem to me that you can expect that they would expand their efforts in that line, and I would think that they might cause us more trouble that way than they could by direct military assistance.

Admiral RADFORD. I would assume they certainly would try to expand their efforts in that direction, and we will have to expand our efforts to counter it.

Senator BARRETT. Yes. That is the question I wanted to ask you.

As I recollect, the Secretary stated that the economic assistance might give the states in that region the force to resist the subversion and infiltration, and so on, of the Communists. Whether that would be effective or not is a question, and I would like to know what we can do.

Admiral RADFORD. Well, we have been working on that. [Deleted.] The Arabs are, if they are Moslems, as most of them are, basically anti-Communist because of their religion. So the Russians have a little problem in getting agents to work for them through those countries. It is not quite as easy for them as it is in some other parts of the world.

Senator BARRETT. But because of the tension between the Arabs and the Israelis, it would seem to me that this field would lend itself pretty nicely to the efforts of the Russians to create trouble.

Admiral RADFORD. It does, and one of the most fertile areas in which they have had to work is in connection with these Palestine refugees, this very large group of refugees that are living around the borders of Israel who haven't been resettled. They are a fertile field for Communist activity.

INDIRECT MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator BARRETT. There is one other question I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Dulles said that, roughly speaking, the \$200 million would be divided about a hundred million for military assistance and a hundred million for economic aid.

I would like to ask, just how much of that hundred million for economic aid could be classed as indirect military assistance, in your judgment?

Admiral RADFORD. Indirect?

Senator BARRETT. Yes.

Admiral RADFORD. I don't know exactly what you mean by indirect.

Senator BARRETT. Well, certainly it would—a good deal of that money ought to be spent over there for the purpose of furthering our efforts from a military standpoint in that area.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator BARRETT. I distinguish between some expenditures for dams, for instance, that are so remote that you could not possibly classify them as indirect military assistance programs, but I would

imagine considerable of that hundred million of economic aid could well be classed as expenditures which you would approve as indirect military aid.

Admiral RADFORD. I am sure that will be, Senator, I am sure it would be the case.

Senator BARRETT. I think it would be very helpful if we could differentiate between the two. I believe a lot of members of the Senate would have no objections to military assistance programs or the indirect military assistance programs for such expenditures as would be approved by you, representing the military department; whereas they might have, some peculiarly economic assistance programs of some character of other.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator BARRETT. Do you think that you could separate that part of the economic assistance and designate a certain portion of it as indirect military assistance?

Admiral RADFORD. I think we could; yes, sir.

Senator BARRETT. Thank you very much.

[Deleted.]

ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

Senator KENNEDY. As I understand it, the arms deal came about because the United States, the British, and the French under the tripartite agreement were enforcing equality between the Israelis and all the Arab countries together, because they were together in the Arab League against Israel, which meant that Egypt, in relation to Israel, was at a sharp military disadvantage. Is that more or less correct?

Admiral RADFORD. I would say that is probably a good estimate of the situation.

Senator KENNEDY. Therefore, when the Gaza raid occurred, then he—Nasser—turned to us for military assistance, and we felt because of the tripartite agreement we could not give it. We used economic reasons as the excuse. Nevertheless we didn't feel we wanted to break that balance and give him the arms.

Now, wasn't that really the decision which led to the—

Admiral RADFORD. As far as I know, Senator, the United States policy, going back a number of years, has been to avoid giving offensive-type weapons to either Israel or Egypt or any of the countries adjacent.

[Deleted.]

WILL RESOLUTION TEND TO SPLIT THE ARAB WORLD?

Senator KENNEDY. Do you think we are helping those factions by giving this type of guaranty, which it seems likely would result in this closer tie with the Soviet Union? Do you think we are helping those factions within those countries, on which we must greatly depend, by splitting the Arab world, which may be the result?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, I would say, No. 1, the Arab world is already split very badly. I would say that if this resolution or something very similar to it is not passed, which gives the Middle Eastern countries and the world a pretty definite idea of where we are going to stand in this Middle East controversy, that the split in the Arab

world, with the help of the Russians, is going to result in an outbreak, probably, of some kind of fighting.

The main virtue of this resolution, as I see it, is that it will tend to prevent the outbreak of military action, and by so doing will give the diplomats and statesmen time to work on healing some of these splits which exist out there.

The real virtue of the resolution, in my opinion, is that it will prevent a showdown fight, with all its attendant consequences, that might spread into world war III. It will give the statesmen a chance to heal some of these tensions that exist out there.

[Deleted.]

GUARANTY PROVISION OF THE RESOLUTION

Senator KENNEDY. Admiral, would it not have been possible to take on this program without undertaking the guaranty, in the regular program?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, the guaranty of the resolution is a psychological position which, in my opinion, is almost essential to the whole operation.

Senator KENNEDY. But it wasn't essential in order to give them the equipment.

Admiral RADFORD. No; but here is what we run up against: If we didn't give them this guaranty, then they do not know whether we will come to their aid.

[Deleted.]

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Byrd, we will be glad to have you ask your questions now.

DISPOSITION OF \$200 MILLION

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, most of my questions have already been covered.

[Deleted.]

Senator BYRD. Senator Barrett asked you a question about this \$200 million. That is a transfer, but at the present time was there any increase provided in the 1958 budget for this \$200 million?

Admiral RADFORD. In the 1958—

Senator BYRD. Yes; the budget effective the 1st of next July.

Admiral RADFORD. For military aid in this region?

Senator BYRD. No; for this particular project, the aid to the Middle East, economic, military, or whatever you wish to call it. You have not specified in the resolution what you are going to use it for.

Admiral RADFORD. They say in the President's budget message that he stated that the money for the Middle East was included in the \$4.4 billion, but it has not yet been broken down into regional—

Senator BYRD. This \$200 million that you are going to transfer, is that going to be spent in this fiscal year or the next fiscal year?

Admiral RADFORD. As I understand it, the economic part of it will be obligated before the 1st of July. The military aid program, some of it the deliveries will run on over. It will be obligated also.

Senator BYRD. Assuming we continue the economic aid and the military aid, just as we are doing now, will this be an additional \$200 million?

Admiral RADFORD. No, sir.

Senator BYRD. Over a period of years?

Admiral RADFORD. No, sir. I would say, speaking now about the military side, I do not envisage any large step-up of military programs in this part of the world.

[Deleted.]

The largest military-aid program in this part of the world is in Turkey. We expect that will continue to be a large program.

Senator BYRD. Well, it is not fair to assume, though, that this \$200 million which at present is transferred, that if we continue our programs in other areas, that this eventually means \$200 million increase on an annual basis?

Admiral RADFORD. I do not think so, Senator.

Senator BYRD. I do not see why it won't, because if you enter a new field and spend \$200 million in that field, and continue what you are doing elsewhere, it would seem to me it means an increase.

Admiral RADFORD. Well, we are not taking this money from any other areas, and as far as I know—and I am speaking now about the military-aid program—I think the ultimate impact of this resolution will be to hold down our military-aid program.

Senator BYRD. What you actually are doing is taking this \$200 million from the unexpended balance; that is what you are doing.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

I was corrected. They say we are taking it from 1957 funds that have not been obligated, and earmarking it.

Senator BYRD. That is unexpended balances.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. It is money which was appropriated heretofore, but has not yet been spent. That is where you are taking it from.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Somewhere along the line, if you continue this new—it is unquestionably true you are going to spend \$200 million more in the Middle East than you have spent before, is that correct?

Admiral RADFORD. No.

Senator BYRD. Why are you asking for this transfer then? What is a transfer for if it isn't to spend more money in the Middle East?

Admiral RADFORD. I do not know, Senator. I am not an expert on the fiscal management of this program. But my understanding is that we received, in the 1957 and prior years' appropriations, adequate funds to carry out our present program.

EFFECT OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE MILITARY-AID PROGRAM

The only effect of this resolution on the military-aid program would be to have some additional flexibility in the same way that we now have with about a hundred million dollars. We would have the same flexibility with \$200 million more. The military-aid programs in this area will not be affected very much, if at all. [Deleted.] Again I am talking only about the military-aid program.

I think the result of the passage of this resolution will be to assist us, the military side, in holding down the military expenditures.

One of the ways, of course, is in the way I said. We can say, "If you are attacked by a Communist-controlled country, we will come to your help, and we can fit our plans in."

We can tell them in what way we would come to their help and fit their force buildup into those plans.

Senator BYRD. Well, assuming that this crisis in the Middle East had not occurred, you would not have asked for this \$200 million transfer?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, we had the money.

Senator BYRD. I know you have got the money, but I am trying to find out to what extent you are opening up a new field of expenditure.

If this crisis had not occurred, it is reasonable to assume that you would not have asked for the passage of this resolution, would you?

Admiral RADFORD. I imagine that is true, Senator. All I can say, speaking to the military-aid program, we have no plans, nor can I personally foresee any, for a great increase in military-aid programs as a result of the passage of this resolution.

Senator BYRD. This is not spelled out as to whether it is military or economic. You can use the whole \$200 million for economic, is that correct?

Admiral RADFORD. That is correct, yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. And of course those of us who are concerned about increasing this foreign spending have got to look at it from what the resolution provides. It does not say "military." You can use it all economic.

I would like somebody to give me a definite statement that this does not mean an increase of \$200 million of foreign spending. I understand perfectly that this present bill or resolution provides only for a transfer, but I am looking to the future.

Admiral RADFORD. I can say, from the military standpoint, it does not.

Senator BYRD. Who can say it from the economic standpoint?

Admiral RADFORD. I imagine Mr. Hollister would have to testify on that.

Senator BYRD. And you do not think the resolution can be so changed that it spells out how much you will expend for economic and how much for military? At the present time you can spend it all for military if you please, or you can spend it all for economic if you please, any way you want to do it.

Admiral RADFORD. I do not know whether you could find words to do that in the resolution itself. It might have some disadvantages. But I think you could get some understanding.

Senator BYRD. The mere statement that this is merely a transfer has no significance to future budgets or future expenditures. I do not think it is quite an accurate statement.

I do not mean that you have made it, but the impression has been made upon the country that all they are doing is transferring \$200 million from unexpended balances, and that is the end of it. I do not think that is the end of it.

I think some statement should be made very frankly to this committee what are going to be the expenditures brought about by the passage of this resolution, which opens up a new territory for economic spending and more military spending, especially economic.

Admiral RADFORD. On the military side, I would repeat that I see no reason to expect a major change in the military programs now in existence in Pakistan, Iran, or Turkey, as a result of the passage of this resolution.

[Deleted.]

For instance, we had in this last 1957 budget, we had some money set aside for contingencies in military aid. We had [deleted] and we will be well within that amount, I think.

EFFECT OF RESOLUTION ON FUTURE ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS FOR MIDDLE EAST

Senator BYRD. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to ask Mr. Hollister, or whoever the proper person is, to give a clear statement to this committee as to whether or not the passage of this resolution means that there will be a continued and increased expenditure in this particular area of economic aid, because it has been so mixed up that it is very difficult to understand it, and it just seems to me we are taking an obligation here which is very far reaching, that "the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence."

In other words, dedicated to the maintenance of national independence of those particular countries.

Chairman GREEN. There is a representative of the State Department here, and I ask him to make note of that request.

Senator BYRD. I accept Admiral Radford's statement this will not increase the military aid, but this does not confine it to the military-aid program. It is open to economic aid. It is just the beginning, it appears to me, for very large expenditures that will be asked for in the future, based upon this declaration of policy which we have in section 1 in which we dedicate, we are supposed to develop the economic strengths dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

MEANING OF "NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE"

What does "national independence" mean, in your judgment?

Admiral RADFORD. Well—

Senator BYRD. National independence of each of those nations, or what?

Admiral RADFORD. That is what I would take it to mean, Senator.

Senator BYRD. How many nations are involved?

Admiral RADFORD. It depends on what you take as the Middle East, and it could be 10 or 11, most of which we have some kind of an arrangement with now.

DEFINITION OF MIDDLE EAST

Senator BYRD. Do you not think, too, that you ought to spell out more definitely what is the Middle East? We are making obligations, in both economic and military, in the general area of the Middle East, without any definite statement I have heard yet as to how many nations are included in that area.

Admiral RADFORD. I was not here when Secretary Dulles testified in open session, but I was over in the House when he testified on that, and he did outline by name the countries that he considered were in this general area. But he said he didn't like to do it in the resolution for fear it would draw a line somewhere. [Deleted.]

Senator BYRD. I recall his testimony, I may not have it entirely accurate, but he was not absolutely clear as to whether certain nations were in or not.

[Deleted.]

Senator BYRD. In other words, taking it from a discretionary standpoint, because that is what it would be, because it says the "general area," how many nations would be involved where we would guarantee that we make contributions dedicated to the maintenance of national independence? How many are there?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, I couldn't answer that question, because that wouldn't be my part of it. But I would estimate that the national independence of most of them is not threatened at the moment. There are certain ones, however.

Senator BYRD. They might be threatened in the future.

Admiral RADFORD. They might be threatened in the future.

Senator BYRD. There is no limit to this guaranty that we are making.

Admiral RADFORD. That is true.

Chairman GREEN. In your absence, I think, Senator, I brought up that question before, what that term covered, the "Middle East," and they were intentionally unwilling to answer it.

Admiral RADFORD. In open hearings.

Chairman GREEN. Yes.

Senator BYRD. That is something that I think we should have, that information, because national independence is a pretty broad subject. It does not involve Communists generally.

Chairman GREEN. I do not mean in this connection particularly, but the general use of the term "Middle East."

Senator BYRD. I hope, Mr. Chairman, you have somebody here who can give us full information on that.

Chairman GREEN. We have asked the highest authorities, and they have made up their mind not to give it.

Senator BYRD. If they have made up their mind not to give it, then some of us may have to make up our minds not to vote for it.

Chairman GREEN. Secretary Dulles will come again to testify next Friday morning at 10 o'clock, and I trust that you will be here and you will be more successful than I was.

Admiral RADFORD. I am sure the Secretary of State will be glad to discuss this question in a closed session, because he did over in the House.

Chairman GREEN. I am just talking about the definition of terms.

Admiral RADFORD. I think he would be perfectly willing to discuss the details of this problem the way Senator Byrd wants them discussed.

MAINTENANCE OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

Senator BYRD. I would like the Secretary, too, if he will, to discuss what it means, the obligation we are apparently assuming here in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence, what that language means. I would like somebody to interpret it.

That is one of the broadest statements that is possible to put into any law. What is "national independence"? What is the "development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence"?

That gives a blanket authority to do anything at all in the way of economic aid. What I am concerned about is the opening up of a new area of economic aid here. It may be very far reaching and may last for very many years to come.

Chairman GREEN. The witness has stated he is not in a position to define it.

Senator BYRD. I do not hold Admiral Radford responsible. He has made a very clear statement on military aid. But I want somebody to come here and tell us just as clearly what they mean about economic aid. Admiral Radford has assured us, so far as he knows, it will not necessitate additional expenditures in military aid.

Admiral RADFORD. I didn't say "any," but no major revision of the total expenditure in the Middle East.

Senator BYRD. I am not speaking of minor matters, but great plans to build up that section of the world so that it will have national independence. That is a right big undertaking, of these other nations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask your plans for continuance?

Chairman GREEN. I was just going to find out. We had tentatively decided, I think, to adjourn at half-past 12, but would the Admiral be able to stay on until 1 if we could finish by then?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir. I could stay on until 1.

Chairman GREEN. There are two Senators whose names were called this morning who were not here then, but who have come in since. We would be very glad to hear from them if they think their questions and the answers can be limited to the additional time.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are you looking at me, sir?

Chairman GREEN. You were the first one, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I want to say I am very happy that I can ask these questions, and I cannot be here tomorrow.

Chairman GREEN. Neither will the admiral. Could you limit your questions to 15 minutes?

Senator HUMPHREY. I will try to.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Kefauver?

Senator KEFAUVER. I had some resolutions coming up on the floor about money for committees.

Chairman GREEN. We have been over these questions, and most of the Senators wish to be on the floor because of the money bills, and the Admiral cannot be here tomorrow. Secretary Dulles is coming back Friday morning at 10 o'clock, and it would be inadvisable to call another meeting for Saturday.

So if we do not finish it now, it will have to go over to Monday, and I don't know whether we can meet on Monday.

Senator HUMPHREY. May I proceed, Mr. Chairman?

Senator KEFAUVER. We are all going to have to be over on the floor.

Chairman GREEN. What shall we do?

Senator HUMPHREY. I would like to ask a couple of questions before my time is gone, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. I recognize Senator Humphrey.

BAGHDAD PACT MEETING

Senator HUMPHREY. Admiral Radford, the primary question I want to direct to you is this: Were you present during any discussions with the Baghdad Pact country representatives in November when they were here in Washington? You may recall when the Ambassadors from Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran were in Washington in late November.

Admiral RADFORD. No, sir; I was not.
[Deleted.]

DANGER OF SOVIET OVERT AGGRESSION IN AREA

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand your feeling to be or your view to be, Admiral, that insofar as a present and immediate danger of Soviet overt military aggression against Iran or Turkey, that is very improbable; is that correct?

Admiral RADFORD. I feel that it is, because the Russians know that that will probably start world war III. Perhaps I should say I think they feel that way.

Senator HUMPHREY. Haven't we had a number of declarations on the part of our Government, at least by the President, relating to the dangers involved to the Soviet Union if there was any overt military aggression in this area?

Admiral RADFORD. I would agree with that, although I cannot recall the specific ones. I think that is generally true.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it not pretty well understood—well, surely it is understood—if the Soviet moves against Turkey, since she is a NATO ally—

Admiral RADFORD. That is right, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is well understood that if she moves against Pakistan, because of our mutual assistance pact, that there is trouble.

Admiral RADFORD. She is also a member of SEATO.

PROTECTION OF IRAN

Senator HUMPHREY. So the only country immediately on the borders of the Soviet, that is, the geographical area of the Soviet, that is not covered by a known—

Admiral RADFORD. Firm.

Senator HUMPHREY (continuing). Pact, is Iran.

Admiral RADFORD. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY. We do have a military assistance pact with Iran, do we not?

Admiral RADFORD. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do we not have an understanding with Iran as to some protection of her territorial integrity?

Admiral RADFORD. In my opinion, we do not have a firm understanding, but I wouldn't be the best witness on that.

[Deleted.]

Senator HUMPHREY. You mentioned, Admiral, about military assistance, and I was very appreciative of your replies to Senator Byrd, and I surely respect your view and your response. I do not think that we can expect to get all the economic answers, sir, from you as our leading military authority.

IMPORTANCE OF IRAQ

I recognize the validity of your position about the importance of Iraq. I think that is a very important country.

Is it not possible, under the present authority of the Mutual Security Act, to step up our assistance to Iraq?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Has it not been possible since October when the hostilities broke out in the Egyptian area for us to have stepped up considerably our military assistance to Iraq?

Admiral RADFORD. That is right.

[Deleted.]

Admiral RADFORD. It hasn't been the lack of this resolution that has prevented us from moving faster. We have just not been ready to decide what we wanted to do from the military standpoint.

[Deleted.]

SYRIA

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you read Hanson Baldwin's articles in the New York Times?

Admiral RADFORD. No; I did not.

Senator HUMPHREY. He was in Syria. Do you consider him to be a fairly responsible commentator on military matters?

Admiral RADFORD. He is a very responsible man.

Senator HUMPHREY. His reports were not as emotional, let me say as some of the newspaper stories seemed to be on this matter. He did not say that there was no movement of arms into the area, because there is obviously a movement of arms into Syria, but he did not feel that the movement or shipments of arms there up to this time had been alarming, at least insofar as Syria was a threat to the area.

Admiral RADFORD. I would agree with that, but I would say they are continuing.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

[Deleted.]

MIDDLE EAST OIL PROPERTIES

Senator HUMPHREY. American nationals own a good percentage of the moneys, of the properties, in that Mideast pipeline?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Isn't it true that a majority is owned by nations which were not involved in the dispute at all in the Middle East?

Admiral RADFORD. I don't know, sir, but I do know that American companies have a large interest in it.

[Deleted.]

MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF ISRAEL

Senator HUMPHREY. Well now, you said a while ago that Israel had pretty good military capabilities.

Admiral RADFORD. They do.

Senator HUMPHREY. How come we do not tie up with somebody who has some strength as long as we are looking for an ally.

Admiral RADFORD. Well, I think that militarily, I mean politically, we are pretty well tied up with Israel.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, there are some doubts about that in some quarters. But isn't it true that, militarily, Israel is stronger than any of her neighbors?

Admiral RADFORD. That is our estimate, sir.

ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD RESOLUTION

Senator HUMPHREY. Does this resolution contemplate the protection of Israel against aggression?

Admiral RADFORD. The resolution doesn't in so many words, but I would assume that the Israelis would like the resolution because it will tend to stabilize the situation out there and will be of benefit to their long-term aspirations.

Senator HUMPHREY. Has the Israeli Government expressed any view on this resolution?

Admiral RADFORD. I don't know.

Senator HUMPHREY. I have not seen any. I just wondered.

Admiral RADFORD. But I should think they would be smart enough to know it would work to their advantage.

Chairman GREEN. Senator I hate to interrupt, but the 15 minutes we agreed upon is up.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you reminding me, but I only have two more questions, if you don't mind.

With reference to the arms to Egypt, I heard Senator Kennedy, I believe it was, discuss this with you.

OFFER OF ARMS TO EGYPT

Is it not true that we did offer arms to Egypt in 1953 or 1954?

Admiral RADFORD. We had negotiations; and I remember we had certain money set aside, in case the grant aid program was established, money that we were willing to use for aid to Egypt, arms.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it not true that the Egyptians offered to buy arms from the United States, and we offered to sell, but our price was too high?

Admiral RADFORD. I don't think that was the real reason. What they wanted to buy, as I recall them, were types of weapons we did not want them to buy.

Maybe the price had something to do with it, but in my opinion it was not really the controlling factor.

QUESTION OF ABANDONMENT OF MIDDLE EAST BASE

Senator HUMPHREY. At the United Nations I learned from an official about a very fine military or naval base that we had abandoned in the Middle East area into which we had put a substantial sum of money. Is that true?

Admiral RADFORD. Not that I know of. I don't recall.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am going to see him tomorrow afternoon, and I am going to ask him about it. He asked me about it, and wondered why in the world we had given it up.

Admiral RADFORD. I don't know about any such base. It might have been some World War II activity.

Senator HUMPHREY. Right after the war?

Admiral RADFORD. World War II.

Well, we did have quite an installation at the head of the Persian Gulf that we used for sending supplies into Russia. We withdrew from there. And right now—I have flown over there—there isn't very much there now.

Senator HUMPHREY. I shall look into it and get in touch with you later on about it, because I have some questions on it.

[Deleted.]

CONTEMPLATED ARMS AID TO OTHER MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you know of any other country in the Middle East we contemplate sending any arms aid to except Iraq?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, we will continue the programs we have, and there is a possibility that we will step up the program in Iraq, as I have mentioned. We will probably make some arrangements with Saudi Arabia.

Senator HUMPHREY. Some arrangements with Saudi Arabia?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you really think these countries are capable of defending themselves against Communist aggression, regardless of the amount of arms we give to them?

Admiral RADFORD. You mean Communist aggression?

Senator HUMPHREY. Soviet aggression.

Admiral RADFORD. No, sir; not by themselves.

Senator HUMPHREY. Not by themselves.

Is it not a possibility that by pouring arms into these areas, you merely add fire or fuel to the fires of national jealousies and traditional enmities that plague this area?

Admiral RADFORD. I would say you run that risk.

Senator HUMPHREY. Isn't that a real possibility?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes. But I would say that it is a possibility under certain conditions, but when you give people arms, you control the supply of spare parts and ammunition, so you have a pretty good hold over them. They can do something in a hurry, but they can't do it on a long-term basis.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, I know.

[Deleted.]

I want to thank you, Admiral, and I think your answers have been very candid and very helpful to members of the committee.

Admiral RADFORD. Thank you.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Kefauver? We will be glad to give you an opportunity to ask questions, with the understanding we can let the witness go at 1 o'clock.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes.

Admiral Radford, I want to pursue just a little further the question of Senator Humphrey. How do we prevent these nations from using arms against one another?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, by the agreement which they sign when they get them, not to use them aggressively, and through other provisions of the bilateral arrangements we make with them.

Senator KEFAUVER. Some of these nations do not keep their agreements.

Admiral RADFORD. Some of them don't.

Senator KEFAUVER. And actually, when you turn them over to them, there is not much you can do except have the hope that they will abide by their agreement, and have control of the supply of parts.

Admiral RADFORD. Well, that in itself, as I just mentioned to Senator Humphrey, is quite a control.

[Deleted.]

Senator KEFAUVER. Admiral Radford, we would be hard put to it to win a border war in Iran or Afghanistan, against an all-out effort of the Soviet Union, would we not?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, I don't think so.

Senator KEFAUVER. You mean with our long communication lines, with their short ones—

Admiral RADFORD. You mean if the Soviets attacked overtly? Why, that would bring on a general war, it wouldn't be fought as a local war.

Senator KEFAUVER. I mean, that is the question I was getting at. So an overt attack on one of those countries would really be the beginning of world war III.

Admiral RADFORD. By Russian forces, I think.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, suppose an overt attack came, and we signed up to resist or assist them in resisting, who is going to fight with us?

Admiral RADFORD. In a general war, we would have many allies.

[Deleted.]

Senator KEFAUVER. I know, but who is going to make the decision as to whether that is a border foray of any consequence or whether it is a real one? That will be made by—

Admiral RADFORD. You mean under this resolution?

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes. I know the President makes the decision. But actually, you have your military men out there who would decide matters, would they not?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, they wouldn't have any power of decision on the spot; no, sir, unless they were attacked, and they could always defend themselves. But I would say we would get the information back here and make a decision as to what we would do.

Senator KEFAUVER. I cannot for the life of me see—we have had a chance to sign up with people who will fight, which will do the same thing as this—why we don't get into something where we have some allies.

Admiral RADFORD. I think we will, if you mean under this resolution.

Senator KEFAUVER. But nobody is coming in with us under this resolution.

Admiral RADFORD. No. But I mean in the operation of it.

Senator KEFAUVER. If you join the Baghdad Pact, you at least have Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran.

Admiral RADFORD. We have Turkey and Pakistan under other arrangements.

Senator KEFAUVER. Not under this resolution.

Admiral RADFORD. No; but their relationships with us through NATO and SEATO are not changed by this resolution.

[Deleted.]

POSSIBLE UNITED STATES INTERVENTION AT DIENBIENPHU

Senator KEFAUVER. Admiral Radford, did you favor using American troops to help the French at Dienbienphu?

Admiral RADFORD. Not by themselves alone. I had no desire for the United States to assume responsibility for the conduct of operations in that area. Instead, we had considered the possibility that several free nations might join in a common endeavor to cope with this situation by "united action," as Secretary Dulles described it. The United States already had supplied much of the material means with which the French Union forces were waging that struggle.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, were you in favor of some intervention?

Admiral RADFORD. I thought it would be to our long-range advantage to defeat the Communists in Indochina, yes, sir.

Aside from the tragedy to the people conquered, the loss of the entire Indochina area would have meant that these people and their resources would be harnessed to the Communist bloc and would constitute an increasing Communist threat to a far wider area—indeed to the entire Asiatic area.

Senator KEFAUVER. So you recommended some form of intervention to defeat the Communists in Indochina?

Admiral RADFORD. Not exactly sir, but I did advise that our Armed Forces possessed sufficient military capability to help prevent the loss of that situation, were that to have been the political decision of our Government.

Senator KEFAUVER. With our planes?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, our role would have been principally air action.

Senator KEFAUVER. And did you have a certain number alerted to go?

Admiral RADFORD. We didn't go that far.

Senator KEFAUVER. Okinawa?

Admiral RADFORD. We didn't have to go that far. We had forces that could have been used very quickly.

Senator KEFAUVER. You mean carriers?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir..

Senator KEFAUVER. Carrier planes?

Admiral RADFORD. Carrier and Air Force planes.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, where was the decision made not to do this?

Admiral RADFORD. It was made ultimately by the President.

Senator KEFAUVER. Was there a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one way or the other, on that?

Admiral RADFORD. Senator, I don't think it is proper for me to discuss the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the discussions that take place in the executive department.

I did take a part in a discussion in the State Department between the Secretary of State and the leaders of Congress on this problem.

I would also like to point out the military do not make recommendations as to what to do. They are usually consulted as to what they have the capability to do, and that was my participation in this debate.

[Deleted.]

Senator KEFAUVER. Then the second part of my question: You were in favor of doing it?

Admiral RADFORD. I am always in favor of giving the Communists a setback, militarily or politically, if we can.

PROXIMITY TO MIDDLE EAST AREA OF SOVIET AIRFIELDS

Senator KEFAUVER. How many airfields—where are the closest Russian airfields to this Middle East area?

Admiral RADFORD. The closest ones are the ones in the Caucasus area, but they have fields on both sides of the Caspian Sea, and then they have other airfields on the European side of the Black Sea.

Senator KEFAUVER. Are these fields that will handle jet planes?

Admiral RADFORD. Most of them can; yes, sir.

[Deleted.]

EFFECT OF RESOLUTION ON SUEZ CANAL

Senator KEFAUVER. How do you figure this program is going to help keep the canal open, the Suez Canal?

Admiral RADFORD. The operation of this particular resolution?

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes.

Admiral RADFORD. It will not have any direct bearing on the operation of the Suez Canal, and that will be handled largely through the U. N. But I think the indirect effect of this resolution will be to promote stability in the Middle East, and that will in turn insure the satisfactory operation of the Suez Canal after it is once started.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, I mean, how is this resolution going to make Nasser happier about the situation so that he will relinquish his tight control over the Suez Canal?

Admiral RADFORD. I don't think this resolution is going to have an immediate and direct effect in that respect. I think it is the U. N. action which is going to affect Nasser first.

Senator KEFAUVER. We have been told that the big danger coming from a deterioration in the Middle East was the cutting off of the oil supply for Western Europe, which might give the Soviet or give communism a stronger foothold there.

But I cannot see that this is going to help that problem. In other words, they can cut the oil off without violating the terms of this resolution.

Admiral RADFORD. You mean through the Suez Canal?

Senator KEFAUVER. Closing the Suez Canal.

Admiral RADFORD. Well, the Suez Canal is closed at the moment, and the efforts to open it are going on through the U. N. This resolution doesn't directly affect that part of the problem.

The problems in the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli problem and the Suez Canal problem, are separated from action under this resolution, and will be pursued in the U. N.

The indirect effect of this resolution, if it is passed, will be to, in my opinion, establish a stability in certain other aspects of the Middle East situation which will be helpful in solving the canal problem and the Arab-Israeli problem.

[Deleted.]

Chairman GREEN. Senator, I am sorry to have to remind you of the time.

Senator KEFAUVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Admiral. You have been very patient. And, Mr. Chairman, you have been very considerate.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you. As I announced before, there will be no meeting this afternoon for the reason I gave, and there will be no meetings tomorrow.

The next meeting will be Friday at 10 o'clock, when the Secretary of State again will appear.

Thank you, Admiral, very much for your patience.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the joint committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Friday, February 1, 1957.)

192. *Thymelicus sylvestris* (Fabricius) *Thymelicus sylvestris*

THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D. C.
EXECUTIVE SESSION

The committees met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Theodore Francis Green (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations) presiding.

Present: Senators Green (chairman) presiding, Wiley, Fulbright, Smith of New Jersey, Sparkman, Hickenlooper, Langer, Mansfield, Knowland, and Aiken.

Senators Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Saltonstall, Byrd, Johnson of Texas, Smith of Maine, Case of South Dakota, Bush, and Barrett.

Also present: Senator Kuchel.

Robert C. Hill, Assistant Secretary of State; Robert G. Barnes, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State; Roderic L. O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; William C. Burdett, Jr., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Capt. W. C. Mott, USN, Military Assistant to Admiral Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Charles Youngblood, Congressional Relations Staff, International Cooperation Administration.

(Procedural discussion deleted.)

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Dulles has consented to attend with the committee this morning so that the members who have not had an opportunity to question him in executive session may do so. When Mr. Dulles was last before the committee, I proceeded on the basis of seniority through the name of Mr. Johnson of Texas.

This morning, the first member of the committee to question Mr. Dulles will be Senator Hickenlooper.

I would like to add that Secretary Dulles stated that he has other important international engagements, so that he must ask to leave at 12:30, and I told him that we would agree.

Senator Hickenlooper?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE—Resumed

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have just one question. It might lead to another one.

Mr. GREEN. You may proceed.

REACTION TO KING SAUD'S VISIT

The only question I care to ask the Secretary this morning is whether or not there is any evidence of resentment on the part of other Arab countries arising out of the visit of the King of Saudi Arabia. Is that creating any noticeable irritation in other Arab countries?

Senator DULLES. No. There is, on the whole, evidence that that visit is welcomed by all the Arab countries.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see. That was a matter that I was concerned about, and it is the only question I have to ask, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Is that all?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is all.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Langer?

Senator LANGER. No questions.

Chairman GREEN. Mrs. Smith of Maine?

Senator SMITH of Maine. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions this morning.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Mansfield?

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I have only one question, I believe.

KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SUEZ ATTACK

Mr. Secretary, the President, in a speech on November 6, made the following statement:

The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions—

referring to the attacks on Egypt—

nor were we informed of them in advance.

Did we have knowledge of the Israeli attack against Egypt and the British-French assault on Egypt?

Secretary DULLES. We had no advance information of any kind. I think that statement of the President is entirely correct. After the Israelis went into full mobilization, we surmised something of that sort was coming, and the President then, as you will recall, within a matter of hours, sent a message to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion.

The British-French participation also came as a complete surprise to us. We had, of course, known for months that the use of armed force was a possibility which they were considering. But we believed that those plans were in suspense, and we had no advance knowledge.

Senator MANSFIELD. Of any of the three attacks?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Aiken, do you have any questions?

UNITED NATIONS PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, I noticed in the press either last night or this morning that the United Nations is making very gratifying progress in the settlement of the Middle East problems with which it is concerned. Are there any grounds for such optimism?

Secretary DULLES. I would say that there are grounds for cautious optimism, but that the situation hangs still pretty much in the balance.

I have been very active on the telephone with various people in New York on that subject already, before coming here. That is one of the matters that will require me to return as soon as I can.

The question of the form of resolutions to be adopted, the question of whether or not they will get a two-thirds vote, still is hanging in the balance, and while I am inclined to be hopeful, I don't want to take anything at all for granted. These matters at the United Nations are very complicated due to, among other things, the procedures which make it possible by a majority vote to amend a resolution, but then require a two-thirds vote to adopt the resolution after it is amended.

So it is possible to use the amendatory process to put a resolution into form where it cannot get the two-thirds vote. In other words, a majority can amend a resolution, but it takes two-thirds finally to adopt it. There are a good many complications.

As I say, it hangs very much in the balance today. I see ground for hope, but I don't want to seem to imply that the way is yet clear.

Senator AIKEN. Is there any reason to hope that an agreement will be reached regarding the collection of tolls on the Suez Canal before the canal itself is opened for traffic?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Could you ask that question again?

Senator AIKEN. The question is: Is there any reason to hope that an agreement will be reached in regard to the collection of tolls on the Suez Canal by the time that the canal is open for traffic?

[Deleted.]

Senator AIKEN. No more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Barrett?

Senator BARRETT. No questions.

Chairman GREEN. We will call on you, Senator Russell.

Senator RUSSELL. I have only a few questions.

ESTIMATED COST OF PROGRAM

Mr. Secretary, you told us in your prior testimony that the problems of this area were receiving constant and vigorous study in the Department, including all the phases of the military and economic assistance programs that might be applied.

You were not in position to tell us now what they were, but stated that they were all under vigorous study.

As time has gone on and these hearings have proceeded, have these studies produced as yet any figures which would enable us to have an estimate of the total amount this program is likely to cost the United States, or of the length of time the program might continue?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I don't think we will have any useful material in that respect until we make the presentation for the fiscal year 1958.

Senator RUSSELL. So you are not at this time able to make any estimate of the magnitude of the program for 1958, 1959, and 1960 or as to the nature of the projects which would be approved?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think I can make any estimate which would be really worth while, Senator. It would be pretty much guesswork on my part.

[Deleted.]

Senator RUSSELL. Is the amount of military assistance determined by the Department of Defense or the State Department?

DETERMINATION OF SIZE OF PROGRAM

Secretary DULLES. Well, it is worked out prior to the submission of the budget as a result of meetings in which both State and Defense take part, and I would say that the Defense Department takes the primary responsibility with respect to the amounts that are required for the military program, although the State Department, of course, also has certain views on the political aspects of that. Particularly we have to watch the economic consequence of military programs. We are anxious to avoid military programs so large that they burden the economy of a country which in turn sets up a need for economic assistance.

So we watch the thing from those standpoints; but, subject to that, the military missions in the area make their recommendations to the Defense Department, those pass through the Ambassador, and we get the comments of the Ambassador upon them. But the reports of the MAAG missions are primarily working material for the Defense Department, and it is the Defense Department which has the primary responsibility.

Senator RUSSELL. In other words, to use a simple illustration, in determining the number of divisions we will equip in Iraq, that would primarily be made in the Department of Defense?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. The way it would go would be probably that the MAAG military advisers in the area would make suggestions to the Defense Department. Those would be brought to the attention of the Ambassador, who would make any observations that he thought appropriate. The suggestion would then go to the Defense Department. They are then compared with demands all over the world.

If you totaled up all of the military requests that came from countries, you would have a staggering total. So everything is cut down in the light of all the demands, and then a final figure is presented at the time of the makeup of the budget.

COMMENT ON WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE

Senator RUSSELL. I know you do not have time to read the papers a great deal, Mr. Secretary, but I wondered if you had had brought to your attention an article in the Wall Street Journal in the issue of Monday, January 14, which purports to disclose a great deal of information about what is contemplated in this Mideastern aid program, by Mr. John R. Gibson.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir, I have not seen it.

Senator RUSSELL. I will read the headlines. It sounds like the evening newspaper.

Mid-East Aid, United States Planners Mull Costly Projects To Prop Shaky Economies, Irrigation in Iraq; Homes for Arabs; Loans and Roads; Aswan Dam's Back Again, the Cost: \$600 Million-Plus.

It goes on to say that while they have not determined the exact projects, that such schemes as these rank high in consideration:

Development of Iraq's ancient Tigris-Euphrates Valley with irrigation and other projects.

An improved system of highways and railroads connecting Middle Eastern nations.

A longstanding scheme for developing the Jordan River Valley, which involves squabbling between Syria, Jordan and Israel.

A sort of TVA for the entire Nile River Valley. This power and irrigation project would harness the 4,000-mile river all the way up to its sources in central Africa and Ethiopia, as well as along its length in Egypt and the Sudan.

A scheme for low-interest loans to farmers in the region, with the aim of boosting farm production and income.

Widening and deepening of the Suez Canal to increase its capacity and accommodate many of the supertankers now being built.

A batch of land reclamation projects, mostly in the form of irrigation projects, which would provide new homes in Egypt and elsewhere for many of the 1 million Arab refugees who fled Israel after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

There is a good deal more to the article, but what I have read will give you the gist of what it contains.

Is this a "leak" out of the Department of State, or is this sheer speculation on the part of the author of the article?

Secretary DULLES. I would say it reflects a very active imagination on the part of the author, Senator. It gives a totally misleading impression. I can see little bits here and there, pertaining to projects that have been considered such as the reference to the widening and deepening of the Suez Canal. That has been something which has been projected for a considerable period of time, and it is going to be a necessity if the canal is going to serve usefully.

However, that has never been considered as a governmental project. That is something which, if there is political stability in the area, can be undertaken, by the private interests who are concerned in the canal, and will not involve a dollar of the taxpayers' money.

Senator RUSSELL. You do not think Nasser is going to turn that canal back to private interests, do you, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DULLES. I think that he undoubtedly was eager to have private money to deepen and widen that canal. He has shown that interest repeatedly.

Senator RUSSELL. But it is not contemplated that the United States Government will undertake to assume the cost of improving the canal?

Secretary DULLES. Not at all.

Senator RUSSELL. Not at all.

Senator WILEY. What is the date of that article?

Senator RUSSELL. It is January 14 of this year, while this program was under hearing here in the committee.

Secretary DULLES. I noticed there was a reference there to the Aswan Dam. I have said, I think at every hearing I have been at, that there is no slightest intention whatsoever of financing the high Aswan Dam.

Senator RUSSELL. I would like to have all of this article put into the record, Mr. Chairman, just to show that the Secretary stated that this was not any outline of the projects they contemplated.

Chairman GREEN. The whole article?

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman GREEN. The whole article will be placed in the record.
(The article referred to is as follows:)

[From the Wall Street Journal, Monday, January 14, 1957]

MIDEAST AID: UNITED STATES PLANNERS MULL COSTLY PROJECTS TO PROP SHAKY ECONOMIES

IRRIGATION IN IRAQ; HOMES FOR ARABS; LOANS AND ROADS; ASWAN DAM'S BACK AGAIN—THE COST: \$600 MILLION PLUS

By John R. Gibson, Staff Reporter of the Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON.—The Eisenhower administration already is busy figuring how to spend the Middle East aid cash it hopes to get from Congress. Officials aim to pour the money into giant projects to build up dramatically the economies of lands from Egypt to Israel to Iraq.

The likely magnitude and duration of these projects make it all but certain that in the end the Middle East aid program will cost much more than the \$600 million now mentioned and that it will linger on for longer than the 2 or 3 years that officials now talk about.

Spreading it around

Though the exact projects that will get the cash haven't been decided, such schemes as these rank high in the consideration:

Development of Iraq's ancient Tigris-Euphrates Valley with irrigation and other projects.

An improved system of highways and railroads connecting Middle Eastern nations.

A long-standing scheme for developing the Jordan River Valley, which involves squabbling between Syria, Jordan, and Israel.

A sort of TVA for the entire Nile River Valley. This power and irrigation project would harness the 4,000-mile river all the way up to its sources in central Africa and Ethiopia, as well as along its length in Egypt and the Sudan.

A scheme for low-interest loans to farmers in the region, with the aim of boosting farm production and income.

Widening and deepening of the Suez Canal to increase its capacity and accommodate many of the supertankers now being built.

A batch of land-reclamation projects, mostly in the form of irrigation projects, which would provide new homes in Egypt and elsewhere for many of the 1 million Arab refugees who fled Israel after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

WHO WILL PAY?

"Altogether, we've got perhaps two dozen rather detailed projects we could use," says an official of Uncle Sam's aid-dispensing International Cooperation Administration. Taken together, they would cost far more than the cash the Administration has or is even asking for Middle Eastern use, but the United Nations, the World Bank and the recipient countries are expected to shoulder part of the load.

The Chief Executive wants Congress, right now, to let him spend with no strings attached \$200 million of aid money already appropriated for this fiscal year, ending June 30. Then he has served notice he will ask Congress to give him similar \$200 million allotments for the Middle East in both the 1958 and 1959 fiscal years—a total of \$600 million for freehanded spending in all.

As foreign-aid administrators explain it, the \$200 million to be spent the rest of this year would be on top of roughly \$30 million worth of technical cooperation already slated. That consists of United States help for schools, health projects and the like.

Although the lines aren't clear, the \$200 million would probably include any large-scale development projects already planned for the Near East. Congress gave the Administration \$250 million for such projects in the Near East, Africa, and Asia this year, with original planning calling for up to \$60 million of this to go into the Near East. The Suez Canal seizure put a halt to any such spending in the region, and it has never been made clear what big projects originally were planned.

Bars on spending

Eisenhower men are asking Congress to let them spend \$200 million in the Middle East pretty much as they want. That means removing two principal restrictions. The planners want to be free from a congressional restriction that requires 80 percent of Middle East aid for building big projects within a single country to be loans instead of grants. The other chief restriction bars Government spenders from laying out more than 20 percent of their aid appropriations

in May and June of each fiscal year; this is designed to keep aid men from a last-minute rush of spending for fear of losing already appropriated funds.

In selling the aid portion of the Eisenhower Middle East resolution to Congress, the President and Secretary of State Dulles have publicly emphasized the cash is aimed at thwarting Communist infiltration. But that task is more a matter of legislative strategy than a full disclosure of intentions.

The policymakers who helped draw up the aid ideas and the men who will administer them have much broader ideas. They see the aid cash as an important weapon in solving basic Middle East troubles—Arab-Israel bad blood and the anticolonial hatred of Arab countries, principally Egypt, for Western nations.

Umbrella over aid

"The military force part of the resolution would be an umbrella over the aid," explains a high Dulles assistant. "That's what NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was originally planned to do in Europe—remove the Russian threat so economies could be repaired."

More explanation comes from one of Uncle Sam's knowledgeable Mideast officials. Says he:

"In order to get the resolution through Congress, you have to play down the aid as a solution to basic Middle East problems. Congress is a hornets' nest on that subject."

He adds: "It would look like we were trying to undercut the United Nations if we came out and said we wanted the aid money to patch up basic troubles out there. We're backing Hammarskjold (U. N. Secretary General) in his efforts."

Indeed, the administration is currently in the process of trying to stave off a determined move in both the House and Senate to sever the President's Middle East aid requests from the authority he wants for use, if necessary, of armed force in the region.

Secretary of State Dulles has vigorously criticized a Democratic proposal for a congressional resolution that would omit the aid part of the scheme. "It [the Democratic proposal] does not touch at all upon the economic phase of the problem which is of extreme importance and urgency," the Secretary declared.

"Without the aid, you would be closing only half the stable door," is the way an administration official puts it more directly.

What administration officials say they want is a free hand to promise economic aid to a country or group of countries quickly any time the diplomatic situation suddenly turns favorable.

Tooling with cash

Specifically, the diplomats see increased freedom in using the cash as a tool to help settle Arab-Israeli feuding. Right now, say Mideast experts, the Arabs won't talk about a joint economic project because they're angry at Israel and because some Arab countries are angry at others. They say poor economic conditions within the troubled countries underlie most of the discontentment.

"It's a vicious circle that the aid freedom might give us a chance to break," contends a Dulles aid.

An ICA insider talks of three broad purposes of the spending projects the administration plans.

The first aim is to ease tensions fast. Chiefly, this means getting refugees from the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 out of United Nations camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria and into productive work of their own. Old Middle East hands at the State Department narrow the reason for much of the discontent in Arab countries to ugly animosities against Israel stirred up in the Arab refugee camps. The United States and the United Nations currently have plans in the works for irrigating and reclaiming large sections of arable land on Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and in Jordan as homes for many of the refugees.

Excitable people, ease off

The second, longer term purpose is to help large economic groups, such as farmers, in Mideast nations in an attempt to keep tensions down. "These are excitable people," a United States theorist says of the middle easterners, "But if they see you're trying to give them something, they ease off."

This situation calls, in the eyes of United States planners, for more irrigation and land reclamation. It also calls for farm-to-market roads in a region where highways, as well as other forms of transportation, are scarce. And the United States planners foresee a possible scheme for lending individual countries large amounts of cash which would be reloaned at low interest to farmers for agricultural work.

The third aim is still broader and longer-range: To lift per capita incomes and living standards of whole countries in the poverty-plagued Middle East through projects of nationwide impact. These might include multipurpose river valley developments, railroad construction, and big industrial enterprises.

Administration officials won't give a complete rundown on the schemes they have in mind chiefly because they don't want to be besieged with cries for help from the countries involved. As Secretary Dulles explains it, disclosure of what projects the United States intends to underwrite makes the countries involved think they have a vested interest in the project.

But it's clear the foreign aiders have a batch of big specific projects lined up for potential use.

Aswan's back again

For instance, there's Egypt's \$1.3 billion Aswan Dam, a proposal which intermittently dies and comes back to life. Officials who call it "dead as a doornail" one day admit the next that there's still a chance the United States may help pay for it. The dam's fate depends, apparently, on how friendly Egypt becomes with the free world.

They now call much brighter, however, the prospects for a United States hand in a development project for practically the entire Nile River. Whereas the Aswan Dam would have blocked the Nile in its comparatively lower reaches, the big development scheme would go into the Nile's headwaters for irrigation and power projects. These would benefit not only Egypt, but also the newly independent Sudan, Ethiopia, and British-controlled Central Africa, where one branch of the Nile starts in Lake Victoria.

Uncle Sam's strategists also eye the Tigris-Euphrates River Valley system in Iraq. The home of ancient Babylon and the cradle of modern civilization, the valley had a rich, highly advanced culture thousands of years ago. Developers would like to help the valley toward new preeminence, principally with more irrigation.

Most likely of all the schemes to win United States funds is the beleaguered Suez Canal, assuming Egyptian President Nasser agrees to play ball with the West. The State Department and the World Bank, of which the United States is the biggest member, are studying cash outlays to Egypt for widening and deepening the 105-mile desert waterway. Experts estimate the cost at up to \$1 billion.

Resolved: Preserve Suez

Many international strategists consider a loan for this work as potentially desirable because of the strategic location of the canal on the heavy oil-shipping route connecting the Middle East and Western Europe. They seem resolved to keep Suez the main artery for this oil flow.

Neither Egypt nor any other country will get its aid just for the asking. Administration officials make clear privately, although they don't say it openly, that they want various assurances that the cash will prove effective before they dole it out.

For the Suez development, as an example, Uncle Sam wants Egypt, Britain, and France to agree first to a settlement of their Suez differences. Our diplomats expect to offer cash for expansion of the canal as a come-on, if necessary, to a final settlement by the three countries directly involved.

That's the way they expect to use many of their other aid schemes, too. They'll make clear to disputing Middle Eastern nations that we're ready to help raise their living standards and boost national income, if the countries will just work together on the projects. This squabbling which the United States wants to end not only embroils Arab countries with Israel, but, as well, Arab countries with each other. Our diplomats note, for instance, that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are constantly trying to pull oil-rich Iraq away from her friendship with Britain. And both Iraq and the Egyptian bloc are contesting for weak little Jordan's allegiance.

Not all Uncle Sam's Middle East aid dollars will go for economic schemes, of course. Some will go for military aid that President Eisenhower wants to promise the countries. The President wants to give Middle Eastern countries arms and other military help, so they can beef up their own forces against Communist threats. Leaders of Iraq already have indicated they've been promised added United States arms aid.

But our planners say military help would take only a minor part of the \$200 million that Mr. Eisenhower wants freedom to spend this year and the \$400 million he wants in future years, let alone money to be spent still later.

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, there are just two other questions.

I am not completely clear as to what has been agreed with respect to the token military forces of the United Nations that are now in this area to maintain the status quo with the withdrawal of the Israel forces and those of England and France.

How long is it contemplated they are to stay there? Do we expect to keep them there until we settle the basic problems of that area, or are they going to pull out shortly?

[Deleted.]

ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATTACK

Senator RUSSELL. I was interested in your statement to Senator Mansfield, I am greatly concerned about it, that we had no definite intelligence whatever as to military movements in this area which brought on the unfortunate war there.

Did we not have some, at least a few hours' advance notice that the Israelis were going to strike or that France and England were going to issue an ultimatum, if they had their forces on the alert in Cyprus?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we knew, Senator, that this possibility had been considered by the Israeli and the British and French Governments, with varying degrees of intensity, over the past months, ever since the end of July, since the seizure of the Suez Canal Co., and that there were in each one of these Governments members of the Cabinet, some advocating so-called strong action, and others against it. And there was always the possibility that the preponderance of weight in these Cabinets would shift to the hard line as against the more moderate line.

But we had no advance knowledge that that transition had occurred in the case of Israel until it was advertised by the mobilization order.

Senator RUSSELL. How long was that before they actually moved?

Secretary DULLES. I think it was about 48 hours.

Senator RUSSELL. And in that 48 hours, we were not able to get any definite information that they were preparing to actually strike?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we assumed that they were preparing actually to strike. We were not even sure then, however, as to what direction they were going to strike in, whether they were going to strike against Jordan or strike against Egypt.

As you know, I think twice during that period, the President personally communicated with Ben-Gurion, but got no dependable information.

Senator RUSSELL. Have we been able to get any information since the event which would enable us to know whether the British or the French knew the plans of the Government of Israel?

[Deleted.]

Senator RUSSELL. Did we have any advance information that Colonel Nasser was going to undertake to nationalize the canal?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator RUSSELL. We did not. We had none whatever.
I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

STATUS OF U. N. FORCES

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, would you yield to clarify one point on the first part of Senator Russell's question on the status of the U. N. forces? I did not understand it.

Do they stay until affirmative action is taken, or do they automatically leave without affirmative action?

[Deleted.]

Chairman GREEN. Senator Wiley, have you any questions?

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, what difference would it have made if you had had notice of the action that the Israelis or the French and the English were going to take?

[Deleted.]

PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

Senator WILEY. The primary purpose of this resolution is to stabilize the Near East. There is ample evidence to show that the Kremlin would probably take advantage of unstable conditions, march in, and take possession of the oil. Am I right about that?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Am I also right that if it took over the Near East, it would then have a gateway to Africa and to the raw materials there?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. If it had the oil and the raw materials, it would be a very serious threat to the free world as well as to America?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. The purpose of this resolution is to serve notice that if the Kremlin moves to take over this area vital to our security, it will have a fight on its hands?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. How do all these other matters we have been talking about fit into that picture? Take, for instance, the Israeli-Arab situation. That might precipitate, I take it, an opportunity for the Kremlin to provide volunteers or to take other action. Then we would have to decide, I take it, under the resolution, what our position would be?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

HOPE FOR SETTLEMENT

Senator WILEY. It is hoped that through the agency of the United Nations, with such assistance as we can give diplomatically, and through a commonsense approach of all the other interested parties, some sensible, constructive solution to the Suez situation will result. That is more or less just a hope, is it not, at the present?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; it is more than a hope, perhaps. It is an area in which we are working very actively in concert with other countries, primarily through the United Nations, and it is a hope which is reinforced by effort and determination.

Senator WILEY. We had nothing to do with bringing about that situation; did we?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Did we have anything to do with bringing about the differences that have existed for decades between the Israelis and the Arabs?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. And it has existed for more than decades. If you will read the Old Testament, you will find it was going on even then.

ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY, NOT FUNDS, REQUESTED

Senator WILEY. I want to get something else clear in my own mind. Last year this Democratic Congress appropriated \$750 million for this area for military and economic aid; is that right?

Secretary DULLES. That is approximately the figure; yes.

Senator WILEY. Yes. And your resolution, as presented, would give you added time or, let us say, flexibility with respect to \$200 million of that \$750 million?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. You are not asking for an additional penny of appropriations?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. Nor are you asking for any additional powers in relation to that \$750 million?

Secretary DULLES. Only that there be somewhat greater discretion, primarily in terms of time as to its commitment.

Senator WILEY. Yes. In other words, for more time, thus making possible more profitable, economical, and constructive investment of the \$200 million?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. It permits us to expend this money with regard to the new situation created during November and December of last year, and I believe that if it is expended with regard to that situation rather than on the lines that were worked out prior to those important events, it will be spent more usefully and more productively from the standpoint of the United States.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would the Senator yield there?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Specifically, Mr. Dulles, what you ask for is the release of three restrictions which were put in the Mutual Security Act, in order to accomplish this purpose.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

DIVISION OF FUNDS BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID

Senator WILEY. Can you tell us approximately how much of this total of \$750 million you believe will be for the military program?

Secretary DULLES. About half. Some of the half which we call economic is in a sense to enable the economies to support their military establishment, and it is not possible to make a complete differentiation between the military and the economic, because a military establishment casts a certain economic burden upon a country, and it is necessary to offset that to some extent by economic assistance. But I think if that is understood, then the answer to your question is correct.

Senator WILEY. Have you any judgment as to what percentage of that half would go into that particular phase?

[Deleted.]

COST OF MAINTAINING TURKISH, PAKISTANI, AND UNITED STATES SOLDIERS

Senator WILEY. What does it cost us to maintain a Turkish soldier?

Secretary DULLES. That has been brought out before. I do not remember the figures, but it is a figure which represents only a very small percentage of the cost of a United States soldier.

Senator WILEY. Is the figure \$200 a year?

Secretary DULLES. The representative of the Defense Department has just gone out to check. It is about that, yes.

Senator WILEY. Is it true that it costs us over \$6,000 a year for every soldier we maintain?

Secretary DULLES. I think so, yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Then as a matter of economy it is good business to get a fighting Turk lined up on our side, is it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. What is the cost in Pakistan?

Secretary DULLES. Something generally comparable.

[Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. Well, I would appreciate it if we can get the costs for an individual Pakistani and Turk soldier in the record.

Secretary DULLES. I will put that in the record, if I may.

Senator WILEY. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 5, 1957.

Hon. THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR GREEN: In the course of the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Service Committees on February 1, 1957, Senator Wiley asked the Secretary about the cost of maintaining soldiers in Turkey and Pakistan as compared with the cost for maintaining a United States soldier in those countries. The Secretary promised to look into the matter and supply definite information for the record.

I am informed by the Department of Defense that the average cost per year of maintaining a soldier in Turkey is \$234 and in Pakistan \$272. The cost of maintaining a United States soldier in those countries would average \$5,463 per year. These figures do not include weapons or training but they do include pay allowances, medical care, clothing, etc.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT C. HILL, Assistant Secretary.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Byrd, have you any questions?

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, Senate Joint Resolution 19 is not an amendment, of course, to the Mutual Security Act.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator BYRD. It is an independent act.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

ELIGIBLE NATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator BYRD. It takes in new territory as compared to the authorizations of the Mutual Security Act, and "any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East"; for the purpose of the record, will you clearly define those nations that are eligible for this aid?

Don't speak of those that you have in mind giving aid to at this time, but what nations are eligible under the broad generalization of that "in the general area of the Middle East"?

Secretary DULLES. I think I testified here, if not I know I testified before the House, to the effect that we adopted, generally speaking, the definition which had been made by Mr. Jernegan, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Middle East, last March 1955, when he said this:

There is no officially or generally recognized definition of the term "Middle East." So it is necessary to be somewhat arbitrary. However—

Mr. Jernegan said—

I think it is sufficient to say that when the American Government thinks in terms of the Middle East defense, it is thinking about the area lying between and including Libya on the west, Pakistan on the east, and Turkey on the north, and the Arabian Peninsula to the south.

That ends Mr. Jernegan's statement.

I went on to point out that the definition of the area of the south should, in my opinion, include on the African Continent the areas adjacent to the Arabian Peninsula; that is, Ethiopia and the Sudan.

Senator BYRD. Would you object to defining by name these nations?

[Deleted.]

Secretary DULLES. Well, those nations are the same nations, Senator, that are eligible for that aid under the present law.

[Deleted.]

Senator BYRD. What nations are not receiving any economic aid at this time?

Secretary DULLES. What I said covers both military and economic aid.

Senator BYRD. Very well.

Secretary DULLES. Do you differentiate between so-called defense support and development assistance?

Senator BYRD. Well, that is a very loosely drawn phrase, and they are operated very loosely. Except for the military equipment, I think it all ends up pretty much in what may be termed general economic aid. You change the classifications year by year on this aid, and it is very hard to keep track of it.

Secretary DULLES. Well, they are always differentiated in the presentations made to the Congress, you know, Senator.

Senator BYRD. I was speaking right now of the total. I am going to ask later for a breakdown of these different nations of what they are now receiving from these different classifications of aid, whether it is economic or other.

Secretary DULLES. I gave the list, I think.

Senator BYRD. That is all right, if you have given it.

BREAKDOWN OF AID

I want it broken down between these different classifications.

Secretary DULLES. You say you want it broken down?

Senator BYRD. I want the aid broken down between the economic aid and the military aid, and what is this other one you have got there?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the ordinary way in which these things are broken down in the presentations to the Congress are in terms of grant military aid, defense support, development assistance, and the

minor programs of so-called technical cooperation which do not involve any substantive grant aid.

Senator BYRD. Defense support is very closely related to economic aid?

Secretary DULLES. What?

Senator BYRD. The defense support, in my opinion, and I have investigated it both here and abroad, is very closely linked with economic aid. In fact, I would put it under the same classification. But if you desire to have it separately, it is all right.

Secretary DULLES. I would do it any way you want, Senator. I am just trying to find out which way you want it.

Senator BYRD. I realize I have got to go by the books that are kept, so I want it by the way you keep it, those three classifications.

Secretary DULLES. It is a little bit complicated to break these things down here. I wonder if I might put in a chart, I think that would do it better.

Senator BYRD. It is understood now that what I would like to have in answer to the question is what each of these nations has received, and how long it has been receiving the aid.

Secretary DULLES. Well now, that is a different question, if you will excuse me, sir. You asked first what are they receiving, and which ones are now receiving aid. Your last question says how much have they received, which is quite different.

Senator BYRD. I understood you to say that you had already put into the record what these nations have received; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. You asked me, I think, Senator, which nations are now receiving economic aid, and I gave you the answer to that question. Now you ask another question, which is—

Senator BYRD. Give me the names of the nations not receiving economic aid which are eligible to receive it under this resolution.

[Deleted.]

Secretary DULLES. All of those countries that are not now receiving economic aid are, you understand, eligible to receive it under the present law, and it is a matter of Executive discretion that they are not. The same Executive discretion that will presumably be exercised—

Senator BYRD. This specifically provides that they are eligible because it says "in the general area of the Middle East," and we are bringing other nations under the economic-aid tent; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

REASON FOR REQUESTED FLEXIBILITY

Senator BYRD. Well, if you have already got the authority to give them the economic aid, why are you asking for this legislation?

Secretary DULLES. Because, Senator, what we are asking for is more time in which to assure that the aid will be more intelligently spent. There has been a catastrophe in this area during the months of November and December which leads the President to believe that the money can be more advantageously spent if it is freed from some of the present restrictions which were imposed in the light of the conditions of last June and July, notably, the provisions as to the time within which it must be spent. We are not asking for any new eligibility for any country whatsoever, or for any more appropria-

tion of money whatsoever, or for any more authorization of money whatsoever.

Senator BYRD. Well, if the Congress would change that date of April 30, would that relieve you to the extent that you would not have to ask for this legislation? You have got about 6 to 7 billion dollars of unexpended balances.

Secretary DULLES. Well, we have worked out, Senator, language which appreciably alters the language in the original resolution, and which is quite specific. It was included in the bill as adopted in the House, and I indicated that it would be acceptable.

The primary purpose of that is to change the date by which the money must be obligated. It also deals with 1 or 2 other matters. That is in the draft which was worked out with the staff.

Senator BYRD. Your main argument, as I have heard the testimony that you have given, is because of the date, April 30, which requires the money to be obligated as of that date.

If that date was changed to the end of the fiscal year, would that relieve the situation so that this authority which would be provided in this bill would be unnecessary?

Secretary DULLES. It would relieve the situation to some extent, but not fully, because there are two other matters from which we seek relief.

One is from the present precise terms of the law which require certain agreements to be signed in the event of grant military aid, and which, as I pointed out in my prior testimony, was language which was devised in 1951 with primary reference to Europe, and is not applicable to the Arab countries. It creates very great suspicion in their minds, and limits our ability to operate to maximum advantage in that area.

LANGUAGE BROADER THAN MUTUAL SECURITY ACT

Senator BYRD. I would like to emphasize the point that the authority, the authorization in this bill, or this resolution, is very much greater, in my opinion, broader in scope, than the one in the Mutual Security Act, and I will read it again as I did the other day:

The President be and he is hereby authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

Now, that language has not been, so far as I can ascertain, in any previous act. What is the "maintenance of national independence"? Take one nation and explain to us why we should, under what conditions should we, aid in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

Why was that language not included in the other legislation, in the Mutual Security Acts that have been enacted and reenacted several times?

Secretary DULLES. The purpose of that sentence, Senator, is to emphasize a restriction upon the authority which is now possessed, to emphasize the importance that this assistance should be dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

There are some of those countries which, in our opinion, are not or may not be striving to maintain national independence to the extent necessary and which may be opening themselves up to being

controlled by Soviet communism. We wanted to make it entirely clear that we did not intend to give economic assistance to any country which might then turn itself over to Soviet communism.

So, we emphasized the point "dedicated to the maintenance of national independence" as a limiting clause on our present authority.

Senator BYRD. In other words, you regarded this as an amendment, in a sense, to the Mutual Security Act, which has another definition whereby the President can give aid?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the emphasis is not the same. A principal purpose of this resolution, Senator, is to make a joint statement between the President and the Congress which will have a major impact in the area; and to say that our economic assistance is only going to go and will go to those who are dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. It is, I think, a very important statement of policy to make at this juncture.

Senator BYRD. But that does not confine you to that definition, because you have stated you could use the definition under the Mutual Security Act if the President so desires. This is simply to supplement the definition of when and how aid can be rendered as already set forth in the Mutual Security Act, is that not correct?

Secretary DULLES. Well, the authority to give military and economic assistance to this area is already contained—.

Senator BYRD. That is what I mean.

Secretary DULLES (continuing). Already contained in the Mutual Security Act; yes.

Senator BYRD. The language here does not change that. In fact, the President then can use both formulas, or whatever you may call it, as he desires.

ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION

Now another question: After this \$200 million has been obligated, does it require an annual authorization, or not, for any further expenditures? All the other economic aid, as you know, is annually authorized. As I read this resolution, it will not require an annual authorization for funds.

Secretary DULLES. The authorization applies, Senator, only to the present fiscal year.

Senator BYRD. But it does not read that way, Mr. Secretary. Section 3 does, but the general authority which is contained in section 1 is not limited to any specific time. It says:

This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise.

Secretary DULLES. Where are you reading from?

Senator BYRD. I am reading from section 5. Section 1 is the authorizing section. Section 5 says it shall continue until the President determines the peace and security, and so forth, are reasonably assured.

I have been advised by competent legal authority that this will not require that Congress shall make an annual authorization as is now being done under the funds that are expended under the Mutual Security Act. In other words, this does not limit the authorization.

It does limit the transfer and expenditure of \$200 million, but it does not limit, in my opinion, the authorization.

Senator KNOWLAND. Will the Senator yield at that point?

Senator BYRD. I yield.

Senator KNOWLAND. In reading section 3 as originally introduced, I think the Senator is very likely correct on it. I think section 3 has been added to by the House, and has been accepted, as I understand it, by the State Department and the administration, and now reads:

The President is hereby authorized to use during the balance of fiscal year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this joint resolution, not to exceed \$200 million.

So I would think that the House language, which is now acceptable, would clearly limit that part of the resolution to the fiscal year 1957, whereas the original language may be as broad as the Senator indicates.

Senator BYRD. I think it should further be made clear that the Congress should have the same power on an annual authorization basis in regard to future expenditures as it has with the other economic aid.

I am not speaking of this \$200 million. I am speaking of expenditures which we all know will occur, because we know when we start this, this will last for many, many years to come, and I have been advised by a competent legal authority that under the Senate resolution, after the \$200 million has been expended, then there can be appropriations without authorization by Congress under section 1 as it is, as related to section 5.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that that ought to be made very clear. As I say, if we are going to extend this economic aid scope by taking in more nations, we certainly ought to give Congress the right to have the authorization powers just as we have now under present economic aid.

Chairman GREEN. Have you any alternative to offer?

Senator BYRD. I will have. I am trying to find out from the Secretary here exactly what section 1 means, whether that is regarded as an authorization, which I think it is, and that it lasts so long—and I am speaking of the Senate resolution—and lasts until the President believes that the peace and security, and so forth, in that area is reasonably assured.

I have not read carefully the House amendment, but that relates, it seems to me, only to the \$200 million. I am speaking of expenditures which we are authorizing now, which you admit this resolution does do, taking in more nations.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I did not admit it takes in more nations.

Senator BYRD. Well, it could take in more nations.

Secretary DULLES. No; it could not take in a single nation which is not now eligible.

Senator BYRD. But again the point comes that you are operating under this bill, are you not? Why would you want the bill if everything is covered in the Mutual Security Act? Why can we not amend existing law to permit you to obligate these funds to do whatever you want to do?

SCOPE OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY

Secretary DULLES. Well, basically, Senator, we want the bill because the President believes there is a very dangerous situation developing in the Middle East, that it is under threat from Soviet communism. He believes that if the Congress will give him the added authority he seeks here, we can prevent that disaster happening; and without that authority, it is doubtful whether we can prevent it happening.

Senator BYRD. You said he did not need the authority. You said there is no added authority given in this bill, except for this transfer, which can be arranged by changing the time.

Secretary DULLES. There is no added authority in terms of authorizing any additional money. That has been repeatedly, I think, made clear, many times. I think it is quite clear from the provisions of the act that the authority contained in section 1 is not an authorization of funds. Authorization of funds is on a year-to-year basis.

Senator BYRD. If you will permit me to say so, sir, it is the same authorization that you got on the Mutual Security Act, not the same language, but the same type of authorization. And the policy in carrying out the resolution is in the first part of it, that is the policy; and then you come to the resolve section.

Secretary DULLES. Is the Senator familiar with the fact that in the bill as adopted by the House, section 5 is also amended to provide for termination by concurrent resolution of the Congress? That has been accepted by the administration.

LIMIT OF 1 YEAR ON AUTHORIZATION

Senator JOHNSON. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. Secretary, would you have any objection to saying that any authorization granted by this resolution would be terminated at the end of this fiscal year?

Secretary DULLES. I don't think so, no. I think that is implicit. I think it is in the resolution now.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the staff draw an amendment so that it would be clear that any authorization contained in this resolution will come to an end at the end of this fiscal year or at an earlier date.

Senator KNOWLAND. If the Senator would yield at that point.

Secretary DULLES. I would say "authorization of funds."

Senator KNOWLAND. You are referring to the authorization of economic aid and not to the use of armed forces?

Senator JOHNSON. I am referring to the economic and military aid program; the aid program has nothing to do with the military forces whatever, and I want to determine the fact that the Congress can terminate it earlier if desired. But we are arguing about a thing we ought to clear up, and I think it ought to be satisfactory to both principals.

I think Secretary Dulles is not asking for authorization beyond this fiscal year, and I think Senator Byrd does not want to give it to him; and if we can get language from the staff to say so, I think we can go on and get the resolution acted on.

Chairman GREEN. Before we get into more colloquy, will you kindly answer Senator Johnson's question?

Senator JOHNSON. He did answer it.

Secretary DULLES. I said that I would like to see the text. If it relates to the authorization of funds for economic or military purposes, I quite accept it.

Chairman GREEN. Would that require rewriting?

Secretary DULLES. In my opinion, it does not; but if there is any ambiguity—

Chairman GREEN. Are you willing to remove the ambiguity, or so-called ambiguity, by changing the phraseology?

Secretary DULLES. I would like to see the phraseology which the staff suggests.

Chairman GREEN. Is that satisfactory?

Senator JOHNSON. Satisfactory.

Chairman GREEN. Are you satisfied, Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Satisfied? I don't commit myself until I see it. I commit myself to the general proposition that we confine it to 1 year.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield for an observation on the point you raise?

It occurs to me what you are seeking to do is link up section 3 with section 1, and to link section 5 with section 2.

Senator BYRD. That is right, exactly. I think that can be done and should be done.

That is all, Mr. Secretary. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I am through.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the committee will indulge me. I have to be on the floor at 11:30.

Chairman GREEN. If there is no objection, the Chair will recognize Senator Johnson at this point.

JOHNSON AMENDMENT

Senator JOHNSTON. I have some questions which I would like to put to the Secretary while the Secretary is here, and because I have to leave because of other duties.

I want to get the Secretary to comment, for the record, on the proposed amendment which has been sent to members of each committee by the staff. It reads as follows:

Add the following new sentence to the end of section 3—

that is the House-passed resolution, and this is the language proposed to be added:

None of the additional authorization contained in this section shall be used until 15 days after the appropriate committees of the Congress have been furnished a report showing the object of the proposed expenditure and the country within which it is proposed to use such authority.

Now, Mr. Secretary, my question, very simply, is this, it is a very simple one: If this amendment should be added by the Congress, do you see any insurmountable difficulties on the part of the Executive, and would you have any serious objection to the resolution containing that language?

Secretary DULLES. I—

Senator JOHNSON. I may say this is the language submitted the other day, with the addition of the word "additional."

Secretary DULLES. That would be acceptable, Senator. We do not like it particularly, because it cuts down the effective time period that

we have, the extra days of grace so to speak, from 60 to 45, which is a 25-percent cut in that respect.

However, if something of this sort is, in your opinion, in order to get the necessary support for the resolution, the administration would accept it.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all the members of the committee.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman—

Chairman GREEN. Have you finished, Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Yes.

Chairman GREEN. Have you, Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. Yes. Unless there are some other members—

Chairman GREEN. Senator Knowland, have you any questions?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes; just briefly. I have to go for the same reason Senator Johnson will have to leave here.

ADVANCE NOTICE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH INTERVENTION

Just for the record, I would like, Mr. Secretary, to ask you whether or not the Government of the United States had reason to believe, through normal diplomatic channels, that armed intervention would not take place at the time it did take place?

Secretary DULLES. The answer to that question, as I understand it, is "No." We had not been given any assurances that the armed intervention would not take place. Is that the answer to your question?

Senator KNOWLAND. Had there been any reason to believe that armed intervention would not take place at the time that it did?

I had understood that earlier there had, of course, been the buildup on Cyprus; that there had been representations made to the governments concerned, that this Government would hope that there would not be armed intervention, and that there appeared to be a cooling off which took place; and when this final intervention came, at least the Government of the United States had had reason to believe that there would not be military action at that time.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct. The military buildup on Cyprus had ceased, certain military preparations had been reversed and undone. [Deleted.]

Senator KNOWLAND. I might ask, as a second question, whether or not we, and other nations for that matter, did not have a right to assume in view of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, that a member of the United Nations would not resort to armed intervention without going through the normal diplomatic procedures in the United Nations prior to taking military action?

[Deleted.]

Secretary DULLES. [Deleted.] Under those circumstances, we were considerably taken by surprise when the attack occurred.

Senator KNOWLAND. The third point I was going to raise is: The North Atlantic Treaty, article I, reads as follows:

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved, by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations—

Did we not have a right to rely on that to a considerable extent, that our allies would not take such armed military action at the time they did?

[Deleted.]

"CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES"

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, virtually every security treaty to which we are a party such as the North Atlantic Alliance, the Southeast Asian Pact, and I believe most of the others, refers to response to aggression "in accordance with our constitutional processes."

In the pending resolution, reference to "constitutional processes" is eliminated. Is there any particular significance to this elimination in the existing resolution?

Secretary DULLES. We believe that the resolution constitutes an exercise of the constitutional process.

Senator KNOWLAND. Thank you.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Case of South Dakota, any further questions?

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask a couple of questions.

THE ASWAN DAM AND THE SUEZ CANAL SEIZURE

With reference to this attitude of Mr. Nasser, Mr. Secretary, what difference would it have made if you had known in advance that Nasser was going to seize the canal?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think it would have altered our policy in any significant respect.

Senator CASE. Would it have had any particular effect upon the withdrawal of funds for the Aswan Dam?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. There is one thing I want to make clear, Senator. I do not believe in the United States being blackmailed, and any time I scent a purpose on the part of any country to try to get money out of us by threatening that if we don't pay it money it will do something, at that point I say, "Nothing doing."

Senator CASE. You were not particularly surprised by the attitude or the action of Nasser in seizing the canal, were you?

Secretary DULLES. Well, that particular action at that particular time did come as somewhat of a surprise, and I may say that it happened to come at a time when I was in South America, having attended with the President a meeting of the Presidents of the American States at Panama.

[Deleted.]

Senator CASE. Have you had an opportunity to see Time magazine, the current number of Time magazine, with reference to you and this particular matter?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Senator CASE. Time magazine, which I just happened to have been reading last night, has a feature article on the Cabinet of President Eisenhower, and in this it treats of each member of the Cabinet with a few paragraphs.

In connection with the paragraph dealing with John Foster Dulles, it says this:

In abruptly canceling the Aswan Dam negotiations, he provided Nasser with a public-relations excuse for seizing the Suez Canal (which he had long intended to do anyway).

When Senator Russell was querying you with respect to whether or not you had advance notice of the seizure, I was interested, or it recalled to my mind this parenthetical remark, "which he had long intended to do anyway."

Secretary Dulles. I think, Senator, it is now demonstrable that he had long planned this. Indeed, he said himself at one point that he had been planning it for 2 years. And Marshal Tito, in a speech which was made last fall, said that he had been told of Nasser's intentions in this respect at the first meeting which he had with Colonel Nasser at Cairo.

Those facts, however, about Nasser's intentions, were not as fully known to us at the time he acted as is now the case, where more evidence is available than we then had.

Senator Case. Of course, I accept your statement that you did not know about it in advance; but if he long intended to do so, it would not have surprised me if you had known about it, and then it would not surprise me if you had canceled the plans for financing the Aswan Dam perhaps because of such knowledge.

Secretary Dulles. We would never have gone through with the plans for the Aswan Dam as a way of getting insurance for the non-seizure of the Suez Canal Co. As I made clear, I just do not believe in doing business in that way.

Senator Case. In fact, I think, though, that if you had known he was going to do it, that might have been one of the considerations which might have led you to—

Secretary Dulles. It would certainly have reinforced my determination in that respect.

Senator Case. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Green. Is that all?

Senator Bush, have you any questions?

Senator Bush. No, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Fulbright. Mr. Chairman, I have one question I would like to ask.

Chairman Green. Senator Fulbright?

Senator Fulbright. I have a very short question I would like to submit.

ALTERNATIVES TO CANAL CLOSURE

Mr. Secretary, this is a matter purely of policy: If Mr. Nasser should take an unreasonable stand about the conditions under which traffic can go through the Suez Canal, which of course he may very well do, what are some of the things we would be prepared to do toward insuring an adequate supply of oil and other things through the canal for Europe?

In other words, what is the thinking of you and the Department as to what would be done under those circumstances?

[Deleted.]

Senator Fulbright. That is all.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman.

PURPOSE OF RESOLUTION

I would say to Mr. Dulles that I listened to Admiral Radford yesterday, and I thought that these two paragraphs from his testimony, in answer to questions of Senator Smith, summed up very concretely what you were trying to accomplish by this resolution. I would like to read you these two paragraphs and get your "yes" or "no" comment with regard to 1 or 2 sentences, if you desired.

Admiral Radford said this:

I did say yesterday that in my opinion, if this resolution is passed and it is thus made perfectly evident that we are going to back up countries who might be attacked by a Communist-controlled country [deleted] the Russians will be inclined to review their programs, and so will the countries they are supplying with arms. The countries supplied by Russia would receive advance notice from the terms of this resolution that if they become controlled by international communism and attack free countries in the area, we will, on request, come to the aid of the free nations.

In other words, the impact of this resolution would be to make the Communists stop and review their own programs. Perhaps they will decide it is no longer worth their while to build up armed forces in the area. I would hope that would be one effect of this resolution. However, that would be their decision, and not ours.

And again, he says:

If we adopt the policies that are permitted by this resolution, it is my feeling that the United States efforts will stabilize the governments that are now determined to remain free from Communist control, and I think we can reasonably hope that some of the other Arab countries [deleted] which have not yet openly taken a stand against the activities of international communism will be encouraged to do so.

Now, those two paragraphs seem to me to sum up as concretely as possible the purpose of this resolution, and the background on which you and Admiral Radford have been testifying.

Would you care to comment on that?

Secretary DULLES. I agree, Senator, that that is a very admirable statement of our purposes and expectations under this resolution.

I would like to say that I have previously testified, I think, that the passage of this resolution will deprive the Soviet Communists of much of their incentive to build up satellites in the area to be used, possibly, to attack other countries, because if they know that having made Egypt or Syria, for example, into a satellite, that if it then should attack an independent country then upon the request of the victim attacked we would come into the fray, obviously under those circumstances the satellite would be wiped out.

Therefore, this cuts down very greatly the potential value of satellites in the area; and, since that is the case, I think they will spend less effort to create satellites. In a similar manner, the Caracas resolution cut down the value to international communism of getting control of the political institutions of an American state. We said if that happens we all are going to go in to deal with that situation. Ever since then, there has been less effort to get control, and I think the same would be the case here.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman—

Chairman GREEN. Senator Sparkman has a question he said he wishes to ask.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, some columnist made the statement that the testimony showed clearly that we would not use Armed Forces to protect Israel in the event Israel should be attacked by an aggressor.

There has been nothing in this record to that effect, has there?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. However, this resolution concerns overt armed attack by a state controlled by international communism.

Senator SPARKMAN. I did not think so, either. And yet I saw that statement which said it was quite plain from the testimony that we would not.

There has also been a good bit in the paper about the insecurity of Jordan. Some have said that it might be desirable if Jordan would be broken up and divided between Syria and Israel.

[Deleted.]

Senator SPARKMAN. One other question deals with the one that Senator Knowland asked here about whether or not we should have known that the forces were moving in.

ADVANCE NOTICE OF MILITARY ACTION

For the record, is it not true that during the week or the days following Nasser's seizure of the canal, both Britain and France made it clear that armed intervention was not out of the picture? In other words, the whole world was put on notice, was it not, that they did retain that as a possible resort?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. It was because we were concerned with that that I went so hastily to London on the 30th or 31st of July, I think it was.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was it before or after that that you made your statement that we will not shoot our way through the canal?

Secretary DULLES. That was some time after that. That was at the time the Suez Canal Users Association was proposed. That was sometime, I think, in the early part of October.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, even at that time, they were still talking about the use of force, were they not? I believe that Sir Anthony Eden in the House of Commons did state that the use of force was not ruled out.

Secretary DULLES. [Deleted.] At all times since the end of July, there was concern about the use of force, although the concern on our part had somewhat lessened as a result of the cessation of the military preparations, a reversal to some extent, and the rather promising state of the negotiations before the Security Council.

TO AUTHORIZE OR TO APPROVE

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I believe, in the very first day's hearings on this, Senator Stennis, I think it was, brought up the suggestion that the word "authorize" ought to be changed to "approved." I do not remember what your attitude on that was.

Secretary DULLES. I think the present language is better, Senator. It says he is authorized to employ. If some Senators believe that he is already authorized, it meets that point of view. If the President feels that he does not have that authority without congressional authorization, it meets that point of view.

It seems to me the word "approval" carries a connotation which is less desirable, if I may say so, from the standpoint of the Congress. I am not sure that this authority should necessarily be used in every case. There might be some circumstances here where we would want to not react instantly. I referred here to a military practice which is known as "spoofing," where you try to draw the other fellow in by tricks and devices, and so forth.

Now I would think there might be some Members of the Congress who would be willing to say that the President is authorized to use the Armed Forces, but who would not necessarily want to say in advance that they approve of that use under any and all conceivable circumstances.

In other words, this is not automatic. The word "approval" implies that the Congress has given advance approval of the use of force under future circumstances which cannot now be foreseen. It seems to me preferable to say that the President is "authorized," but to leave him with the responsibility rather than giving an advance approval which would commit the Congress in advance of knowing the particular circumstances of a particular case.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was interested in your suggestion that you do not construe this as necessarily being limited to a grant of authorization from Congress. It might be a recognition of the existence of that authorization, that power.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. It seems to me in view of the fact that this whole topic of the division of authority between the President and the Congress is, and I suspect for a great many years will be, a matter of debate and uncertainty, that it is wise to find language which will to the least degree possible involve an effort to resolve that constitutional difference.

This is the language, as I recall, which was used and found unobjectionable in the case of the Formosa resolution. It seems to me to lend itself to the constitutional interpretations which various Senators might make.

Therefore, I think it is a better word than the word "approve."

LONG-RANGE PROGRAMS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the economic aid program, I am concerned about the type of programs that we might get into under the spur of the moment.

I have believed in long-range programs, carefully worked out, to develop projects and programs which would better the economic standing of a country.

Have you read a book recently by Rostow and Millikan?

A couple of weeks ago also there appeared in the Sunday edition of the Washington Post an article entitled "Mideast Policy Must Look Beyond This Crisis," and a subheading, "'Crisis Dollars' Can Actually Retard a People." Did you by any chance read that article or are you familiar with the book?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I have heard of the book but I have not had time to read the article.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me a very sensible discussion.

Secretary DULLES. Let me say, Senator, as a general thesis, I accept the desirability of long-range programs. I do feel that when you have had a crisis, an economic and financial crisis, as severe as

that which has recently occurred in the area, there may be—and I emphasize the word "may"—there may be the necessity of doing some things on a shorter term basis than we thought necessary a year ago.

Now whether that will prove to be the case or not, I do not know. But I would subscribe in general to the theory that you referred to.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with you in that last statement. Of course, you realize that people from whom we hear, back home, read a lot of these articles, and read about some of these impact programs that have been tried in the past.

For instance, I have just read the first article in this month's Reader's Digest, about the program in Iran.

Have you read that, by any chance?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I am sorry to say.

CRITICISM OF FOREIGN AID

Senator SPARKMAN. It is entitled "How Not To Handle Foreign Aid," by Bernard S. Van Rensselaer, who, by the way, was a member of the Economic Cooperation Administration and Mutual Security Agency, and was on the staff of the Hoover Commission in this matter. He writes convincingly. I notice at the end that reprints may be had, so I am certain we are all going to receive plenty of these reprints in the next few weeks.

Secretary DULLES. I know, Senator, that this program is very hard to administer. It is not possible to carry out these tasks in these foreign countries in a manner that the people in all respects feel is ideal, and there is inevitably a measure of inefficiency, which ought to be eradicated as fast as possible.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, as long as the human factor is there, there are going to be mistakes.

Secretary DULLES. I would say this: That, much as the handling of the Iranian situation may be criticized, I think there is no one who would like to go back to the situation which existed in 1952 and 1953, or thereabouts, when the Tudeh Party, the Communist Party, had this area virtually under its control, when there was a total stoppage of the oil.

And if you look at the thing in the large, there has been a very important and positive result achieved. If you look at it in detail, you can find plenty of imperfections.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with you.

I was in Iran back during the time when Mossadegh was riding high.

Well, Mr. Secretary, my chief concern on this economic program is that it be carried out in such a way as to build real strength there.

U. N. POLICE FORCE

One other thing I want to say, too. I hope even in those problems which have been given over to the United Nations, that we will exercise real leadership in such things as this police force, for instance.

I think we ought to be pushing for a police force to be available to prevent outbreaks such as this in the future. I believe we ought to take a leading part in making certain that the canal is open to everybody, including Israel, and in the settlement of the refugees and the boundary problems.

I think there is a real responsibility for us to exercise that leadership, even though those problems are not encompassed in this proposal, but are left to the United Nations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the courtesy of the Chair in affording me an opportunity to clarify a point which I thought was left a little unclear following the questioning by Senator Fulbright, and that is with respect to our policy regarding Israel and the Gaza strip.

Is it not a fact, Mr. Secretary, our policy is to support the action which the United Nations has taken with respect to the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Aqaba? Did we not support the resolution of the United Nations?

[Deleted.]

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you.

Well, Mr. Secretary, let me thank you for this long series of hearings that you have attended, and the patience you have shown. We have profited by it.

Secretary DULLES. I hope, Senator, it has been useful and helped to clear minds on this matter.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the joint committee adjourned.)

THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1957

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Theodore Francis Green (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations) presiding.

Present: Senators Green (chairman, presiding), Sparkman, Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Smith of New Jersey, and Aiken, of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senators Richard B. Russell (chairman of the Committee on Armed Services), Byrd, Stennis, Ervin, Saltonstall, Smith of Maine, Case of South Dakota, and Barrett, of the Committee on Armed Services.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Chairman GREEN. The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, which are sitting jointly to consider the President's proposal on the Middle East, are devoted today, both morning and afternoon, to receiving the testimony of some 20 witnesses who, within the time set, have asked the committee to be heard.

I anticipate that we will continue in session until about 12:30 p. m. today, adjourn for luncheon and reconvene at 2:30 this afternoon.

In view of the fact that the committee has been able to devote only 1 day to hear this rather large number of witnesses, it has been necessary to ask witnesses to limit their oral presentations to the committee to 10 minutes each.

All witnesses have been informed of this limitation. I wish to add, however, that if witnesses' statements are not completed within this time, it will be possible for us to incorporate the balance of the statements, if of a reasonable length, in the committee record which will be published in due course.

I have asked the committee clerk to remind each witness when his allotted time, 10 minutes, has expired.

Let me add, however, that if members of the committee wish to question witnesses on their testimony, the time taken in questioning will not be deducted from the 10 minutes allotted to each. In other words, the questioning will be in addition to the 10 minutes.

I remind each witness that when notification was set that the committee would hear them today, they were informed of the provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act which require that statements be filed with the committee in advance of hearing.

I understand that in a few instances such statements have not been

filed, and it will be necessary for me in those cases to ask that statements of such individuals be postponed to the end of the day, at which time we will determine whether time is available to receive their testimony.

The first witness this morning is Mr. Elmore Jackson of the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

Is Mr. Jackson here?

Good morning. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF ELMORE JACKSON, FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, my name is Elmore Jackson and I am here to testify on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation on the subject of Senate Joint Resolution 19.

My views reflect the position on the FCNL, an organization of the Society of Friends, or Quakers. The organization does not claim to speak for all Quakers, since the democratic structure of our society does not lend itself to the use of official spokesmen.

My views also reflect personal experience in the Middle East and at the United Nations in New York. I have been in the Middle East twice in the last 18 months. For the past 8 years I have represented the American Friends Service Committee at the United Nations.

PROGRAMS OF QUAKERS

I do not claim to be an expert on the Middle East. Quakers have, however, had considerable experience with Middle Eastern governments and peoples. We have carried on projects in both Israel and in the Arab States. For 16 months we administered the program of the United Nations aid to Arab refugees in the Gaza strip.

I would like to address myself to the relationship of the proposed resolution to the basic conflicts within the Middle East.

INCREASED DANGER IN MIDDLE EAST

There is, I believe, an increased danger in the region. This danger seems to me to lie primarily in the possibility that the conflicts within the area itself, if they continue, will be utilized to prevent the development of stability and the growth of free institutions and free governments.

I believe it is important, therefore, that United States action, and any resolution reported by the two committees, be focused on measures which are designed to reduce tension and to create the setting in which free institutions can grow.

There may be a threat of overt external aggression against one or more states in the Middle East. If there is, I believe this threat can and should be met through United Nations action.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN AREA

I am convinced, however, of the great dangers inherent in the continuing internal conflict within the region. The members of the 2 committees are, I am sure, fully aware of the 3 basic internal conflicts in the area:

1. The first is the conflict between the rising tide of nationalism and the colonial patterns of the past. This is not only a conflict between many of the governments in the region and the remnants of Western domination. It is also a conflict between the old order and the new within each of the countries themselves.

We, in the United States, out of our own past experience, are in a position to have some understanding and sympathy with the aspirations of the peoples of the Middle East in this respect.

2. There is the conflict between Israel and the Arab States. The resolution of this conflict will require time, patience, and great imagination.

3. There are the conflicts between the Arab States themselves.

I believe that anything which aggravates any one of these conflicts not only helps open the way for the extension of philosophies and programs alien to free institutions, but also makes more difficult the eventual achievement of a peace settlement.

The Middle East is relatively a small area.

NEED FOR CLOSELY COORDINATED APPROACH TO PROBLEM

Here I would refer to the Middle East in the traditional sense. The interrelationships of the three conflicts suggest the need for a closely coordinated approach to the problems of the region. These interrelationships also suggest the need for close coordination with the very useful initiative which the United Nations has been taking during the past 3 months. This U. N. initiative should be strongly supported and built upon in any expanded United States effort. I am sure the President has such an intention. This does not seem to me, however, to be clear in Senate Joint Resolution 19 which is now before you.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

I trust the members of the two committees are clear, as I am, that there is much economic aid that must be provided by the United States on a bilateral basis. At the same time, I am sure we are all aware of the limitations inherent in programs carried out in agreement between a very large and powerful state and small states which are struggling to achieve their economic independence. From our own experience in relief programs, Quakers are aware of the psychological problems that exist in such a relationship. Many of these problems are greatly aggravated when the relationships are between governments.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS NEEDED

To these normal difficulties, there is an added major difficulty in the Middle East. Several of the principal development programs that are needed in the area require the cooperation and agreement of several states. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel are all concerned with the division and use of the Jordan waters. Any program for settling the Arab refugees involves Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, and possibly other countries within the area.

When the Suez Canal is cleared of its present obstructions, and if and when suitable guarantees can be concluded with regard to freedom of passage, the canal will still be an inadequate instrument for sea-going traffic through the area. It is in need of enlargement and fur-

ther development. This is a matter of major economic interest to most of the countries in the region, as well as to Egypt and the user nations.

There is a need for a highway which would link the Arab States across the Gulf of Aqaba area. Any proposals for making additional use of the waters of the Nile involve agreements between Egypt and the Sudan, and very likely an agreement with Ethiopia as well.

The United States could approach all of these development problems on the basis of a bilateral relationship with each of the countries concerned. That may not, however, be the wisest course.

A REGIONAL APPROACH PROPOSED

When the United States was considering the development of an emergency economic aid program for Europe, our Government asked the countries in the area to form an organization which would take responsibility for surveying the needs and for establishing the priorities under which the program would proceed.

Our Government made a somewhat similar approach to several of the countries in South and Southeast Asia in the spring of 1955. Had the United States, as the supplying nation, participated in the Simla Conference, I believe it could have resulted in the establishment of a regional program in South Asia, devoid of some of the interstate competition which now exists.

There is a need in the Middle East for an overall survey of economic development programs, in which those projects already proposed would be assessed in relationship to the larger regional approach now in prospect. I believe the United States should explore the possibility of this basic survey being conducted by the United Nations.

A second need is for priorities to be established for development programs within the area. Could not the United States, in partnership with the countries concerned, establish a regional development agency with responsibility for establishing these priorities?

Such a new agency might be brought into some relationships to the United Nations. Within the framework thus established, the economic aid could be provided directly by the United States to the individual countries concerned.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me very important, at this crucial stage in western relationships to the countries in the Middle East, that a maximum of responsibility be placed upon those countries themselves to harmonize their differences and, insofar as possible, to approach the problems of the area in regional rather than national terms. It would obviously be necessary in this kind of development for the United States, or for the United Nations, to maintain separate programs for Israel until such time as there was a peace settlement between Israel and the Arab States.

I believe, however, that it would be in Israel's interest, and the interest of the other countries concerned, for the emphasis to be placed upon a regional approach, with as many of the problems as possible being settled within the area.

Given such an approach, I believe the question of arms traffic into the Middle East could be brought under control, perhaps through international agreement.

SUEZ CANAL CRISIS AND ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The countries especially concerned have a responsibility to move promptly toward a settlement of the complex problems involved in the Suez Canal crisis and the Israeli-Arab conflict. These are both questions, however, on which the initiative is rightfully, and I believe usefully, in the hands of the United Nations. The United Nations emergency force is proving an important instrument. It should be upheld and strengthened. The armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab States must be reinvigorated pending new efforts to achieve a settlement. Prompt moves must be made for the settlement of the approximately 900,000 Arab refugees.

MOVES THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is important that these moves, undertaken through the United Nations, should be supported through more extensive programs of economic and social development in the Middle East. But it is essential that in fact these programs do give such support.

As a means of insuring close coordination, I have suggested that it might be wise for the basic survey of regional development needs to be carried out by the United Nations and for the priorities to be established by a regional development agency which might be brought into some relationship to the United Nations. I hope the two committees will give serious consideration to these suggestions.

SUPPORT FOR A FORWARD LOOK

There is a need for the more developed countries to join in a new partnership with the countries of the Middle East in projects which have the possibility of capturing the imagination of Middle Eastern peoples. The past for them has been full of injustice. They have reason to be suspicious.

While they will not easily forget the past, their thoughts are increasingly on their hopes for the future. I hope that the two committees will take action which will enable the President, and the United Nations, to give strong and substantial support to this forward look.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my appreciation for this opportunity to give testimony before the two committees.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you.

Does any member of either committee have questions to ask?

If not, you may be excused. Thank you.

The next witness will be the Honorable Charles J. Kersten, former Member of Congress from Wisconsin.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES J. KERSTEN, FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM WISCONSIN

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Chairman, it is an extraordinary privilege to appear before these two distinguished committees of the United States Senate in this crucial hour of their deliberations regarding the future

course of our American policy in the deadly struggle with the international, Moscow-directed Communist Party.

By way of identification, I am a practicing attorney in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

From June 1955 to February 1956, I served as a White House consultant on psychological warfare.

Prior to that I was a member of the 80th, 82d, and 83d Congresses of the United States.

KERSTEN AMENDMENT TO MUTUAL SECURITY ACT

During that period I authored the so-called Kersten amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

Under this amendment the Congress, for the past 6 years, has provided \$100 million annually for the purpose of aiding resistance behind the Iron Curtain, primarily through the formation of national military units composed of escapees from the Communist-enslaved nations.

The idea of these units is that the thousands of young men from the Communist-dominated nations who escape through the Iron Curtain can play an extremely important role for freedom.

Defense against Communist aggression in remote parts of the world should not fall alone on the shoulders of American boys. These young escapees from the enslaved nations, Poles, Hungarians, Balts, Rumanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, even Russians and Chinese and those from elsewhere in the Red orbit, which the amendment now covers, burn with a desire to participate against their common enemy, that is, the Communist Party.

Many witnesses before our House Committee on Communist Aggression testified that most of the young men who came through the Iron Curtain did not want to be resettled as refugees in a distant foreign land. They wanted to join national military units representing their own nation and await the day when freedom would come to their homeland and they and their loved ones could return.

To get some idea of the power of these units to disarm the Communists, suppose the United States were taken over by the Reds; that they had persecuted Americans as they have the people of the captive nations and the American Army was under Soviet marshals. Suppose, then, suddenly there appeared in Mexico or Canada, attached to still-free forces—say, the British or French—small American units of American boys who escaped, in the American uniform and the American flag flying once again in freedom. Suppose that the news of these American units were beamed into a Communist-dominated United States.

What would the knowledge of the mere existence of such units do to the ability of the Communists to control American boys? Would the Communists dare to send their captive American armies against them?

MORALE OF ESCAPEES

These escapees, therefore, from the Communist-dominated countries have the highest morale against communism. They know Red subversion, false propaganda and terror first hand. They remember their relatives, their friends, and their homes. Should they be denied the opportunity to join those ranks of freedom that hold some visible

hope of the ultimate liberation of their loved ones and of their native land?

These units, with their own free flags and uniforms, as the law contemplates, are intended to provide the escapees this opportunity they do not now have and thereby lift a very substantial part of the burden from American shoulders.

Such national military units are intended also to be strong deterrents to Red aggression. The Communists would be understandably very slow to strike at an American force in the Middle East, for example, or elsewhere, to which these escapee units were attached. In the massive Soviet troop defections in World War II; in the refusal of Russian and Chinese POW's to return to Communist rule; in the uprisings in the Ukraine and Poland; and in the recent dramatic defection of almost the whole Hungarian satellite army, they see very well the tremendous morale defection potential of Communist-controlled armies.

They know that Communist led forces may well suffer defections en masse to escapee units carrying their national flags in freedom.

During the U. N. session in 1951 in Paris the Honorable Mr. Mansfield, one of the honorable members of this committee, in defending the Kersten amendment, said in part:

The tens of thousands of people who make their way through the Iron Curtain had the right to join in the defense of free Europe if they chose to do so.

And Senator Mansfield said further in part:

We wish to see the day when all the people who have sought asylum with the free nations will have a chance to return peacefully to their homes and start their lives anew in the country of their birth.

This was said in defense of the Kersten amendment when the Soviet attacked it in the U. N. They have attacked it twice, and the U. N. has rejected their attack.

NATURE OF NATIONAL MILITARY UNITS

I would like to introduce if I may, into the record, without reading it in extenso, a memorandum describing in detail the nature of the national military units, if that may be permitted to me.

Chairman GREEN. Without objection it will be included.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

MEMO ON NATIONAL MILITARY UNITS COMPOSED OF ESCAPEES FROM COMMUNIST-DOMINATED COUNTRIES

(By Charles J. Kersten)

Text of section 101 (a) (1) of Public Law 165 of the 82d Congress under title I (Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended), known as the Kersten amendment:
 *** Not to exceed \$100,000,000 of the funds available under this section may be expended for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia or the Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied areas of Germany, or any Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied areas of Asia and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union, either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes, when the President deter-

mines that such assistance will contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area or to the security of the United States."¹

PRELIMINARY ASSUMPTION

The source of the Communist threat to world peace rests in their control over extensive armed forces, together with supporting political police.

What follows is based on the conviction that men presently in Communist armed forces do not willingly support international slavery but will, if given a chance, join those ranks of freedom that hold some visible hope of the ultimate liberation of their loved ones and of their native land.

While there is evidence of potential defection from these armed forces, the Communist control of them is as yet uncontested by any effective magnetism from the free world.

If the free world has confidence that its cause appeals to human nature and that the cause of communism, when applied to peoples, is repellent, it will boldly enter the struggle to challenge the absolute control over these armed forces by Communist tyranny. It will not only assert its cause in the international political arena with words but it will also provide the visible and tangible mechanism to activate this potential defection so that freedom-starved men of the captive armed forces may escape from the ranks of slavery to join the ranks of liberty.

Thus we can inject a new dimension into the present world struggle that penetrates horizontally all the areas behind the Iron Curtain with dynamic ideas and ideals which can unite all mankind in the common cause to overthrow tyranny and achieve freedom.

If we ignore the appearance of these new dimensions and continue to set the stage for classic conflict on opposing sides of only vertical lines, we become unwitting partners with the Communists in the preparation of war between the peoples of the slave and of the free world. There is already ample evidence at hand that the Communist tyranny cannot be defeated by only orthodox tactics.

If we accept this new dimension wherein our own security coincides with sympathy for the enslaved, demonstrated by deed, we make allies of those who might otherwise be hurled against us. We will impede the Communist effort to Sovietize its armies and its peoples, and disrupt at its source their power to launch universal war affecting the will to fight of the armed forces behind the Iron Curtain.

No true soldier wants to fight and die for communism.

Therefore, the target of the free world should be to disrupt and eventually destroy Communist control over all the armed forces of the enslaved nations.

Background to legislation providing for military units

The legislative history of this section, prior to its initial passage, which took the form of a floor amendment, is not extensive. But it is definite. It is worth noting that it passed both the House and the Senate without dissent, with specific authorization by the Senate of expenditures of not to exceed \$100 million. The Congress has, since the original enactment of the above-cited amendment, five times reaffirmed its provisions without dissent. The action of Congress appears noteworthy because since its enactment the amendment has been the particular target of concentrated Soviet bloc attack (UNGA, Paris 1951; UNGA, New York 1953). This continuing unanimous support of the Congress would not have been possible if the language of the amendment had not been in tune with the hopes and wishes of the leaders and vast majority of its members.

For these reasons the author of the amendment has set forth below the intent and objectives thereof as he understands them, and as indicated by the debate on the House floor at the time of its passage.

The prime objective of the amendment was to authorize the establishment of national military units (from selected persons who have escaped from Iron Curtain countries) to be affiliated with NATO forces.

These national military units are to be made up of such selected persons who are nationals or former nationals of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, or any other countries enslaved by the Soviet Union.

To provide the required flexibility and support for such a program the phrase "or for other purposes" was included. Envisaged are such measures as main-

¹ NOTE.—The above has been renumbered in the Mutual Security Act as passed in 1956 and presently in force and is to be found under sec. 401 special fund (a) of Title IV: Other Programs of the MSA of 1954, as amended.

taining a flow of desired escapees, provision for dependents of such escapees and those who would not or did not qualify for the national military units by providing for them in other United States corollary programs, and support of activities within the Iron Curtain countries essential to the establishment and development of such military units.

In summary the intent was to provide the President with funds and flexible and wide authority to initiate an affirmative supporting program to strengthen the North Atlantic area and the security of the United States by drawing on the potential for freedom from behind the Iron Curtain which, consistently for a long time throughout the Soviet orbit and recently in Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere, has been so dramatically illustrated.

The idea for national military units grew out of a long study of international communism, its objectives and techniques, and firsthand experiences with a great number of escapees from the countries controlled by communism. It was clear that the International Communist conspiracy has for its primary objectives the destruction of all national sovereign states and to make the people thereof subservient to the central authority of Moscow. This is the Communist concept of a new kind of class internationalism called by them international proletarianism as distinguished from nationalism, as pronounced by Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Mao, and other leading Communist theoreticians. This concept makes enemies of all anti-Communist elements in every nation they take over. In contrast, the vast majority of escaped nationals from the countries now controlled by the Communist Party expressed a deep and vigorous love for their enslaved countries and a bitter hatred for communism and its destroying methods.

These escapees from the Communist orbit spoke with a unanimous voice which was also the voice of the overwhelming majority of the people of their respective nations. They hate communism in any form, national or international.

These expressions were those of national patriotism and love of country of the kind which has made and preserved the United States. They were the true feelings and aspirations of the captive peoples themselves.

It was obvious that some way had to be found to permit these escapees to participate in the common effort of the free world. The free world, and particularly the United States, is dedicated to the preservation of human freedom and governments which are responsible to the will of the people. We need all the support we can get from the people who are equally dedicated.

Since the escapees—people who have experienced firsthand life under Communist tyranny—did not have the opportunity to participate in the common defense of the free world, the national military units were intended to provide them with such opportunity.

BENEFITS OF NATIONAL MILITARY UNITS

The legislation, originally enacted in August 1951 and still awaiting implementation, can provide outstanding benefits to the United States. As I see it, the benefits provided would include:

1. Help to solution of refugee problem

The current massive escapes from Hungary raise the question whether permanent resettlement in the free world is the final answer to the problem of the continuing, and possibly even increasing, numbers of refugees from Communist terror.

The national military units provide a place and a positive purpose for freedom-loving and courageous military defectors. They also foreshadow the means by which the captive nations will be free of Communist rule and the desire for escape will cease and many of those who fled will want to return to their native land.

2. Visible and understandable symbols of freedom

Such units would provide a symbol for all the enslaved people of central and Eastern Europe. They would be looked upon as manifestations of the legitimate and constant hopes and aspirations of the captive peoples and the nations they represent. This would be accomplished by each unit being formed on national lines with identifying flags, chevrons, arm patches, etc.

3. Rallying points for military defection

The units would serve as rallying points to attract persons of military age behind the Iron Curtain, including those already inducted into the Communist-

controlled military forces or about to be. Every Communist bloc individual of military age who escapes to the free world and is inducted into the national military units represents a net gain of two for the free world.

4. Deterrent to Communist military aggression

They would serve as a deterrent to war because of the effect they would have on the morale of the Communist military forces. Properly exploited, the mere existence of such national military units could create real problems for the Communist political and military apparatus and render it extremely unsafe for military offensives.

5. Disruption of military will to fight for communism

They would serve as a powerful force to weaken the discipline and will to fight of the Communist-controlled military forces in the event of war. Communist-controlled military forces will not want to fight against their countrymen who are fighting—in the well-known and established national units—on the side of the free world. Capabilities for substantial wartime desertions and surrenders together with significant behind-the-lines insurrection can accrue if such units are developed and their establishment properly exploited.

6. Upset Red propaganda re German militarism

They would serve to offset Communist propaganda about the resurgence of German militarism (with regard to such nations as Poland, etc.). National military units, made up of men who formerly lived in captive nations, marching side by side with Germans, Americans, and other free people, would put the big lie on such propaganda.

7. Symbols of a united Europe

The morale of NATO military forces would be strengthened. The French military have traditionally held that the liberation and federation of the Balkan States is vital to the defense of France against Germany and now against Russia, as the Balkans are a mountainous fortress lying across the flank of Germany and Russia. If the significance afforded by the national military units representing Eastern Europe is added to the forces of Western Europe a United Europe and the "European idea" are thereby symbolized—a more inspired banner around which there can rally against atheist materialism all of the spiritual and cultural ideals common to Europe as a whole for nearly 2,000 years.

8. Economy of American forces in Europe

The initial value of the units would be chiefly their psychological impact on the satellite and Soviet forces. However, as they develop and grow they can, guided by experience and sound military judgment, contribute to the economy of American forces in Europe.

9. Special wartime value in captive nations

They could, in the event of war, in addition to missions as part of United States or other NATO conventional forces, have a peculiar value in essential specific operations behind the lines. Knowing the language, traditions, and terrains of their homelands they could rally and strengthen local resistance and blockade the enemy's lines of communication and supply, and also prepare for airborne or armored thrusts by our conventional forces.

10. Best means available short of war

The establishment of the national military units would provide perhaps the most significant action program short of war to weaken and defeat international communism at its base. The units would be an effective challenge to the loyalty of Iron Curtain armies which demands they serve Communist Party interests. For it is only by such unchallenged loyalty that the Communists remain in power to threaten the world.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Extension of units

While the primary use of these units would be in affiliation with the United States ground forces in Europe, there is envisioned the distinct possibility that air and naval units could be developed from such a program.

Units attached initially to United States forces

In order not to delay the program in its inception and until such time when appropriate arrangements can be effected to provide for their services with other

NATO elements, the units should be affiliated with United States forces in Europe and be organized under American commanders.

Would units provoke Soviet reaction?

Soviet propaganda would react violently to the establishment of the units. It has already done so to the passage of the amendment.

But the moral force, with its implications of freedom and independence, flowing from the existence of these units would be more likely to deter rather than provoke. The units would do much to deprive the Communists of that popular support which is necessary in any substantial military aggression.

The concern previously expressed of possible Soviet reaction to the establishment of such units has been discredited since the spontaneous massive military defection of the Hungarian armed forces to the side of the Hungarian patriots as have the previous uprisings in Poland, East Germany, and elsewhere.

And since we have already been charged with every crime and with particularly a wide range of activities in implementing this amendment, there can therefore be no further charge or provocation in its actual implementation.

Are national military units interference in East Europe's affairs?

This charge was twice made by the Soviets against the United States in the United Nations and twice rejected by the U. N. It is the Communists who have interfered in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe so as to endanger the West. Anything done to assist the peoples of East Europe to regain control of their own affairs is in defense of the principle of noninterference.

THE LODGE ACT

(Public Law 597, 81st Cong., chap. 443, 2d sess., amended by Public Law 51, 82d Cong.)

The Lodge Act serves a supporting but separate purpose in behalf of the United States security. Under it up to 12,500 aliens may enlist in the Regular United States Army to be integrated with citizen soldiers and not established into separate units of aliens. After 5 years of honorable service such aliens are eligible for permanent residence in the United States. The Lodge Act provides a means whereby an escapee serving in United States uniform may eventually immigrate to the United States.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The greatest problem within the Communist empire is fear of the demands of the enslaved people for freedom. There is reason to believe they are more afraid of their own people than of atomic attack. The national military units would stand as the symbol for freedom for the enslaved. When launched, they would typify the bold initiative expected of United States leadership by the free world and they would greatly increase the fears of the Communist masters and improve tremendously our position at any future conference sessions with them.

2. We have to prevent war, if possible, by disintegrating the capability of the enemy powers to wage war on a significant or dangerous scale. The greatest single means is to render them more distrustful of their own military forces.

3. The ordinary devices of government may not be fully suited to the development of the program herein proposed. Because of the unique nature of such national military units and their direct connection with national security, it is respectfully recommended that, in proper liaison with the Department of the Defense, a special task force be set up at the White House level to do the preparatory work, to launch the program and to give it continued guidance in its orderly development.

Experience to date in getting anything done under the amendment, strongly indicates the need for such special measures. For example, it was almost 2 years after its enactment before that portion of the program pertaining to escapee relief began to function and demonstrate any real concern for the lot of the escapee. The United States escapee program which operates under the Kersten amendment has helped to resettle the Hungarian refugees. But the main purpose of the amendment has not as yet been realized.

4. Finally, these national military units would demonstrate by concrete action, understandable to all freedom-loving people, the decision of the United States to stand by its publicly stated position of never acquiescing in Communist enslavement of people whereby they can be molded into servile instruments of aggression, and of our determination to see those nations once again free and independent.

SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES

MR. KERSTEN. Which memorandum states in brief that the establishment of such military units would help a great deal in the solution of the refugee problem.

The current massive escapes from Hungary raise the question whether or not permanent resettlement in the free world is the final answer to the problem of the continuing and possibly even increasing numbers of refugees from Communist territory.

PURPOSE OF NATIONAL MILITARY UNITS

The national military units provide a place and a positive purpose for freedom-loving and courageous military defectors.

They also foreshadow the means by which the captive nations will be free of Communist rule and the desire for escape will cease, and many of those who have fled will want to return to their native land.

The gentleman from Wisconsin, the Honorable Mr. Wiley, also spoke favorably of this amendment on the floor and wrote an article concerning it in a national magazine.

So therefore without further burdening the members of the committee I request that the entire statement that I have prepared be permitted in the record together with the memorandum on national military units, to which I have referred.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Kersten.

(The remainder of Mr. Kersten's prepared statement is as follows:)

In the 83d Congress, it was my honor to serve as chairman of the House Select Committee on Communist Aggression.

Through a period of 2 years, that committee heard the detailed testimony of 335 witnesses, both in this country and in Europe, regarding the subversive and aggressive methods and actions through which the Moscow-directed Communist Party seized its victim nations.

Most of these 335 testified either as eyewitnesses to that seizure, or as actual participants in the events which they described.

Our committee, which consisted of nine members of both parties in the 83d Congress, concluded these extensive hearings with certain unanimous bipartisan recommendations.

OBJECTIVE OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

The objective of these recommendations was the political defeat of the Moscow-directed Communist Party at its base in the Kremlin.

It was unanimously agreed by the membership of that committee that such a political defeat of international communism provided the only reasonable way to avoid major war and to bring peace—with justice—to the world.

The recommendations which I shall now set down are, therefore, largely those made by that same House select committee.

I believe it pertinent to make these recommendations to this august body at this critical moment in which it is deliberating upon Senate Joint Resolution 19 which has as its prime objective the preservation of the freedom of the nations of the general Middle Eastern area against the very same Communist aggression with which our House committee was forced to deal after that aggression had become an accomplished fact of history in Central and Eastern Europe.

COMMUNISTS' POLITICAL OFFENSIVE IN MIDDLE EAST

For some time now the Communists have been conducting a political offensive in the Middle East. In subversion centers in the U. S. S. R. they have schooled cadres of nationals of every one of the Middle Eastern countries, training them to penetrate every echelon of society, such as important educational centers like

the great Al Ashar University, the seat of Moslem learning, in Cairo, to which came religious men and students from every corner of Islam. They have bribed writers and reporters of Middle Eastern countries to peddle their time.

From the Czech Embassy in Damascus is operated a vast conspiracy of Soviet economic political warfare. They have engaged in dumping products such as glass in the area so as to ruin local industry and make the Middle East dependent on the Soviets.

They have gone to great lengths in stirring up antagonism among the several nations, seeking particularly to aggravate the differences between the Arabs and the Jews.

This Communist political offensive in the Middle East, which is the actual prelude to that feared aggression, endangers not only that vital area, but what remains of free Europe, and therefore our own national security.

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

This confronts us with two possible courses of action:

The first would be to limit ourselves to mere reaction to Kremlin initiative. The second would be to ourselves seize the initiative.

We severely limit ourselves if we merely react to the initiative which the Kremlin is currently employing against us in the Middle Eastern area.

To submit ourselves to this would be to wage this contest on the periphery, which, in effect, would restrict us to waging a self-limited rear-guard action in political, and possibly eventually military, warfare.

Bitter experience with Communist tactics of the type which were graphically revealed before our House Committee on Communist Aggression has emphatically demonstrated that to restrict ourselves to mere reaction to the Kremlin-established initiative at a momentary single trouble spot does absolutely nothing to deter subsequent Communist initiative elsewhere.

For example, in the late 1940's, while we concentrated upon the Communist initiative in Europe, Greece and Turkey, the Communists were actually busily engaged in what became their successful aggression in China and elsewhere in Asia.

In the early 1950's, while we concentrated upon the Communist initiative of military aggression and their subsequent political offensive in Korea, the Communists were busily engaged in launching the very same initiative to which we only now are beginning to react in the Middle East.

By limiting that reaction to the current Communist initiative in the Middle East, we are merely permitting the Communists to hold our attention and effort there, while, through one of the bloodiest and most massive purges in history, they are trying to resolidify their position in Central and Eastern Europe—which has been so sensationaly threatened by recent events in Hungary, in Poland and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain—including within Russia itself.

Thus, as at no previous time, should it now be perfectly obvious that to continue to pursue the policy merely of responding to Communist initiative, complete with its feints and its tangents on the flanks and on the periphery, we are but dancing to the Communist-called tune, and paying a fantastically high price to the fiddler in terms of billions of dollars expended, and, from time to time, of thousands of American lives, as in Korea.

DESIRE FOR FREEDOM OF CAPTIVE PEOPLES

For all the billions of dollars and the thousands of lives so far expended in this Kremlin-created atmosphere which is neither true war nor true peace in the sense which we have heretofore accepted those terms—for all of this fantastic cost—nothing has more threatened the Communist structure than the uprisings behind the Iron Curtain by those captive peoples whose only real weapon, sadly enough, is the burning desire for freedom.

It is this weapon, which courses in the hearts and sinews of these people from the Baltic to the Adriatic, which the Communists fear more than whatever new billions of dollars and thousands of American servicemen which we may now be preparing to commit to the Middle East.

The Communists fear this weapon that is the desire for freedom within the captive peoples themselves because that same weapon lies poised for another massive blow which may come at any time, as it has so recently in Hungary, to strike directly at the Moscow base of the Communist Party and the international conspiracy which it controls.

This will for freedom of the Communist-hating peoples of the captive nations is devastating to the Communist cause because it lies like a gigantic time bomb at the very heart of the Communist apparatus, quite unlike whatever reaction to Communist initiative we may elect to employ at some remote tentacle of that Red octopus, whether it lie in the Middle East or in the Far East.

However hard or often we may choose to chop away at such a Red tentacle, we will continue, in so doing, to little harm that heart, as Korea graphically proved.

In fact, even as we now prepare to become unlocked in what could well prove, if the Communists wish, a new Korea in the Middle East, the Communists, in a new initiative in the original Korea, are building themselves to a military strength far beyond that which they enjoyed at the 38th parallel in 1950.

SEIZING THE INITIATIVE

It is time that we abandon this losing and self-restricting policy of mere reaction to the Communist initiative. Instead, it is imperative that we adopt the positive policy of seizing the initiative which puts the Communists on the defensive.

This we can do, with the help of commonsense, and with such forces at our command as those found in the millions of natural anti-Communist allies who look to us for assistance in their prayers and struggles for liberation behind the Iron Curtain.

I fully recognize that to this suggestion the false prophets and blind diplomats who too long have stood as strange gods before us, to lead us from reaction to reaction to Communist initiative, will immediately cry out that to employ these natural allies is to invite war.

I point out, however, that so long as these millions of anti-Communist dissidents remain within the Communist orbit, it is as impossible for the Communists to wage conventional warfare against us as it is for a sea captain to sail his ship into battle with a mutinous crew.

At no moment in history has any captain, however terrible and tyrannical, ever suffered a more mutinous-minded crew than do the Kremlin-based captains of communism today in the angry face of the restlessness and the demands for freedom which daily grow more massive among the Iron Curtain's Communist-hating millions.

PROVISIONS OF KERSTEN AMENDMENT

It was in preparation for this very moment that the Kersten amendment was carefully fashioned and enacted into the law of the land 6 years ago.

Among its several purposes for the encouragement of the desire for freedom among the captive peoples was its provision for the United States escapee program which proved of such vital assistance in the case of the Hungarian refugees from the Kremlin-ordered blood bath in their Communist-battered homeland.

Even more important to our Government and to the cause of universal freedom today, is the amendment's provision for the national military units to be composed of able-bodied escapees from the captive nations.

These still little known units, the nuclei of which are based at Kaiserslautern, Germany, and which represent every Iron Curtain nation, including Russia itself, were designed to become, when properly advertised, powerful magnets of attraction to members of the armed forces of Russia and its satellites, in order to draw the morale of military power away from Communist control.

Again, the recent rebellion in Hungary, which found Russian and Ukrainian troops joining in that defection by the regiment and turning their guns on the Soviet army, should be sufficient to convince the most obtuse among us that the proper implementation and exploitation of these national military units is the most effective means by which we can deprive the Communist Party of its war-making power.

We are told it may become necessary to commit American troops to stop Communist aggression in the Middle East. But why is so little being done to enlist the willing services of those who burn with the greatest reason in the world to oppose Communist aggression, and are actually able to undermine and paralyze that aggression before it can get started?

This can be done by the Iron Curtain escapees who, in joining the ranks of these national military units based in free Europe, thereby appeal to their brothers-in-arms who remain under Communist command to join them, if not physically, then morally, by refusing to train their guns and bayonets upon

their own people, leveling them instead, in defense of their people, at the Communist leaders who too long have been permitted to enslave them.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL MEASURES ADVOCATED

In concert with this which is basic to the Kersten amendment, certain related steps could easily be taken for the disintegration of the Communist Party and for the downfall of its leaders by means short of war, which are to be found in the following psychological and political measures which could bring about the toppling of the Communist Party by its own weight.

These are measures of the initiative, rather than measures of mere reaction to Communist initiative.

These measures include:

1. President Eisenhower, as the free world's foremost soldier-statesman, can appeal to the armed forces of the U. S. S. R., of the satellite nations and of China to refuse being further used as instruments of Red massacre, but, on the contrary, to insist on the right to stand guard over the inalienable rights and liberties of the people of their respective countries and resist their destruction and perversion by Communist political leaders.

2. Get rid of the academic experts and faceless career advisers who have been dictating that we must continue to do business with the bloody gangsters who compose the Red regimes.

These so-called experts have fashioned the theory that "evolution and not revolution" will take place within the Communist-dominated nations, and, therefore, nothing should be done to aid the captive peoples to replace their Communist governments with those of their own choice. This theory of evolution has recently run through much of our policy.

It is the product of the academic experts as is clear from, among other things, the recent book, *How the Soviet System Works*, issued by the Harvard University Press in 1956 and written by three of these same "experts," Harvard professors (Russian Research Center) Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn. These and other "experts" such as Dr. Max Millikan of MIT, Dr. Harold J. Berman, and John K. Fairbank apparently have sold our policymakers on the theory of evolution as they describe in this book their work nominally under a Government contract for the United States Air Force, but actually affecting our entire basic policy.

They have also developed the false theory of national communism as a goal toward which the captive nations should strive.

Both of these ideas are dangerous because they deliver with finality all of the captive nations to the Communist regimes and delude the free world into thinking that the Communist Party can be changed into a decent political party and a decent government.

Anyone who has had any real experience with Communists knows they don't evolve into decent persons until they leave the criminal, godless way of life which Marxism-Leninism prescribes.

They know also that real communism cannot be national but by its nature is international, based on Marx' idea: "Workers of the world, unite." "Evolution" and "national communism" are false faces which the international conspiracy can put on and, like Tito, receive economic support from the free world.

3. An all-out United States information program beamed behind the Iron Curtain showing our sympathetic understanding of the suffering of the people under communism, including the enslavement of every segment of society.

Simultaneous with such an information offensive we should withdraw diplomatic recognition of Communist Party regimes as nonrepresentative of any of the nations they dominate.

4. An information offensive primarily in Western Europe against the physical entity of the Iron Curtain consisting of 1,200 miles of barbed wire, land mines, watchtowers, machineguns, dogs, and border guards which painfully separates the peoples of Eastern from those of Western Europe.

The only rational explanation for the Iron Curtain is to give the Communists the opportunity to hide the reality of life under Red rule from the light of truth and, further, to give them the opportunity to mold the captive nations into willing slaves of aggression. There is no possible defense for the continued existence of the barbarous anachronism of the Iron Curtain. It can only breed war. It should be made anathema.

5. The passage of a well-publicized Political Asylum Act to take temporary but decent care in Western Europe or elsewhere of the dependents of anti-Com-

unist fighters, in the Red-dominated nations, until they are liberated from Communist enslavement and until it is safe for loved ones to return to their homelands.

6. Outside coordination and leadership to popular internal resistance to Red rule in the several captive nations, avoiding abortive uprisings, but giving guidance and timing to general resistance and support to efforts of self-liberation with material aid.

7. A continuing and ever-increasing general information offensive led by the American delegation by procivilization and anti-Communist delegates in the U. N. against Red aggression and Red imperialism and colonialism in each of the captive nations, as the chief warmongering in the world today.

8. Setting up of a Free World International Trade Commission to channel all trade with Communist bloc nations, insuring that every major item of trade would be conditioned with the extension of freedom to the people of Iron Curtain nations, e. g., diesel engines will go to Poland only when the Polish government will permit the publication of an anti-Communist newspaper in Warsaw, or a certain number of anti-Communist professors are permitted to teach in the large universities, etc.

9. The establishment of an International Juridical Commission within the framework of NATO or in the UN so that Communist crimes perpetrated against humanity may be fully recorded and officially noted for prosecution.

REMOVAL OF COMMUNISM'S MILITARY THREAT TO THE WORLD

Gentlemen, these measures, in concert with that which the Kersten amendment provides for the proper implementation of the national military units, and for which you and your colleagues have been appropriating funds for the past 6 years, are measures which, if properly and promptly exercised, could pave the way for the freedom of the now captive nations of communism and, therefore, for the removal of communism's military threat to the world, including the Middle East.

REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT KERSTEN AMENDMENT

In conclusion, I most respectfully suggest that the moment is at hand when great and vital committees such as yours should begin to ask some searching questions as to who within the executive branch of our Government, for the past half-dozen years, has been frustrating the will of Congress by failing, if not pointedly refusing, to implement this amendment of the Mutual Security Act which calls for the establishment of national military units of escapees and other measures such as those designed for the defeat of international communism and international socialism by means short of war.

And I suggest, as the author of this amendment, that your conduct of such an inquiry will demonstrate that those responsible for this failure to act are the very same faceless men, sinister and powerful within our Government, who never tire in their efforts to bring Red China into the UN, to bring pressure to have Tito come to America and furnish him with jet fighter planes, who consider that the Communist enslavement of the captive nations is "final," and who believe that we must do business with the Communist conspiracy, and who believe that we should abandon international morality and forget our tradition as a nation which was born in a revolution for free men.

Whether these forces within the executive branch do this in stupidity or conspiracy, they are helping to promote the very Communist aggression which you, gentlemen, are endeavoring to prevent in your dedicated consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 19.

I thank you for this distinct honor which you have afforded me in permitting my appearance before you here today.

Chairman GREEN. Any questions?

Senator RUSSELL. I have one or two, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman, as you know, I have also been strongly in favor of this plan. I have supported this provision in each of the mutual security bills for the last several years; I have forgotten how long.

Mr. KERSTEN. Six years, Senator.

OBTAINING IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN

Senator RUSSELL. We have been unable to get it implemented in any way. Do you know of any way whereby we can be assured that this plan would be put into force and effect?

Mr. KERSTEN. Senator Russell, I believe that this plan, this part of our law, has widespread support in the Government, particularly on top.

However, I think it is the type of thing that would be opposed by the so-called faceless men of the executive department who do not want, I believe, or are not particularly concerned about breaking up the power of the Communists from within.

I know of no more direct way of shaking Communist power than to shake the morale of those armies that the Communists now control, and I think that it is a matter of popular public opinion and understanding of this thing that will help save the lives of American boys that should spark its implementation.

Senator RUSSELL. I agree with that. I think we do more to weaken the military might of the Communist world with \$100 million here than we would do to strengthen the free world by several billion dollars of armed assistance to the free countries.

But as a practical matter we have had a great deal of difficulty in getting first a Democratic administration and now a Republican administration to implement this program.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes; there are several suggestions contained in the memorandum, Senator Russell.

I think the most important help and aid, however, would be popular understanding which, if it came, if the understanding is had by the public, I think there will be widespread support, because it pertains directly to the problem of using only American boys in remote parts of the world. And once it is understood that these units have the potential of relieving that burden on only American arms and the further and very important potential of disrupting the Communist Party ability to control their armies, I think it will have widespread support, and I am satisfied it will have the strong support all along the top of the executive department.

Thus far it has not had any support at the right places. I think it has a great deal of popular support throughout the country.

Senator RUSSELL. The Congress undoubtedly favors it or they would not have adopted it from year to year in these various bills, but it has run into a great deal of difficulty somewhere, and it is contended in some quarters that this would be highly provocative to the Communist world.

EFFECT OF KERSTEN AMENDMENT

Do you think this would be any more provocative than issuing statements that we would defend countries all over the world in case they moved against them?

Mr. KERSTEN. Senator Russell, I think it would be exactly the opposite of provocative, for two very good reasons. First, the United Nations has received Soviet objections and charges against this amendment twice. They have been rejected. So legally it has been resolved.

Secondly, and practically speaking, they would be deterrents rather than provocative, because what military commander would send forces

into a field where large portions of those forces would be likely to defect.

We certainly have seen tremendous examples of military defection from Communist Party control, most dramatically in Hungary, the whole Hungarian Army.

How much more of an acceleration to that process would there be if you have a small Hungarian unit attached say to the forces of Western Europe, with the flag of free Hungary flying around which those forces could rally?

And the same goes for every other one of the captive nations.

So I believe we could virtually disarm psychologically a large part of the Soviet-controlled armed forces, and this is the thing I believe they fear most.

We have had several witnesses before our committee in the House, who were Communist defectors, and they stated that the one thing they did fear most was the implementation of this military potential in this amendment.

Senator RUSSELL. I completely subscribe to those views. I think you could do more to weaken the military strength of the Communist conspiracy with a few million dollars spent on these independent units with nations that are under Communist control by force of arms at the present time, than we will be able to counter their strength by spending bills for armaments in other areas.

Mr. KERSTEN. I agree with you, Senator.

Chairman GREEN. Any other questions?

Senator Saltonstall?

LODGE ACT

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Kersten, following up a little bit on what Senator Russell has said, I have glanced through your memorandum and on page 7 you cited the Lodge Act of the 81st Congress.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. How does that work, do you know?

Mr. KERSTEN. I think they have some difficulty in getting recruitment into the Lodge Act, for understandable reasons.

The standards were very high. The Lodge Act provides that escapee aliens might enlist in the United States Army. That is the vital distinction. And after 5 years' service I believe they would have citizenship in the United States.

That has a very understandable purpose, but these military units have a distinctly different purpose—not conflicting but different.

These units—the idea is that they shall be along national lines; that is, in their own separate national unit, with their own uniform or arm patch, and most important their own flag, symbolizing their country in freedom.

So, therefore, such units would have a powerful attraction to the armies behind the Iron Curtain, whereas people who enlisted in the American Army—that is, these aliens—there would not be that same magnetism for defection that the national military units would have.

I might state further, Senator Saltonstall, that the Germans, the Nazis, tried this sort of thing in World War II. They were very anxious to do it but Hitler did not want it.

Finally toward the end of the war they did have such units symbolizing the Nazis of the U. S. S. R. and they were tremendously effective

until the brutality of the Nazis began to make itself apparent in these countries in Russia.

But such units would have a very powerful attraction to the armed forces of these other nations in my opinion.

Senator SALTONSTALL. It is my understanding also that the Lodge Act has not brought in many people?

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In fact, I don't know how many it has brought in but I think it is an infinitesimal number.

WHO WOULD COMMAND THE NATIONAL UNITS?

My second question is this: Who would be in charge of these national units?

Mr. KERSTEN. I think, Senator, that the most practical solution to that problem at the outset would be that they should be under an overall American command, and perhaps later under the general NATO command.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And would they have military discipline over them and all the things to keep them in order under their command?

Mr. KERSTEN. I believe that is the thought, Senator, and we have what might be called the nucleus or prototype of this very thing in the labor units in Germany which are formed along national lines of these various nations.

However, they are kept somewhat under wraps, not completely.

You have a Russian group, Czechoslovak, Ukrainian, and all the captive nations.

They are under American command. They are a part of the American Army and there is no difficulty in recruiting young men into those labor services units.

However, they have not the esprit de corps, understandably, that a real military unit would have.

Senator SALTONSTALL. They would really be police units, wouldn't they, because they could not have tanks and such as that?

Mr. KERSTEN. I think the prime purpose, Senator, would be largely as magnets of defection.

Whether they were used for policing purposes—I believe regular military purpose should be the purpose of the units, in whatever particular function they were assigned to. They should be held up, well publicized, and the message in my opinion should go behind the Iron Curtain from these units: "When the opportunity comes we would like to have you join us." They might even be called coexistence units, that is, coexistence between the armed forces.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, sir.

Chairman GREEN. Any other questions?

LODGE ACT

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make one other observation.

I don't agree with the witness that the Lodge Act did not take hold. I think the standards were just made so high as to make it practically impossible to meet that very modest provision of the law.

Mr. KERSTEN. I think that is correct.

Thank you, Senator.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you very much.

The next witness is the Honorable Hamilton Fish, former Member of Congress from New York.

Will you proceed, please?

STATEMENT OF HON. HAMILTON FISH, FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman and Senators, I want to take this opportunity to thank you for listening to my remarks on this highly important resolution and in opposition to both phases of it.

I have prepared a statement here. It may be a little bit too long to read entirely.

Mr. Chairman and Senators, I ask your forbearance by way of introduction in using an extract from the historic speech of Patrick Henry of March 23, 1775, that—

Different men often see the same subjects in different lights; and therefore I hope that it will not be disrespectful to those gentlemen, if entertaining, as I do, opinions of a character very opposite to theirs, I shall speak forth my sentiments freely and without reserve.

There is no time for ceremony, and in proportion to the magnitude of the subject ought to be the freedom of debate. It is the only way that we can hope to arrive at the truth and fulfill the great responsibility which we hold to God and Country.

GIVING THE PRESIDENT DICTATORIAL WAR POWERS

I was chairman of the first House investigation (1930-31) of Communist activities which exposed the evil menace of world communism. I am, however, opposed to undermining the Constitution by giving the President dangerous dictatorial war powers in the Middle East.

The Congress has sole and exclusive power to declare war. It was expressly given that power by the Founding Fathers on that all important issue, to prevent the Executive from making war at his own discretion. The authors of the Constitution were well aware of the danger of placing the warmaking power in the hands of one individual, be he a king or president.

It was placed in Congress deliberately and should be preserved intact as the most sacred part of our constitutional inheritance and tradition.

In view of recent history and the war aggressions of such dictators as Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, it is more essential than ever to maintain the constitutional power of Congress to declare war as a powerful, restraining influence for the preservation of peace.

It is easy to get into war but difficult to get out. Actually the constitutional prerogative of Congress to declare war is sounder and more practical today than when originally adopted. Due to the rapid flight of modern airplanes, Congress could be reassembled in 24 hours.

Never before has it been more vital to safeguard and protect the congressional power to declare war owing to the frightful menace of an atomic war which might destroy a large part of our population.

EISENHOWER DOCTRINE AND ROOSEVELT POLICIES

The Eisenhower doctrine is the culmination of the Franklin D. Roosevelt speech of October 15, 1937, urging the quarantining of aggressor nations. At no time did F. D. R. dare to ask Congress to abdicate its war power at his discretion. He would have been overwhelmingly repudiated. At that time, Senator, I was the ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House, on which I served for some 22 years, and led every one of those fights in the House against giving the war powers to F. D. R., directly or indirectly.

The lend-lease bill passed by administration propaganda as a peace measure was in reality not only a completely unneutral dictatorship bill but was actually a war measure. Even Editor Sulzberger of the New York Times, one of its strongest advocates, now admits it was not a peace but a war measure. It was followed 8 months later by war. Even then Congress passed a formal declaration of war against Japan, and a few days later against Germany.

F. D. R. would turn in his grave in a fit of jealousy and envy if he believed Congress would abdicate its war power and give a blank check to President Eisenhower to go to war at his own discretion in the Mideast and send American boys to fight and die at Armageddon.

"A BLANK CHECK TO MAKE WAR"

That part of the Eisenhower doctrine in this atomic age is sheer international folly. It is internationalism carried to its final zenith of madness. It is one thing to authorize the President to use our fleet to protect Formosa against attack but to give him a blank check to enter a war in the Mideast without any consent or consideration of Congress is not only an abject surrender of its war power by Congress but in my opinion a betrayal of our Constitution and of the American people without their consent.

I voted twice for Dwight Eisenhower for President. I admired his strong stand in the U. N. against the aggressions of the British, French, and Israelis upon Egypt. I wish President Eisenhower well in every move he makes to preserve world peace because an atomic world war is too horrible to contemplate.

I am, however, unalterably opposed to having Congress abdicate its constitutional war power by giving President Eisenhower a blank check to make war in the Middle East. It is wrong in principle, dangerous in policy, un-American in essence, unprecedented in practice, unconstitutional from every point of view and against the fundamental principles and traditions of our great peace-loving Republic.

I hope it is not too late to arouse the American people against this emasculation and erosion of the Constitution. It is just one more case of the gradual wilting away of the safeguard of peace and further undermining the Constitution. No Chief Executive should ask Congress to waive such power or have such power, be he Republican or Democratic—be good, bad, or indifferent.

Judging from past experience, I warn you, distinguished Senators, that so-called peace programs have the habit of turning suddenly into war measures. I am mindful of the fact that Secretary Dulles stated that we were three times on the brink of war.

Once back on April 26, 1954, President Eisenhower, Dulles and Admiral Radford agreed without the consent of Congress and the American people to send our warships and airplanes to fight in North Vietnam in defense of Dien Bien Phu and for French colonialism. We were only stopped a day before by the strong opposition of Winston Churchill and the British Cabinet, which met on April 25, a Sunday afternoon, and unanimously repudiated the project after we had agreed with the French to go in, without the consent of Congress.

Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford, against the advice of the General Staff and of General Ridgway, were determined then to step over the war brink with the approval of the President.

The machinery of war was already set in motion without the knowledge of Congress or the American people. These are the same three men who now want a blank war check. I am opposed to weakening, frittering away or in any degree abdicating the constitutional power of Congress to declare war.

Imagine what would have happened if Congress had given the President, Dulles and Radford a blank check to make war in the jungles and swamps of Vietnam a few years ago. The restraining peace influence was that Congress still maintained solely the power and prerogative to declare war and had to be reckoned with.

POWER TO DECLARE WAR SHOULD NEVER BE GIVEN TO ANY INDIVIDUAL

It is totally untrue and a deplorable propaganda myth that the President has the power to declare war. F. D. R. knew very well that he did not have it; so does every other President. He is Commander in Chief of the Army and it is only after war starts that he acquires the enormous authority to conduct the war.

A President who deliberately attacked a foreign nation without consent of Congress could and should be impeached; to turn Congress into a rubber stamp on the war issue would be a tragedy and to give a blank war check or a predated war or a preventive war declaration to any President would place total and dictatorial war power in the hands of an individual to send our sons to fight in the far corners of the world.

This power should never be given to any individual no matter who he may be as he is human, subject to impulse, anger, enmity, and to the accidents of health and age.

Five years ago I predicted publicly that due to the ghastly blunders we committed in China in 1947 when we helped the Chinese Communists to overwhelm the Nationalists who were our traditional friends, that within 10 years an army of a million Red Chinese, well-armed, equipped and fanatically brave, would be fighting and killing our sons at Armageddon and the Suez Canal.

If the Eisenhower doctrine of internationalism is adopted as submitted, I predict it may turn into a war measure like other so-called peace measures based on meddling and war-provoking internationalism and eventually involve us in another terrible war.

Internationalism based on the U. N. or the NATO is one thing but internationalism based solely on the lives of our sons and the squandering of our money and resources is another. And, also based on the power of one man. That is the road to war, bankruptcy, and disaster.

NO EVIDENCE OF PROBABLE SOVIET AGGRESSION IN NEAR FUTURE

The Senate has a duty to rewrite or amend drastically the entire program. There is no need for haste as no evidence has been submitted of a probable Communist aggression in the near future.

I do not believe that Soviet Russia wants or is prepared for war in the Mideast; such a war would not be in her interest at the present time.

If Soviet Russia wanted war in this atomic age she could probably invade and conquer Germany and France in 2 weeks' time—some experts say less.

It may well be, as the Chinese suggested, that Chinese troops might play a big part in any fighting or war in the Mideast. The hordes of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane did and it would be far less difficult for a well-equipped and motorized Chinese army to cover such distance.

OPPOSITION TO FOREIGN HANDOUTS

I am opposed to the continuation of foreign handouts. They have made us few friends and many enemies. There is an old maxim that you cannot buy friends and if you do they are not reliable.

It is strange how the Founding Fathers knew so much so long ago. The United States will have to pay a terrible price for our reckless squandering of our resources. We have not yet started to pay that price but when we do it will be a fateful day for our country.

Churchill said in 1930: If the United States of America had minded its own business in 1917 the war would have ended and saved the lives of millions of French and English and prevented the subsequent rise of communism and fascism.

With the best of intentions we have fought in two world wars and squandered lives, resources and hundreds of billions of dollars. We do not seem to have yet learned the real lesson that wars do not pay off.

We are again on the brink, this time with the consent of Congress, to start out with a chip on our shoulder in the Mideast and in the name of peace looking for war and more opportunity to squander economic aid in an area where recent experiences have been far from successful.

The oil companies alone pay \$750 million in royalties annually in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and in several smaller principalities. The King of Saudi Arabia receives almost a million dollars a day when the Suez Canal and pipelines are open and in a few years time it is apt to be more.

I am opposed in principle to all foreign handouts and believe that if a referendum was held the American people would vote 5 to 1 against them. Certainly the Congress should not extend a blank check authority over foreign aid in the Mideast or elsewhere. It would be a dangerous and un-American precedent and a type of dictatorship contrary to our constitutional and republican form of government.

The whole question of economic aid should be investigated by the Congress. We have spent over \$50 billion since the end of World War II and much of it has been wasted.

There is also a great constitutional question involved whether the Congress has the power under the general welfare clause to provide for

huge foreign handouts. The welfare clause unquestionably was designed for the welfare of the American people, not for foreign nations. The time has come for an agonizing reappraisal of our foreign handouts and, if necessary, the substitutions of loans that will be repayable.

Before the Members of the Senate act on the so-called Eisenhower doctrine they are entitled to have all the related facts placed before them to help in reaching proper decisions and formulating sound legislation.

I served for 22 years on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House and have continued my interest in international issues since leaving the House in 1945.

CONTRIBUTION OF OIL COMPANIES TO ARAB UPRISINGS

I was astonished to learn from high and reliable French sources that when the French seized Ben Bellagh and four Arab chiefs in an airplane which by treachery or trickery they managed to divert and land in Algeria, some 13 kilos (27½ pounds) of secret papers and incriminating documents were discovered in the plane.

Many of these captured papers exposed the Aramco (Arabian American Oil Co.) composed of the Standard Oil group, Standard of New Jersey, Standard of California, and the Texas Co. of having contributed heavily to stir up Arab uprisings in Algeria.

It is now known that the French have discovered a huge new oilfield 400 miles south of Algiers in the Sahara Desert. It seems that the Aramco believed it could make a much better arrangement with the Arabs than with the French to develop this new oil discovery.

Chairman GREEN. I am sorry to announce the time is up.

Senator BYRD. I move, Mr. Chairman, that the witness be given 5 more minutes.

Chairman GREEN. Then proceed. The motion is carried.

Mr. FISH. I am much obliged.

Imagine the indignation, bitterness, and anger of the French authorities when they found evidence that American Standard Oil money was being used to promote civil war and rebellion against the French resulting in the killing of French civilians and of its armed forces.

I am told that these captured documents were shown to Ambassador Dillon in Paris who naturally was bewildered and dumbfounded and it is alleged that he immediately flew to Washington to make a report.

I have presented this information to you in good faith because I realize you have the power to subpoena witnesses and get all the facts concerning this amazing, dangerous, and extraordinary oil and dollar diplomacy.

I am sure that no individual will be able to break through the State Department iron curtain of secrecy nor the conspiracy of silence among the oil companies, but your Senate committees have the power to do so.

The American people are also entitled to know the facts and be protected from having their sons sent to the mideast to fight the battles of the Standard Oil and other big American oil companies. I would not vote to sacrifice the life of a single American soldier for all the oil in Arabia.

This I do know, that for years the Standard Oil group have had both during Republican and Democratic administrations a very pow-

erful voice and influence in the State Department. This can be easily ascertained by an investigation.

I am in the oil business myself and believe it is essentially sound and honest but do not want my son and other American boys sent to fight and die for the Aramco, or any oil monopoly in the Mideast.

PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF MIDEAST OIL PROBLEM

I respectfully suggest that the State Department consider the advisability of arranging with the Aramco and other big American oil companies operating in the Mideast as a peaceful gesture to permit Soviet Russia to buy at a reasonable price 20 percent of all the oil produced by these American oil companies.

Soviet Russia may not want or need any additional oil in view of the recent large oilfield discoveries in the Ural. At least the preservation of peace in the Mideast is worth working for before it is too late.

A peaceful solution of the Mideast oil problem might be mutually beneficial to the American oil companies but even more so eliminating a cause for war that might set the fuse to world war III and atomic desolation.

REASONS FOR OPPOSITION TO RESOLUTION

I may be a voice crying in the wilderness for peace and against another world war but as much as I loathe international communism I am opposed to preventive wars and predicated war declarations because I am hopeful that time and events will spread the seeds of liberty and freedom in all the satellite nations and finally in Russia itself. If that can be done without another world war it is an objective worth striving for.

I am convinced that American mothers, fathers, and wives are vitally interested in the preservation of peace and if that be treason, make the most of it. That is why I am openly and strongly opposed to any abdication by Congress of its prerogative to declare war or providing unlimited authority for the use of economic aid in the Mideast.

As chairman of the Committee of Three which wrote the preamble to the American Legion constitution that stands for God and country and to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States, I do not believe that the Constitution is a mere scrap of paper as the Commies proclaim but a charter of human liberty and fundamental principles that must not be scrapped at the whim of any Secretary of State or even for the President of the United States, no matter what his popularity rating may be.

The Constitution is superior to any President or of any temporary personality cult. F. D. R. once only lost two States and had a larger popular majority than Eisenhower.

As former President Theodore Roosevelt said in 1918—"to announce that there must be no criticism of the President or that we are to stand by the President, right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile but it is morally treasonable to the American public. Nothing but the truth should be spoken about him or anyone else but it is even more important to tell the truth—pleasant or unpleasant—about him or about anyone else."

In conclusion I would point out under our form of government and free institutions that the President, Secretary of State, and the Con-

gress are not the masters but merely the servants of the American people.

The Constitution belongs to the people who can amend it if they see fit but anything that is designed to tear down the Constitution is morally treasonable to the American people.

There seems to be some misguided sentiment in Congress that the President can do no wrong but I trust that this is merely an aftermath of the election resulting in a temporary hotbed of cold feet.

Neither the Queen of England, nor the King of Belgium, nor the President of France have any power to declare war nor has any ruler in a democratic and free nation. If President Eisenhower receives the war power controlling the life and death of millions of young Americans and the atomic destiny of our people, he automatically qualifies as a dictator. A dictator by any other name is still a dictator. We may live in an atomic age but the basic principles and verities of the Constitution remain unchanged.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations: (1) Congress should not abdicate any of its constitutional power to declare war nor give any blank or predicated war checks to the President.

(2) Congress should oppose any preventive war or military police action without its consent.

(3) Congress should oppose sending American troops to garrison the Middle East or to fight there without constitutional declaration of war.

(4) Congress should investigate all phases of the economic-aid program, oppose all foreign handouts and substitute repayable loans and stop squandering our money and resources all over the world which can only end in bankruptcy and ruin and play into the hands of international communism.

(5) Congress should investigate the political and financial activities of the Aramco and its oil and dollar diplomacy undermining American prestige and friendly relations with other nations in defiance of existing law (Logan Act).

(6) Consider the advisability of offering Soviet Russia as a peace gesture an opportunity to buy 20 percent of all oil produced by American companies in the Mideast at a reasonable price. I say consider. I am not recommending. A few well-placed Soviet atomic bombs, and poof, up goes most of the oil in the Mideast.

(7) Congress should make certain that not a single American soldier shall be sent to fight and die for the Aramco, Standard Oil, or other big American oil companies operating in the Mideast.

(8) Congress should, while providing adequate Armed Forces, endeavor to promote peace not war.

(9) Congress should either scrap or completely rewrite the proposed Eisenhower Doctrine in view of the evidence presented before the joint committee hearings of the Senate.

(10) Congress should empower the President if it has not already done so to retaliate without a declaration of war against any atomic bomb attacks or attempted invasion of the United States of America or its possessions (our inherent and basic power).

Chairman GREEN. Thank you.

Any questions that any Senator would like to ask?
 If not, we are glad to have heard from you, Mr. Fish.
 The next witness is Mr. Dan Daniel, national commander of the American Legion.

STATEMENT OF W. C. "DAN" DANIEL, NATIONAL COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN LEGION

Mr. DANIEL. Chairman Green, my beloved Senator Byrd, and gentlemen of the committee, my name is Dan Daniel, national commander of the American Legion. For this opportunity to appear briefly before you and to present the views of our 3 million members on Senate Joint Resolution No. 19, I am sincerely and humbly grateful.

Before giving you our views, however, may I respectfully make three brief observations.

We are most gratified, sir, that you have chosen to have a searching debate on this issue. The vast majority of the American people will applaud this action.

I have great faith in the capacity of the American people for self-government, and great faith in the Congress to intelligently analyze the views and motivations of the people whom they represent.

In our judgment you have chosen wisely to conduct a full-scale review of events leading up to the Middle East crisis. The American people will support and applaud this action.

FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS OF AMERICAN LEGION

The foreign policy views of the American Legion reflect these fundamental beliefs:

The primary purpose of our foreign policy should be to protect the vital interests of the United States of America. The United Nations should be used as a tool and not the cornerstone of our foreign policy.

The current difficulties in the Middle East, like virtually every other international crisis since 1945, are the direct result of Soviet Russia's attempt to communize the world.

Great Britain and France, in spite of their weaknesses, are still our staunchest allies. United States economic aid to foreign countries, both friendly and unfriendly, has proved to be completely ineffective as an instrument of foreign policy.

Middle East resources are vital to the interests of the Western World, and our foreign policy must be based on strength and honor, and not on weakness and vacillation.

In our judgment, Senate Joint Resolution No. 19 should be divided, and the two component parts should be voted upon on their individual merits.

SUPPORT FOR USE OF FORCE PORTION OF RESOLUTION

The American Legion supports that phase of the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine dealing with the use of force to retard Communist expansion. We take that position because the positive approach has been effective in the past. If history has any meaning at all, and I believe that

it does, then we know that the Kremlin understands just one word, and that word is "force."

The time has come, sir, when we can no longer afford to temporize with communism. But we must demonstrate a manifestation of unyielding firmness. The question naturally arises, will such action involve risk?

Any positive action that we take involves risk. But certainly not to the same extent that would characterize a negative policy.

I remind you, sir, that in every instance in which we have remained firm, such as we did in Berlin, Turkey, Greece, and in Formosa, the cause of communism has been retarded. And in every single instance where we have vacillated, creating a vacuum, such as we did in Korea and Indochina and China and in Egypt, the cause of communism has been advanced.

COMMUNIST EXPANSION

The dominating fact that should be demanding the attention of all freedom-loving people is this: If international communism expands over the next 12 years to the same degree or the same ratio that it has over the past 12, all of the free peoples of the earth with the exception of the population of the United States will disappear into the black night of slavery.

Since 1945 over one-third of all the human population of this earth has become dominated by the most abject and diabolical slavery since the prehistoric dawn of man.

In a little over one decade, the tentacles of these despotic regimes in Moscow have reached out and entangled 14 of the free nations of the world and all of this without the firing of a single shot or the loss of a single Russian soldier.

INCREASING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE

We are today in our judgment living in an era of uneasy temporary peace because we have a superior stockpile of nuclear weapons.

It is our recommendation, sir, that we continue to increase that technological advantage.

EVENTS LEADING TO CURRENT CRISIS

In supporting this position, with its glaring weaknesses, does not make us insensitive to our errors in judgment which encouraged the present crisis.

We of course encouraged England to pull her troops out of the Suez Canal area, and in doing that we created a vacuum similar to what was created in the case of Korea when Mr. Acheson declared Korea outside of our defense perimeter.

Our vote in the United Nations on the Middle East crisis has, to some extent, condemned our friends and condoned our enemies, and I think that the fact that the President has now called for this action to some extent vindicates the position taken by Israel, France, and Britain, and to a certain degree repudiates our own policy.

The legion supported the principle involved when Israel, Britain, and France desired to keep the Suez Canal open to the traffic of all countries.

We disapproved of their methods, however, because we sincerely believed that the same result could have come about through economic sanctions without bloodshed.

OPPOSITION TO ECONOMIC PORTION OF RESOLUTION

We are opposed, sir, to the economic phase of the so-called Eisenhower doctrine. We do not believe that economic aid programs have been effective in the past, and if any evidence is needed, I respectfully refer you, sir, to the cases of Burma, India, and Yugoslavia, and particularly to the case of Yugoslavia.

Here we have spent over a billion dollars of American taxpayers' money, and also contributed other sinews of war, and there is no question in our minds as to where Mr. Tito stands, because just last June 3 in Stalingrad, while speaking to the Russian people, he said that "in peace as in war, that we will march shoulder to shoulder with the Kremlin toward our announced objective of complete socialization of the world."

To us a Communist is a Communist whether he lives in Belgrade, Moscow, in Washington, D. C., or my hometown of Danville, Va.

The American Legion supported the Marshall plan, but we were told at that time that that program would cover a period of 4 years and would cost an estimated \$17 billion.

But we have reached the point now, sir, where we believe that an end must be brought to the spending of the financial resources of this country all over the world without benefit to us.

In our judgment Colonel Nasser is a fanatical dictator, captivated by his own subjective thinking and completely dominated and controlled by the Soviet Union.

REAL ISSUE IN MIDDLE EAST

We must also realize, sir, that the Suez Canal crisis is not the real issue in the Middle East. Until the passions and the hatreds are calmed between the Arabs and the Jews, there will always be trouble between that area of the world, because Russia delights in fishing in troubled waters.

In the cotton for guns deal that was consummated by Colonel Nasser with the Soviet Union, he has placed Egypt in an economic strait-jacket.

I am in the textile business myself, and we know that Russia has no facilities for spinning long-staple cotton, so what it means is that he has a psychological weapon, and all he has to say to Nasser now is "You do as we say or we dump this cotton on the market," which will further reduce the standard of living of the Egyptian people.

OPPOSITION TO AID FOR EGYPT, JORDAN, SYRIA, AND YEMEN

With particular respect to this resolution, we would vigorously oppose any aid whatsoever to countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen, because it would have the effect of stimulating the economy of the Soviet Union, inasmuch as those countries today are receiving their sinews of war from that source.

Since 1939, we have spent 130 billions of dollars on foreign aid. Since 1945 we have about 55 billions of dollars. In no 10-year period

of our history have we spent more than 47 billions of dollars to educate our own children.

The per capita debt of all other peoples of the world is \$91.
Chairman GREEN. I have to tell you that your time is up.

Mr. DANIEL. Thank you, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. How much time will you require?

Mr. DANIEL. Sir, I can conclude in 2 minutes.

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I make a motion that he be allowed 3 minutes.

Chairman GREEN. Is that seconded?

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I second it.

Chairman GREEN. All those in favor say "aye."

(Chorus of "ayes.")

Chairman GREEN. It is so carried.

USE OF PRIVATE CAPITAL

Mr. DANIEL. Instead of spending American taxpayers' money around the world for what we believe to be useless programs, and certainly we are a sympathetic people and desire to help those who are less fortunate than we, we would suggest, sir, that we encourage the use of private capital through our free-enterprise system in these countries.

Most of these countries, sir, that we have been pouring out our money in are victims of their own economic systems, and certainly we do not suggest that we attempt to impose our way of life upon those people.

But it seems to us that if we would encourage them to bring about an economic system similar to ours, then we could do more good through that method than through all of the American taxpayers' dollars that we could pour out in that area of the world.

I remind you, sir, that the financial resources of the United States are not unlimited, and if in our attempt to shoulder the financial burden of the world we allow our level of living to be dragged down to match those we are attempting to raise, then we will have served no man well.

BEST GUARANTY FOR PEACE

We believe that the best guaranty for peace is to keep America economically sound, morally, and spiritually right and militarily impregnable.

I realize that from some quarters will come the statement that this is a nationalistic attitude, and to that, sir, we plead guilty.

We think it is about time that our policies be geared to look into what is best for America. We are citizens of the United States and not of the world.

We have hopes and aspirations that are our responsibility to advance, and no one else's.

We, of course, must be sympathetic to the problems of freedom-loving people all over the world, but our first responsibility is to our own security, and we believe that the best approach to the goal of world security is through the security of the United States of America.

Thank you.

(Mr. Daniel's prepared statement is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF W. C. "DAN" DANIEL, NATIONAL COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN LEGION

Senator Green, Senator Russell; Senator Smith, and gentlemen of the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services:

My name is W. C. "Dan" Daniel and I am the national commander of the American Legion.

I wish to thank you, Senator Green, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and you, Senator Russell, as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, for allowing me to appear before the committees in joint meeting assembled, in connection with your deliberations on Senate Joint Resolution 19.

Senate Joint Resolution 19 embraces a proposed policy of vital importance to the peace and security of the United States. The American Legion, an organization of nearly 3 million veterans of World War I, World War II, and the Korean war, has from its inception considered the preservation of peace and the strengthening of America's security to be among its primary objectives. I appreciate deeply, therefore, the privilege of offering the American Legion's viewpoint with respect to the pending resolution.

Before commenting on the resolution itself I should like to make several general observations relating to the approach of the Senate committees to this issue.

SEARCHING EXAMINATION OF PROPOSAL WISE

Your committees have chosen to subject this proposal to the most searching examination and to hear the opinions of many organizations and individuals. This choice, in my judgment, is not only wise but thoroughly consistent with the view of the vast majority of American citizens. All who cherish our national tradition of free and unlimited debate and who respect the capacity of the people for self-government will applaud your insistence that the Senate's decision be based upon careful consideration and discussion.

REVIEW OF EVENTS LEADING TO PRESENT CRISIS

Last week the Congress declared its intention to conduct a full-scale review of events of the past 10 years leading up to the present crisis in the Middle East. In the American Legion's view, this, too, is a sensible and sorely needed action. Despite the discouragements of the recent past, we hope for better things than a continuing cycle of crisis. We believe that America possesses among its human resources sufficient intelligence and foresight and leadership to pursue the national interest in world affairs without periodically leading us to war or the brink of war. A complete and objective inspection of our policies involving the Middle East since World War II should at the very least disclose mistakes and miscalculations which can be guarded against in the future.

FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS OF AMERICAN LEGION

During recent years American Legion expressions on the conduct of United States foreign policy have reflected certain fundamental beliefs.

We believe:

1. The primary purpose of our foreign policy is to protect and advance America's interests, and every action must be consistent with this purpose.
2. The United Nations as presently constituted is unable to prevent or punish aggression or to execute the will of a majority of member states. The United Nations, therefore, cannot be expected to shoulder responsibilities of the United States.
3. The current disturbance in the Middle East, like virtually every other international crisis since 1945, is the direct result of Soviet Russia's attempt to communism the world.
4. Great Britain and France—and particularly Great Britain—remain the major powers in the world whose friendship for the United States is firm and upon whose help we could rely in the event of all-out hostilities.
5. United States economic aid to foreign countries—both friendly and unfriendly—has proved to be ineffective as an instrument of foreign policy.
6. The resources of the Middle East are essential to the economic strength of the western bloc.

LEGION'S FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT

These convictions were clearly reflected in the foreign relations report adopted by the national convention of the American Legion at Los Angeles, Calif., September 3 to 6, 1950. A portion of that report dealing with the Middle East and the Suez Canal reads as follows:

"The American Legion takes note of the historical and grave differences which exist in the Middle East and which have culminated in the most threatening and dangerous situation in the world today. We believe that such tensions may be relaxed only when the injustices there present are fully redressed. * * * Recognizing that the Suez Canal is a waterway of vast commercial and strategic importance, and that the present Suez crisis is patently a Moscow directed conspiracy created to weaken and disrupt the economy of the western democracies, we urge our Government to take all steps possible to assure and guarantee the unrestricted passage of the vessels of all nations through the Suez Canal."

In the same report our organization also stated:

"We hold that the policy of attempting to win friends and allies by giving away American taxpayers' money has been demonstrated to be a complete failure."

OBJECTION TO "SINGLE PACKAGE" PROPOSAL

The proposed program of the President consists of two distinct parts. In one the Congress is asked to authorize the use of American military forces in the Middle East in the event of overt, military aggression by the Communists and to approve American military assistance to Middle East countries in order to stiffen their defense against possible aggression. In the second part the Congress is asked to authorize economic aid to Middle East countries in the amount of \$400 million.

We feel it is unfortunate that the military and the economic proposals are presented to you in a single package. In our opinion, they are separate matters and should be considered separately.

AUTHORITY TO USE MILITARY FORCES SUPPORTED

The American Legion supports the President in his request for authority to use military forces to retard Communist aggression. At the same time, we recognize that the Middle East is merely one of many areas where the Communists are trying to extend their power, and that the source of that power is not in the Middle East.

I am aware that many individuals hold that the President already has the power to order military action. Without debating the question, I feel very strongly that the present situation more than justifies the Congress specifically approving the use of that power, if necessary, in the Middle East.

This action by the Congress would emphasize in plain and powerful terms the intention of the United States to protect Western influence and interests in the area.

It would serve notice on Soviet Russia, as the Formosan resolution of 1955 served notice on Red China, that a Communist attack will be met by American power.

It would reassure our friends in Western Europe who depend upon America's leadership to prevent Communist capture of their vital oil supplies.

And, equally important, it would encourage the independent nations in the area to resist Communist pressure.

The one thing most needed now, in my judgment, is a firm, unequivocal declaration of the willingness of the American people to answer in kind if the Soviet Union resorts to force. The collapse of British influence and the recent public exhibition of Western disunity have created a power vacuum which is bound to have the imperialists in the Kremlin licking their chops. This is no time for striped-pants diplomacy. It is no time for letting the dust settle. We must leave no doubt as to what we will do if the Soviets try to fill the vacuum by force.

Admittedly, there are risks involved. But the risks will be far greater should we do nothing and thereby give credence to the already prevalent impression that the Western World is drifting and divided, unable to make up its mind.

We understand that under the terms of the resolution, possible American military action would be conditioned upon the request of the government attacked and, in addition, made subject to the overriding authority of the Security Council of the United Nations—the one place where Russia's authority and

potential influence is greatest. This latter provision, we believe, is ill advised and could have the effect of nullifying the objective sought by the President's proposal.

It should be borne in mind also that the current proposal is in effect a vindication of British and French efforts last fall to assure the international integrity of the Suez Canal. Now we are asked to repudiate the position then taken by our Government when it joined with Russia—our worst enemy—in a condemnation of our best friends.

Indecision and equivocation got us into this mess. Drawing a clear line against Communist aggression may get us out.

The cold-war record shows that in every instance where we have taken a firm stand—in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Formosa—communism has been checked; and in every instance where we have vacillated—as we did in China, Korea, Indochina, and Egypt—communism has advanced.

In urging the Congress to approve the military phase of the President's requests we are prompted chiefly by our concern for America's interests. The Middle Eastern area is a vital link in our own security. Its vast oil resources are indispensable to the industrial and military machines of our own country and of those of our friends. If Russia can capture those resources for herself or deny them to the West, she will strike a grievous blow at the entire western alliance.

These facts, of course, are not new. It is a tragic indictment of the previous policies of our Government that only now, under circumstances of extreme urgency, are they brought forth and emphasized in an extraordinary appeal for verification of Presidential powers.

While we favor affirmative action by the Congress and have every confidence that the President would employ his authority prudently, we do not believe that this action alone is an answer to the crisis. Like most other recent projections of American foreign policy, it is negative in nature. At best it will buy time for developing a clear total policy to retrieve the initiative for the West on a worldwide front.

In summary, we believe that the military phase of the resolution deserves the support of the Congress. Aside from the reasons cited above, there is the further consideration that failure to approve this request could lead to a dangerous misinterpretation of America's will to resist international communism. Under these circumstances, the mere fact that the proposal has been presented to the Congress militates in favor of its approval.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE OPPOSED

The proposal dealing with economic assistance involves far less merit and, in our judgment, far greater peril to United States security.

This proposal must be examined in the light of overall United States economic aid programs of the past 10 years. Viewed in this light, we feel that a program of economic aid to certain unnamed countries in the Middle East would in all probability prove to be of greater benefit to Soviet Russia than to the United States. We earnestly hope that the Congress will refrain from issuing what is in effect a blank check to cover the spending of additional millions of American dollars.

If our record of foreign aid proves anything, it proves that we cannot buy friends or influence by governmental handouts.

Since the end of World War II the United States has spent over \$58 billion on economic aid to foreign countries. In some cases the beneficiaries were allies, and we were told that our generosity would guarantee their friendship. In some cases the recipients were so-called neutrals, and we were told that our generosity would win their respect for American leadership. In other cases, the Communist nations were helped, and we were told this would encourage them to throw off Communist domination.

During this postwar period approximately one-third of the earth's population and 15 free nations disappeared behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains—all without Russia firing a single shot.

In terms of results achieved, an objective observer must conclude that we squandered \$58 billion of American taxpayers' dollars. The effectiveness of economic grants as an instrument of foreign policy has been exploded as a myth. It is obvious now that we could give away the entire wealth of the United States without enhancing in any substantial or lasting way our position as a world power.

We are opposed, therefore, to the economic phase of the pending resolution on the grounds that further economic giveaways would not serve America's interest.

The proposal has other serious deficiencies.

It does not identify the nations to be given aid. It fails to spell out the circumstances in which grants would be made and it raises the real possibility that our aid would benefit the very forces which seek to destroy us.

Among the Middle East nations, at least four are already heavily infiltrated by Communist agents and Communist doctrine. Money and material given to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Yemen could very well be used as downpayments to Russia for military supplies. A giveaway program that builds deposits in the Kremlin treasury and increases the warmaking potential of our enemies is not a good program for America.

Under existing conditions, furthermore, we suggest that it would be impossible to provide effective administration and accounting of American funds in wide areas of the Middle East.

An editorial published in the Saturday Evening Post of February 2, 1957, states as follows:

"The peoples of the Middle East have not managed on their own to establish viable political or economic systems. Arranging matters with them is often reminiscent of Theodore Roosevelt's exasperated remark during the Panama negotiations that making a deal with the Colombians was 'like nailing currant jelly to the wall.' We should have to expect delays, repudiations, evasions, and breaches of contract of which Colonel Nasser's activities remain a working sample. Unless we were prepared to go broke as a sort of Good Fairy of the Bad Lands, we would find ourselves forced to imitate the hated imperialists at least in their efforts to establish respect for contracts and agreements as the basis of economic progress."

Sharp differences of ethics and economic philosophy place a special and peculiar barrier against sound administration of economic aid in this area. As a matter of fact, experience has shown that reasonable control of such a program is an impossibility even in countries where economic and human values are more closely related to our own.

ADMINISTRATION OF AID PROGRAMS IN IRAN

A preview of the best conceivable results we could expect from pouring additional American dollars into the Middle East is given in a report of a subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee of the House filed less than 2 weeks ago. This subcommittee, headed by Representative Porter Hardy, of Virginia, made an exhaustive study of the administration of United States aid and technical-assistance programs in Iran between 1951 and 1956. It reported, among other things:

That aid funds totaling a quarter of a billion dollars "were administered in a loose, slipshod, and unbusinesslike manner;"

That the expenditure of funds "was undertaken without regard to such basic requirements of prudent management as adequate controls and procedures, with the inevitable consequences that it is now impossible—with any accuracy—to tell what became of these funds;"

That the amounts of aid "seem to have been picked out of the air" without relation to what the Iranian economy needed, the amount it could absorb, or programs which could be intelligently administered by the United States personnel available.

The factual story told by the Hardy subcommittee is a story of bureaucratic waste and haste to spend American resources not wisely but promptly. This same type of carelessness and mismanagement characterized practically all of our foreign giveaway adventures.

STRENGTHENING AMERICA'S ECONOMY

Tremendous expenditures for foreign aid, in my opinion, have done more harm to our own economy than to international communism. I strongly feel that our own economic health should be given priority evaluation in considering all future Government spending. We cannot continue to subordinate our economic well-being to the discredited notion that we can somehow gain stature and followers around the world by giving away our wealth.

Every request to the Congress for dollar handouts has been accompanied by claims of great urgency and by predictions of dire consequences should the request be denied. I sincerely hope that the Congress will insist upon a hard,

critical look at every such proposal from now on. The strengthening of America's economy also is a matter of urgency, and many Americans feel that it should attract at least as much sympathy as proposals to deplete our resources for highly questionable objectives.

EXAMPLE OF PRIVATE AMERICAN INITIATIVE

I do not suggest that economic power and its application have no place in the conduct of American foreign policy. On the contrary, I believe that this factor is second only to the military factor in our efforts to stop Communist expansion. It is evident, however, that attempting to assert this power in the form of government giveaways will not produce the results we all seek.

It seems to me that the private enterprise system offers a sounder and more productive channel for the assertion of America's economic influence. Private investments and the development of private industry abroad should be encouraged. As a practical starting point and in connection with the present crisis in the Middle East, the Congress might well consider ways and means of stimulating interest—and perhaps providing special inducements leading to increased business and industrial activity in the area.

The tensions of the Middle East have deep roots. They arise from basic and bitter differences of religion, race, culture, and other factors. One of the major problems is economic in nature, and it stems largely from the fact that the Arab peoples lack the understanding and the drive necessary to adapt to modern economic practice. These people are prisoners of their own economic systems.

They need help. They will not get effective help, we feel, through any Government-administered assistance program. Why not try instead to build up American business activity under private sponsorship and with safeguards against exploitation? Such a course, I believe, would advance our national interests in a positive, wholesome way while encouraging the residents of the area to strengthen their own economy.

Realizing that there can be no gain in attempting to force our way of life upon another nation, there is still reason to hope that the example of private American initiative might stimulate some of those people to follow suit.

I trust that some such approach will be carefully examined by the Congress in the course of the coming review of the United States policies in the Middle East.

SUMMARY OF LEGION'S VIEWS

To sum up, the American Legion believes that the request for authority to provide economic assistance on a government-to-government basis should be denied. The proposed program, to the extent that it can be envisioned, appears to us to be both unnecessary and wasteful. Aside from the highly questionable nature of the program itself, we also question whether it would be wise for the Congress to approve in advance a course of action which is poorly defined and over which it could have but little control.

RESOLUTION NOT A PANACEA

Whatever the decision of the Congress, it is important that all Americans understand that the pending resolution comes nowhere near offering a solution for the overall problems confronting us.

It is no answer, and hardly an approach, to the problem of resolving the dispute between Israel and the Arab bloc.

It sets up no defense against infiltration, economic bullying, and other traditional tactics of Communist pressure short of overt aggression.

Should the military phase of the resolution be approved and the program achieve the success anticipated by its most optimistic supporters, it still would not guarantee free usage of the Suez Canal and western access to the area's oil supplies.

Neither would this action of itself serve to retrieve the prestige and unity which we and our western allies lost in the recent breakdown of our policies in the area.

Meeting these larger problems will require keener vision, firmer leadership, and more realistic diplomacy than the Government of the United States has so far manifested. We realize that the development and direction of foreign policy is the constitutional responsibility of the executive department. We prayerfully hope and believe that the Congress, through its disposition of the pending

resolution and of the full-scale review to follow, will play an aggressive and constructive part in helping to shape a foreign policy worthy of American ideals and capable of advancing America's quest for peace and security and justice in a troubled world.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you.

Are there any questions?

Senator RUSSELL. I have 1 or 2 questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, Senator Russell.

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Commander, I am very much impressed with your statement.

I wonder whether it reflects the views of the Legion as a whole taken in any committee or in any convention?

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir; it certainly does.

Our convention went on record in Los Angeles in September opposing all types of economic aid, with specific reference to those countries that are controlled or dominated by international communism.

The latter part of my statement is also confirmed by convention resolution dealing with world government.

Senator RUSSELL. That is, being citizens of the United States and not of the world?

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir.

AID PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION

Senator RUSSELL. It is my understanding of your position here that you are opposed to the economic and military aid provisions of the pending resolution?

Mr. DANIEL. No, sir. We support the military phase.

Senator RUSSELL. I am not talking about the announcement to world communism that we will resist any aggression in that area.

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. But I am speaking about the delivery of arms from the United States.

Mr. DANIEL. Very definitely, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. What is your position on the delivery of arms, military aid rather than as military strength to support—

Mr. DANIEL. Do you have reference, sir, to the Communist-dominated countries?

Senator RUSSELL. No, sir; I am referring to the Middle East generally.

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. You see, this resolution is in three parts. One is the notification to world communism that, if they commit an act of aggression on any one of these nations, they will be confronted by the military might of the United States if that nation asks our aid.

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. As I understand it, you approve that provision of the resolution?

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. The other two parts of the resolution are extending what is called military assistance aid to the countries in the area, and economic aid?

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. Are you opposed to both of those?

Mr. DANIEL. Senator Russell, we take the position that the seat of communism is not in the Middle East, and if we are forced—and I want to emphasize the word "forced"—into another all-out war, that we should go to the source of the trouble with whatever weapons we have at our command.

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, sir; I understood that and I share that view, but I was trying to get your views on the remainder of the resolution.

There are three parts to the resolution; first, military strength of the United States to support any country in resisting Communist aggression that requests that support.

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. I understand from your statement that you are in favor of that?

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. The other is the aid program in the matter of dollars and cents and whether it is in the building of dams, construction of roads, improvement of harbors, digging of canals, or whether it is in supplying military arms to the nations in that area.

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. What is your position on that?

Mr. DANIEL. Let me say this, Senator Russell.

I think that we would support any type of aid to a country with which we had an alliance, in which we were both working toward the same objective.

Iraq, for example. I think that we would certainly support aid to that country if we were working toward the same objective and we had bases and troops in that particular country.

Does that answer it, sir?

Senator RUSSELL. No, sir; I am afraid it does not clear my own thinking on it. You would favor then economic aid to Iraq, I take it?

Mr. DANIEL. Provided that we were in a conflict working toward the same objective and we had bases or had military forces stationed in that country; yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. Despite the fact that Iraq has vast resources of their own that they could use to borrow money on, or at least that they might be able to get assistance from those other Arab countries that do have vast quantities of oil?

Mr. DANIEL. Let me say this, sir.

I think that economic aid should be the last approach.

I think that we should use every other resource first; for example, through the International Bank, and so forth, the investment of private capital, the encouragement of private capital in Iraq.

I think that the giving of economic aid should be the last step that we take in any of these countries.

Senator RUSSELL. I do not believe I have any further questions.

Chairman GREEN. Any other questions?

Senator SALTONSTALL. On page 9, your third paragraph, following what Senator Russell has just said, do I understand from that paragraph that you believe that there should be some economic aid?

You are not opposed to any economic aid but you are opposed to Government giveaways?

Mr. DANIEL. That is right, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And you are opposed to economic aid in any countries except where military aid is going forward?

Mr. DANIEL. That is correct, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that that aid would be given in what form? In the form of loans or in the form of stimulation of business or what?

Mr. DANIEL. Well, first, stimulation of business and then loans, and last and perhaps never, I hope, in grants.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask about two questions.

WEAKENING NATO.

According to my construction of this resolution, it contemplates that America shall pledge the lives of its sons and the resources of its taxpayers to keep Middle East oil flowing to 15 nations of Europe lying outside the Iron Curtain and having a total population of at least 270 millions of people, without calling upon a single one of those nations to contribute a single one of its sons or a single penny of its resources to the continuation of the flow of that oil, and on that premise I ask you this question:

Don't you think that the assumption by the United States of this duty in respect to the Middle East will have the effect of weakening NATO?

Mr. DANIEL. Sir, I did not put that construction upon the resolution. Our position is that we believe that because it has been effective in the past, that we must use this certainly as a psychological weapon to retard the progress of communism.

We are not for going around the world with American soldiers to put out brush-fire wars.

Senator ERVIN. That is exactly what disturbs me about this resolution.

Now I would support a resolution which told the U. S. S. R. that the United States would put its armed might in action against the U. S. S. R. if it attempted to subjugate, by military force, any independent nation, but the testimony of the Secretary of State, who is the foremost proponent of this resolution, is to the effect that there is no evidence that Russia is preparing to invade any of the Middle East countries, and therefore the inference can be drawn from this that this resolution is really directed at the Middle East countries to deter them from accepting help from Russia and starting a war.

Mr. DANIEL. Frankly we would rather support a resolution designed along the lines that you have just outlined, sir.

Senator ERVIN. That is the way I stand on it.

I have misgivings about this resolution because you interpret it in one way; I interpret it entirely differently. But taking my interpretation to be true, would it not have a psychological tendency to weaken the NATO if the United States could assume this sole obligation in the Middle East?

In other words, would not our allies in NATO tend to say, "Well, if the United States is powerful enough not only in effect to assist Nasser in pushing France and England out of the Middle East but take the responsibility itself, why you can take some more of the responsibility in Germany."

Mr. DANIEL. It could very well have that effect.

Senator ERWIN. That is all.

Senator CASE. One question, Mr. Chairman.

BRANDS OF COMMUNISM

Mr. Daniel, in view of the emphasis in your voice at one time when you referred to international communism, I would like to ask whether or not you differentiate between international communism and national communism?

Mr. DANIEL. Sir, I do not believe that we serve the best interests of the United States by promoting one brand of communism against another brand.

As a matter of fact, I do not think there is any such thing as an American Communist, a Yugoslav Communist, or a Russian Communist. I think that they are all international conspirators with the same ultimate objective, the complete domination and control of the free world.

Senator CASE. And on that emphasis on the word "objective" you would not admit that a so-called national Communist country might have the same objectives as we do?

Mr. DANIEL. No, sir, I do not though it may be that it would be of some value. My father used to tell me when I was a kid if you keep the crooks and the scoundrels fighting among themselves that you might come out on the best end so it might have that effect.

But I do not think it serves our best interests in promoting one so-called brand of communism against another.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to state that Commander Daniel is one of the most notable citizens of Virginia and we are all proud of the great honor that has been paid by his selection as commander of the American Legion.

Now, Commander, I want to express my full agreement with what you have said with respect to separating this resolution, and also in regard to economic aid.

MAGNITUDE OF ECONOMIC AID

You are perhaps not aware that this resolution as it is now written will take in 18 nations that heretofore have not received any economic aid, take these nations in under the tent, in addition to other nations that are covered by this resolution that are already receiving economic aid.

In my opinion this \$200 million which is provided as a transfer from existing funds is simply the opening wedge to great additional expenditures in this area. I have so often seen these aid programs and other things start as a mouse and end up as an elephant.

This is what is going to happen in this case if it is passed.

OBSERVATIONS ON EGYPT

Now, Mr. Commander, I understand that you visited this area about the time of the closing of the Suez Canal; wasn't it about that time?

Mr. DANIEL. I left Egypt, left Cairo, just 8 hours before the bombs fell.

Senator BYRD. Have you any statement you would care to make to the committee as to the conditions that you saw at that time, any impressions that you received?

Mr. DANIEL. Well, Senator Byrd, certainly I would not choose for you gentlemen to look upon me as an expert upon the Middle East, because I am not. We were there only about 30 hours, because of the crisis that developed. We had intended to visit all of the countries in the Middle East as a result of the resolution that was passed by our convention in Los Angeles, because the Legion has recognized for a long time that there was a serious situation developing in that area of the world.

I would make this observation, sir, that the economic conditions in Egypt today are such that we know that Egypt has no warmaking potential of her own. We also know that as a result of the Sinai campaign, the Egyptians do not have the will to fight. They in themselves pose no great threat to the freedom-loving people.

But it is because of the influence that Russia is exerting in that area of the world that makes it dangerous, and I would say to you, sir, that based on what knowledge we could gain in the short period of time that we were there, that this Russian influence is considerable, and is growing.

Senator BYRD. Thank you very much, Commander.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you very much, Commander.

Mr. DANIEL. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for allowing us to present our views.

Chairman GREEN. The next witness will be Mr. Kenneth M. Birkhead, executive director of the American Veterans Committee.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. BIRKHEAD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE

Mr. BIRKHEAD. Thank you, Senator Green.

We appreciate the chance to be here today and to express the views of our organization. You have many witnesses before you who will appear today, and in the interests of brevity I would like to submit my statement for the record, and to make a very few brief comments concerning it.

Chairman GREEN. You may do so, and summarize it now orally.

Mr. BIRKHEAD. Thank you.

CONCERN OVER FACTORS INFLUENCING MIDDLE EAST

We support action in the Mideast. We feel it is necessary. We support military and economic action as it is felt necessary.

However, we are concerned whether in passing this legislation the Congress takes into full consideration many factors which are influencing the Middle East: the question of the Suez Canal; the question of whether we may be bypassing the U. N., not taking the necessary action in that regard; and importantly, I think, whether in stressing the military phases of this resolution, our position may not be misused by the Communists and others in that area in saying that

our country is disregarding any chance of peace in the Middle East.

We feel that the economic parts of this program are important. We are not, also, interested in using American boys in an area where it is possible that proper economic aid, proper use of the facilities of the United Nations, the strengthening of the United Nations, may bring about the possibilities of peace.

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY DULLES

Finally, there is one matter which we are concerned with and which occurred before this committee about 10 days ago, when Secretary Dulles stated he felt that if he was an American soldier, he would not want either British or French soldiers fighting alongside of him.

We feel that although he has apologized or said that his statement was misinterpreted, this has had a tremendous effect in these countries, and in possibly other countries. We feel in taking final action on the resolution before you, and the President's proposals on the Middle East, that this committee might consider, these committees might consider, whether they should not clarify the feeling of the Congress in regard to Mr. Dulles' statement.

We have reports or we have seen in the papers reports out of Europe and Britain and France that in spite of his stating that he was misinterpreted, his apologies, his statements continue to have effect.

We were in communication with the British and French affiliates in the World Veterans Federation, of which we are a member, and they felt that his statement had had a tremendous effect in those countries.

We would ask the committee if they would consider some kind of clarification of the position of Congress as it regards Mr. Dulles' statement.

Thank you very much.

Chairman GREEN. Are there any questions any Senator wishes to ask?

Well, thank you, Mr. Birkhead.

Mr. BIRKHEAD. Thank you.

(Mr. Birkhead's prepared statement is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE (AVC) BY AVC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR KENNETH M. BIRKHEAD

CRISIS IN MIDDLE EAST

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, today, the Middle East is the world's greatest danger spot—capable of erupting into world war III unless we take definite, positive and forceful action.

This is not to minimize the depravity of the Communists in Hungary, Poland, and the other satellites. It is not to disregard the critical problems in reuniting Germany. Communist domination of large areas of Asia is also of vital concern. We must make sure that in focussing attention on the Middle East, we do not forget or lead the nations of the world to believe we have forgotten these other problems.

The President in his proposal to Congress is rightfully facing up to the crisis in that area.

We were heartened at passage of last Wednesday by the House of House Joint Resolution 117. We were particularly pleased that the vote in favor of the resolution was strongly bipartisan. It is our firm belief that action we take in the Middle East would suffer if it carried in the minds of the people either a Republican or a Democratic label. This is the time for bipartisanship.

This, of course, does not mean that searching inquiries into what has happened in the Middle East are not necessary. The action by this joint committee in calling for a review of our Middle East program over the last 10 years is a step in the right direction.

RESOLUTION'S SHORTCOMINGS

We raise the question, however, whether the passage of this resolution by the House without at least an indication that these other factors exist will be of continuing value. The President's recommendations seem to skirt many of the causes of the difficulties in the Middle East and the question can be raised that without some recognition of these causes by the Congress, the approval of this resolution may fall short of fulfilling the real needs of that area.

It is a principle of law that when one includes one thing only, all others are excluded. By emphasizing the United States' concern with Soviet armed aggression in the Middle East, Congress must consider whether we are encouraging the belief that we will not interfere in other kinds of situations which could be more destructive to the interest of the West than the fear of Soviet armies on the march. There is abundant evidence to indicate that Soviet domination of Middle Eastern nations may come about without the use of any force and that nations which may appear on the surface to be without Soviet domination are actually under the thumb of Communist dictators. The President's proposals set forth no definition of what constitutes a "nation controlled by international communism."

DEFINING "NATIONS CONTROLLED BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM"

Last spring, the American Veterans Committee published a pamphlet made up of excerpts from broadcasts of various Middle Eastern nations. The title of this pamphlet was: "When is an Arab State a Soviet Satellite?" We attempted in this pamphlet to point out that many nations in the Middle East area were not on the surface under Soviet domination but were actually working as tools of international communism.

Congress should consider whether "nations controlled by international communism" should not be clearly defined.

DEFINING "USE OF THE ARMED FORCES"

In this same proposal the President suggests the "employment of the Armed Forces of the United States" in behalf of the Middle East nations. Nowhere does he delineate the meaning of the "use of the Armed Forces." Is it fair to ask whether this would include the use of nuclear weapons? If it does, is Congress ready to grant the use of nuclear warfare in the nebulous manner in which the President's proposals are set forth?

DEFINING "GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST"

The President's recommendations deal with "the general area of the Middle East." The boundaries of the Middle East are not set forth and information available to the public indicates that in a question directed to the Secretary of State on this point, he declared that he would rather give these boundaries in executive session. It seems to us that this is a dangerous position to take since it will leave great uncertainty as to those areas we consider to be within our realm of interest and may lead the Communists to believe that they can attack in certain areas without any opposition by our Government. There was considerable debate a few years ago about whether American interests extended to Korea. The charges were made that Russian aggression occurred in Korea because it had not been clearly defined as falling within the American defense perimeter. There are inherent in the President's proposals similar possibilities.

Congress should consider clearly defining the area to be governed by the Eisenhower proposals.

"BLANK CHECK" AID APPROACH

The President has asked for authorization to use funds available under the mutual-security program and has requested additional funds in future budgets to be used in the Middle East. The rapidly developing conditions in that area call for some latitude in the use of any funds which are available. However, Congress must consider whether this blank check for funds is fully justified.

Undoubtedly, the American withdrawal of funds for building the Aswan Dam did much to precipitate Nasser's move to close the Suez Canal. The question naturally arises whether Congress, in endorsing a blank check, might not be giving its implied approval to other such actions in the future.

USES FOR ECONOMIC AID

There is much that could be done in the Middle East with the proper distribution of economic aid. Through the technical assistance program, the backward areas of the Arab nations could be materially aided in improving their standards of living.

At least part of the economic funds that the President is asking for might be used through the United Nations to aid in the economic development of the Middle East. The United Nations Assembly in 1952 approved the establishment of a U. N. Fund for Economic Development. Only last Thursday, the United States delegation of the United Nations again refused to participate in this fund. The excuses which the United States gives for blocking this fund are not impressive.

American funds could also be used in financing U. N. action in the resettlement of the Arab refugees now in the Gaza strip. The clearing of the Suez Canal will be an expensive undertaking. The use of American funds in this work would have a beneficial response from all of the peoples in the Middle East as well as the peoples of much of the world to whom the Suez Canal means a vital life-line in moving goods. Any American action in helping to reopen the Suez Canal should be predicated on making the Suez Canal a free passageway for use by all of the nations and not for a selected few.

DETERMINING FEELINGS OF ARAB PEOPLES

There is no recognition in the President's proposals of the strong flow of Arab nationalism. This particular problem needs full and comprehensive study by the Congress to determine the true nature of the feelings of the people of the Arab States which lead them to join in mob action and even to being parties to support of the aspirations of the Communists in the area.

IMPORTANCE OF ISRAEL

The President's recommendations fail to face up to the present dangers encountered by our only continuing friend in the Middle East—Israel. The Secretary of State has minimized the aid which the President's proposal might provide for Israel. The denial of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping has been an overwhelming burden to that young nation throughout its existence. The threat to Israel of the Gaza strip continues to be of vital concern. Israel is completely surrounded by unfriendly nations. Only recently, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, have entered into military pacts which can only be considered as directed against Israel. Despite the armistice agreements between Egypt and Israel, the Egyptian Foreign Minister has told the Security Council of the United Nations "the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement will not be interpreted by us as terminating in any legal or any technical sense the state of war between Egypt and Israel."

THE NASSER GOVERNMENT

Egypt is carrying on a campaign of terror against British, French, and Jews. These unfortunate people are being uprooted from their homes, and their businesses are being confiscated. A lifetime of labor is being snuffed out in one fell sweep by the Nasser government. They are being deported from the country with little else than the clothing on their backs.

CAN "OTHER PROBLEMS" OF MIDDLE EAST BE DISREGARDED?

The President, in his message to the Congress setting forth his Middle East recommendations, stated that there were these "other problems of the Middle East." He said that these were problems which are being dealt with by the United Nations and the United States would support the U. N. actions.

The Congress must consider whether it can endorse United States action in the Middle East along the lines recommended by the President and disregard these other problems? What will be the reception of the United States program in the Middle East when these other problems are apparently shunted off to debate in the U. N.? This is a very serious question which cannot be avoided by the Congress in enacting the legislation requested by the President.

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Another factor which must be realistically weighed is the possibility that the President's proposals may mislead some, and be distorted by others, into a belief that we see little chance of peace in the Middle East and are preparing for open conflict as the means of settling the Middle East problems.

Congress should, in endorsing the President's program, make abundantly clear that it does believe peace is possible in the Middle East, and its endorsement of the Eisenhower recommendations does not in any manner rule out continued and redoubled efforts to achieve a peace.

Last spring, the American Veterans Committee, as an American affiliate of the World Veterans Federation, met in general assembly in Brussels, Belgium, with the representatives from veterans organizations throughout the world. Included in this assembly were the representatives of the leading veterans organizations of Egypt and Israel. These delegates from these opposing nations joined in supporting a resolution calling for keeping the door open for possible settlement of the difficulties which exist there. There was no discouragement on the part of these representatives of the veterans of these two nations over the possibility of security a peaceful settlement of their dispute. If this view exists among the veterans of these nations, it seems to us it would be well for Congress and our Government to consider building on this favorable view.

UNITED STATES POLICIES

The United States does not take this new step in the Middle East with completely clean hands. We have sometimes appeared to be the sole champion of a status quo which means nothing but a continuation and even worsening of the Middle East dilemma.

At other times we have appeared as the friend of those nations which have broadcast their anti-America feelings and have been the tools of Communist infiltration in the area. Appeasement of these nations has won us little. In fact, it appears that these nations have moved closer to international communism.

We have denied our friend Israel arms, refused her a mutual security pact, and left her surrounded by enemies. When she has attempted to protect herself she has too often found our Nation facing the other direction. We often seem to fail to realize that the nation of Israel is here to stay.

No one will say that a simple answer is possible in the Middle East. No one will say that United States action alone can solve the problems existing there. All forces must be brought to bear—the U. N., friendly nations who have a stake in peace in the Middle East, and world leaders who may be able to command a hearing from those who are at war in the Middle East, must move and move quickly.

INDIA'S ROLE

Our organization recently addressed an open letter to Prime Minister Nehru of India through the columns of the New York Times urging that he base his influence to help the Middle East choose peace, as one means of trying to arouse a leader in the Asian-Arab area to work for peace.

In this message for which we bought space in the Times we said: "You, Mr. Prime Minister, advocate peace in principle. Why not peace in practice—in the Middle East?"

We pointed out that Americans had been disturbed by India's role in the Middle East, and particularly by its opposition to U. N. proposals seeking direct peace discussions between the Arab States and Israel. We urged the Prime Minister to reverse his position and help the Middle East choose peace.

ACTION NEEDED

The complex nature of the Middle East crisis must not deter us from failing to take action. If President Eisenhower has proposed a major project with minor ideas, then Congress must rectify this situation. It is our considered opinion that it cannot ignore the facts which we have tried to set forth in our testimony.

STATEMENTS OF SECRETARY DULLES

As a representative of a veterans' organization there is one final comment I would like to make. Our organization is composed of veterans of World Wars I and II and Korea. In these conflicts we have fought alongside our allies which

include soldiers of Britain and France. We were deeply disturbed when we read 10 days ago that Secretary Dulles had stated before this committee that if he were an American soldier he would not like British and French soldiers fighting alongside. This was a most unfortunate statement and, of course, the Secretary has stated that his comment was misinterpreted. Nonetheless, it is always difficult for denials and explanations to catch up with the original comment and we feel it would be of great value if in taking its final position on the President's proposal that the Congress could some place make abundantly clear that the Secretary's comments were unfortunate and do not in any way reflect America's feelings about the British and French soldiers.

I thank the committee for this opportunity to present AVC's views on the President's proposals on the Middle East.

Chairman GREEN. The next witness will be Mr. David C. Williams, director, education and research, Americans for Democratic Action.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the witnesses' statements are printed in the record?

Chairman GREEN. When they ask it.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did Mr. Birkhead ask to have his whole statement printed in the record?

Chairman GREEN. Yes.

STATEMENT OF DAVID C. WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR, EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committees, my name is David C. Williams. I appear here today on behalf of Americans for Democratic Action, as its director of research and education. ADA appreciates the opportunity to express its views on Senate Joint Resolution 19 and its implications.

ADA'S CONCERN WITH MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS

ADA has long been concerned with developments in the Middle East, and has debated and up-dated its position on these questions at each of its annual conventions since its founding in 1947. The views I am presenting today are based upon the discussions and decisions of our last convention, May 11 to 13, here in Washington; our last national board meeting, December 1 and 2 in New York City; and our last executive committee meeting January 15 in Washington.

At its December meeting, the board declared that—

the weak and wavering policies of the administration are in large part responsible for Communist penetration of the Middle East,

and added:

We welcome the administration's warning, belated though it is, to the Soviet Union against further meddling in the area. We believe that these warnings warrant repetition in the most unequivocal language.

We are glad that, since the presidential campaign ended, the administration has brought itself publicly to recognize the grave dangers facing our Nation and the free world in the Middle East. We believe, however, that it is contrary both to the Constitution and to sound policy for the President to "pass the buck" to Congress as he has in the form of Senate Joint Resolution 19.

RESOLUTION CONTRARY TO CONSTITUTION

It is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Constitution, which fixes upon the President himself the responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy, and unsound because he is asking Congress to sign a blank check for the administration to fill in when and as it pleases.

As in the case of the Truman Doctrine, the warning which our board urged in December should have been issued by the President himself.

If there is to be a resolution, we much prefer the form in which Senator Fulbright has proposed it, that the—

President be advised that the sense of the Senate is that this Government *** contributes to the maintenance of peace by reaffirming, with particular reference to the Middle East, the determination of the United States to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense, under article 51, should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

We take this position with the assumption that the President will make it clear to the Soviet Union, publicly and through diplomatic channels, that direct aggression in the Middle East, or aggression by any satellite it may acquire there, will constitute an armed attack affecting our national security. This is clearly his duty, not the duty of Congress.

We further feel that Senator Fulbright's resolution, by including the subjects of the Suez Canal and Arab-Israeli relations, fills a gap in the administration's resolution big enough for the Soviet Union to establish its power in the Middle East without any need to resort to armed aggression.

AID FEATURES SUPPORTED CONDITIONALLY

As to the President's request for authority to use \$200 million in the Middle East regard to any existing limitations, we support this only if it is to be used for the benefit of its people and not, as well-informed columnists have suggested it will be, to buy off princes, potentates, and dictators of various degrees of power and barbaric splendor.

We find it shocking that some persons who fiercely oppose the spending of dollars are quite willing to support military commitments which may cost American lives. But we do insist that these dollars be constructively invested, and it seems quite clear to us that something must first be done about the existing political chaos in the Middle East.

Indeed, it is this chaos which opens up to the Soviet Union its greatest opportunities—those of internal subversion and the exploitation of the deep divisions existing within the area. It is littered with highly flammable political and economic conflicts, which would exist even without Israel or the Suez Canal.

There are dynastic rivalries such as those between the Hashemite and the Saudi rulers. There are national rivalries such as that between Egypt and Iraq. There is the chronic and growing instability of Jordan, a largely artificial state. There is the division between the have states—those with oil—and the have-nots—those without.

RISING TIDE OF ARAB NATIONALISM

Rising throughout this area is the tide of Arab nationalism, which is hardly confined or affected by the rather arbitrary boundaries of

the successor states of the Ottoman Empire. This nationalism has profound social and political implications within the Arab world.

It has risen in spite of and potentially against the traditional ruling families of the Middle East, and finds its most vocal spokesmen among the intellectuals of the small but growing middle class.

Colonel Nasser owes his present prestige in the Middle East—so great that in several countries other than Egypt he is patently more popular than the native rulers—to the fact that he appeals to this new type of Arab. It is on these same discontented intellectuals that communism makes its greatest impact.

The British largely ignored this rising middle class, and exercised their influence through the traditional nobility, whose sons were welcomed at Eton and Harrow in the confident expectation that they would remain Moslem equivalents of British officers and gentlemen throughout their lives.

As the influence of these families declined, so did that of the British—as recently and dramatically demonstrated in the case of Jordan. The French in North Africa have acted as if this ferment were primarily the result of Communist and Cairo propaganda.

It is obviously not—neither Communist preachings nor the broadsides of Radio Cairo would have much effect if they did not fall upon ready and willing ears. Not only is the nationalist spirit growing in intensity—it is spreading. There are substantial Moslem communities as far south as Nigeria, the headwaters of the Nile, and even the coast of Kenya, and the evidence of experienced observers is that they are more and more identifying themselves as part of a single Arab world.

We should be repeating the mistakes of the British and the French on a larger scale if we acted as if anticomunism were a sufficient policy, as if we thought that the problems of the Middle East were created by Colonel Nasser and would disappear with him, or as if we could buy the good will of the ruling families—either by oil royalties or direct American handouts—and thus buy the friendship of their peoples.

The old order is passing. It is noteworthy that, even in so primitive a state as Saudi Arabia, there was a large-scale and well-organized strike against the oil companies.

Military guarantees, in fact, are futile without prompt, energetic action to deal with the immediate and long-term problems of the area. We must help to resolve the Suez Canal and the Arab-Israeli problems as part of and preliminary to our effort to provide constructive channels for Arab nationalism and the ambitions and abilities of the new class of educated Arabs.

SUEZ CANAL

The Suez Canal should function as an international waterway open on equitable and comparable terms to the shipping of all nations, including Britain, France, and Israel. It may still be possible to negotiate an adequate long-term settlement on the basis of Egyptian ownership and maintenance, coupled with a commission of users authorized by the U. N. or by international treaty to interpret as a threat to the peace, justifying the immediate employment of sanctions, any capricious violation by Egypt of its obligations to maintain and operate the canal in accordance with agreed standards.

A solution might be facilitated by new and appealing proposals. One such proposal would be a long-term U. N. lease of the canal on generous terms. Another proposal, under which the foregoing could be subsunited, would be for the United States to take the lead in proposing international regimes for all international canals, so that no single nation would possess the life-and-death power over other nations which comes from sole control.

As a longer run safeguard, the construction of supertankers should be speeded, an international pipeline from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean should be constructed, and consideration given to the development of an additional canal.

UNITED NATIONS MEASURES NEEDED

Basic to any Arab-Israeli settlement is the deployment of U. N. forces along the Arab-Israeli frontiers, as called for, for example, in Senator Morse's resolution, so that the recurrence of border incidents can be prevented and there can be time for the present tensions to subside.

In this respect, we warmly support Senator Mansfield's proposal that the United States, under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, furnish facilities and military assistance to the United Nations Emergency Force.

A U. N. trusteeship should be established for the Gaza Strip and the illegally militarized islands in the Gulf of Aqaba. It is unrealistic to expect Israel to withdraw from these areas and dangerous for the United States to exert pressure on it to do so until there is real assurance that they will not again be used as Arab bases for action against Israel.

U. N. control of at least a reasonably wide corridor from Gaza to the Gulf of Aqaba could provide international territory for a highway and a new pipeline—as proposed above—and would safeguard the route for a possible supplementary canal.

International control of the Gaza strip would provide an area in which development programs for Arab refugees might be operated without the roadblocks which have so far been put in their way by Arab nations.

Solution of the Arab refugee problem along humane lines will require, in addition to the Gaza Strip arrangements suggested above, repatriation of some refugees to Israel and a loan from the United States or the U. N. to Israel to help her compensate those who would settle in Arab lands or outside the region.

Meanwhile, the creation by Egypt of additional refugees through the deportation of its Jewish residents and the confiscation of their property must cease.

Above all, the Arab States must recognize, and the United States must make this unequivocally clear as its policy and commitment, that Israel, brought into being by the United Nations, is a permanent member of the world community.

DANGERS IN ARMS RACE

So long as the present competitive arms race among Middle Eastern nations continues, the prospects for peace and for economic develop-

ment are gravely prejudiced. We therefore heartily endorse Senator Morse's and Senator Mansfield's proposals that the President call upon the U. N. General Assembly to establish a special commission on arms traffic in the Middle East to control the flow of military material into the region.

PROJECTS TO IMPROVE LIVING STANDARDS

The peaceful and constructive development of the Middle East depends upon irrigation, electric power, river development, and other projects to improve the living standards of the people, and to provide scope for the energies and emotions now being squandered on barren hatred of Israel, fervid nationalism, and in some cases outright communism.

Particularly important, in this largely desert area, are river development projects. The development of the Nile Valley, for example, could link together in one large-scale drive for economic improvement, peoples who are already becoming conscious of their cultural identity. The same may be said, on a smaller scale, for other river development projects in the area.

More difficult to tackle, and yet worth serious consideration, is the maldistribution of natural resources in the area. Some states are enjoying riches almost, if not quite, beyond the dreams of avarice; in the case of Saudi Arabia, this wealth is presently being squandered with little benefit to its people. Others profit from oil resources of the region only as transit countries.

Still others, like Egypt, face a bleak future, with rapidly growing populations and little in the way of natural resources. The population of Egypt, now 23 million, has increased sixfold over the past hundred years. Both the birth and the death rates are among the highest in the world. Three-quarters of the people are illiterate and weakened by one or more major chronic diseases. With respect to farmland, the United Nations reports an average of half an acre per head in 1907, which by 1952 had dwindled almost by half.

POOLING PART OF AREA'S OIL INCOME FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

We raise the question: Is it beyond possibility to achieve, to some degree, the pooling of a portion of the area's oil income for regional development? We commend to your attention an interesting plan drawn up by independent observers and published in the London Observer, December 16. The establishment of a U. N. Middle East Development Authority is proposed, to be financed by a levy on all oil shipments from Middle Eastern ports.

In addition, the Authority should take over and operate all Middle East pipelines, charging an additional levy to cover operating costs and existing charges for transit rights.

The authors of this plan point out that the oil companies and their customers would benefit from the increased security of international operation. The nations of the Middle East would have a strong interest in uninterrupted production and marketing. They would have reasonable assurance that these funds would be used where they would most benefit the area, instead of being monopolized by the oil-producing countries.

Even the latter would benefit, since they would have added security against interruption of oil transport. For example, King Ibn Saud appears to have lost for the time being about a third of his oil royalties because of the Suez crisis.

The participation of Israel in Middle East regional development would obviously be important—indeed, essential in the case of the long-pending Jordan Valley project. Some of the more moderate Arab leaders have already shown willingness to accept Israeli participation, on an equitable basis. More might be willing to do so as present tensions subside and the motives of economic self-interest increasingly prevail.

Economic development may possibly not commend itself to the more backward of the present Arab rulers, who profit greatly from the survival of semifeastal ways of life and government. But it offers hope for the poverty-stricken Arab peasantry, and scope for the ambitions of the urban middle classes—and the time is passing when the will of the people can be ignored or flouted by their rulers.

Moreover, the very fact that Arab nationalism is already linking the peoples of the area, without regard to boundaries and dynastic rivalries, becomes in this context a constructive factor, rather than a further source of turmoil.

AMERICAN PURPOSES AND POWER

Mr. Chairman, in adopting this or any similar resolution, the United States will be taking a grave and irrevocable decision, but an inevitable one. The question no longer is whether or not American power shall be used to fill the Middle East vacuum—it must and will be. The question is, rather, how responsibly and how constructively we use that power.

We suggest that American purposes and power be, from the beginning, linked with people rather than with potentates, with the future rather than the past. We shall be wise to identify ourselves, not with the fading fortunes of the traditional great families, but with those classes of the Arab community which, however recklessly and irresponsibly at times, are seeking a place in the 20th rather than the 16th century.

If we move with them, not against them, we need have no fear of competition with the Communists, for America can offer progress plus—not minus—freedom.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I again express my appreciation for the opportunity to appear before the two committees.

Chairman GREEN. You concluded exactly to the minute, and I congratulate you on that.

Are there any questions to ask Mr. Williams?

If not, thank you very much for attending.

The next witness is Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, chairman of the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs.

Will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF RABBI PHILIP S. BERNSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN ZIONIST COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. We have submitted to the committee a written statement which represents a careful delineation of the views we

would like to express. I would, however, like the privilege of a few moments to emphasize certain matters which seem to us of primary concern.

I should like to say in the first place, for our group, we represent the eight major Zionist organizations of America, a very large percentage of American Jewry.

EISENHOWER DOCTRINE AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD

In our concern for peace in the Middle East, in our concern to promote good relations, fructifying and happy relations, mutually beneficial relations between the United States and Israel, we wish to express our approval basically of what is in the Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East, that we regard it as an important step forward, because it represents a commitment in the area which we think is desirable.

We think that many of the problems that have developed in the area have been due to the lack of clear-cut commitments on our part, which this new doctrine is designed to correct.

DOCTRINE DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH

However, it is our judgment that the doctrine does not go far enough. It is our opinion that this doctrine does not deal in a firm, clear, definitive way with some of the basic internal problems within the Middle East, and if these are not resolved, we feel there will not be peace in the Middle East and, therefore, the danger of aggression in the Middle East will not be removed.

Our primary concern here has to do with the conflict between Israel and the Arab States; and it represents our judgment that this doctrine, certainly to the extent that it has been promulgated by the Department of State and interpreted by the Secretary, is not designed to deal directly with these problems within the area.

And in our judgment, I repeat that if these problems are not dealt with, there will not be peace in the area, and there will not be freedom from aggression.

DESIRE OF ARAB STATES TO DESTROY ISRAEL

Now, Israel is committed to peace. Israel urgently and desperately desires peace in the area. The Arab States thus far have indicated no readiness to make peace with Israel. They have taken the position that they wish to destroy Israel. In fact, the King of Saudi Arabia, now a guest in this country, has publicly stated that he would regard the destruction, the death of 10 million Arabs, as justified to destroy the State of Israel.

AID SHOULD BE CONDITIONAL

Given those facts, what should we do? Well, it is our recommendation that we establish conditions for the aid that we are going to give in the area; that for us to give aid, for example, to Arab States that are committed to war, that are unready for any type of reconciliation, that are unready for any practical solutions to deal with the clearly resolvable problems within the area, is a mistake; that it will be the

perpetuation of a policy of appeasement, that it will be the perpetuation of a policy of wooing rulers without any relation to whether they will work for peace or not. And, therefore, it is our judgment and it is our recommendation that the Eisenhower doctrine should be implemented with very definite conditions, and that before we give military or economic aid to any nation, we should exact from that nation and from the rulers of it, a readiness to make peace.

Now, it may be said that they will not be willing to do this. We do not think that is a fact. We believe that the evidence of what has happened in Hungary is pretty convincing to the Arab rulers, and would lead them not to get under Russia's thumb, if they could avoid it, or Russia's heel, if they could avoid it.

We believe that our President has made very clear that he is opposed to colonialism, and his prestige is very high, and they would have good reason to trust him.

We believe if we set up conditions of this kind, given the desperate economic situation that prevails in many Arab countries, and particularly in Egypt, today, we believe that there could be a readiness to accept some peaceful terms to resolve the basic problems within the area; and if there be not such readiness after full exploration and in relation to the rewards that we would give for a readiness to make peace, then, Mr. Chairman, it is my judgment that such allies aren't worth very much, anyway; that if we cannot have allies who are ready to commit themselves to peace, we can't have allies that are ready to commit themselves to the West in relation to peace, then in our opinion such allies will not prove to be worth very much.

They will be allies so long as we give them things, but if we turn against them as was the case with Dictator Nasser not long ago, then he shouted to the Americans, "May you choke to death on your fury."

And that type of alliance, it seems to me, isn't worth very much.

Therefore, it is our proposal that we establish conditions for the giving of such economic and military aid, and that the primary condition be a readiness to make peace within the area, for there is no problem in the Middle East today that cannot be resolved by governments that are ready to sit around the table and talk business, talk peace.

It has been the lack of willingness on the part of the Arab States to make peace that has resulted in the lack of peace; and, in my judgment, if we continue a policy of wooing them, they are going to play hard to get.

But if we say to them, "We will give you aid on these terms," it is my judgment that they may be ready and I think they will be ready to make peace on those terms.

UNITED NATIONS BLOCS

Now, it may be said in answer to what I have just stated that the policy of the United States is to refer these problems within the area to the United Nations. But I submit, Mr. Chairman, that that isn't enough, because the United Nations has developed into a certain form at the present time which I think is evident to people with perspicacity now. For what we find is that there is an Afro-Asian bloc, and there is a Communist bloc, which together constitute almost half of the United Nations. And if the United States goes along with them in proposals, Israel is licked in advance, regardless of whether it is right or wrong.

We see that to be the case. We see that these blocs are not voting on the basis of abstract justice, but are voting on the basis of their commitments to each other in what they regard as their own interests. And we see in the impasse that has been reached in the United Nations today, the results of this particular situation.

And, therefore, Mr. Chairman, it is our judgment that it is not enough to say "Let the United Nations take this responsibility." That is passing the buck. The United States is the single most influential power in the world today. The United States has unprecedented prestige at the present time. It should exert that leadership toward the making of peace in this area, and should exert that leadership with regard to the two crucial problems that are before the United Nations at the present time with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely, the Gulf of Aqaba, free movement through it, free shipping through it, and a fair and reasonable solution of the Gaza strip problem.

These should not be resolved in terms of the preponderant blocs which exist at the present time, but in terms of proposals that will make for an enduring peace.

DOCTRINE SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED

This, it seems to me, is the area in which our Government should operate. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I conclude by repeating what I began with, namely, that we are in favor of this doctrine. We support it as a step forward. But we believe that it should be implemented with clearecut, specific proposals that will commit the United States to a program of peace within the area, without which there cannot be peace, in our judgment, between that area and the other nations of the world.

Thank you for your attention.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you, Rabbi.

Does any Senator have any questions to ask?

Senator HUMPHREY. I just want to thank the gentleman for his statement.

Chairman GREEN. Do you have a question Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. Yes, I have a question or two.

I want to say, Rabbi, that I got lost in your testimony. On page 1 you say "In principle, we welcome the new Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East." And on page 2 you proceed to set forth a bill of particulars, with which I find myself in agreement, showing rather definitely that the Eisenhower doctrine does not touch the problems in the Middle East.

On page 2 you say Iraq and Saudi Arabia are publicly and continuously committed to the destruction of Israel, and you give a bill of particulars here in the rest of your statement as to the known antagonism of the Arab world to Israel.

Do you think in negotiations that are now taking place between the President of the United States and the King of Saudi Arabia some attempt ought to made to at least get a commitment that Saudi Arabia will not join in what you call a commitment for the destruction of Israel?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. Very definitely I do, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that ought to be a part of the Eisenhower doctrine?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. I think it should be a part of the Eisenhower doctrine.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that these specifics that you set forth on page 3 ought to be a part of the Eisenhower doctrine?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. In general, I do; yes.

WHY EISENHOWER DOCTRINE IS A STEP FORWARD

Senator MORSE Then would you explain to me why you think the Eisenhower doctrine without them is a step forward? What does it contain which is of any assistance to Israel?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. Well, I didn't expect to find myself a proponent of the Eisenhower doctrine at this particular meeting.

Senator MORSE. You made yourself a proponent on the first page.

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. But I would be glad to give you my views, if I may.

Senator MORSE. I would be glad to have them.

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. In the first place, we think this represents a step forward because it represents what we are dealing with at the present moment. This is the reality confronting the American people and confronting the Congress, and it is necessary, then, for responsible people to take a position on it. And rather than being opposed to it, we are for it, for the steps forward that are involved in it.

In the second place, it seems to me that the Eisenhower doctrine is certainly better than what has preceded it, because it does represent a clearcut commitment of the United States to play an important role in the area. It does serve warning on Soviet Russia that they will have us to contend with if they move aggressively into the area.

It does tend, therefore, to make for certain stabilizing factors in the Middle East which I think are to the good.

But it seems to me that responsible people also have the right to say that, whereas they regard this better than what went before and, under present circumstances, worthy of support, that we don't think it goes far enough. And this is our bill of particulars concerning what it is lacking.

Senator MORSE. May I say most respectfully that I think just the opposite is the case. We ought to do it through the United Nations and not outside the United Nations, and this is a step backward and not forward, because it is outside the United Nations and it does not have a single one of the guaranties in it that you have testified here this morning you think ought to be in it. You are not going to have forward results if you have this kind of unilateral action between this Government and the Arab States, but you would have them if we carried out our responsibilities through the United Nations instead of circumventing it, which we are doing under the doctrine.

Therefore, I would not support the doctrine.

That is all.

Chairman GREEN. Is that all?

Thank you very much, Rabbi.

(Rabbi Bernstein's prepared statement is as follows:)

**STATEMENT OF RABBI PHILIP S. BERNSTEIN, OF ROCHESTER, N. Y., CHAIRMAN
OF THE AMERICAN ZIONIST COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

This statement on President Eisenhower's proposals concerning the Middle East will reflect, I trust, the concern of many Americans, Jews, and non-Jews, for peace in that trouble area, for the preservation of the State of Israel and for the defense of freedom. Recent developments demonstrated that peace is indivisible and that the fate of the whole civilized world was bound up with the disposition of a small body of water in that area: The fate of the Jews also seems to be indivisible. Israel not only solved the problems of the survivors of the Nazi holocaust, but seems today to be the indispensable answer to similar problems of Jews fleeing in fear and desperation from Egypt, from Hungary, from Poland. The survival of Israel then is not only a major issue of moral significance to the free world but continues to be the answer to an urgent humanitarian need as well.

Today I speak as chairman of the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs. This committee conducts public action bearing upon relations with governmental authorities, with a view to maintaining and improving friendship and good will between the United States and Israel.

EISENHOWER DOCTRINE WELCOMED IN PRINCIPLE

In principle, we welcome the new Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East.

We have maintained that lack of clarity as to the firmness of our intentions and the absence of commitments to implement our intentions were responsible for many of the problems of the region. They were conducive to infiltration by communism, to continued warmongering by Nasser and other Arab leaders, and to Israel's sense of isolation. Our friends did not quite know where we stood, and finally in desperation acted on their own. Israel, unable to get security assurances from the United States, threatened by growing Soviet belligerence, ringed around by hostile Arab steel, felt isolated and therefore acted unilaterally to avert catastrophe. The lack of a definite American policy encouraged the Arabs to unrealistic hopes which when shattered stirred up bitterness against us. The Russians moved deeper into the Middle East because we had not said to them, "thus far shalt thou go and no farther." Accordingly, while we regard the President's proposals to strengthen and defend the Middle East as an important step, we ask whether they go far enough, whether they come to grips with the basic conflicts in the region which make it so vulnerable to the Communists. I do not see in the President's proposal any contribution to the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict. I do not see in it an adequate answer to the problems of subversion, and continued arms shipments. I do not find the promises of economic aid clearly enough spelled out. I do not see the encouragement of the emerging democratic forces in an area largely dominated by feudalism.

The administration has made it quite clear that the critical internal problems will be dealt with by the United Nations, but if that is to be the case, we believe that there should be a clear declaration outlining the policies we shall follow in that body, and that the administration and Congress might write a firm and vigorous statement of principles dealing with such critical issues as the continued Arab war against Israel, the sea blockades at Suez and Aqaba, the continued homelessness of Arab refugees, the dangers of an arms race growing out of the arms competition between East and West in the region.

Failure to do so in our judgment could aggravate the dangers we are seeking to counter, for our silence may be misinterpreted as continued acquiescence in the Arab war against Israel, as resignation to the intolerable conditions which have prevailed in the past.

DOCTRINE'S NONAPPLICATION TO INTRAREGIONAL CONFLICT

Testimony by the Secretary of State has indicated that the doctrine does not apply in the event of a renewal of intraregional conflict. The doctrine is meant basically to refer to external Communist aggression. It would not come into play even if Egypt and Syria attacked Israel with the weapons they have secured from Communist sources. What then has become of our previous commitments such as the tripartite declaration of 1950? The President, while asking for authority to employ our forces to resist external Communist attack, is not also asking for authority to use United States forces to back up previous assurances and undertakings which we believed to have been guaranties for Israel.

Thus we fear that Israel's position may become even more isolated and precarious than ever before.

Take the question of arms. We have always believed that this area has needed economic aid far more than military aid. We objected in 1954, as did many Members of Congress, when our Government started shipping arms to Iraq. After we shipped arms to Iraq the Communists began sending them to Egypt and now Syria. Under this doctrine, we will undoubtedly send additional arms to Iraq and offer them to Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. The Communists would be challenged to step up their shipments to Egypt and Syria, but the Secretary of State tells us that we will not send arms to Israel because the United States is opposed to an arms race.

Iraq and Saudi Arabia are publicly, continuously committed to the destruction of Israel. So are Egypt and Syria. The Soviet Union has threatened Israel with ugly belligerency. Nasser has displayed not the slightest evidence of conciliation. In our judgment, the danger of a new outbreak of hostilities will grow. The new doctrine, bent on stopping aggression from without, leaves this crucial problem much where it was, and since total peace in the area is impossible without peace between the Arabs and Israel, no basic contribution to permanent solutions is being made.

REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE SECURITY TREATY WITH ISRAEL

This is equally true with regard to security guarantees. The President's proposals seem to provide an alternative to the Baghdad Pact. While we do not join it, we are virtually guaranteeing it in a manner designed to make our position more palatable to the so-called neutralist sentiment in the area. But although we have committed ourselves to security treaties with 42 nations, we have steadfastly refused to negotiate such a treaty with Israel. On the contrary, we reaffirm our past position. Such a security treaty must await an Arab-Israel agreement on borders and on other issues. Thus it is blocked by an inherent Arab veto. Once again we are strengthening Arab States committed to the destruction of Israel and leaving the Israel leadership and people with the troubled feeling that they stand alone, that their fate is in their own hands. This is not the way to peace.

One cannot separate moral factors from political in these issues.

Israel wants peace with the Arabs; the Arabs want to destroy Israel. Is there moral justification for giving arms aid and the protection of American troops to those who desire war and denying them to those who seek peace?

Can we have faith that those to whom we would give arms and economic aid to deter Communist aggression will not use these resources for aggression against Israel? Certainly there is nothing in their record to justify such faith.

ESTABLISHING TESTS TO QUALIFY FOR AID

We should set up tests to qualify for aid. These should include a readiness for peace in the area. If the Arab leaders will reply that they will not accept our aid under such terms it will mean in effect that we couldn't count on them anyway. But I am convinced that they could be induced to accept such terms. The lesson of Hungary has not been lost on them. The dissociation of the United States with colonialism is clearly understood by them.

Another crucial test is free and equal passage of all shipping through the Suez Canal. No aid of any kind should be given to Nasser unless he is prepared to make such a clear-cut commitment grounded in international law, with international machinery to enforce it.

There should be a similar guaranty covering free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. The United States, through the United Nations, should not permit Nasser to remount Communist weapons at Sharm el Sheikh, commanding that outlet to the seas of the world, and allowing him to tighten his monopolistic grip of Europe's life line.

I do not find in the current Middle East policy the necessary qualitative distinctions. There is apparently a readiness to shore up any kind of feudalism or dictatorship and an equal readiness to ignore democratic patterns and commitments. The President has welcomed to the United States the King of Saudi Arabia, an arbitrary feudal monarch of a backward country in which slavery still exists.

This is the ruler who was ready to sacrifice 10 million Arabs to destroy Israel and who inquires into the religion of American soldiers so that he may bar the entry of Jews to the American base we lease at Dhahran.

Under these circumstances are we morally right in welcoming and honoring this symbol of Arab decadence? Are we not once again betting on the wrong horse? Aren't we providing the Russians with a very effective way of weakening us by showing that for our own purposes we are ready to support tyranny and oppression?

And it is quite obvious that we cannot eat our cake and have it too. We will not succeed in appeasing Saud if we make any concessions to Israel, therefore, no concessions to Israel; therefore no real contribution to peace in the area.

CONCERN FOR ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL

There has been little evident disposition to show the necessary concern for Israel's survival. Economic aid remains frozen; arms aid is declared out; a security treaty is subject to an Arab veto; the doctrine does not meet the continuing Arab threat to Israel's survival. Israel may be compelled, by U. N. pressure, to withdraw from the last strip of Sinai and from Gaza, reopening those areas again to Nasser's raiders, and the resumption of his sea blockades.

Nor, in my opinion, are we utilizing economic aid in such a way as to make for peace. Hostile Arab States should not be allowed to veto such a program as the Johnston plan which is obviously good for all the countries of the area. The aid should be proffered to those who are prepared to commit themselves to a peaceful solution of the area's problems and should be given them without delay despite the resistance of the belligerents.

If the situation requires Congress to take emergency action to push economic development, it seems incongruous to permit the Syrian Government to keep blocking, month after month, year after year, an undertaking like the Johnston plan, so vital to the economy of Israel and Jordan, and so helpful in the solution of the Arab refugee problem.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

It is clear that the Eisenhower doctrine does not deal with, is not intended to deal with, conflict within the Middle East. I must say that the failure, the unreadiness, to deal directly, courageously with the problems within the area, leads to very serious questions as to the effectiveness of the total policy as it affects the relations between this area and the Soviet orbit. As I testified before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee: I strongly hope and recommend that we spell out and act upon a program to deal with the current problems within the area for if these are not solved there will be no peace. My specific recommendations were and are:

1. Insist upon direct Arab-Israel negotiations as the best and only method of securing a dependable peace.
2. Recognize the danger of Nasser, cease to appease him, and act realistically toward him by not letting him resume his previous positions and acts of hostility.
3. Offer security guarantees to any nations in the area that are ready to commit themselves to the West and to peace.
4. Give arms aid only on the basis of such commitments and attempt concerted action that will ban all arms shipments by and to all powers in this region.
5. Begin without delay economic aid to those Mid-East nations that desire it for peaceful purposes. Use the economic aid program to stimulate Arab refugee resettlement.
6. Take strong international action to stop and prevent sea blockades of international shipping.
7. Strengthen the democratic nations both of Western Europe and the Middle East and be wary of providing artificial strength for crumbling feudalisms and desperate dictators.

INADEQUACIES OF UNITED NATIONS

The administration has an answer to these questions and problems. It is in effect that the United Nations should deal with conflicts within the area. But let us remember two things about the United Nations. First, it is not a dispassionate objective international tribunal. The United Nations consists of the representatives of 80 countries who are at the United Nations primarily to safeguard and promote their own country's interests. For the most part on crucial issues they vote in blocs and the voting has little relation to the intrinsic merits of the issues before them. Many members of the Afro-Asian bloc and the Communist bloc are likely to vote for the Arabs and against Israel regardless of right or wrong. The Russians can be depended upon to veto in the Security

Council whatever the Arabs are against. Under these circumstances what chance has Israel?

The other factor is the prestige of the United States. We are the single most influential nation in the United Nations. This imposes a very serious responsibility on us. It is not enough for us to say that we will let the United Nations solve these problems, for at this juncture the United Nations appears lined up against Israel. We must, therefore, have a policy clearly spelled out which we will advocate in the U. N. Such a policy has been lacking and I am afraid it will continue to be lacking if our object is still the appeasement of the Arabs and as a corollary holding Israel off at arm's length.

CRUCIAL ISSUE OF SUEZ CANAL

My point is illustrated by the current crucial issues. Let me deal briefly with four of them:

1. *The Suez Canal.*—The United States is committed to the six principles for the settlement of the Suez Canal issue. On October 22, 1958, Secretary Dulles wrote me as follows:

DEAR RABBI BERNSTEIN: Thank you for your letter of October 4, which reached me in New York. I think progress was made there, and I was encouraged by the unanimous Security Council endorsement of the six principles for a settlement, among them that passage through the Suez Canal shall be free and open without direct or indirect discrimination of either a political or technical nature.

You may be sure that we continue to support this principle as one of the essentials of a just and peaceful solution of the Suez issue.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

However, Colonel Nasser has steadfastly refused to change his position. He has indicated no readiness to open the canal to Israel shipping. In fact as I have been informed by good authority he has indicated no readiness for any kind of conciliation. And the United States has remained silent.

CRUCIAL ISSUE OF EGYPTIAN JEWS

2. *Egyptian Jews.*—Nasser is carrying out a Nazi program against Jews in Egypt. In fact he is employing German Nazis to do the dirty work for him. Jews from almost every family in Egypt were arrested during the night, thrown in concentration camps, mistreated, their property taken away from them. They are now being driven out by the thousands, compelled to leave their possessions behind. They have had nothing to do with the conflict between Egypt and Israel for which Nasser's intransigence has been chiefly responsible. It is contrary to international law and commonly accepted international morality to persecute and expel these Jews because of the unrelenting war that Nasser has waged on Israel. But this is what has happened. Thus far the United States has not taken effective public cognizance and action to stop this cruel injustice.

CRUCIAL ISSUE OF GULF OF AQABA

3. *Aqaba.*—In 1948 Arab armies invaded the State of Israel recently established by the United Nations. The invasion was repelled. They then initiated a blockade for the purpose of economic strangulation. They not only closed the Suez Canal to shipping to and from Israel, but also the Gulf of Aqaba with the port of Elath at its heart. Nasser mounted guns on the islands which command and entrance to the gulf and fortified the coastline in such a way as to control all shipping to and from Elath. From that point no shipping was permitted to or from Israel. During all this period no effective action was taken by the United Nations or the United States to redress this injustice, to reverse this violation of international law. Only when Israel was compelled to take matters in its own hands and drive the Egyptians off the islands and away from the coast was freedom of shipping established. Now this is not only of concern to Israel, but to the West, for this is a second lung to the Western World. It provides an alternative to the Suez for western shipping.

Israel does not insist on remaining along the Sinai coast at Sharm el-Sheikh. It is willing to withdraw if there will be dependable guarantees for the continued freedom of shipping. Is this an unreasonable request? But the United States has taken the position that first Israel must withdraw completely without guarantees, and then later the basic issue of free shipping will be considered. But

what assurance does this offer Israel? Nasser consistently ignored and repudiated UN resolutions. Neither the United Nations nor the United States did anything about it. Why should he behave differently now? Especially if he sees that the United States makes no concessions of any kind to Israel but continues a policy of Arab appeasement. It is not enough, I repeat, for the United States to say let the United Nations do it. The United States should spell out its determination that at least this strategic area be occupied by the United Nations Expeditionary Force until basic solutions are achieved.

May I point out that this is not in the interests of Israel alone. The United States is engaged in a power struggle with the Soviet Union. What does it profit us to strengthen our enemies and to weaken our friends? What have we gained from first exasperating and then humiliating France and Britain? We will need them again; mark my words, and we will rue the day when we contributed to their weakening.

CRUCIAL ISSUE OF GAZA

4. *Gaza.*—This is a difficult problem. Gaza always belonged to Palestine never to Egypt. The Egyptians were there until Israel drove them out only because they had invaded Palestine in the war of 1948 to overturn a UN resolution creating the State of Israel. There is no moral or historic reason for Egypt to come back to Gaza.

On the other hand Israel cannot absorb the 200,000 Arab refugees in Gaza plus the other 80,000 who exist there. Their problems must be solved in the larger framework of the total resettlement of the refugees chiefly in Arab countries and with the aid of the UN, United States, the Arab countries, and Israel. Realistically what does this mean? It means that the Egyptians must not come back to use Gaza again as the starting place for Fedayeen assaults on Israel. Israel will never permit this. The world should not expect it. Such a solution can lead only to incessant hostilities.

At the present juncture some type of U. N. supervision seems to be called for. Israel has proposed a plan by which an Israeli civil administration under United Nations mandate will supervise the area until the major problems are solved. Whether this proposal is accepted, or another, in any event Nasser should not be permitted back into Gaza. The U. N. should retain control of the situation until some peace is achieved.

Here too the United States has not spelled out its position, but has maintained that Israel withdraw from Gaza and then later the hope is that the problems will be solved. Once again, this is unrealistic. It merely turns the situation over to Nasser and his supporting Communist and Afro-Asian blocs. The United States should come forward now with proposals for dependable solutions or it falls in leadership.

EISENHOWER DOCTRINE DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH

Does the above mean that I oppose the Eisenhower doctrine? No. As I stated before the House committee, I support it as a step in the right direction, but I go on to say as a thoughtful responsible person has the right to say, that it does not go far enough. We must take leadership for the solution of the problems within the area. We must give direction to their solutions now before it is too late. We must forsake appeasement and espouse justice.

We realize that you are not legislating a program for the Middle East. You are considering a specific proposal by the President who seeks support for the implementation of a broad and necessary purpose.

But, in our judgment, it is time that we adopted an overall Near East policy—a statement of principles that would guide and govern our diplomacy, our military dispositions, our economic aid, our program in the United Nations.

It is, of course, up to you to determine whether this is best done by the adoption of a parallel and supplementary resolution, or by amendments to the pending legislation, or by declarations by the appropriate congressional committees.

Chairman GREEN. The next witness is Mr. J. Ashton Greene, Trans World Shipping Corp., New Orleans.

He is not here. [Mr. Green's prepared statement appears in the appendix.]

The next witness will be Mr. Edward R. Sheehan, of Newton Center, Mass. Is he here?

He is not here.

Next is Mr. Garland Evans Hopkins, of Washington, D. C. Is Mr. Hopkins here?

STATEMENT OF GARLAND EVANS HOPKINS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. HOPKINS. Senator Green and gentlemen, I have prepared a fairly extensive statement on the situation as related to Senate Joint Resolution 19, and I, of course, will be able in the 10 minutes to give you only a briefing of the paper which I have here. I would hope very much that it might find publication in toto.

Chairman GREEN. In other words, you request the whole paper as prepared be printed as part of the record, and you would summarize such parts as you could in 10 minutes?

Mr. HOPKINS. Thank you, sir, I would like that.

I would like first, sir, to point out that I am appearing in my capacity as a private citizen with some knowledge of and great interest in the Middle East. I am not here representing any of the organizations related to the Middle East of which I am a member or official.

I deem it the responsibility of every informed citizen to be of such service to his country as is possible in times of crisis. I sincerely believe we now face a crisis in our relations with the countries of the Middle East.

If any of the knowledge of the area I have gained from 8 extensive visits during the last 10 years and from wide personal contact and friendship with the leaders and people of the Middle Eastern nations be of value to you, I shall be happy to share such information and interpretation as I may be able.

I should like to address myself briefly to three topics, and in this paper I have addressed myself at greater length:

First, why there is need for awakened American interest in the Middle East;

Second, some principles to be kept in mind as we work out a new basis for American-Middle Eastern relationships; and

Third, some comments on the Eisenhower doctrine, a part of the implementation of which is before you in Senate Joint Resolution 19.

WHY THERE IS NEED FOR AN AWAKENED AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST

It is urgently important that American policy toward the Middle East be reconstituted on a sound and viable basis. The nations of that area are caught up in the phenomenon we sometimes call the Asian revolution. More properly, we should call it the revolution of the common man.

This is a revolt that began in Europe, found its way westward across the Atlantic to America and from here spread farther westward across the Pacific and through Asia.

It does not detract from the great contributions made by our European cousins to point out that perhaps the single greatest force in the awakening of Asia from its long sleep was the Christian missions' movement whose educators, doctors, and village workers carried with them ideas of the rights of man that caught fire even where few converts to their faith were made, and whose institutions trained, without

regard to creed, large numbers of the leaders whose voices have awakened Asia.

It is important that Americans keep in mind that this revolution has as its underlying factor the long overdue social, economic, and political liberation of the common man. And we should never lose sight of the fact that it was not the Lenins and Stalins of Russia, but the Blisses, the Eddys, the Dodges and their ilk, who transmitted from America many of the earth-shaking ideas that the Kemal Ataturks, the Mohammed Jinnahs, the Muhammed Abduls, the Jamal al-Din Al-Afghans, and more recently the Mossadeghs and Nassers, have translated into a Middle Eastern revolution.

The tragic aspect of this revolution is the failure of America and the West, until recently, to recognize it for what it is. For too many decades, it was looked on—in London, in Paris, and in Washington as well—as something to be feared, as the end of world order, which was an euphemism for the end of colonialism, and as a threat to Western civilization.

Foreign policies were—and to some extent still are—developed with the intent to thwart or, at least, to slow down the revolution. Instead of capitalizing on the remarkable opportunity which existed for partnership and cooperation in ushering in a new order in the Middle East, the Western Powers lost their position as friends and allies and became looked on as enemies.

Disillusioned by the failure of the West to assist them in their struggle, the Middle East has looked elsewhere for a savior. A great power saw the opportunity to capitalize on the situation and began spreading false but dazzling promises among the Middle Eastern peoples. Some of the people are seizing on these promises and identifying their hopes with the new shibboleths.

Objective observers can see that what is happening is a repetition of old errors. Certainly the future under Communist domination can be only further enslavement. But the important fact is that Middle Easterners are not able to look at Russia objectively. They see only their own present lot in life and ask, "What have we to lose?"

The leaders of the Middle East are swept along by forces they cannot control. They fear terribly, but are impotent to stem, the rising tide of revolution.

The leaders, for example, of the Asian-African bloc in the United Nations certainly are not Communists; most of them are devoted to the democratic tradition. But they are caught in an awful dilemma. The nationalistic aspirations of their people must find an outlet and a forum at the United Nations.

Almost always the Russians, recognizing the propaganda value of such a move, support or refrain from opposing the resolutions offered by Asian and African countries. Despite generally more hopeful policies in the past few years, particularly our recent stand at the time of the invasion of Egypt by Israel, France, and the United Kingdom, the United States still frequently feels obliged to oppose the proposals made by Middle Eastern diplomats.

Hence, without any other possible course, Middle Eastern diplomacy often finds itself allied with the Soviet against the West.

It is, I think, most important that we as westerners realize that in Middle Eastern minds there are not simply two alternatives: to stand for the East or to stand for the West. They believe that there is a third consideration: their own best interest.

We may disagree with them that their best interest can ever be served by other than measures we favor. We may even, at times, consider them naive; but we should recognize the reality and the honesty of their conviction.

This does not mean that the West can expect nothing more than neutralism from the countries of the Middle East. The idea of neutralism, of which India is the principal exponent, and which is now taking hold in the Middle East, is born out of protest rather than desire. Should it prevail in the Middle East, those nations will suffer from it as much as will the West.

It is not a doctrine consonant with the revolution which is taking place. It is a weapon against the West, the use of which may prove as dangerous as mustard gas should the wind change and Russia decide to move in.

But desperate men take desperate chances, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that some Middle Eastern nations may try this dangerous expedient unless the West takes urgently needed steps to reassure them that they are partners in the fight for freedom.

Neutralism could not survive 30 days in any Middle Eastern country which felt that the United States, let alone the rest of the western nations, was its friend and ally, backing against all comers its legitimate demands for unimpaired sovereignty.

MIDDLE EAST POLICIES

In the past year I have traveled in most of the countries of the Middle East, in many of them within the past few months. I have reached certain conclusions about their policies, derived from top-level conferences with their leaders. I believe:

1. That the responsible leadership of every Middle Eastern nation is aware of the realities of political communism and rejects the system. This is borne out by the fact that only one independent Middle Eastern country, Israel, permits an organized Communist Party, and that even there the party has had little success;
2. That every country from Morocco through Pakistan wants to orient its policy in the direction of the West and away from the Soviet;
3. That the major reasons why there is not now a firm alliance between the Middle East and the West are the French colonial policy in north Africa and western support for the policies of the world Zionist movement;
4. That unless equitable solutions can be found to the problems of north Africa and Palestine, the Middle East is likely to be drawn further into the Soviet sphere of influence, despite its desire for closer relations with the West and its antipathy to communism.

AMERICA MUST RECONSTRUCT ITS APPROACHES

Unless America—both our people and our Government—recognizes the reality of revolution in the Middle East and proceeds to reconstruct both the popular approach through newspapers and other communications media and the approaches of diplomacy and other agencies of Government, there is little hope of successful rapprochement between our country and the Middle East.

A case in point was Egypt's acceptance of arms aid from the Soviet Union. It was tragic to see the Soviet given that opportunity to get a footing in the Arab world. Everyone familiar with the facts knows that this tragedy could have been averted.

It galled the Arab States, with vast area of territory and 45 million inhabitants, to be forced to stand idly by while Israel, with 1.7 million inhabitants, crowded into 8,000 square miles, purchased arms from both Iron Curtain countries and the West with money supplied from the United States.

It was nothing short of hypocritical for anyone to cry out after Egypt had accepted Soviet help that no arms race must be started in the Middle East and that the military balance must be maintained. The cold fact is that an arms race had been going on for 7 years with one side blocked in every attempt to reach a balance with the other.

Reaching further back in the decade of tragedies in American-Middle Eastern relations, this same unawareness of the total situation in the revolutionary Middle East led the United States into countless blunders in its handling of the Palestinian problem. We recognized the fact of a valid Hebrew renaissance; we failed to recognize the equally apparent fact that there was also a valid Arab renaissance in progress, and nowhere more than among the Arabs of Palestine.

We made mistakes then that must be corrected before there can be an Arab-Israeli peace, hence peace in the Middle East, hence world peace. The Middle East will scrutinize our emerging Middle Eastern policy with sharp eyes to find the correctives we propose. Unless we deal realistically with the continuing problem of Palestine, we shall not finally succeed in winning the nations of the Middle East as partners.

While the tide of revolution in the Middle East is as inexorable in its course as in any other part of Asia, there are two factors in the situation which differentiates the struggle there from the general Asian revolution: (1) its mutual cultural affinity with the West; and (2) the strategic importance of the area.

MIDDLE EAST'S CULTURAL AFFINITY WITH THE WEST

The Middle East has a cultural affinity for the West not shared by other Asian nations. From the Middle East came the ideas that gave birth to western civilization, and during the European dark age, it was the Middle East that stood guardian over and kept alive those ideas, returning them to the West refined and improved.

Now that the Middle East is emerging from its own dark age of cultural stagnation, the West has a debt to repay. If a formula can be found to end the present political stalemate in Western-Middle Eastern relationships, the people of the Middle East will joyfully accept back from us, refined and improved, what they originally gave to us, and in their turn rescued, refined, and improved for us.

If the United States can implement a policy of sympathetic and impartial friendship in its own relations in the area and influence our Western allies to institute policies based on the same concept, the nations of the Middle East will hasten to let the world know that once again the believers in ethical monotheism are united against their mutual enemies: atheistic secularism and materialism, which have their political expression today in Moscow-brand communism.

We should never allow this fact to escape us: we of the West and they of the Middle East do worship the same God, do have the same basic religious heritage and concepts of the Semitic-Christian tradition.

The time has come for Christendom and the Islamic world to seek avenues of cooperation and understanding. For too many centuries we have drifted apart and emphasized our differences.

The time in which we live demand that we stand together, not apart. This does not mean theological or political compromise. It does mean that, while agreeing to disagree where we differ, we will stand together on the many issues on which we are in agreement.

And I have no doubt, that when such rapprochement has been reached, both the Islamic world and Christendom will be surprised at the contributions each can make to the other.

STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

The other factor which differentiates the struggle in the Middle East from the other Asian areas in the grip of revolution is the especially strategic geographical location of those countries.

I am not here thinking in terms of how effectual the tremendous oil reserves of this area would be in case of war even if these nations were friendly and willing for the West to use their oil, nor am I concerned as to how many divisions they could send to the defense of themselves and the West.

I am thinking of the boon to the Communist war machine the oil of this area could be; I am concerned about the divisions of first-class fighting men the Communists could raise.

If Chinese coolies can be made into the fighting force we witnessed them to be in Korea, how much more dangerous to have nations whose traditions as great fighters has been established throughout history fall into Communist hands.

Or let us suppose for a moment that the countries of the Middle East escape Communist domination but espouse neutralism. Is there anyone who doubts if world war III comes, may God forbid, that much of the fighting, perhaps the decisive battles will be fought in the Middle East?

The morale of an army is a determining factor in its effectiveness. To be forced to fight in Damascus or Cairo with a hostile population taking potshots from windows or just refusing to cooperate could, in itself, be the difference between victory and defeat.

MUTUAL TRUST, COOPERATION, AND FRIENDSHIP NEEDED

What I am trying to say is that the West needs a friendly Middle East just as surely and urgently as the Middle East needs a friendly West.

For either of us, the future is indeed dark unless we find mutual trust, cooperation, and friendship. I believe this is possible, but only when the Middle East has waked up to its need for the West and the West has realized its need of the Middle East.

When mutual need is recognized by both sides, partnership, which the peoples of both areas want, will be possible.

Like it or not, the onus and the initiative in making this possible must come from the United States. But it can come only if the West

is willing to recognize the fact that, whatever the predisposition of the peoples of the Middle East, whatever the desires of their leaders, the impact of our revolutionary age is no less relentless there than elsewhere in Asia.

Its reasonable demands—and perhaps some of its unreasonable demands—must be met. All vestiges of colonialism must go. Its nations must be treated in a sympathetic and impartial manner on a basis of equality and respect.

PRINCIPLES FOR AMERICAN-MIDDLE EAST RELATIONSHIPS

There are a few principles I believe should be kept in mind as the United States Government formulates its new policy in the Middle East.

First, in our relations with the countries of the area we should have no favorite nation. This is a principle in American foreign relations dating from our earliest years. Let me quote from George Washington's Farewell Address:

Nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded; and that in place of them just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The nation, which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.

Second, the best interests of our own country should be the primary concern of our President, diplomats, legislators, and other officials in policymaking positions. The tragedy of American-Middle Eastern policy has been its involvement in domestic political campaigns.

For example, it was difficult at times to tell from the speeches and promises made in the recent New York senatorial campaign whether the candidates were running for the United States Senate or the Israeli Knesset.

Three, the pleas of groups with special political interests in the Middle East on whatever side should be analyzed with great care. Again let me quote from President Washington:

Sympathy for the favorite nation gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation) facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation to commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliance of ambition, corruption, or infatuation. * * * Real patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the favorite, are liable to become suspected and odious; while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests.

Four, we must keep in mind the deep religious devotion of the people and most of the leaders of the Middle East. Just as Christians often emphasize love as the principal virtue and basis for living both for individuals and nations, so in Islam, the dominant religion of the Middle East, justice is emphasized as the principal virtue and basis for living both for individuals and nations.

Compromise, not too difficult a concept for those motivated by love, becomes a much more difficult concept for those motivated by justice. Unless we cleave to justice in our policies in the Middle East, there is little chance we will succeed.

Five, we must deal with the nations of the Middle East on a basis of sovereign equality with our own Nation. This may be our most difficult hurdle to overcome. We all share in the West psychology of superiority. Unless the United States can free itself from such a psychological approach, success will hardly attend our efforts in the Middle East.

For there the peoples are the proud inheritors of past glory, made to seem the more glorious because of their immediate past and present position in world affairs. We must learn the gracious art of bending over backward to avoid offending.

And, even then, we must be prepared to be misunderstood and misinterpreted. There can be no place for personal or national pique in our efforts to create a partnership with the nations of the Middle East.

It may seem that the principles I have listed are broad and vague. In a sense, I recognize that they are; but my years of rather close association with the peoples and leaders of the Middle East convince me that there is no practical and realistic basis for partnership with the Middle Eastern nations apart from these simple principles.

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

The attempt of Americans interested in a sound American-Middle East policy has been made unnecessarily difficult by those whose special interest has led them to demand, successfully until recently, an American policy in the Middle East which has alienated the great mass of the people in that area. The Eisenhower Doctrine would indicate that we are now awake to the folly of our former policy, or lack of policy.

The issue in the Middle East now is the survival of the free world, of which the nations of the Middle East are an integral part. Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Saudi Arabia have, in one way or another, stood up to be counted.

The sad fact is that all the other countries of the area would now be firmly committed on the side of freedom in the battle against those who would destroy the values middle easterners and we alike cherish had American policy over the past 10 years permitted.

Unhappily our policy has seldom taken into consideration either the emerging role of popular opinion in the Middle East, on the one hand, or, on the other, the necessity to hold up the hands of those leaders who do cast in their lot with us.

We have until recently lacked imagination and perspective in our foreign policy approaches. We have failed to keep the friendship and support of leaders in the popular revolutions, seemingly unaware that these movements are inevitably victorious.

We have succumbed to pressures in this country that have caused us to support injustices and to be counted party to driving almost a million men, women, and children from their ancestral homes into the most miserable and degrading exile.

All of this has brought us to the verge of losing the Middle East to the free world. And, if we lose the Middle East, we may well find ourselves involved in a third world war, a war which we might have to fight without the active aid and friendship of tens of millions of middle easterners scattered over huge areas of strategically located terrain containing over half the oil and gas reserves of the world.

We gained back a considerable amount of our lost prestige in the area when we stood up against the recent collusive aggression against Egypt by Israel, France, and Britain. For the first time in years, villagers cheered vehicles flying the American flag; editors wrote commendatory editorials; America's stock went up.

The unfortunate publicity which preceded the enunciation of the Eisenhower doctrine hurt American relations throughout the area.

In the absence of any statement of substance from which to draw facts, imaginations ran riot. The United States military was pictured as moving in to take over the area. Alarmed at what was happening, on December 31, 1956, I telegraphed President Eisenhower as follows:

* * * let me express my admiration for your clear and farsighted policy in the Middle East. Your fearless stand on aggression in Egypt, despite special interest pressures in an election campaign, won an overwhelming vote of confidence from the American people and the trust of the people of the world, including middle easterners.

America has not lost the Middle East, only because you refused to be cowed by Zionism and its few but vocal supporters; but we have not yet won the partnership of the Middle East.

We cannot win it by military force or economic enticements. We can only win it by moral suasion based on a policy of complete impartiality in intra-Middle Eastern disputes and by demonstrating respect for elemental justice.

The Middle East wants American partnership. It does not want American control. I respectfully urge you to make it clear that while America will, if necessary, resist Russian aggression in the Middle East by armed force, we do not intend to use the Middle East as an American military outpost.

I further urge that, to the extent possible, our economic aid and military assistance be channeled through the United Nations.

On January 5 the President went before Congress and the world finally knew what the Eisenhower doctrine was. By and large it is, I believe, a better and more positive approach than we have known up to this time.

I could wish that, whatever the intention or justification in fact, our cold war with Russia might have been subordinated and that the splendid statements supporting the sovereign independence of Middle Eastern States might have been lifted up as the central theme of the document.

The desired result, from our standpoint, would have been the same. To tell states just emerging from the shock of aggression on one of their number by two Western European powers and Israel that we would defend them from Communist attack, if requested, raised the unnecessary but justifiable question: Why did we not guarantee defense assistance against any attack? Why just in case of Communist attack? Does this mean that we will give no assistance if Britain, France, Israel, or some other nation attacks?

Certainly we can point to our record when these states did attack and say that we would again follow the same course. "But," middle easterners ask, "why not go on record that you will help us resist any and all aggression?"

It is an honest opinion. It cannot be answered by saying we do not desire to hurt British and French feelings by suggesting that they might do such awful things. They have done it before; middle easterners fear they may do it again.

DOUBLE STANDARD DEALINGS CONDEMNED

These weaknesses notwithstanding, the Eisenhower doctrine is essentially sound and hopeful. Clarifications and changes of emphasis should be made and I hope will be made. I hope too that the administration will soon permit the unblocking of Egyptian funds in this country and allow Egypt to purchase wheat.

How can we expect the Middle East to understand and accept our professions of friendly concern for its welfare when it witnesses the spectacle of vast assistance to the aggressor nations to help them get back on their feet, including permission to Israel—while still defying both our and the UN request to withdraw from Egypt—to purchase corn, when we refuse the aggressed-against nation permission to purchase wheat?

This double standard in our dealings with Middle Eastern and European nations is a hangover from a period that had its final gasp at Suez. It belongs to the same pattern of thinking that continues to talk about "filling a power vacuum" in the Middle East.

How many more Suez crises will it take to teach the West that the Middle East will not accept—and cannot be forced to accept—the western concept of the inferiority of the Middle East?

If a power vacuum exists, the Middle Eastern nations will fill it themselves—or, which is more likely, keep any outsider from filling it.

PASSAGE OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 19 URGED

Within the context of my remarks and as the first step toward a just and viable American policy in the Middle East, I urge that the Congress pass Senate Joint Resolution 19.

I urge that there be no separation of its parts, that the sections dealing with both military and economic aid be passed the same time, for to pass only the section on military aid at this time would offend our committed friends, further alienate the nations who are not now our friends and provide grist for the Soviet propaganda for many months to come.

I thank you, sir.

Chairman GREEN. Are there any questions to ask?

Senator MORSE. I have one or two.

Mr. Hopkins, what is the system of justice in Saudi Arabia?

SYSTEM OF JUSTICE IN SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. HOPKINS. The system of justice in Saudi Arabia, Senator, is a system based on years of tradition going back eventually to the Koranic system of justice, which has proved a viable system of justice for millions of people scattered over millions of miles for many centuries.

Senator MORSE. Is it based upon a bill of rights for the individual?

Mr. HOPKINS. The Koran, while differing from our own concepts in some respects, sir, certainly is in a sense a bill of rights, and does contain in it many of the things contained in our Bill of Rights.

Senator MORSE. I am asking you to tell this committee the system of justice that exists in Saudi Arabia, for example, in the administration of criminal law and the administration of civil rights. Is there

a bill of rights for the individual, as we know it in the United States, in Saudi Arabia? Yes or no?

Mr. HOPKINS. Well, I don't like to answer it "yes" or "no." I would have to say "No," there isn't the same bill of rights we have.

Senator MORSE. If you cannot tell me whether or not there is a bill of rights in Saudi Arabia in terms of a "yes" or "no" answer, you cannot answer what exists in Saudi Arabia, I say most respectfully.

Mr. HOPKINS. When I am speaking in terms of the Bill of Rights such as we know it, there is no such bill of rights as we have, with its 1, 2, 3, 10 statements.

On the other hand, there is in all history no document which has been more responsible save only the Christian New Testament, for the spreading of the rights of man, than has the Koran, on which the law of Saudi Arabia is based.

I think, sir, that whenever we think of a country like Saudi Arabia, we can either judge it in terms of how it compares with our own country at our high stage of technological advance, or we can judge it in terms of the tremendous progress it has made in the past generation. If you judge it on the first case, then I would think you would say how backward is Saudi Arabia. But if you would think in terms of a nation which entered this generation at, say, the level of 1000 A. D., and that has progressed several hundreds of years in this one generation, you then may exclaim, "Has any nation progressed so rapidly in so short a time?" It depends on one's approach.

QUESTION OF ECONOMIC GRANTS TO SAUDI ARABIA

Senator MORSE. Do you think our Government should make economic grants to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Hopkins?

Mr. HOPKINS. I think that our Government should give consideration to the Government of Saudi Arabia in exactly the same way that it gives consideration to any other friendly government in terms of making its grants. If need is found to exist, then we should by all means make grants.

Senator MORSE. Can you tell the committee what the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia are worth?

Mr. HOPKINS. I have no idea what the oil reserve of Saudi Arabia is worth. I am sure that it is worth more than the oil reserve of perhaps any other country in the world.

Senator MORSE. Including our own?

Mr. HOPKINS. Including our own.

Senator MORSE. Do you think it is sound public policy, then, with a country that has that kind of wealth, for the Congress of the United States to appropriate American tax dollar money by way of grants to Saudi Arabia, rather than to insist that Saudi Arabia borrow the money instead of getting it free, while the King of Saudi Arabia is in our country contracting for jeweled Cadillacs?

Mr. HOPKINS. I think it all depends on whether or not one wants to save the Middle East from communism. If one wants to save the Middle East from communism, it may be necessary for us to take steps which seem to us unreasonable sometimes, even to accept requests which seem naive to even be asked for, but we are not dealing in terms of a Western European power, and we should keep that in

mind and ask ourselves first what our real objective is. Is our objective really to save the Middle East from communism? If so, then one has one answer.

And my answer would be, "yes," I want to save the Middle East from communism, and if that involves doing things that ordinarily might not be done with a country like Holland or Belgium or France, then go ahead and do it.

ENTRENCHING FEUDALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator MORSE. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I will close the examination with this:

I want to assure the witness I want to save the Middle East from communism, but I do not want to entrench totalitarianism in the Middle East, either, which we are doing unilaterally. But through the United Nations, we should cooperate in the Middle East on the basis of establishing a system of freedom in the area, rather than on the kinds of testimony I have been listening to on the justice of the Middle East.

When we are talking about the Middle East, we are talking about a feudal order, and I do not intend to vote American taxpayers' dollars to entrench that kind of feudalism in the Middle East.

Chairman GREEN. Any questions?

INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MIDDLE EAST

Senator ERVIN. I understood you to say you thought our policy in the Middle East has not been successful because we permitted ourselves to get involved in the domestic affairs of some of the countries there.

Mr. HOPKINS. No, I didn't. I think you misunderstood me at that point, sir. I think that one of the problems in having a successful Middle Eastern policy in the United States has been the involvement of our Middle Eastern policy in our own domestic political campaigns.

Senator ERVIN. You think it is all right for us to get involved in political affairs over there?

Mr. HOPKINS. I suppose that every nation has to have its foreign policy toward other nations. I think it is unfortunate that those policies have sometimes gotten mixed up in political campaigns where, in my mind, the question should be the best interests of the United States, and not the intra-area disputes of the Middle East.

Senator ERVIN. Of course, from your standpoint, one of the tragic situations about this country that you were bragging about so much a while ago, is the fact that all of our affairs of Government, both our domestic policies and our foreign policies, all were somewhat involved in our domestic policies.

Mr. HOPKINS. I am afraid that they often do, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And really, as a matter of fact, the American people ought to have something to do with their foreign policy, ought they not?

Mr. HOPKINS. I think very definitely they should have.

Senator ERVIN. How can they express themselves with reference to foreign policy without having them involved in political campaigns?

Mr. HOPKINS. I think the point I was trying to make, sir, is that no

man should be elected to the Senate of the United States or House of Representatives, or any other political office in this country, in terms of his promises for any given foreign country as apart from other foreign countries.

It seems to me that the citizen has every right to bring to bear his thinking upon his elected representatives, and I hope that we will continue to do that.

Senator ERVIN. I agree with you in that observation, because I happen to be an American who has no allegiance of any kind outside of the United States.

Mr. HOPKINS. I am sure that is so, sir.

Senator ERVIN. That is all.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you.

I called the name of Mr. Edward R. Sheehan, and at that time he was absent. Has he returned?

Mr. SHEEHAN. I am here, sir.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Sheehan, will you proceed.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. SHEEHAN, NEWTON CENTRE, MASS.

Mr. SHEEHAN. Distinguished Senators and guests; I am privileged with the invitation of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services to present my views on the Presidential plan for the Middle East. For the last 3 years I have been a foreign correspondent in Europe, North Africa, and Asia for the Boston Globe and many of the leading metropolitan newspapers in New England and elsewhere. I have just recently returned to America from a 6-month tour of the Middle East, having been there prior to the nationalization of the Suez Canal and during many of the explosive events that followed it. I have no pretensions to any extra special knowledge of the Middle East, but come here today to present the point of view of an American citizen who is dismayed by what he saw in the Middle East and is dedicated to a solution.

NEED FOR POSITIVE ECONOMIC MEASURES

I am here to plead in favor of reinforcing whatever military safeguards we have in mind for the Middle East with specific and positive economic measures. It is my conviction that American military guarantees in that area will mean little and in the end accomplish nothing unless we do something dramatic, sweeping and real to challenge not only the destitution but the basic political problems that have contributed so greatly to the present instability.

Our policy in the Middle East should conceive of military protection and economic aid not as identical twins, but as Siamese twins: distinguishable but inseparable.

"THE AMERICAN OBSESSION WITH COMMUNISM"

Now, I am, of course, aggressively anti-Communist, but I would like to mention here such basic Arab conceptions, convictions that the predominant danger in the Middle East is not the danger of communism. In my travels throughout Arab lands from Marrakesh in Morocco in the west to Damascus in Syria in the east, one Arab spokesman after

the other assailed me with what they call "the American obsession with communism."

"Why must you Americans exclusively conceive of every human and political problem on earth in terms of Russia?" One typical Arab—and anti-Communist—Foreign Minister asked me: "When will you realize that the Arab peoples—and Arab nationalism—are far less concerned with communism, which they regard as a more distant danger, than they are concerned with the already accomplished suffering which British and French colonialism, the creation of Israel and legendary poverty have already wrought upon them?"

I am not suggesting that this attitude is the most perceptive or the most reasonable. But I do think it is important to make allowances for these special fears if we are to attack the problems of the Middle East in realism and in hope of success. We must orient our program toward alleviating the fears they already have, as well as underlining the perils of communism and protecting them from it.

PALESTINE REFUGEES PROBLEM

The obsessive and overriding preoccupation of nearly all Middle Eastern Arabs is not communism but the problem of Palestine. Their resentment is both symbolized and realized in the nearly 1 million Arab refugees who were driven from or fled Palestine when the State of Israel came into being. Some money and a great deal of talk has been expended on these unfortunate people since 1948, but hundreds of thousands of them are still subsisting in unspeakable squalor, on considerably less than a dime a day per person. Obviously, the United Nations rations have been terribly inadequate.

I wish every man and woman in this hearing room could visit the three Arab refugee camps in Jericho, squatting like giant weeds in an arid desert 1,300 feet below sea level. When in Biblical times—when the walls of the city tumbled and trembled before Joshua's shrill trumpet—the Plain of Jericho sprawled in lushness to the River Jordan; today Jericho is a graveyard of the living, the half-living and the better dead.

Most of the families in Jericho live in one-room mud huts, even those families with upward of 10 children. The huts are replete with dirt floors and disease. They have no facilities of any kind, not even beds. Occasionally, the man of the hut, not to speak of his family, is a walking skeleton. When a refugee cannot find extra work outside the camp, he and his family may slowly starve to death. Spectacles of this kind cover the Arab States like scabs.

It was my impression that the majority of Arab refugees do not want to migrate to other parts of the Arab world, such as undeveloped Iraq, where there is room for them and the opportunity to build a better life. They prefer to remain in the camps, languishing on the bare hope that some day they can go home. What keeps them alive is their obsessive determination to return to Palestine.

Believe me, gentlemen, it is a very difficult and futile task to enter one of the caves of Jericho and lecture the skeletons inside it on the perils of communism. The only peril the refugee knows is the force that banished him from his farm, his field and his orange grove. It is precisely because the refugee is so ignorant of what communism really is that his condition is so susceptible to it. If it is true that the

question of a third world war hinges on peace in the Middle East, it is also true that there can be no peace in the Middle East until the problem of Palestine is solved. And there can be no solution to the problem of Palestine until the future of the Arab refugees is settled. Any American program in the Middle East, then, will be unrealistic and suspect unless it immediately comes to grips both economically and politically with the Arab refugees.

Clearly, we must supplement the meager United Nations rations. Clearly, we must use all our influence with the Government of Israel to reabsorb—not just a token number—but as many hundreds of thousands of refugees as she possibly can and to compensate the others justly and liberally. Clearly, we must replace long years of talk with large helpings of action toward a people who cannot much longer be allowed to languish. Clearly, we must make it abundantly plain that we are as alien to any further expansion of Israeli borders as we are alien to any Arab dream of removing Israel from the map.

MIDDLE EASTERN POVERTY

Finally, we must address ourselves to the problem of Middle Eastern poverty as a whole. I am not going to attempt any general exposition of Middle Eastern destitution, but at least I can try to dramatize the need for economic aid by concluding with a few reminders.

Take, for example, the pattern of village life in southern Egypt, or what is called upper Egypt, and which I visited extensively. The conditions there are much more terrifying than routine semistarvation, pestilence, and pain. Nearly all the inhabitants of Egyptian villages have amoebic dysentery and 92 percent of them have billharzia (intestinal parasites). Trachoma, a running disease of the eyes, afflicts 89 percent.

Through the skin of the peasant's bare legs, the minuscule parasites of the various intestinal plagues work their way from the Nile and the soggy soil around it into the human body. Once within the intestinal tract, they proliferate at a prodigious rate. All over Egypt one sees these walking ghosts of men, mere shadows, an unbearable burden to themselves and their kin. The parasite virtually carves out their intestines, climaxing their agony in a nightmare of suffering from which the great release is blessed death. What hospitals there are are barely better than the jails. The high Aswan Dam scheme was partly aimed at these people.

At any rate, these are the kind of people we must help all over the Middle East, if, in the end, we are to banish Lenin from its sands and cause it to bloom in a new oasis of prosperity and peace.

ARAB NATIONALISM

In the meantime, we must master the admittedly difficult business of coming to terms with Arab nationalism. No Western nation before us has done so, but if this nationalism is as irresistible as we think it is, then we must make ourselves the first who found the modus vivendi. It will be all the more difficult because of the quixotic and intransigent character of the Arab governments. But the peace of the world requires that we explore every means possible.

SUMMARY

My own conviction is that we must begin to pursue a go-it-alone economic and political program in the Middle East if the next few months demonstrate that Britain and France are once and for all discredited in that area. And above all, we must make up our minds that any enlightened American policy for the Middle East from here on out will have to be divorced from domestic politics and immune to local indignations.

This is, then, my summation:

1. The United States should take immediate steps toward solving the Arab refugee problem as one of the principal sources of the area's instability.

2. The United States should substantially increase its financial aid to the Arab refugees, either through the United Nations or independently, in an effort to relieve the squalor pending a final settlement. In addition to this, the United States should seriously consider replacing the British subsidy to Jordan, where the majority of refugees live, if Jordan can be persuaded to accept it.

3. The United States should engage its influence to persuade the Government of Israel to take back a large number of the Palestinian refugees, and justly compensate the others.

4. The United States should provide permanent guaranties aimed at preventing either expansion of Israel's borders or an Arab attack on Israel.

5. The United States should pursue a political and economic policy in the Middle East independently of, but not necessarily contrary to, Britain and France.

6. The United States should begin a large-scale economic program to combat other poverty throughout the entire Middle East.

7. It is my conviction that the pursuance of these points would provide some of the best strategy for insulating the Middle East from Communist subversion.

And finally, gentlemen, I would like to remind you that although there are few in this room who would dream of forgetting the Hungarian refugees, I leave you only with the thought to remember the Arab refugees, because they have been suffering in such squalor for 8 years, and no one has been doing anything for them.

Thank you.

Chairman GREEN. Any questions?

Senator HUMPHREY. I would only like to say, Mr. Chairman, that I feel that Mr. Sheehan has given us some points of great importance for our deliberations. I feel that most of them are very valid.

I think your emphasis upon the United States doing all of this unilaterally may be a little bit more than we are either equipped to do or should do, and I think we have to work through some of the international organizations.

ARAB REFUGEES

I would just like to end by saying that some of the very points you have raised here, it has been my privilege to discuss with representatives of Arab countries and of Israel, and I am happy to say that when you discuss these things privately, you find, first, that

both the Arab countries and Israel realize they have obligations about the Arab refugees. There are obligations on both sides here, not on just Israel, because the Arab countries have sometimes used the Arab refugees as a political tool.

There surely is a definite need of mollifying any feeling of Zionist expansion, as the Arabs call it. But by the same token, there is a definite need of preventing any more Arab attacks, because, after all, the Israeli attack in Egypt was not with provocation, and I think this is what you have been trying to emphasize here.

MR. SHEEHAN. Senator, in connection with what you have just said, may I ask you two questions?

Senator HUMPHREY. You can, sir, but let's do it privately.

Chairman GREEN. You have used more than your allotted time, and there are other witnesses waiting to be heard, and we ought to hear them.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Sheehan's emphasis on the Arab refugee problem is a very deserving emphasis.

Chairman GREEN. I agree with you.

OBTAINING SOME COMMITMENTS FROM DISPUTANTS

Senator MORSE. May I say to Mr. Sheehan that what I think we ought to be doing in connection with this doctrine is getting some commitment with the disputants over it as to the procedure for handling it, prior to our adopting it. If we could get some of these acts written into this doctrine, some of us who are otherwise going to oppose the doctrine could go along with it.

But I certainly think the free nations of the world ought to recognize that there can be no peace in the Middle East until the Arab refugee problem is settled, and settled fairly. And I think also all the free nations ought to assume their share of the moral obligation that goes along with it.

I would be very much interested in economic aid that seeks to help settle the Arab refugees on lands of their own, some in Israel and some outside of Israel, and I think that some of our allies ought to share in that economic aid, because there is one of the great potential causes of war. It is going to be a cause of war until justice is done those refugees, and I am glad that Mr. Sheehan emphasized that problem.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Paul D. Thompson, Sr.

This will be the last witness before luncheon.

STATEMENT OF PAUL D. THOMPSON, SR., SEVERN, MD.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, distinguished members of these two great committees; I am Paul D. Thompson, Sr., inventor in human relations, and I am philosopher of the idea of the great council and the great foundation.

It is my business to uphold human dignity in the world of philosophy, to withdraw the support of the people from international stalism, to enlist millions of people around the earth in building a world fit to live in.

Mine is a total war against barbarism in the realm of human relations.

If the little girl who clutched a grenade to her breast and rushed to her death under a Russian tank is a pacifist, then I am a pacifist. I

believe in sacrifice, in courage, in winning this struggle by binding the people of the earth together in a great cause, the right to live in freedom and peace.

I would have the national cultures free.

The telegram extending me the great honor of testifying on Joint Resolution 19 was delivered through the mails. This statement of testimony which you have was written under pressure of time, and handed to the mimeographer without revision. I hope this oral testimony and that statement will be made a part of the record.

I have from time to time written messages to illustrate the work of the great council idea. These include several papers on the Midwest, a Suez Canal plan, and some inspirations which I hope you will include in the record or use in any way you wish.

This oral statement will be brief and will include one point of great importance not stressed in the statement.

Senator Langer included some of my work——

Chairman GREEN. If I may interrupt at that point, I will say your own statement will be made a part of the record, and the others that you submit will be kept in the files.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. Thank you.

Senator Langer included some of my work in the Congressional Record July 27, page 13770. I am deeply gratified and grateful to this distinguished member of your committee.

I have brought also Manifesto in Favor of Life, written by chance on the very day and hour of the invasion of Egypt. Here it seems I caught history on the wing.

GREAT CHANGES IN THE WORLD

I view Joint Resolution 19 in the light of great changes that are going on in the world that mark this year as a culminating point in history, and the birth time of a new order of things on the earth.

A few days ago, I heard Mr. Keyserling testify to the Subcommittee on Disarmament that disarmament effects on our economy need cause no immediate concern because disarmament would proceed slowly.

I disagree. The moment world order starts building, the moment evolution toward freedom in the satellites proceeds, the changes in force by this philosophical revolution in arms and in human relations will literally make Mr. Stassen's and Mr. Wilson's hair curl.

Things are going to move fast in the world. That is the only way they can move.

We are emerging from the period of the great tyrants. Because we had in the world no assembled public philosophy relative to the need of the people to live, the world has been plagued by men of evil genius, little men with little philosophies who used these little philosophies, the new weapons and the obsolete international institution of war, to fool and despoil the people of the earth.

Their gaudy pictures outraged the view; their words besmeared the mind; their bones will find no easy resting place among the peoples on the earth. The wave of terror and deceit recedes as people over all the earth strive to build a world that notes man's right to live and have the passage of their life in peace.

Here and there, as in Hungary, a dying order tries force and terror, but all they find is a widening circle of absolute defeat, so far as the people are concerned.

In the surge of the people to live, these men will join the caravan of the people or the tide will outrun their positions and the people will emerge free.

In the last half century, the work of the people will dominate the scene. Men seek on this earth a home and not a prison, and I see in Russia that there has been another one shot, a casualty in that engagement. There will be more.

NATIONAL CULTURES SEEK NEW FREEDOM AND CHANGE

Without our realization we are at the end of a terrible adventure for the human race, and at the beginning of greatness and the building of public order on the earth. In the Middle East and elsewhere, the national cultures seek new freedom and change. All the people need is great programs and inspiration to help them live, rather than inaction or programs dependent on force and oppression.

I believe the Middle East resolution will help hold the line while we marshal the people of the earth to wage peace and make this earth a place to live, and I might say also that I believe that we have been very delinquent in not going forward rapidly enough. That is why Resolution 19 is needed now.

When the national cultures are all free, when they are all engaged in this common task, we will have historical peace on the earth.

That peace must be built. It can't be anything contrived or brought about by conference.

That time is not too far away if we act. That is the new principle to which all policy must adhere in the Middle East and elsewhere, for this philosophical revolution will dominate the last half of this century and form the fiber of historical achievement.

This is the challenge we are faced with in this century. The third world war then is a war of the people for dignity and life. It will be carried on all over the earth. For this new kind of war, the people need new short-range weapons to disarm the tanks. They will need new inventions in human relations. They will need and can now use the assembled philosophy of men relative to the basic needs of life.

The armies of the national cultures will merge with the people of the national cultures as they did in Hungary. The great weapons that destroy people will vanish from the earth even as they did in Hungary when little girls clutched grenades and hurled themselves under tanks that threatened the people they loved.

People over all this world will work in the institutions of peace that will replace the international institution of war. I believe King Saud and King Hussein will take back to the Middle East some new thoughts on ways in which the people there can engage themselves in a third world war and make that region yield its abundance for the welfare of the human race as it did in ancient times.

I have, it seems, an invention in human relations of a great importance for use in the third world war. I have the primary assembly of that invention ready to run. The people like it, it fits their needs. It will be used by the people of the Middle East, by people around the

earth. It will help us recruit the army we need to assist the people's armies to wage peace like we have formerly waged war.

I have noticed that the instruments needed in the Middle East for the common defense are of the greatest importance to the Defense Department. It seems to me that new inventions in human relations and their use in the Middle East should be the first consideration of our department of peace, not dependence upon contrivance or conference, but an actual army in the field.

Public order will come only with a building of it by waging peace, by the participation of people in the effort. The securing of a participation of the people in the Middle East in this effort is a matter of great importance now, and will enhance the usefulness of Joint Resolution 19.

Peace and armaments reduction must come as a result of growth, growth of an assembled philosophy on the earth. Even the children can have a place in this, a great place.

King Saud's little son has made many friends in America. The children will build their world of the future. As the people's welfare and common work grows, the great weapons will be scrapped and their metals turned to good use.

REASONS FOR FAVORING RESOLUTION

I favor the first part of Joint Resolution 19 for the following reasons:

1. Because of the continued presence in the world of international Stalinism.
2. Because it can be a preliminary step to the neutralization of the area in a general program.
3. Because it is an evolutionary step in the use of the military for keeping public order in a present crisis until the United Nations can fill the breach.
4. Because it crystallizes world thought around our real objectives in the region. These are good, worthwhile objectives, absolutely in harmony with the future of the people in any state in that region.

All that is necessary for the building of public order on the earth is that the needs of the people be put first and the gears meshed in action.

I hope the President will be supported in his request for this power. I hope we can harness the human power we need.

I believe the Congress will wish to see emerge the shape of a larger solution, tied with the progression the people have established toward increasing freedom of the national cultures that is going on over the earth, and a larger purpose for the assembly of the nations.

After this step is taken—

Chairman GREEN. I am sorry, your 10 minutes is up.

Mr. THOMPSON. May I have a half minute? Could I have a half minute, please?

Chairman GREEN. Certainly.

Mr. THOMPSON. After this step is taken, I hope we may advance boldly into this new age with trust in God and faith in the greatness of people who have one common wish, to build a world where little children will be free and safe.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.

(Mr. Thompson's prepared statement is as follows:)

**STATEMENT OF PAUL D. THOMPSON, SR., INVENTOR IN HUMAN RELATIONS,
SEVERN, MD.**

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, distinguished members of these committees, I think it best to limit my exposition of my viewpoint in these matters which so gravely affect our future to testimony in relation to my work as an inventor in human relations and to our own general attempt to secure peace through growth of free national cultures. I consider that the men who conceived our own great Constitution, the United Nations Charter, and such fine enterprises as the Boy Scouts, the service clubs and the 4H Clubs were inventors in human relations. In my task I must look at people everywhere and draw conclusions based on available facts. I shall not make a single recommendation or further a single act or movement contrary to the word and spirit of the Constitution of the United States and that heritage of freedom which our great venture has enhanced in the hearts of men everywhere. The heritage of a people cannot be hid from the people anywhere. As a philosopher I seek no compromise in thought or deed with any enterprise of oppression. As an inventor it is my business to find ways for peoples to make government work, and ways for governments and peoples to work together in respect to those needs for life and happiness which are common to all men, so that public order may be increased, distortions and conspiracies abated, the political health restored and a future of happiness built for our children.

I am very grateful that Senator Langer put some news of this attempt to build the institutions of public order in the Congressional Record, July 27, 1950, page 13770. The first wire to illustrate the work of the great council is there and it concerns the Middle East. I consider it a great honor that I have this chance to appear before this joint meeting of these 2 great committees, to bring a thought or two on our attempt to stabilize affairs so that men can have the opportunity and time to build institutions of public order we need in the world to assure a continued destiny of greatness for our Nation, and a future of happiness for the people of the earth.

PEOPLES OF WORLD DISUNITED

In thinking of our future I believe we should think of the people of the world, not as divided but as disunited. If we can find a way to increase the good enterprises which meet the needs of people we will find the useless enterprises decreasing, and the people united in the good enterprises. It is a tragedy of our history that a line of division became so fixed between the North and South that no way could be found for tolerance to increase in the North and slavery to decrease by orderly processes in the South. All over the earth enterprises are going on. Despite the fact that these enterprises may not all be handled in our manner we can be sure that the people everywhere will have a larger share, with increasing education, in these attempts. I cannot take the time here to discuss the processes by which the participation of the people can be increased, or a just jurisdiction of the people's welfare assured, but this can be done in our lifetime and the people can be united, without war, without revolution (with arms), without diminution of the real strength in the national cultures. Evolution, free evolution of national cultures must become the accepted rule of life in this atomic age. With that evolution we must have increasing freedom in commerce, a free flow of ideas, and great leadership and common work. The job can and must be done.

We may expect that with the growth of participation in government by the people; with the increase of inspiration and common work the representative branches of government will increase in importance over the world and the arbitrary powers of rulers and executives will grow less. You may well question why I favor the request of the President for the grant of this power, and the freedom of expenditures that is also requested, which would seem to be at variance with the Jeffersonian philosophy of government, and the shape of things to come in the world.

REASONS FOR FAVORING RESOLUTION

I favor the first part of this resolution because of four things:

1. Because of the presence of international Stalinism in the world.
2. Because it can be a preliminary step to neutralization of the Arab States in a general program.
3. It is an evolutionary step in the use of the military for keeping public order in a present crisis.

4. Because it crystallizes world thought around our real objectives in the region. These are good worthwhile objectives absolutely in harmony with the future of the people in any state in that region.

INTERNATIONAL STALINISM

There is an intimate relation between events in Hungary and present, past, and future actions of international Stalinism in the Middle East. I predicted those disturbances in the satellites February 22, 1955, when I wrote in the message to Moscow these words, "you will lay the threat of war upon the world to keep the satellites in line." I also predicted that involvement of the people in the destruction that would inevitably follow the introduction of armaments and armaments races in the areas unstabilized or lacking in these side arms of western civilization. I will include these remarks in this statement although I know my time will be insufficient to include them in the oral presentation. I think this has a vital bearing on the Middle East problem.

The international Stalinist is a born conspirator, a seeker of personal power and he invokes the overall conspiracy to extend the national power under the pretense of spreading some philosophical enterprise. He glories in the international institution of war because force is his natural element, and this obsolete institution serves his purposes in spreading fear and oppression. To disguise his aims he seeks to spread a philosophy by force. This is like carrying coals in a bucket of water. The fires of Communist inspiration are dead in Hungary but the bleak, drab structure of naked force remains the true skeleton of the international Stalinist.

The Stalinist always seeks to throw monkey wrenches into the cooperative enterprises of other peoples. Now one of those cooperative enterprises is living, and millions and millions of people in Russia want to live and see their enterprise of life succeed and that includes most of the Communists. The Stalinist can never see his own future involvement in the complication he sets up. He cannot see that an attempt at Suez would utterly disrupt his own backyard and lead to sure defeat for the whole enterprise. The conspirator never contemplates the boomerang effect of his conspiracy. Now I believe there are many millions of people in Russia and the world who know the danger of the Stalinist overreach. The President's wish for peace is known. I think that millions of people in Russia and the Middle East will breathe easier knowing that a definite stand has been taken by the President and the Congress to prevent a conspiratorial act from boobytrapping the earth into a war nobody wants. I wonder how close we were?

I believe there must emerge from this a neutralization of the Arab States bloc at a later date, with enterprises of conservation and commerce proceeding in a cooperative fashion. To this Russia can have no sane objection.

TRENDS IN HUMAN AFFAIRS

The idea of the use of the military in the world for public order is a rapidly growing concept. We must be thinking not only of the conditions as they are but thinking in terms of great trends in human affairs. There is a growing wish for evolutionary change in Russia to give the people more participation in government and more opportunity for expansion of new ideas. This is also a kind of life insurance for the leaders. This is one of those great trends in the affairs of men—as inevitable as growth. Sometime soon the decision will be made to allow such change. That would be a great victory for the sensible people of Russia and a very real victory for the communal enterprise. When that decision is made there will be no real bar to use of the military in keeping order on the earth; no real bar to Russian and American cooperation. I believe that the President's request is a first step, an evolutionary step toward the conversion of the military to keeping order. I believe it will be so regarded in Russia. I believe that many in Russia will consider it a step toward the use of the military to stabilize situations until further steps can be taken to remove boobytraps left by Stalin on the world scene.

SATELLITE SITUATION

There is, I am certain, a wide variety of opinion in the Soviet Union even in the Communist Party itself. It is entirely possible that the Politburo has alternative sets of plans to be invoked in certain areas, some allowing for evolution, some geared to the needs of international Stalinism in a martial situation.

There is no doubt in my mind that the international Stalinists were contriving something in the Middle East. There is likewise no doubt in my mind that more liberal elements in Russia were ready to permit reasonable evolution in the satellites. Now in Hungary there was a true peoples' revolution. They were thoroughly tired of Stalinism. In a few days a few thousand young people, workers and soldiers, utterly defeated the forces of international Stalinism and stood free. It was one of history's most decisive battles. At this moment the Marxian enterprise had its greatest opportunity. The workers in the councils vowed to work as they had never worked before to make a success of the communal enterprise of the people of Hungary. Here Marx's dream was realized. The communist enterprise was vested solidly in the people and government had "withered" away to a remarkable degree.

Before this was completed the Stalinist time bomb had exploded prematurely in Egypt. The plan of International Stalinism was invoked in a martial situation. The peoples' revolution—the communal enterprise of a great people—was utterly suppressed by the reactionary ruthless forces of International Stalinism. The continuance of that policy of ruthless suppression will involve the whole Communist enterprise in revolution and defeat. There are forces stirring over all this earth that will not be denied. When people have the tools of learning they like to use them. Any society that tries to suppress this expression will create their own roadblock situations that will bring internal disorder and ruin. The satellite situation is a very real time bomb left by Stalin, and the people of Russia know it.

MIDDLE EAST DANGER DEPENDENT ON EVOLUTIONARY PROGRESS IN RUSSIA

Thus we can consider that the danger will not be over in the Middle East until evolutionary progress is allowed in Russia, in China, and in the satellites. When that evolutionary progress is allowed we may within a short time find the means of replacing the institution of war with the use of the military for public order, with weapons to suit their reasonable mission. In the meantime any enterprise to control arms shipments or use an international police force is a step in the right direction that builds a philosophy of order relative to the deepest needs of the people.

EXPLOITATION OF INSPIRATION

I wish to state that the exploitation of inspiration—the acceleration of the free flow of ideas is just as important in our society as it is in Russia. We have not advanced boldly enough in the programs that relate directly to the hopes and aspirations of people for their future. In the Middle East we find an unparalleled opportunity for the exploitation of inspiration. We have not there approached the genius of ancient times. Once industrial enterprise is linked with conservation, free commerce, and free national cultures the people will reject any situation that will lead to the undoing of their national enterprise. Charity and vision can do much to remove suspicions that have been held over from former unsatisfactory arrangements of government. Orderly change will take place.

I will continue to describe these movements in human affairs in terms that fit them, and I will not confuse issues by the use of vague indefinite terms that meet the needs of conspirators for the deception and confusion of the people. I consider the methods of the great tyrants whose reign on earth we are passing out of, are comprehended by the words "international Stalinism." I believe in pin-pointing my philosophical targets in this great encounter. I do not use a scatter gun. I deal with people in a world—one world. There may be knots, and distortions, and even rotten spots on an apple but it is still one apple—the stuff apple sauce is made of. People are of one general constitution on the earth—carrying in their hearts and minds the elements of freedom and growth—the aspirations with which a world society is built. Love of country is a natural and salutary aspiration, not inconsistent with a world where the people's needs must establish the shape of public order on the earth. Freedom in the heart and mind has been established in Hungary. A humane world must establish the outward visible symbols of a great people's victory. That will be the immediate task of the people of the earth.

DEVELOPING COMMON ENTERPRISES

A year or two ago I wrote to Mr. Symington and others in favor of a fleet of great airships to serve in keeping order on the earth while we were building the institutions of public order. These could also be useful for humanitarian

enterprises in case of great emergency. The situations in Hungary and the Middle East have strengthened my arguments. I believe also that tanker construction should proceed with more speed. Above all, however, some common enterprise of conservation should be started in the whole area of the Middle East. For this reason I favor the power of Presidential discretion in the use of the funds. If we can get people started on enterprises which meet the needs of the people the political matters will more surely be settled. Every possible enterprise that is constructive should be programmed for future use. I remember I wrote to President Nasser a few weeks before the Suez closure and asked him to help me start an enterprise to build public order in the world. I told him I feared greatly the complications of power and politics that might well fill the water courses with debris. Sure enough, in a few days the canal was full of debris. I fear we are not moving rapidly enough to develop common enterprises. I feel that there is a quiet, invisible revolution going on in the world, that the institution of war is dead in the hearts of the people, that instrumentalities of force and oppression are dead, that the people are waiting for their leaders to go straight ahead with great enterprises of living, in which they can have a part. I think we should uncover more talent, more inspiration. Perhaps some schoolteacher in the Arab States is thinking now of some great plan that will make that region great again with the earth returning its abundance to men who think it is greater to see a valley bloom with life than it is to see the human spirit crushed in some enterprise of conquest or factional strife.

In the summer I conveyed a message to the Arab states to illustrate the work of the great council I hoped would someday be built. That contained a Suez plan which is still appropriate to the peoples' needs. I am including this and any other papers that you may wish to have. I wish to thank you for this, the most wonderful opportunity of my life, for the measures by which we can meet the challenge of this century are the true provender of the statesman. In these historic buildings I have been treated with courtesy and respect because I worked at a task all of you are working at, the welfare of our Nation and our world.

(The following quotation from an article by Mr. Thompson was also submitted for the record :)

We must truly wage peace and enlist the world's youth in the effort. That is the army we need to build the institution of public order. God must approve our efforts and history will record our success.

I do not intend that the assembled philosophy will reach to heaven. That is the realm of the religious leaders. The common people are close to heaven. Mohammed expressed it this way "Heaven is at the feet of a mother." Christ expressed it in another way "Suffer little children to come unto me * * *." I did not intend to fulfill Bible prophecy. I only know a little boy and the children led me to think of a way to build the institutions of peace on the earth and a way to get rid of the institution of war, and convert the tools of war to peaceful uses. It happened that way. Because it happened that way untold millions of people will have a way to act to build peace on the earth.

Chairman GREEN. This hearing stands adjourned until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Green (presiding), Fulbright, Sparkman, Humphrey, Smith (New Jersey), and Aiken, of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senators Saltonstall and Flanders, of the Committee on Armed Services.

Chairman GREEN. The meeting will please come to order.

The next witness on the list is Mr. Clark Eichelberger of the American Association for the United Nations. I am told that he is not here now. We will call him later, if he comes in.

The next witness is Mr. Oskar J. W. Hansen of Charlottesville, Va. Mr. Hansen, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF OSKAR J. W. HANSEN, CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, my qualifications and views regarding conditions—

Chairman GREEN. Excuse me for interrupting but is this your statement?

Mr. HANSEN. Yes. There are two of them. One covers the testimony already given in the House of Representatives before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and a brief of the testimony I would give here at this time.

However, since it is fully covered in the printed matter, I do not see any necessity for taking your time to read this testimony necessarily.

There is a matter, however, in amendment of my testimony which I wish to read.

Chairman GREEN. I do not understand why you have to put before our committee a statement which you made before the House committee.

Isn't it in their record?

Mr. HANSEN. I am not making the same statement before your committee. I am making an extension of that statement, sir, a followup testimony, so to speak.

Chairman GREEN. Then we can keep for our record this statement you made before the House committee?

Mr. HANSEN. The testimony made before the House committee is already in print, sir.

Chairman GREEN. Is the statement you are going to make here today the same printed statement?

Mr. HANSEN. No, it is on an entirely new matter, the matter on whether the Congress of the United States may properly divide its powers by extending warmaking powers to the President when they rightfully belong to the Congress and to the Congress only, sir.

Chairman GREEN. You may proceed.

Mr. HANSEN. Shall I read the brief, Senator? It covers that matter. I will read it if you wish or I may ask you to print it in the record.

Chairman GREEN. Proceed.

Mr. HANSEN. I wish to make some remarks in amendment of my statement, which is really the crux of this testimony. The President of the United States came before the Congress with an unusual request for using the armed services in the Mid-East, in effect warmaking powers. He very poorly defined against whom and in what cause he should use the Armed Forces of the United States. He said he would devote the next 4 years of his administration to make war on international communism.

DEFINITION OF "COMMUNISM"

Now this is a question of words and the meaning of words. What does he mean by communism and what does he mean by international communism?

A word is a very important matter. When it is spoken, it is an extension of thought. If a person speaks in the Senate of the United States, it is very important.

If he speaks with the mouth of the President of the United States for all the world to hear, he should be very certain that what he has to say is exactly correct, and that he has looked in the dictionary.

Inasmuch as his request is to be translated into law, it would be well to take up the root of the word "communism." It comes from the Latin "communitatum."

From that word we get all the words pertaining to communality and community.

It is a word of long usage which has become properly identified in the minds of people for over 2,000 years. It denotes the smallest self-governing division of the Roman Empire in France, and is used there today in the word "commune."

It is used in many ways in our daily lives. It signifies the communality, the municipal corporation, a community, since 1792 a small territorial division in France governed by a mayor and municipal council, any similar division elsewhere in the world since 1832.

I am quoting from the Oxford Dictionary of Definitions.

It is a word in opposition to a centralized state. It comes from the Latin "communae." It is a theory of government which advocates the widest extension of local autonomy for each locally definable community.

The act of communing is to talk together, to converse, to hold intimate mental or spiritual intercourse with, to receive the holy communion, to communicate.

Thus communism is a theory of society according to which all property should be vested in the community and labor organized for the common benefit.

When we tax a corporation 51 percent, we are practicing communism plus. A Communist since 1841 has been defined as an adherent to the theory of communism or sharing things in common.

Since 1652 and since 1646 the meaning that men have a certain communion with God in this world has been held in common belief.

In 1570 in-law marriage was defined as the foundation of the community and the state. And finally it means the people of a country or a district or the public and all these institutions of mankind.

All these words are translated into a commonly used word "community."

Now in St. Matthew the Lord warned us to have care against false prophets who come to us with planned words in sheep's clothing but are in reality ravening wolves within. So the people whom you and I mean when we come near this word "Communist" today are the folks who were subversives and through the use of a very lovely and inclusive word have propagated upon the word a grandiose deception saying they are the sheep when in fact they are the wolves.

It seems to me that the President of the United States, whom the people say employed 100 ghostwriters to write that speech he delivered here to Congress, might well require some of them to look in the dictionary a little oftener.

We know what he means, we think we do, but we do not know really, because that speech was very ill-defined, and if now such a thing finds its way into a joint resolution of Congress with the effect of law, then we will be in a very bad way.

We will have done exactly what the so-called Communists expected us to do. We will have abdicated a total belief that we have held for 2,000 years in Christianity, in cooperation, in all the communal activities of mankind, in their ideology and I thought it was worthwhile for me and for you, since I have created for you the image and figure of liberty for America's No. 1 battlefield at Yorktown, that we might define for ourselves together the use and misuse of this word "Communist" so that whatever legislation issues from the Congress in respect to the Near Eastern situation, the objectives will be more closely defined in order that we may not in actuality go to war with our own ideals.

Now will you kindly, Mr. Chairman, print into the record what I had prepared as testimony here before the Senate plus what I have now given, and I will now answer any questions you may wish to direct my way.

Chairman GREEN. Any questions?

Very well, thank you very much.

Mr. HANSEN. I simply included the printed matter given in the House because I had referred to it in the brief prepared for the Senate, and I thought the Senators might wish to read both.

Chairman GREEN. I think since this is your statement today we will incorporate it.

The other one will appear in the record of the House.

Mr. HANSEN. That is right.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Hansen is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF OSKAR J. W. HANSEN

Mr. Chairman, Senators of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, I am appearing before your committees in the capacity of my office as an American citizen. For close to a half a century, I have discharged this office with moderate distinction in both peace and war for myself, mine, and my country. White sails still covered the trade lanes on the Seven Seas, when I disembarked unceremoniously into the Atlantic Gulf Stream and swam ashore to make my bid for American citizenship and the protection of the Constitution of the United States.

I was asked by a reporter, just the other day, "Why are you testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs? Are you a Constitutional authority?"

Without hesitation, I could answer, "Yes."

It is only thus I could carry proudly for nearly 50 years the consummate dignity of an American and to have that knowledge materialize into the clean-cut, sculptured image of "Liberty" which is at Yorktown.

The Declaration of Independence of the United States, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights issuing in consequence thereof are simple documents. They were written by ordinary folks with extraordinary dedication. If I may borrow Biblical language, so appropriate even on the throughways today, the meaning of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights is so clean and simple, "that those who run may read."

WARMAKING POWERS

Therefore, " * * * those who run may read" that the issues of life and death involved in a declaration of war may only be resolved by the Congress. The Constitution wisely provides this procedure in order to temper with wisdom the nature of a request by the Commander in Chief, the President. The fact that untimely precedents have infringed upon our rights under the Constitution, by reason of the Korean and Formosan decisions which, in reality, carried over from a period when our country was actually at war, does not in effect enable either the President, or this Congress, to redistribute the powers for making war while the nation is at peace. The power to distribute responsibility away from the legislative to the executive by joint resolution is not a constitutional

process; to become a constitutional process and to be defined by such a name in our code of national conduct, it would have to receive the sanction of the people of the United States, through a duly and completely qualified constitutional amendment. For all the practical purposes of serving deterrent notice upon the Russian autocrats, a concurrent resolution, which does not have the compelling force of law, would be amply understood by the whole world and without setting a precedent for destroying the constitutional rights of the American people.

The President of the United States has a constitutional duty to inform the Congress so as to invoke this sanction of a declaration of war. Under our Constitution, the Congress may not accept for such a declaration the merely fancied unreality based upon the probable results of an ill-defined ideology alien to our mode of thought. The President of the United States should seriously bear in mind that the Constitution extends to the whole life of this Nation and is not subject to casual abridgment through legislative and Executive action within their terms of office. The United States has, through repeated solemn declarations, stated that we eschew war as an instrument of national policy. If the President now desires the powers for which he asks a joint resolution, he should be dutybound to vindicate his oath of office by initiating a referendum through a constitutional amendment seeking the consent of the American people to wage preventive war and so exactly reverse our present national policy. The joint resolution which he seeks could not possibly obtain any tangible benefits, except through the waging of preventive war within a theater of operations remote from the territories of the United States. The desire to wage war in the other fellow's front yard may hardly gain for us the admiration of the world, no matter what money we attach to the bargain.

LAW

In my testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House, I touched upon the nature and origin of the law. It is clear that since the law is the gift of Divine Providence, human beings may not, in their own right, make, or amend laws; the law is. It was in the beginning. This is the basis for the inalienable human rights so well understood and humbly accepted by the signers of the Declaration of Independence.

In the acceptance of the provisions of Divine Providence, they framed the Constitution and Bill of Rights to be, unless properly and lawfully amended, the un-failing guide for our national code of conduct. The formulation and legislation of these codes in consequence of the Constitution are the duties of the Congress and the President. A code may not supersede either the Constitution or the law of the Supreme Providence which gives it both sanction and authority.

RESOLUTION ALIENATES FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS

I believe the proposed joint resolution to alienate the fundamental human rights guaranteed to an American citizen under the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and for the following reasons: Under the proposed resolution a citizen may be drafted and compelled to serve on foreign soil for the preservation of the independence of peoples and institutions which are in nature diametrically opposite to the ideals and purposes guaranteed us by our Constitution.

Should he be asked to defend Saudi Arabia, for instance, he would give his blood in defense of an absolute monarchy, ancient in its prejudices, ignorant in the common decencies, deeply stained with the order of slavery. The President of the United States within these walls of Congress enumerated Mecca as the No. 1 holy place to be defended against communism. This cruel monarchy exhibits a remarkable absence of most all the noble ideals envisaged by our fathers.

LAXITY IN PROTECTING AMERICANS ABROAD

Indeed our Government has of late shown a remarkable laxity in the protection of American nationals and soldiers abroad by permitting our citizens wearing the uniform to be tried by the civil courts wherever they happen to be. Sentences of penal servitude for a great number of years are meted out for civil misdemeanors. In Saudi Arabia, our nationals could, for some trifling pilfering, have their right arm legally amputated. It is this extraterritorial legal gimmick, so blithely consented to by our Government in any number of instances all over the world, which the Communist Chinese Government has used with such inhuman and cruel effect against hundreds of our Armed Forces who are left to rot in oriental prisons, quite beyond the reach and protection of the Stars and Stripes.

Is it now, gentlemen, the intention of this Congress to legalize through a joint resolution such present and future disabilities and abuses, including the torture and taking of life itself, of American citizens and servicemen in distant foreign lands?

Will there be no end to the alienation of our inalienable rights? Since our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution and Bill of Rights were inspired and given sanction by the Divine Law that is and has been since the beginning, our inalienable rights may not be abrogated either by justices clothed in black robes, or clothed in colored robes of black injustices, nor by action of this Congress except through constitutional amendments.

ADMINISTRATION'S ARGUMENTS FOR RESOLUTION

The messages by the President of the United States, the testimony of the Honorable Secretary of State within the confines of these hearings, clearly define the fact that overt aggression, as such, has not been committed by the Russian autocrats in the Near East. The Executive, apparently, wishes to promote in us a state of panicky fear for the safety of this Republic by stating that covert aggression is taking place and that this infiltration may erupt into overt aggression at any moment and, therefore, may at some future time effect the security of the United States. The argument is, that in order to meet this uncertain and unpredictable variety of danger, we should forthwith inflict violence upon our own constitutional code of conduct.

The above is not a new historic argument. It is an evil counsel which has often adversely effected the physical and spiritual progress of mankind.

In my statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and in order to spotlight the spiritual stamina of the protagonists now resolving their conflicts in the Near East, I quoted history concerning the siege and destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A. D. What has the siege of Jerusalem in 70 A. D. to do with the presently proposed joint resolution of Congress? Simply this: The autocrats of the Roman Imperium were the aggressors against the Holy City of Jerusalem in that day. Because the Jews resisted with a tenacity beyond the understanding of a Roman legionnaire, the Roman hurled against them the unspeakable epithet of "folly." They called them "zealots." Today, the unspeakable epithet of "folly" has become the highest distinction conferred by this Congress upon a soldier who persists in his devotion beyond the call of duty. To these, our zealots, you give the Congressional Medal of Honor. Theirs is conduct within the finest concept of living and dying under the inalienable rights of our Constitution. For the defense of such ideals, we may properly seek to extend the strong arm of the sanction of our code of conduct against any aggressor, whomsoever.

Our determination to so act in defense of our ideals does not need to be propelled by fear, nor prodded into existence by joint resolutions. The arguments used by the President have been heard before. When the Sanhedrin plotted the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, He was considered to be a supreme danger to the state. Were He not put out of the way, so the high priest said, the Romans would come and destroy the hierarchy. "It was better," said the high priest, "that one should die for the people." Now the President of the United States says the Russians are coming.

It was not certain in that day that Rome would have attached such importance to the man, Jesus. The record of His trial would indicate otherwise. It is not certain that the Russian autocrats will risk a general war for the Near East, unless we pose the provocation to bring it about by magnifying an unreal fear of the Russian bully. So, gentlemen, let us not display this fear to the world by crucifying the spiritual structure of the Constitution of the United States. Let us turn instead to every legitimate extension of help for a better way of life within our powers to extend to all the peoples in the Near East. Each, within the framework of their own nationality, the Jews, the Egyptians and by no means, omitting the Arabs, has long and noble traditions that in the sight of God, bear the seeds of a better future.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION RECOMMENDED

My statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House carries the framework of a suggested program which would make plain to the world whatever concern we may express in a concurrent resolution. I should wish to add one more suggestion. Since in the crowded world of tomorrow boundaries will have, at best, only administrative significance such as exists between the States

within our Nation, a crying need of the Near East is for throughways; throughways, without custom barriers, but with copious signs of "Welcome." Let such connect Egypt and Israel and let it go as rapidly as possible to Damascus, from thero branch to both the north and east with an eventual terminus in the other direction, at Capetown. So it could be that all those men of good will in the East who consider themselves to be wise, would again follow the star of their destiny to a little village called Nazareth and in so doing, would again draw from the mentally able and physically progressive Jewish nation the inspiration which has set it apart for good since ancient days.

As for what may be the future course of communism in the world, a word of wisdom was spoken by one man at the Sanhedrin trial of Jesus Christ. I could paraphrase, in light of our present condition, that if communism is evil, and I believe it to be, it will defeat itself and reap the deserved condemnation of mankind; should it, on the other hand, be accepted as good, neither heaven, nor hell, nor a joint resolution by this Congress, may prevail against it. In the light of recent events in Hungary, could you possibly, gentlemen, doubt the future atrophy and extinction of communism in the face of our determination to preserve the law, so that His will may be done on earth as it is in heaven?

Chairman GREEN. Mr. Benjamin H. Freedman, of New York City.
Mr. Freedman, glad to see you.

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN H. FREEDMAN, NEW YORK CITY

Mr. FREEDMAN. My name is Benjamin H. Freedman and I reside in New York City. I appear here representing myself.

I have a statement that I submitted which I would like to read if I can in 10 minutes or go as far as I can.

Chairman GREEN. You won't be able to read these 12 pages in 10 minutes.

Mr. FREEDMAN. I will go as far as I can and then I would like the whole statement submitted as my testimony, if that is agreeable, with a little addendum that I will mention to you when I am through.

Chairman GREEN. Very well, proceed, please.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN "REFUGEES" AND "EXPELLEES"

Mr. FREEDMAN. Before I proceed with the statement I would like to say that there is great confusion from the President down to the lowest person in the United States on the use of the word "refugee."

The reference to the Arabs who were Palestinians until they were driven out by the Zionists—they are now expelled from their ancient homeland. They are not the refugees, they are expellees. They were expelled.

The refugees are the Zionists who were transplanted into Palestine. They are the ones who should be considered as the refugees. The Palestinians who were expelled by force and violence from their country to save their lives, they are expellees. They are not refugees. They did not seek to go anywhere. They were driven out of their country.

The real refugees are the Zionists who were transplanted with the help of the United States, the help of international Zionist conspiracy, transplanted into Palestine. They are the refugees who sought refuge from lands in Europe where they thought they were unwelcome or unsafe. That is one remark.

LOOSE USAGE OF "COMMUNISM"

The next is that communism is used very loosely here. The term "communism" is generally accepted as the political word to apply to the theories of Karl Marx, and where the theories of Karl Marx are adopted by a country, as a rule they are adopted without overt armed aggression—so that where international communism, in the sense that it is the adoption of Marxist ideas, is the subject matter, it is difficult to say that Marxism or communism, as it is better known, was the result of overt armed aggression, so that the Middle East is not subject to overt armed aggression as the instrument by which Marxism will be introduced into those countries. But there are other means, the means by which almost 50 percent of the total world population and almost 50 percent of the total land area of the world has come under Marxist domination without 1 man crossing a border line or firing 1 shot.

Now I would like to go along and read a little of this statement if I may, Senator.

Chairman GREEN. Yes, will you proceed?

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 19 IS ACTUALLY MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY

Mr. FREEDMAN. In fact and in effect, Senate Joint Resolution 19 is actually a mutual defense treaty between the United States of America and the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine.

Knowingly or unknowingly, intentionally or unintentionally, and by whatever other name it may be called, for an ulterior motive, it is essentially and primarily a mutual defense treaty between the United States of America and the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine.

Senate Joint Resolution 19 is a mutual defense treaty between the greatest republic in the recorded history of mankind and the stabilized offspring of the 1948 armed insurrection in Palestine by 600,000 transplanted alien Zionists, revolutionists transplanted into Palestine from Eastern European areas between the years 1921 and 1948 by the international Zionist leadership for that purpose.

RESOLUTION WILL INVOLVE UNITED STATES IN WAR

An intelligent and honest examination and analysis of the intent of Senate Joint Resolution 19 will soon convince persons competent to judge and correctly evaluate the factors involved, that in its present form this resolution, if enacted into law, will soon involve the United States in a war with the Arab Middle East countries, followed by a more extensive war with the other Asian and African countries, and finally in a full-scale and all-out East-West world war.

The words and phrases which have been used in drafting Senate Joint Resolution 19 contain inferences, innuendos, and implications which are frightening in view of the crisis which now threatens world peace. These inferences, innuendos, and implications cannot be ignored or disregarded in the context of recent history in Palestine and the Middle East area, and in the content of the aims and intentions of the international Zionist leadership so openly and so frequently expressed by them concerning Palestine and the Middle East area.

DANGERS IN PHRASEOLOGY "AS HE DEEMS NECESSARY"

The words and phrases which now appear in Senate Joint Resolution 19 have many meanings to many persons. Therein lies their danger. These words and phrases demand careful scrutiny and consideration before they are permitted to become the law of this land. After the approval by both Houses of the Congress, one of which they already obtained on Wednesday, January 30, 1957, and the signature of President Eisenhower, these words and phrases will become the law in this land.

When the United States Senate votes on Joint Resolution 19, the Senate cannot afford to miscalculate upon the dangers which are inherent and latent in the term "as he deems necessary," which appears in Joint Resolution 19 now on page 2, in line 12. Those four words make the President of the United States a dictator at will. The founders of this country feared that possibility and did everything in their power to prevent such an occurrence, when they drew up the Constitution of this country.

Those four words delegate to the President the power of Congress to declare war. That can create grave dangers. It indicates a dereliction of duty by the Congress to abdicate its constitutional responsibility in this manner. The Constitution vests in the Congress the sole right to declare war. Senate Joint Resolution 19 vests too much authority in any one man under our form of government. It is unthinkable that any one man possesses the authority to send the entire United States Armed Forces into a war halfway around the world without obtaining the consent of the Congress in advance.

It is unthinkable that the United States Senate will enact legislation which will place in any one man, even the President of the United States himself, the power to employ, "as he deems necessary," the entire Armed Forces of the United States. Who will say that the United States will not be intentionally provoked into a small local war in the Middle East as part of a conspiracy by our enemies to thus involve the United States in a full-scale and all-out East-West world war? The United States will thus appear as the aggressor in the eyes of the world.

President Eisenhower may easily be provoked into a small war in the Middle East which he may sincerely believe can be localized and easily won, under the provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 19 as it now reads.

A small police action in Korea in 1950 developed into a full-scale war with disastrous results. The Korean war did not then develop into a full-scale and all-out East-West world war only because our real enemies in that contest were not at that time prepared to fight a full-scale and all-out East-West world war. Today they possess the military might to fight a full-scale and all-out East-West world war, with the probability and the possibility that they will be victorious in that struggle.

President Eisenhower may not take the wrong step intentionally or knowingly. But, he can miscalculate if he is incorrectly informed, or maybe intentionally misinformed, to be more correct.

If President Eisenhower is the most sincere person on the face of this earth, he is exposed to that danger. So-called or self-styled "advisers" to the Presidents of the United States are undoubtedly

responsible for the fact that we were advised into World War I and World War II.

If President Eisenhower relies upon "advice" from the same "advisers" to Presidents of the United States the impending full-scale and all-out East-West world war may be just around the corner.

The competence and integrity of President Eisenhower may be above all question. But, what about those who may succeed him in office? Senate Joint Resolution 19 in its present form will put upon our books today as a law of the land the words and phrases in the resolution as it now appears.

But the same terms and phrases will remain on our books as the law of this land when President Eisenhower leaves office. That must be taken into consideration.

What about the integrity or incompetence of his successors?

Another Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, or Harry S. Truman may be installed in the White House for the purpose of dragging the United States into another war by reason of Senate Joint Resolution 19. It happened before and it can happen again.

The phrase "as he deems necessary" should come out of the resolution. It actually amends the Constitution by legislation. It makes the Congress the rubber stamp for a dictator, now or at some future time.

Chairman GREEN. I am sorry to say that your time has expired.

Mr. FREEDMAN. May I read the last page?

Chairman GREEN. How much time will it take?

Mr. FREEDMAN. I will do it in 1 or 2 minutes.

Chairman GREEN. Yes, you may proceed to do that.

RESSETLEMENT OF PALESTINIAN ARABS REQUIRED

Mr. FREEDMAN. There is only one solution which will bring "peace with justice" and, at the same time permanent peace to Palestine and the Middle East area. That solution requires resettlement immediately of the 1,350,000 expelled Palestinian Arabs back in their homes in their ancient homeland, and the return to them of all their other worldly possessions.

President Eisenhower speaks again, and again, and again, that any solution in Palestine must be based upon "peace with justice." If he is sincere, he knows that this is the only solution of the situation in Palestine, besides the dangers inherent in the situation. It will cost the taxpayers of the United States nothing to resettle the Palestinian Arabs in their homes in their ancient homeland, and resettle the Zionists now in Palestine in their former homelands, or in countries where they will be safe and welcome.

The international Zionist leadership is now providing the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine with approximately \$1 billion each year in United States dollars. This money will eventually prove a total waste. The United States provides in its military budget several billion dollars to cover the cost of strategic military provisions in the Middle East area. This large amount can be considerably reduced in the event that the United States takes an active part in the resettlement of the Palestinian Arabs in their homes in their ancient homeland. These two items will provide for the resettlement of the Zionists now in Palestine in their former homelands or other countries of the world, where they will be safe and welcome.

It is the duty of the United States to evacuate the Zionist population now in Palestine and to resettle them in their former homelands or in countries where they will be safe and welcome. Unless the United States embarks upon that program, war in the Middle East is inevitable. War in the Middle East will precipitate the impending full-scale and all-out East-West world war. The United States cannot be the victor in that war against the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union receives the support of the Asian and African 80 percent of the world's total population.

Failure of the United States to resettle the 1,350,000 Palestinian Arabs in their homes in their ancient homeland and to resettle the 1,850,000 transplanted Zionists elsewhere than Palestine, will precipitate the impending full-scale and all-out East-West world war.

The tremendous manpower, the enormous natural resources, and the strategic areas of the world inhabited by the Asian and African almost 80 percent of the world's total population, will prove the determining factor in deciding the victor in an all-out and full-scale East-West world war.

The manpower, the natural resources and the strategic areas of Asia and Africa, inhabited by the Arab Middle East countries, will play a very important part in providing this Nation with security, and ultimate victory. The United States only produces 11 of the 77 raw materials required in its defense program.

(The remainder of Mr. Freedman's prepared statement is as follows:)

DANGERS IN PHRASEOLOGY "AS HE DEEMS NECESSARY"

On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower said to the Nation over radio and on television, "If, contrary to my hope and expectation, a situation arose which called for the military application of the policy which I ask the Congress to join me in proclaiming, I would, of course, maintain hour-by-hour contact with the Congress if it were in session. And if the Congress were not in session, and if the situation had grave implications, I would at once call the Congress into special session."

That is altogether different than asking the Congress for unqualified and unconditional authority to employ the entire United States Armed Forces in the Middle East "as he deems necessary." If President Eisenhower feels that a "grave implication" exists, he assured the Nation that he would consult with the Congress before any "military application of the policy which I ask the Congress to join me in proclaiming" was invoked. Senate Joint Resolution 19 invests President Eisenhower with authority to employ United States Armed Forces without limitation "as he deems necessary" without seeking the consent of the Congress.

IMPLICATIONS OF PHRASE "FROM ANY NATION"

Senate Joint Resolution 19, on page 2, line 15, states "from any nation", as will be observed. This phrase has very sinister implications. The phrase "from any nation" instead of "by any nation" was written into the resolution for a very specific purpose. The purpose of the phrase "from any nation" requires United States Armed Forces to fight in Palestine against the expelled Palestinian Arabs in the event they seek to recover their homes in their homeland, from the Zionists who stole it from them, by the same methods employed by the Zionists.

The expelled Palestinian Arabs are now existing in camps in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Some day, they will seek to recover their ancient homeland, and the homes from which they were driven, and all their other worldly possessions, from those who robbed them. If the expelled Palestinian Arabs enter the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine, they must enter "from any nation." They cannot drop out of the clouds. Judging from the manner they now employ to express their sentiments in this respect, they will never cease planning to return to their ancient homeland, and to repossess it from those who stole it from them.

If the intention of Senate Joint Resolution 19 is that it shall apply to the official acts of sovereign Arab Middle East countries, the phrase "by any nation" must be used in place of the phrase "from any nation." The term "from any nation" will give the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine the right to request and receive United States Armed Forces to fight against any attempt of the expelled Palestinian Arabs, seeking to return to their ancient homeland and their homes, where they enjoyed peace and prosperity until the Zionists covet Palestine.

"By any nation" describes the official acts of Arab Middle East sovereign countries. If the expelled Palestinian Arabs now resident in exile in Arab Middle East countries seek to return to their homeland, it will not be an official act of the Arab Middle East country where they were resident. "From any nation" makes it possible to apply Senate Joint Resolution 19 against an Arab Middle East sovereign country with the effect of an official act by that country. This will lead to the "grave implication" to which President Eisenhower made reference.

The use in Senate Joint Resolution 19 of the phrase "from any nation" will require United States Armed Forces to fight in Palestine, and the Middle East area, to protect for the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine, the loot and booty acquired by the Zionist aggressors in Palestine since the 1948 armed insurrection by the 600,000 transplanted Zionist revolutionists.

There can be no question but that President Eisenhower had in mind, when he addressed with the "voice" of Jacob, reference to overt armed aggression "by any nation." It seems obvious that it was the "hand" of Esau which drafted Senate Joint Resolution 19, submitted to the Congress by President Eisenhower. Presidents of the United States do not draft their own resolutions, even if they are lawyers, which President Eisenhower is not. Even a President who is a lawyer is not capable of drafting legislation. Drafting legislation is performed by specialists to whom this responsibility is delegated by the President. There is a possibility that Zionist leadership in the United States played a role in the choice of words and phrases used in drafting Senate Joint Resolution 19. One thing is certain, President Eisenhower did not draft Senate Joint Resolution 19.

BALFOUR DECLARATION

The words and phrases used in Senate Joint Resolution 19 were purposely selected to create confusion when implementation was found necessary. The same Zionist masterminds evidently selected the words and phrases who selected the words and phrases incorporated in the infamous "Balfour Declaration." Senate Joint Resolution 19 will create as much trouble for the United States as the Balfour Declaration created for Great Britain.

The Balfour Declaration was drafted in Washington by Justice Brandeis and Justice Frankfurter. The Zionist leadership in the United States prepared the draft of the letter which President Woodrow Wilson was compelled to initial, indicating his approval. The draft was forwarded to the Zionist leadership in London, who compelled Lord Balfour to mail a copy on the stationery of the British Government to Lord Rothschild. Undoubtedly, Senate Joint Resolution 19 was given the same "treatment."

"OVERT ARMED AGGRESSION"

President Eisenhower referred in his address to the joint session of the Congress on January 5, 1957, to "overt armed aggression." President Eisenhower explicitly and implicitly was referring to "overt armed aggression" by countries with Communist governments, under the direct control of the Soviet Union, and including the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower also explicitly and implicitly was referring to "overt armed aggression" by countries which did not have Communist governments but were also under the direct control of the Soviet Union.

"CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM"

The Arab Middle East countries are not under the "control of international communism." If "international communism" means being under the direct control of the Soviet Union, no Arab Middle East country can be so characterized. If under the "control of international communism" refers to the adoption of Marxist ideologies in the political, economic, or social field, then every country in the world today falls into that category, to a greater or lesser extent. In order to avert the introduction of communism in many countries, many countries adopted Marxist ideologies in the political, economic, and social field.

The Arab Middle East countries had very little to do with the Soviet Union until recently, outside of the normal diplomatic amenities. Recently, Arab Middle East countries began purchasing military materiel from the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. They did so only after the United States, Great Britain, and France refused to sell them military materiel under pressure from international Zionist leadership in these countries. But, that should not put the Arab Middle East countries under control of International communism. The Arab Middle East countries were exercising their rights under International law. There was nothing irregular or illegal in purchasing military materiel in the ordinary course of business, even if it had political connotations which the United States, Great Britain, and France did not relish.

The monopolistic control by Zionist leadership in the United States of all media of mass communications for shaping public opinion makes it possible for them to easily brainwash the public. Zionist leadership in the United States is now feverishly working to make the public in the United States believe that Arab Middle East countries are "controlled by International communism." Zionist leadership in the United States is employing all media of mass communications, newspapers and magazines, radio and television networks, motion pictures and entertainment fields, the political platforms and the pulpits, to convince the public in the United States that Arab Middle East countries are already satellites of the Soviet Union, to a greater or lesser extent, and well on their way to becoming Communist countries.

The purpose is simple. If the public in the United States is made to believe that Arab Middle East countries are in fact and in effect controlled by International communism, and therefore Communist countries, the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine can request and receive United States Armed Forces to repel any attempt by the expelled Palestinian Arabs when they seek to again enter their homeland and homes in Palestine.

If the Arab Middle East countries, from which the expelled Palestinian Arabs enter Palestine, can be successfully smeared as controlled by International communism, or so-called Communist countries, the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine has the right to request and to receive United States Armed Forces to fight against the returning expelled Palestinian Arabs. The basis on which this demand will be made is that "overt armed aggression" has taken place against them "from any nation" that is "controlled by International communism."

EFFECTS FLOWING FROM RESOLUTION'S LANGUAGE

That is the sole reason the hand of Esau employed the phrase "from any nation" and not "by any nation" in drafting Senate Joint Resolution 19. The sole reason was to so word Senate Joint Resolution 19 that United States Armed Forces would be compelled to fight in Palestine, and the Middle East area, when, as, or if the expelled Palestinian Arabs start their trek back to their homes in their ancient homeland, where their ancestors fertilized the soil of Palestine with their sweat and blood for more than 1,700 years, if not from time immemorial. Yet this is exactly what will happen under the circumstances as long as Senate Joint Resolution 19 contains the words and phrases which now appear in it.

It is a betrayal of the trust of the men, women, and children of the United States in their Government to permit this to take place. There is no reason which justifies the sons, husbands, fathers, and brothers in the United States going to Palestine to fight there to protect the loot and booty of the 1948 armed insurrection in Palestine.

There is no obligation on the part of the citizens of the United States to lay down their lives under the circumstances explained here. It is a well-known principle that "those who live by the sword shall perish by the sword." If the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine is the product of a war conducted by the armed alien aggressors, the transplanted Zionist revolutionists, it is not illogical that a war conducted against them may prove as victorious as they were in 1948.

The international Zionist leadership, and the Zionists in their so-called sovereign state in Palestine, are living today in fear of what is inevitable. The 80 million Arabs in the Middle East and other Arab countries will soon have the per capita military strength of the 2 million Zionists in Palestine today. When that time arrives, it is not unreasonable to expect that the 80 million Arabs will take steps to aid the 1,000,000 or more Palestinian Arabs to recover the homes and other worldly possessions which were stolen from the expelled Palestinian Arabs by the armed insurrectionists, the 600,000 transplanted Zionist revolutionists, in 1948, and since then.

The 80 million Arabs in the Middle East and other Arab countries will receive support from the Asian and African almost 80 percent of all the world's total population. That support was pledged to the Arab Middle East countries at the Bandung Conference. The Arab Middle East countries can be expected to make further purchases of military materiel from the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. They have a perfect right to do so, under international law. The Arab Middle East countries will use this military materiel for a better purpose than Great Britain and France employed their vast arsenals of military materiel in their unjustified and unprovoked assault upon Egypt.

When United States Armed Forces are requested and required by the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine to fight against the returning expelled Palestinian Arabs, the United States Armed Forces will find themselves very shortly fighting against the armed forces of the other Asian and African countries, almost 80 percent of the world total population, 4 out of every 5 human beings on the face of the earth.

The Soviet Union and other European Communist countries will not come into that war at the start of it. They will come into that war "for the kill," like the United States came into World War I and World War II "for the kill" when the belligerents on both sides were exhausted, making victory for the United States less difficult.

SOVIET UNION WILL NOT RESORT TO "OVERT ARMED AGGRESSION"

The Soviet Union has no intention to use "overt armed aggression" in the Middle East. That is all Zionist propaganda. The Soviet Union now dominates almost 50 percent of the total population of the world, and almost 50 percent of the total land area of the world. The Soviet Union did not resort to the use of "overt armed aggression" to achieve that result. The Soviet Union did not send a single soldier across any boundary line to fire a single shot. They will do nothing different in the Middle East from what they did in the almost 50 percent of the world which they already dominate.

The Soviet Union believes that it can control 100 percent of the world eventually, without resorting to the use of "overt armed aggression."

This does not seem improbable if United States strategy follows the same stumbling and fumbling methods which are responsible for international tensions at the moment.

The international Zionist leadership knows that the Soviet Union will never resort to the use of "armed overt aggression" to advance their cause in the Middle East area. The international Zionist leadership is at a loss how to obtain United States Armed Forces in Palestine to defend their Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine against the expelled Palestinian Arabs, and other Arab populations, and the Asian and African countries which have pledged their support.

The international Zionist leadership is conspiring to request and receive United States Armed Forces in Palestine by claiming the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, and other countries allegedly "controlled by international communism," are planning to use "overt armed aggression" to gain control of the Arab Middle East countries. This Zionist fiction is a red herring. There is no remote possibility that the Soviet Union will ever be stupid enough to resort to "overt armed aggression." The Soviet Union can obtain greater control of the Middle East area without making it the battleground of the full-scale and all-out East-West world war which is now so imminent.

RESOLUTION IN EFFECT A MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY

President Eisenhower, in his address to the joint session of both Houses of the Congress on January 5, 1957, referred to the Soviet Union and other countries with Communist governments, and to other countries without Communist governments but in fact and in effect controlled by the Soviet Union. It now develops that the draft of Senate Joint Resolution 19 submitted to the Congress by President Eisenhower's advisers on his behalf is a mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine.

President Eisenhower's advisers are attempting to slip in through the back door what public opinion so vigorously opposed last year when the attempt was made to slip the same thing in through the front door.

Strong opposition by the public, last year, prevented the United States from concluding a similar mutual defense treaty with the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine. By whatever other name the international Zionist leader

ship seeks to baptize its mutual defense treaty, it is in fact and in effect nothing but a mutual defense treaty, although international Zionist leadership already publicized it as President Eisenhower's "Middle Eastern security resolution."

The Arab Middle East countries have little or not confidence that President Eisenhower's "Middle Eastern security resolution" means what it says, or says what it means. The name is very misleading. The Arab Middle East countries have justified reason for feeling the way they do.

TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF 1950

The United States did not honor its obligations under its tripartite declaration of May 25, 1950. The Arab Middle East countries have learned by sad experience that the tripartite declaration of May 25, 1950, never meant what it said, and never said what it meant. The Arab Middle East countries can never again be trapped by such diplomatic deception.

The tripartite declaration of May 25, 1950, by the United States stated that the United States, Great Britain, and France would "immediately take action" if the boundaries in the Middle East were violated. Between May 25, 1950, and October 29, 1956, the United States on many occasions "rattled the sabre" threatening to "immediately take action" against the Arab Middle East countries if they attacked the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine. On occasions too numerous to recite here, the United States "rattled the sabre," the tripartite declaration of May 25, 1950, to discourage "overt armed aggression" by Arab Middle East countries.

On October 29, 1956, approximately 100,000 Zionist troops engaged in a campaign against Egypt. Zionist armed forces violated the borders of Egypt and penetrated as far as the Suez Canal zone. The United States did not thereupon "immediately take action" against the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine for violating the boundary lines.

This failure by the United States to honor its obligations under the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, "lost face" for the United States with the 80 million Arab population, and the Asian and African, almost 80 percent of the world's total population.

The reputation of the United States for political integrity, in matters where the legitimate rights of the Arab Middle East countries come into conflict with the illegitimate pretensions in Palestine by the international Zionist leadership, disappeared into the thin air.

It is an undisputed fact, recognized throughout the world, that the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine is controlled by the United States, and has been for several years. The United States will again be in a position to escape its obligations, under the terms of Senate Joint Resolution 19, by using the alibi that the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine is not controlled by international communism.

OBJECTIVES OF ZIONIST SO-CALLED SOVEREIGN STATE

That contention by the United States will duly qualify the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine as the only one in that area to request and receive United States Armed Forces for defense against overt armed aggression. The international Zionist leadership planned it that way.

The international Zionist leadership must keep Arab Middle East countries defenseless. They realize that when the Arab Middle East countries have the per capita military strength of the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine they will have something to fear. It has therefore become necessary for the international Zionist leadership to exert every possible pressure, everywhere in the world, of every nature, to prevent the delivery of military materiel to the Arab Middle East countries. The Scriptures relate the story of Jacob and Esau.

The unholy deception by Esau was exposed with the explanation that it was "the voice of Jacob, but the hand of Esau." It was the voice of President Eisenhower which spoke to the Nation over the radio and on television on January 5, 1957. But, it apparently was the hand (and head) of Esau, the international Zionist leadership in the United States, which suggested the words and phrases in the present draft of Senate Joint Resolution 19.

BELIEF OF ARAB COUNTRIES

In the event of overt armed aggression by the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine again, all Arab Middle East countries feel certain that the United

States would resort to every possible subterfuge, and resort to every possible excuse the United States can conceivably cook up, to escape its obligation to employ United States Armed Forces on behalf of Arab Middle East countries, against armed forces of the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine.

The Arab Middle East countries sincerely believe that the United States will never employ United States Armed Forces against the armed forces of the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine, under any circumstances, come hell or high water. The United States will evade its obligations with diplomatic parlance that such an attack by the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine against an Arab Middle East country is not considered by the United States overt armed aggression against an Arab Middle East country, from any nation at that time controlled by so-called international communism. That alibi will not be too hard to coop up.

The odds are infinitely against the possibility that an Arab Middle East country will ever request the United States Armed Forces to defend them against overt armed aggression from any source. By the wildest stretch of imagination it is inconceivable to picture circumstances whereby an Arab Middle East country will request United States Armed Forces to assist in its defense.

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The United Nations Charter, in chapter VIII, the chapter on regional arrangements, in article 52, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4, provides for the maintenance of international peace by the Arab Middle East countries under the League of Arab States Treaty.

The League of Arab States Treaty provides adequate measures for the defense of Arab Middle East countries, against aggression. United Nations Charter also provides additional methods for the preservation of international peace.

FRAUDULENT CLAIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ZIONIST LEADERSHIP

The claims of the international Zionist leadership to ownership of Palestine as their homeland are fraudulent, fictitious and false in every respect. They never had an ancestor who set a foot in Palestine in all history. Their claim to Palestine as the promised land of God's chosen people is totally fictitious. Their ancestors were converted in the seventh century A. D. to monotheism from pagan phallic worship and idolatry. Their claim as the remnants of the lost 10 tribes is totally untrue. Their ancestors were the Khazars who came into Europe from deep in the heart of Asia, in the first century. Their claim to Palestine—based upon the infamous Balfour Declaration—was only a letter, drafted in Washington by Justice Brandeis and Justice Frankfurter, the two most fanatic Zionists in the history of Zionism.

The international Zionist leadership has given worldwide publicity to the most flagrant untruth that a United Nations resolution on November 29, 1947, created its so-called sovereign state in Palestine. Nothing could be more untrue.

United Nations Charter, in chapter IV, states all the powers and functions of the General Assembly, in article 10 and in article 11 (1) and 11 (2).

United Nations can only make recommendations. When United Nations makes a recommendation it becomes necessary for United Nations to pass a formal resolution.

The substance is a recommendation but the form is a resolution.

United Nations has no more authority to partition Palestine than to partition the United States if Mexico duplicated in Texas what the Zionists did in Palestine.

RESOLUTION'S PHRASEOLOGY

Under the terms of Senate Joint Resolution 19 as it now reads, President Eisenhower can exercise this dictatorial power forever, unless President Eisenhower in his own opinion "shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions."

What will be the criteria for President Eisenhower's conclusion that peace and security are what he regards as reasonably assured? What does reasonably assured mean?

It may mean one thing today and another thing tomorrow to President Eisenhower. What will "reasonably assured" mean to President Eisenhower's successors? What will "reasonably assured" mean to another Democratic President

like Harry S. Truman, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and other Zionist stooges of the same caliber in the service of the Government?

If the dictatorial power granted to President Eisenhower under the present terms of Senate Joint Resolution 19 "shall expire when the President shall determine," it means that United States Armed Forces may remain in Palestine, and the Middle East area, for a very long time.

The general area of the Middle East, according to official United States declarations, extends from Turkey in Europe to Pakistan in the heart of Asia.

It may possibly be centuries before the "peace and security" of the nations in that "general area of the Middle East," solely in the opinion of any President of the United States, "are reasonably assured," from present indications.

RESETTLEMENT OF PALESTINIAN ARABS

As a consequence of the confiscation of their ancient homeland, and their homes and other worldly possessions, the 1,350,000 Palestinian Arab men, women and children, harmless and helpless, were compelled to flee for their lives, and become homeless and penniless outcasts. They were driven out of their ancient homeland by 600,000 armed alien aggressors, transplanted Zionist revolutionists, with the help of \$350 million in the world's most modern military material, supplied to them free of charge by the international Zionist leadership in the United States, Great Britain, France, and for many years by the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

Approximately \$10 million in tax-deductible United States dollars were contributed by the international Zionist leadership throughout the world, without any requirement for repayment. Hypocrites are seeking to arrange a peace with justice in Palestine.

The proposed "peace with justice" in Palestine, and the Middle East area, proposed "resetting" the expelled Palestinian Arabs in many other foreign countries. The United States has offered to make available to the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine the \$5,600 million required to compensate the expelled Palestinian Arabs for the reasonable value of their property, as determined by United Nations investigation.

The taxpayers in the United States will bear this burden again, undoubtedly. But, the expelled Palestinian Arabs refuse to sell their homes. They wish to return to their ancient homeland and to again occupy their homes. In this attitude on their part, the 1,350,000 Palestinian Arabs have the unqualified support of 80 million other Arabs and the total remainder of the other Asian and African almost 80 percent of the world's total population, who have pledged their support to the expelled Palestinian Arabs.

There is only one solution which will bring "peace with justice" and, at the same time, permanent peace to Palestine and the Middle East area. That solution requires resettlement immediately of the 1,350,000 expelled Palestinian Arabs back in their homes in their ancient homeland, and the return to them of all their other worldly possessions.

President Eisenhower speaks again, and again, and again, that any solution in Palestine must be based upon "peace with justice." If he is sincere, he knows that this is the only solution of the situation in Palestine, besides the dangers inherent in the situation.

It will cost the taxpayers of the United States nothing to resettle the Palestinian Arabs in their homes in their ancient homeland, and resettle the Zionists now in Palestine in their former homelands, or in countries where they will be safe and welcome.

The international Zionist leadership is now providing the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine with approximately \$1 billion each year in United States dollars. This money will eventually prove a total waste. The United States provides in its military budget several billion dollars to cover the cost of strategic military provisions in the Middle East area. This large amount can be considerably reduced in the event that the United States takes an active part in the resettlement of the Palestinian Arabs in their homes in their ancient homeland. These two items will provide for the resettlement of the Zionists now in Palestine in their former homelands or other countries of the world, where they will be safe and welcome.

It is the duty of the United States to evacuate the Zionist population now in Palestine and to resettle them in their former homelands or in countries where they will be safe and welcome. Unless the United States embarks upon that program, war in the Middle East is inevitable. War in the Middle East will

precipitate the impending full-scale and all-out East-West world war. The United States cannot be the victor in that war against the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union receives the support of the Asian and African 80 percent of the world's total population.

Failure of the United States to resettle the 1,350,000 Palestinian Arabs in their homes in their ancient homeland and to resettle the 1,850,000 transplanted Zionists elsewhere than Palestine will precipitate the impending full-scale and all-out East-West world war.

The tremendous manpower, the enormous natural resources, and the strategic areas of the world inhabited by the Asian and African almost 80 percent of the world's total population, will prove the determining factor in deciding the victor in an all-out and full-scale East-West world war.

The manpower, the natural resources, and the strategic areas of Asia and Africa, inhabited by the Arab Middle East countries, will play a very important part in providing this Nation with security, and ultimate victory. The United States only produces 11 of the 77 raw materials required in its defense program.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Sparkman?

ZIONIST SO-CALLED SOVEREIGN STATE IN PALESTINE

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness a question. You constantly refer to the Zionist so-called sovereign state in Palestine. What is that state?

Mr. FREEDMAN. In April or May of 1948, 600,000 transplanted Zionists from Eastern Europe, provided with arms by the United States, England, France, with funds supplied by the international Zionist leadership, rose in armed insurrection, drove the inhabitants of that country out of their homeland and proclaimed themselves a state.

Now they are only armed insurrectionists. If the Mexicans did in Texas what they did in Palestine, I am sure we would not recognize them as the Republic of the Alamo simply because they proclaimed themselves the Republic of the Alamo.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you refer to the State of Israel?

Mr. FREEDMAN. If you call it that, Senator, that is what I am referring to. I don't call it that.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is the name of one of the states in the Middle East; isn't it?

Mr. FREEDMAN. If Al Capone called himself "Senator Capone," I would not recognize him as a Senator. You can call yourself anything, but that does not make you that, not in my opinion, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. It has been recognized by most of the nations of the world; hasn't it?

Mr. FREEDMAN. No; I won't say it has been recognized. Most of the nations of the world have been blackmailed or bribed into giving them recognition.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask you this then.

Do you believe that the State of Israel should never have been set up?

Mr. FREEDMAN. I do believe that it should never have been set up.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now that it has been in existence for nearly 9 years, do you still believe it ought to be obliterated?

Mr. FREEDMAN. I do, the same as I believe North Korea, East Germany, and the Government of the mainland of China which have been in existence just as long, and we don't recognize them.

Senator SPARKMAN. I just wanted to be certain that I got your point clear.

Chairman GREEN. Any further questions?

If not, thank you.

Mr. FREEDMAN. Senator Green, may I insert this as an addendum to my statement in the record?

Chairman GREEN. Is that in addition to your prepared statement?

Mr. FREEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman GREEN. We will put it in our files.

Mr. FREEDMAN. I can't tell you what to do. I would like it printed in the record because there is much factual basis which will help the Senate in reaching a conclusion.

Chairman GREEN. This is far more than you are entitled to submit.

Mr. FREEDMAN. I am doing it for my country to prevent it from being wiped out by a war with the Soviet Union. If it is too much, then it is too much.

Chairman GREEN. This will be kept in our records but not put in the hearings.

Chairman GREEN. Mr. M. B. Somerfield, director of the Mayence Research Associates, Longwood, Fla.

He is not here.

Mr. Alfred Lilienthal, author.

STATEMENT OF ALFRED M. LILIENTHAL, COUNSEL TO COMMITTEE FOR SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. LILIENTHAL. I welcome this opportunity to appear at these hearings of the combined Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. Last August I opened my testimony before the Democratic and Republican platform committees at Chicago and San Francisco with the statement that "the most important need of American foreign policy today is to prevent the loss of the vital Middle East." Events since the conventions have dramatically emphasized the urgency of this need.

The pending Senate joint resolution is based on the request of President Eisenhower for authorization both to commit the military forces of the United States against any open Communist aggression in the Middle East and to spend, free of present restrictions, \$200 million for special aid projects in the Middle East.

RECENT TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST

Ten days ago I returned from a 7-week visit to the Middle East—my third trip to the area in 4 years. I had private talks with many Arab leaders including President Nasser, King Saud, Lebanon's Prime Minister, Sami Solh, and the chief rabbi of Egypt. I worked with the latter on the problem of the Jews in Egypt. I was in Riadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, when the first news of the new Eisenhower doctrine was received and thereafter proceeded to Jeddah, Dhahran, Beirut, and Cairo. On the basis of on-the-spot evidence and an intimate knowledge of the Arab peoples, their thinking and attitudes, here are some of my observations:

MIDDLE EAST REACTION TO EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

The initial reaction in the Arab world to the Eisenhower doctrine was that of hostility. It was abysmally inexcusable on our part to

permit the leakage of incomplete, inaccurate reports of the plan, which result in misunderstanding and draw attacks. In Jeddah the earliest cabled report from Arab correspondents in New York talked of "a United States mandate" over the Middle East. Cairo and Damascus newspapers found grounds on which to assail the plan as "new imperialism" because it had not been clear that the United States armed intervention was to be based only on the request of nations to be aided.

When the President delivered his message to Congress, some of the earlier Arab skepticism gave way to a "wait and see" attitude while other criticism persisted.

WEAKNESSES OF DOCTRINE

One of the chief weaknesses of the Eisenhower doctrine is that the use of United States Armed Forces is confined to instances of Communist aggression.

What about aggression against Middle East countries by Britain, France, or Israel?

This is the type of aggression which the Arabs have just experienced. To them Communist aggression is something very remote. The Arabs have a proverb: "The dead donkey does not fear the hyena."

The fear of Zionist and western imperialist invasion is very real to the Arabs who ask "what provision is made about such aggressions?"

The linking of limited economic assistance to military aid is likewise questionable. It would have been far better for once to have offered economic aid to the Arab world without strings. The Arab argues with much justice: "Israel in the past 8 years has been given well over \$1 billion in tax-free dollars with no strings attached. You offer as an extraordinary economic program for this strategic area 200 million dollars and then link it to requests for military aid."

GREATEST DANGER IN MIDDLE EAST FROM SUBVERSION

It is my opinion that the Eisenhower doctrine is more criticizable for omissions than commissions. The pending resolution concerns itself with means of halting external aggression. But the greatest danger in the Middle East does not come from overt Communist aggression but from subversions based on the continued reliance by the Arab world upon Soviet diplomatic, political, and economic assistance.

There is little danger of communism knocking down the front door of the Middle East; the strong theism of Islam helps bar that approach, but there is grave danger of the Soviet Union walking in the back door.

If the Arab world or any part thereof goes behind the Iron Curtain, it will not be by means of external aggression or because of the Arab adoption of Communist doctrinaire. It will simply be because the Arabs are more willing to trust their aspirations for justice and hopes for the future in Soviet rather than in United States hands.

ARAB NEED FOR MORAL AID

Flying from Beirut to Cairo, a former Prime Minister of Lebanon told me: "What we Arabs need most from the United States is moral aid." This is in substance what President Nasser told me on December 15. And that is what the Soviet Union has been and is giving the Arab world. By continuing to support the Arabs in their grievances against Israel on every possible occasion, the Russians have been able to intrude themselves past heretofore forbidden barriers.

In his message to the special session of Congress on January 5, the President alluded to the "Israel-Arab problems, the future of the refugees and the status of the Suez Canal"—problems with which his program does not deal.

"These difficulties," the President stated, "are aggravated by international communism."

THE CENTRAL PROBLEM: ARAB-ISRAELI

Might I say that there would be no present danger from international communism in the Middle East were it not for the Arab-Israel problem. Nor would there be a refugee or a Suez problem were it not for the creation of the sovereign State of Israel. This is the heart and crux of present Middle East tension. Everything else is a direct and concomitant result of the failure to solve this central problem.

There will be no peace in the Middle East until justice becomes more than a lofty-sounding word. So long as 1 million Arab refugees remain homeless, so long as the Holy City of Jerusalem is severed by barbed wire and so long as Israel continues to flout existing resolutions of the United Nations, there will be new Suezes and more bloodshed. This can only eventually mean one thing: There goes the Middle East—both the Arab world and Israel will fall behind the Iron Curtain.

The pending resolution must be interpreted as an attempt to freeze the status quo and gain time with which to deal with the central problem. But the clock is running out on the West in the Middle East. As a result of the October invasion, Britain and France are through there. Had the President not acted with such courage and forthrightness at the time, we too would be through. The last chance rests with the United States: either we or Russia will emerge as the real friend of the area.

Incidentally, we do ourselves little good by talk of "filling the vacuum" which words deeply affront sensitive Arab nationalists. Arabs, they insist, will fill whatever "vacuum" exists.

We must come to grips at once with the Arab-Israel problem and take our position on the basis of two simple standards: what is just and what is in the national interest.

TAKING MIDDLE EAST OUT OF DOMESTIC POLITICS

The forthcoming Senate inquiry into Middle East policy since 1946 will reveal the extent to which the national interest has been continuously handcuffed in the quest for local votes. The encumberances of our alliance with Britain and France helped leave us open to the charge of imperialism.

Our political support of Zionism in the United States added to the belief in the Arab world that Israel only represented America's im-

perialist arm in the Middle East. In contrast, the Soviet Union had no territorial holdings in the area and having astutely kept out of the Middle East they were and are viewed by most Arabs without suspicion.

We have played too much internal politics with the issue of the Middle East. We would not be facing the crisis we face in the Middle East today were it not for the Wagners of America.

Incidentally, it is my humble opinion that both political parties should forthrightly reach a bipartisan agreement to take the Middle East out of domestic politics.

The Congress and the American people alike would be able to see the real picture in the Middle East were it not for the almost absolute refusal on the part of every American directly concerned with the area to relate cause to effect.

Who dares connect the 1947 partition of Palestine to the present Communist infiltration of the Middle East? The mediums of information and American public-opinion leaders feel that by criticizing the state of Israel they are opening themselves to the serious charge of anti-Semitism. It is my opinion that yielding to such fear is sheer nonsense. There is a great, a valid difference between Zionism, the political movement, and Judaism, the universal faith. To insist that Israel's failure to do justice to the Arab refugees has contributed to the Soviet's gains in the Middle East is not anti-Semitism.

When the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Green, after visiting President Nasser in October 1955, stated that he could not blame the Egyptian leader for seeking arms behind the Iron Curtain, the outraged newspapers of his State and political leaders there called on him to return home and retract this statement. Many in the State of Rhode Island even made the ridiculous and absurd charge of anti-Semitism.

LOSS OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI LIVES

May I say here, too, that on the basis of my recent study in Egypt, what has been taking place has not been discrimination against Jews as Jews but identification of Jews with Israelis against whom Egyptians now harbor a deep hatred in the wake of the October 29 invasion.

The final judgment as to whether Egypt has been anti-Semitic toward the Jews in Egypt or whether the Israelis have been anti-Semitic toward the Arabs in Israel must rest in part on the fact that not a single Egyptian Jew has lost his life during the current troubles, while 386 Arabs died in two major Gaza strip incidents at Khan Yunis and Raffa, 66 in minor incidents, and 48 Arabs living in Israel were slain in the village of Kafr Kassem, on the conversion of Mr. David Ben-Gurion.

If this joint committee wishes to halt the very real Communist penetration of the Middle East, it must go far beyond the present resolution, examine the facts carefully—and not through labels and slogans—and then act courageously on the heart of the trouble.

GUIDE FOR DEALING WITH PROBLEM

The problem can be dealt with successfully only if the honorable Senators are willing to adopt, as their guide in their endeavors, the definition which William Ellery Channing affixed to the free mind:

I call that mind free which jealously guards its intellectual rights and powers, which calls no man master, which does not content itself with a passive or hereditary faith, which opens itself to light whencesoever it may come, and which receives new truth as an angel from heaven.

Chairman GREEN. Are there any questions?

If not, thank you very much, Mr. Lilienthal.

I called the name of Mr. Eichelberger some time ago but he was not present. I understand he is here.

Mr. Eichelberger, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF CLARK EICHELBERGER, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I have more liberty today in expressing my own personal views. However, Senator, I think that most of the people in the country who support the United Nations would agree that whatever legislation is passed and whatever interpretation is given to it should be such as to strengthen the United Nations and the role of the United States in it, and I want to address myself to that particular point of view.

I shall not read my statement, Senator, which you have before you, but confine myself to several points that I am very anxious to make.

I would like to point out there are several important facts which should be taken into consideration as we consider the legislation to give effect to the Eisenhower doctrine.

One of the most important facts before us is the enhanced role of the United States in the United Nations in the opportunity of leadership that is before us there.

UNITED STATES POSITION IN UNITED NATIONS

Recently 2 great crises arose, 1 in the Middle East and 1 in Hungary, and the Government of the United States took the position that the charter applied to the British and the French and to the Russians in Hungary.

It was a soul-searching decision I know, but the fact was that the United States indicated to the nations that it was not voting with the colonial powers, that it was trying to apply the law of the charter to all those who violated it.

As the result, the United States demonstrated that it was the one great power with a permanent seat on the Security Council that was both able and willing to fulfill the obligations of the charter.

UNITED NATIONS IS FUNCTIONING WELL

The second fact that I would like to call to your attention is that the United Nations is functioning surprisingly well. I am looking at the faces of three of you who have been delegates to the General Assembly in the last few years.

I know that you are gratified—4 of you, I believe, Senators—gratified at the fact that the United Nations has demonstrated that despite the fact it is the Assembly acting rather than the Security Council—I believe 5 now, Senator, 1 more has come into the room, and it is a very fortunate thing indeed that one may talk to a Senate Foreign Re-

lations Committee or to a House committee where there are so many that have had practical United Nations experience.

You will agree with me that the United Nations today is able to dispatch a fleet of some 40 vessels to clear the Suez Canal, that it has an international army of some 5,700 members, that it is functioning efficiently and with dispatch.

The General Assembly has been meeting in emergency session, sometimes night and day.

Along with that I would like to point out as part of my argument that the General Assembly today has 80 members. That is 20 more than were at the Assembly when some of you were delegates.

Of these 80 members, only 5 are classed as great powers because they have permanent seats on the Security Council.

COLLECTIVE POWER THROUGH UNITED NATIONS

Only 3 of them are capable of waging nuclear warfare. That means that there are some 70 members of the United Nations, one-fourth of whom are new states, having won their independence in the last 13 years, who can never be classed as great powers because they cannot have permanent seats in the Security Council and under present conditions they cannot wage nuclear warfare.

But, nevertheless, they want security. And since they cannot find strength in individual power, they are gradually coming to find collective power through the United Nations.

They don't want any one particular power to fill vacuums in any part of the world. They want to fill it themselves with the help of the United Nations.

I have been listening to the debates in the General Assembly for months. I realize there are difficult blocs to deal with.

I realize that just because a nation has won its freedom recently its statesmen are not necessarily wise on all occasions.

The fact remains that something very remarkable is taking place, that almost 80 nations are developing a common identity of interests, common ideals, and a common parliamentary practice.

UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP

The United States today, if it is willing to bring policies into the United Nations and give the leadership to which its position entitles it, is in position to give leadership to these many small states that are trying to find through the United Nations an outlet for power and responsibility which they cannot find in individual strength.

I think that this growing sense of unity in the United Nations, its growing capacity to function, its growing up, and the position of the United States is so important in any piece of legislation. And so I would say that since the President has indicated that he wants us to work through the U. N. in the future, and that the purpose of the legislation is to help the U. N. that we should consider whatever revisions are necessary and whatever interpretations should be made to the general public, so it will be very clear that in this legislation we are not weakening the United Nations, we are not bypassing the United Nations, we are not lessening the role of the United States in it.

There are several points that some of us have formulated. I might say in drafting these points I have had the help of such people as Prof. Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago and Professor Holcombe of Harvard, and so on.

There are a few points we have made and we have tried to suggest practical amendments to the legislation to bring them about.

MAKING CLEARER UNITED STATES INTENTION TO WORK THROUGH U. N.

I think it should be made much clearer that we intend to work through the United Nations, as the President has said. We have suggested that there might be another sentence: "Whereas in pursuance of this purpose the United States will continue to take an initiative in the United Nations to preserve peace, security and justice in the Middle East."

I would point out that the House of Representatives in an amendment said:

The joint resolution adds the phrase to section 2: that the authority herein granted shall be carried out to the greatest extent deemed practicable by the President through the United Nations.

ECONOMIC AID THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS

Quite obviously there are two parts you might say to the President's request for authority. One is in the economic field. I think most of us would be in agreement that an economic program for the Middle East must be constructive, must result in irrigating the desert, in co-operative efforts, rather than economic aid simply as a bribe to this nation or that nation or its ruler, without any improvement in the conditions of the people, such improvement being necessary to make the people stronger in their resistance to communism.

And so we would like to suggest when you are dealing with the question of economic aid "providing such cooperation and assistance shall be carried out so far as possible through the United Nations," and to this end take the initiative in proposing to the U. N. the establishment of an international economic development authority for the Middle East.

I realize that you are not going to give the U. N. a check for \$200 million, but some of it will be spent bilaterally. But I would also suggest that a TVA on the Jordan, some of the bold economic programs in the Middle East can be very much better carried on through the United Nations than individuals.

I would point out that Henry Cabot Lodge—and I would like to pay a tribute to the way in which Senator Lodge has borne his very heavy burdens in the emergency and the regular sessions of the General Assembly just going on, but Senator Lodge pointed out that one of the dangers was that an auction develop in which Russia and the United States are asked to bid for aid to a particular country.

He did not mention Egypt but Egypt was a very good case, whereas he said if more of our aid were done through the U. N., we would reduce the danger of rivalry, by doing it in a multilateral manner.

DELETING PHRASE "INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM"

Another important point of the legislation, of course, is the President's authority to act to restrain international communism. We suggest that the phrase "international communism" be struck out, because we believe that we should be aggressive against aggression as aggression.

Quite obviously it is the aggression from international communism that we fear, but I think it would be better not to discriminate between different kinds of aggression in legislation. Ah, but you might say, does that mean then we would have to use American arms against Israel or against Britain and France?

Not at all, because remember the authority to use the American force is permissive, not mandatory, a power which I think probably all of us would agree the President has anyway.

Then when it comes to the actual using of the force, how does the President proceed, if he works in cooperation with the United Nations? Quite obviously if there were a threat of aggression or an aggression, we should inform the Security Council of the United Nations.

Let us say the Security Council is unable to act because of a Soviet veto. Twice in the last few months the Security Council was meeting late at night. Twice a veto was cast, once I am sorry to say by the British and the French, another time by the Soviet Union, and in each case the uniting for peace resolution was invoked and a special session of the General Assembly called before the Security Council members left their chairs.

So quite obviously we would act through the General Assembly if we could not act through the Security Council.

Now there might be such an occasion where the necessity of retaliation would be instant, where we would have to act under article 51 of the charter before a meeting of the Security Council of the General Assembly could be convened, although the chances of that are less because they have demonstrated that they could even have a meeting of the General Assembly within 24 hours.

In case then that we have to act immediately under article 51, our obligation should then be to inform the Security Council or the General Assembly if the Security Council is paralyzed with the veto, and ask the authority and support of what we have done.

If we are willing to act, then our individual resistance to aggression becomes part of the total resistance of the U. N. which is the way we spelled it out in the Atlantic Pact.

And so I have suggested a few amendments. I have not read all of them worked out by some of the international lawyers as our advisers, ways in which we believe that the legislation could be strengthened, to make it very clear to the world that we want to act under the United Nations.

IMPORTANCE OF ACTING THROUGH UNITED NATIONS

What I fear above everything else, gentlemen, is this: We condemn the British and the French for acting unilaterally. There are those who fear abroad that we are now asking for authority for the President to do exactly the same thing that we criticized the British and French for doing.

It is different, of course. According to this legislation, the President cannot act without the consent of the powers concerned, but it is very important that we spell out in every way possible that to the greatest extent possible we will act with and through the United Nations, and that our economic aid and all that goes with it will be in harmony or through the United Nations.

For let us face the fact, the danger to the Middle East is not that the Soviet Union will move an army there some time. It is from subversion. It is from any other factors. If this legislation is to have an important influence, it will be because it is a steady factor to the commitment of the United States against aggression, so that the United Nations in a more relaxed mood can go on to solve the problems of the Middle East, which it is trying very hard to solve.

Therefore, this legislation should be couched in such a way as to enhance our leadership in the United Nations and not to weaken it.

For I want to say that at this moment the United Nations is in its finest hour, its moment of greatest strength. But whenever you have made a great achievement, you are in your greatest danger.

The United Nations is undertaking terrific things. It is undertaking now by the resolutions that were passed late Saturday night to move for a peaceful solution to the problems of the Middle East, having secured a withdrawal of forces and having made considerable progress toward the clearance of the canal.

Chairman GREEN. I am sorry, your time is exhausted.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Thank you.

Chairman GREEN. Are there any questions?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask 1 or 2 questions.

SHORTCOMINGS OF RESOLUTION

Do you think the resolution really serves a good purpose, a beneficial purpose, or would you just as soon have no resolution?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. That is a rather difficult question, Senator, because I have been proceeding on the belief that the resolution did have very considerable support and that I should devote myself toward seeing how it might more correspond with—I will not dodge the question.

Of course I say that the legislation does not meet the fundamental problems of the Middle East.

I would say that we can accomplish all we want through a strong United Nations policy. I would say, however, that if the legislation were clearly directed against all aggression, I believe it could serve a useful purpose in indicating that the United States would act and act quickly.

Therefore I think the heart of it is for it to be against all aggression. Everybody knows that the greatest fear is from Communist aggression.

DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

Senator FULBRIGHT. Isn't it true, Mr. Eichelberger, that the United Nations appointed a committee about 2 or 3 years ago and they spent 2 or 3 years trying to define aggression and they finally gave it up as a bad job and disbanded?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I don't believe you can define aggression any more than you can define fraud, and I suppose the reason for the word "overt," overt aggression, means an armed attack.

I presume the definition of aggression in this legislation rules out many things that might be included in the broad definition of aggression.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is extremely vague, the term, isn't it? It is very difficult to be precise when you are talking about aggression.

No country ever admits it is an aggressor. It is always the other fellow, isn't it?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Quite.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you have any clear idea as to whether Israel committed aggression or not?

Do you think she committed aggression?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I regret to say I think Israel committed an aggression by moving her forces in violation of the charter. I go just part way with you, Senator. I believe that there are very definite tests of aggression.

If you move your troops against someone else, if you invade someone's territory, if you blockade his ports, that is aggression.

I grant that the United Nations has never been able and the League of Nations either, to define aggression because by trying to define it, you might rule out some terrible thing that could harm a nation so terribly that it would be aggression.

Therefore I don't think you can define it too accurately and I was opposed to putting a definition of aggression in the charter at San Francisco.

However, I do feel while I think Israel's provocation was great, I think Israel was guilty of aggression as well as Britain and France.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What was Egypt guilty of in refusing Israel's ships passage through the canal in violation of the U. N.?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Certainly violation of the charter and not in accordance with the wishes of the Security Council. I am only sorry that they did not act earlier because this whole tragedy could have been avoided.

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

Senator FULBRIGHT. You said at one point that you thought the President had the power to use the force given in section 2 of this resolution already, didn't you?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I believe I did, yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. If he has that power, then why perform a useless thing? Why pass a resolution giving him a power he already has?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I presume that the President felt that an indication from the Senate in advance would be that much more of a warning to the Soviet Union.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Doesn't it, on the other hand, create the possibility or even the probability that people will conclude he does not have the power?

We don't normally assume that the Senate does a useless futile thing that has no meaning. Therefore you would reason that he does not have the power, so in undertaking to do this, we are restricting his present power according to your own theory; is that not right?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. You could draw that conclusion from what I said. I am not drawing it myself.

IMPORTANCE OF STRONG ROLE OF UNITED STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it correct for me to conclude that you are not very enthusiastic about this resolution at all, that you believe we might get along very well without a resolution?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Let me put it this way, Senator, and again understand I am speaking as an individual and not for the officers of our association, which are divided among very many political points of view and slants.

I would say this: that I believe more important than this resolution is a strong role in the United Nations.

I do not believe, however, that this legislation, if properly amended to bring it clearly in harmony with the United Nations, could be harmful; let me put it that way.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then another resolution would be all right, but this one is not very beneficial, is it?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I have seen quite a number of resolutions that seemed very good. I believe you had one, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Eichelberger, I want to ask just 2 or 3 questions.

I believe you know that I have strongly advocated our exercising as strong a leadership as we possibly can in the United Nations.

You said that the United Nations today stands at its all-time high, or something to that effect. There have been 1 or 2 things that have caused me some concern with reference to the U. N. handling of the present problem.

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

For instance, it seems to me that in setting up the police force that they sent over, apparently there was a good bit of ambiguity about the resolution, nobody seemed to know just how long the force was to stay or the extent to which it was to be used, and I noticed when Mr. Hammarskjold came back with what I consider an incomplete settlement of the situation there, he said that he was not authorized to go further. And I saw the newspaper just a little while ago—I thought I had the right paper with me but I have looked through hurriedly and I don't see it—in which reference was made to the two resolutions that were passed Saturday. The article said nobody knows, nobody can tell under the wording of those resolutions, just what authorizations Mr. Hammarskjold has, what his limitations are, and so on and so forth.

I am wondering if there is too much effort at expediency or pleasing everybody or enacting or passing resolutions loosely drawn so that they may attract support and each one makes his own interpretation.

All I am saying leads up to this: Don't we need some pretty strong leadership exercised on our part there in our effort to pull other nations into it, to see that the resolutions that are adopted state clearly what is intended, and that they be passed upon the basis of right, what ought to be done, rather than upon merely day-to-day expediency?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I will have to refer to the meeting of Saturday night.

I don't know whether Senator Humphrey was there Saturday night or not. I believe he was there on Friday. I was there until the last word on Saturday night at midnight. The situation was this: One resolution certainly was going to pass.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. And that was a resolution to ask Israel to withdraw promptly. That resolution was passed by 75 in favor, 2 abstentions and 2 against. It was very clear that it would have been a tragedy if that resolution would have passed without an accompanying resolution which our Government wanted originally, one resolution for the moving of the United Nations forces on the armistice line to protect Israel, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Gaza strip.

I think Cabot Lodge did the best he could to get the best possible resolution on Saturday night. He got a resolution by a two-thirds vote. Two-thirds of 78 were 52. It passed by a vote of 56.

That resolution, if it had been strengthened very much, it might not have been possible to have gotten a two-thirds vote.

Various interpretations were made. He made an interpretation. Mr. Menon, of India, one of the sponsors, made a weaker interpretation. Egypt understood it in a most restrictive manner. But shortly before the vote was taken Mr. Pearson, of Canada, spelled out point by point I think eight points as he interpreted the resolution and no one took back that interpretation.

Then they asked the Secretary General to carry the resolution out. He must now have conversations with Israel and with Egypt. He is in a difficult situation because the United Nations is not a government and the Assembly cannot pass resolutions and he has to go far.

I think a very interesting evolution of national society and its machinery is taking place. I marvel that they did as well as they did. But Senator, if they had not passed the resolution they did, we would have been on record of having said that Israel must withdraw without anything else, because Israel—I am sorry, I am very pro-Israel in sympathy with her in many ways—the overwhelming fact is that the Assembly wants Israel to withdraw.

I think our Government and all governments made mistakes last year and the year before and the year before that might have led to this tragedy.

But I must say that given the situation as it is, not being able to go back and correct the past, I think Ambassador Lodge did the very best he could. He conferred with many peoples, with the Canadians, with the Indians; there were conversations going on all the time.

I think it was the best resolution that could have been passed.

But gentlemen, lots of times political bodies will produce resolutions with some ambiguity and leave it to people to interpret later.

It is up to the Secretary-General now to move with the best possible interpretation and get the best thing he can with the two sides.

Senator SPARKMAN. I certainly agree with your statement as to the necessity of a resolution to carry out the second part, because I felt that Israel was certainly entitled to some degree of assurance before she should be compelled to move out and to invite the status

quo ante, which would be again flaunting another U. N. resolution.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Right. I think the heart of it may be varied there, it bears reference to something Senator Fulbright asked me a moment ago, too. The two parts are to reestablish, reaffirm their support of the armistice agreements.

The armistice agreements denied the right of one of the parties to act as a belligerent. We should have checked on that years ago. Egypt then couldn't have acted as a belligerent because, under the armistice agreement, they cannot.

Now, if we mean to enforce that part of the resolution, clearly, then, Israel does have her shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all I care to ask, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Senator Flanders, did you wish to ask a question?

ATTITUDE ON RESOLUTION

Senator FLANDERS. Yes; I would like to ask a question.

I think, Mr. Eichelberger, you suggested a little earlier that you were not particularly enthusiastic about this move at all, but if we were going to do it, you had some suggestions to make.

Is that a proper description of your position?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I think so, Senator. When I say "enthusiastic," I am trying to—I am rather in a spot in answering a question that way. I don't want to appear to be opposing some legislation that the President feels is necessary.

But I would say this: I do believe that there are other phases of our foreign policy much more important, and that is why I have suggested ways in which I think this could be brought in harmony with that policy.

Senator FLANDERS. Yes.

Now, one thing that occurs to me is this: You have stated earlier that there was a history of failure to face situations in the years which have led up to this crisis. I do not ask you to agree with me, but would you feel that I might be justified in the feeling that it was necessary to do something a little bit dramatic in order to get out of this halfhearted thing of not facing the facts of the situation, and does not this resolution offer us something in the nature of a resolute facing? What would you say to that point of view, which is my own?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I can agree with you, sir, and not be inconsistent with anything I have said to Senator Fulbright. Yes.

May I say this: that I felt that immediately after Ralph Bunche got the armistice agreements, if all the powers had worked to translate those armistice agreements into final peace settlement, we could have had that before the Arab States got out of hand as they have in the last years.

I believe you have a point, that there is something dramatic about this legislation, but its drama must not overshadow the drama of what the United Nations has been doing or our role in the United Nations as the one great power that was willing to fulfill the obligations of the charter.

Therefore, I would like to see, shall I say, the two dramas be brought into harmony.

Senator FLANDERS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GREEN. Any other questions?

CASE OF OVERT COMMUNIST ATTACK

Senator HUMPHREY. I only wanted, Mr. Chairman, to say that I was very pleased to see the draft resolution that Mr. Eichelberger has presented, with modifications, including the language relating to the United Nations.

My only question in reference to the United Nations language that you have outlined or specified here is this: Do you believe that the language referring to the United Nations in your proposed resolution would in any way delay prompt action on the part of the United States in case of any overt Communist attack in the Middle Eastern area?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. No; assuming that it was an armed aggression, we have the right to act under article 51, the right of individual or collective self-defense if the Security Council were not able to act in time. Therefore, if the attack was such that retaliation had to be instantaneous, we could make such retaliation immediately, asking for a meeting of the Security Council or the General Assembly, and ask them to go along with us.

I cannot see anything in this that would deter instant retaliation, if that were necessary.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Eichelberger, the problems in the Middle East that have been of such tremendous proportions of late have been or are being handled in the United Nations in general, and I would say even in all particulars.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

REACTIONS OF UNITED NATIONS DELEGATES TO RESOLUTION

Senator HUMPHREY. You are up at the United Nations practically every day. You have a working acquaintanceship and knowledge of the delegates to the United Nation. What have you heard, Mr. Eichelberger, from delegates, particularly in the Asian-African areas, relating to the resolution as presented to Congress? Do you hear favorable comments about it, or unfavorable comments?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. To tell the truth, I haven't sought out such comments, and I haven't heard enough to make a comment possible.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have not? Have you not talked to delegates from Egypt, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and others, about this resolution?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. No, Senator, I have not.

When I have been over there, I have been so busy talking about problems before the United Nations itself, the—you are speaking of this resolution now?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, I am.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I have been so busy talking about some of the things the United Nations was doing, that I purposely have not sought out any such discussion. I am afraid I haven't talked to any of the representatives of the Arab States.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I am not trying to dodge your question. I just haven't, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. I appreciate that.

I have had a chance to visit with some of them. That is why I went up there.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. You have a very much better chance, because the delegates--you can talk to a delegate as a delegate.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is why I went up there. I went back Thursday and Friday. I went up there to have consultation with different delegates. I wanted to check my observations with yours.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. The last few days, I was so concerned with other things—

Senator HUMPHREY. I know.

Mr. EICHELBERGER (continuing). That I am afraid I didn't.

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. I want to say, in concurrence with what you said a moment ago, I knew of the work that was going on relating to the two resolutions, and while I had no hand in it at all, I was there as an observer.

I think that in order to get the two-thirds vote for the second resolution, the language had to be relatively ambiguous in some areas.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. However, if it is spelled out as it was in the debate, as I read in the press, I think it is pretty meaningful.

The most important point, however, is that none of these resolutions are any good unless the nation states are willing to abide by them and to implement them.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Quite. I admit two points: Unless the nations state they are willing to abide, and unless the powers that are in position to do so give leadership.

I believe that we have been quite right in saying that our policy in the Middle East will be a United Nations policy. But the United Nations isn't a superstate, and it isn't a self-starter, and therefore it must have policies. And I think it is much more important that we announce our policies through the United Nations at the moment and give the leadership that we are in position to give.

MR. EICHELBERGER'S AMENDMENT

Senator HUMPHREY. The only point in your amendment that disturbs me somewhat, Mr. Eichelberger, is where you generalized with the language "and armed attack by another nation," and so on, using language which would possibly inject us into all kinds of military maneuvers and attacks of different sizes and proportions, even arguments and battles between states where there is really no direct interest of our own or even of the overall peace of the area.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Well, after all, this legislation is permissive, it isn't mandatory, anyway. So if the President is to be armed by you gentlemen with authority in advance, putting aside the arguments as to how much authority you have anyway, and to act, it might as well be permissive to act against all aggression in the Middle East.

For instance, I think we made a mistake in the SEATO treaty in being against Communist aggression and not aggression, an aggression of a nation.

TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1950

Senator HUMPHREY. What does the tripartite agreement of 1950 provide for?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. That was a statement, of course, on the part of Britain and France and the United States that it is somewhat of a guaranty to both Israel and Egypt.

Senator HUMPHREY. No; not only to Israel and Egypt, but all the States in the area.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes. How much validity that doctrine has as a result of the problems of Britain and France recently in the Middle East, I wouldn't know.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, the President said in his special message to the joint session, as I recall, that the tripartite agreement was still a fundamental part of our position in the Middle East, or of our policy in the Middle East, and it has been repeated again and again throughout the past years since 1950 that we adhere to our obligations under the tripartite agreement.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Providing France and Britain go with us, or would we act anyway?

Senator HUMPHREY. I am not sure about that.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. That is what I am not sure of, on that.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am not sure of the details.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. That is what throws me.

Senator HUMPHREY. But I gather we had an agreement to resist aggression in the Middle East.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. There is another reason in the back of my mind for suggesting this. I wanted the record to be very careful on this point, because certainly I take as dim a view of communism as anyone possibly can, and certainly Russia has retrogressed very much since they have been trying to reestablish the Staline doctrine as a result of what happened in Hungary.

I have felt, and I go along—I hope, Senator Flanders, I am not overstating something you said in the past—but there might be a possibility of getting an accommodation of the Soviet Union on arms, possibly, on Germany and the Middle East.

I was anxious that the language of the resolution not use the language of the cold war; and providing words that could be so worded so that it would be against aggression, and everyone knew what we meant.

I hope I have not overstated it.

Senator HUMPHREY. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman, except to thank Mr. Eichelberger for his testimony.

Chairman GREEN. If not, thank you very much.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, before Mr. Eichelberger leaves the stand, I want to commend him and compliment him for having made what I think is a very fine and able statement, and I certainly think that we all must be grateful to Mr. Eichelberger for the very fine service that he has given us in connection with the United Nations ever since it has been a going concern.

I think there is no person more closely identified with it and our interest in the United Nations than Mr. Eichelberger.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Fulbright. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with those remarks, as long as we are calling attention to his activities, because he is sort of the patron saint of the United Nations.

Chairman Green. You may do so.

Senator Fulbright. Thank you.

Chairman Green. Thank you very much, Mr. Eichelberger.
(Mr. Eichelberger's prepared statement is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF CLARK EICHELBERGER, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

I am presenting my own personal views. However, I believe there will be general agreement on the part of the public with the thesis that Senate Joint Resolution 19, relating to the Middle East, should both be drafted and presented in such a way as to strengthen, rather than weaken, the United Nations and American leadership in it.

UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN UNITED NATIONS

I would call your attention to two very important facts. One is the leadership which the United States occupies in the United Nations at the present time.

There have been moments when this leadership has been outstanding: the resistance to aggression at the 38th parallel in Korea; the proposal to the General Assembly for a United Nations atoms for peace program, and the position of the United States when the United Nations was called upon to face simultaneous crises in the Middle East and Hungary.

In these two situations the United States has taken the position that the law of the charter is to apply to our friends in Western Europe in their invasion of Suez and to the Soviet Union in its invasion and repressions in Hungary.

The United States demonstrated for the moment that it was the one great power capable and willing to fulfill the obligations of the charter. It surprised many of the new nations which constitute one-fourth of the membership of the world organization that the United States was not voting with the colonial powers.

Increasingly many of the so-called neutral states have supported United States resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge has ably carried the heavy burdens during the past months in these critical meetings of the General Assembly.

UNITED NATIONS HAS FUNCTIONED EFFECTIVELY

The second fact which I wish to emphasize is that the United Nations has indicated its capacity to function effectively. The General Assembly has had to take over the job of peacemaking.

Within the last few months this General Assembly, which has grown from 60 to 80 members, has met in 2 emergency sessions and in regular session, sometimes meeting night and day. It effected a cease fire and a withdrawal of forces in the Middle East.

It has a fleet of some 40 vessels clearing the Suez Canal. It has dispatched an international force of now approximately 5,700 men.

The United Nations has moved with confidence and has gained maturity in the past few months. It is now facing the second and perhaps even more difficult task in the Middle East of creating a situation in which peace settlements can grow.

The United Nations now has 80 members. Only five of them are classed as great powers with permanent seats and a veto in the Security Council. Only three are capable of waging atomic warfare.

This leaves some 70 nations that can find only in the United Nations a source of collective power—a power organized and controlled by common standards of morality and law.

Day after day I have listened to the statesmen of these many powers debate the great issues. I do not say that all of the speeches have been wise. I know that there are difficult blocs to deal with.

But I do say that for the statesmen of almost 80 nations day after day to discuss and to vote on solutions for these great issues means that there is

developing in the world a sense of unity, of common standards, and with established parliamentary practices. Nothing must be permitted to interfere with this development.

Consider the role of the United States in this situation. Assuming it will continue to base its policies on the United Nations and will give leadership in that body, it is in a position to encourage and help the new states make their contribution to international peace and security in the United Nations.

The granting of the contemplated authority in Senate Joint Resolution 19 must not in any way weaken the situation just described. Since the President has made it clear that he wishes to continue to work through the United Nations, it is for Congress, both as it drafts the legislation and as it presents it to the world, to indicate that it will continue in this policy.

POINTS FOR CONGRESS TO CONSIDER

May I suggest seven points which Congress should consider in granting this authority:

1. The new policy should be an extension of our present United Nations policy, and should now be directed toward securing permanent settlements in the Middle East.

2. The United States should continue its leadership in the United Nations against aggression and imperialism.

3. While American strength properly used can add to stability in the Middle East, the United States must not be subject to the accusation that it is substituting its imperialism for others.

Neither must the United States give the impression that it contemplates acting unilaterally in the way for which we condemned the British and the French for acting. No power vacuum can be permanently filled except by the United Nations and the Middle East powers themselves.

4. Any congressional authority or Presidential authority to resist aggression in the Middle East should permit armed action only (a) if pursuant to a United Nations Security Council or General Assembly resolution, or (b) if based upon article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Any unilateral action should cease, as is provided in the North Atlantic Pact, when the United Nations takes over.

5. To avoid emphasis upon the cold war, the congressional resolution should not mention the Soviet Union or communism by name; rather the resolution should give authority to the President within the framework of the above limitations to resist any aggression in the Middle East from any quarter.

While the authority would be given primarily to deter Communist aggression in the Middle East, it would likewise serve to deter attack by any outside power, or by one Middle Eastern state against another. It should be remembered that the resolution is an authorization, not a guaranty for the use of American forces.

6. Any authorization should be accompanied by support of the use of United Nations forces as a continuing factor in the Middle East.

7. American economic assistance for Middle East development should either be channeled through the United Nations or be related to the United Nations. Such a policy would prevent the charge of an American policy of economic dominance and would reduce the danger of rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States to buy the support of Middle Eastern states.

I attach herewith suggested amendments to the resolution to accomplish the points made in these comments.

SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO JOINT RESOLUTION

(Proposed changes and additions are italicized; new material is in black brackets)

To authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Whereas a primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and

Whereas in pursuance of this purpose the United States will continue to take an initiative in the United Nations to preserve peace, security, and justice in the Middle East; and

Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered as long as [International communism and the nations it controls seek] any nation or party seeks by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, international subversion, or other means to attempt to bring under [their] its domination peoples now free and independent; and

Whereas such danger now exists in the general area of the Middle East: Therefore be it

SECTION 1. Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the President be, and hereby is, authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence, provided such cooperation and assistance shall be carried out so far as possible through the United Nations, and to this end to take the initiative in proposing to the United Nations the establishment of an international economic development authority for the Middle East.

SEC. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance and to support the use of United Nations Emergency Forces in any part of that area especially menaced.

Furthermore, he is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations requesting such aid against [Covert armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism] an armed attack by another nation.

Provided, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations; and, as specified in article 51 of the United Nations Charter, measures pursuant thereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security or of the General Assembly to make recommendations for that purpose in case the Security Council fails to act.

(The joint resolution as passed by the House of Representatives significantly adds the phrase in section 2 " * * * That the authority herein granted shall be carried out to the greatest extent deemed practicable by the President through the United Nations * * *".)

SEC. 3. The President is hereby authorized, when he determines that such use is important to the security of the United States, to use for the purposes of this joint resolution, without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation, not to exceed \$200,000,000 from any appropriations now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations.

SEC. 4. The President shall within the month of January of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder.

SEC. 5. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise.

Chairman GREEN. The next on the list is a representative of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The name which was first presented was Gladys D. Walser.

I understand that there is a substitute, Mrs. Annalee Stewart.

Mrs. Stewart?

STATEMENT OF MRS. ANNALEE STEWART, LEGISLATIVE SECRETARY, WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, UNITED STATES SECTION

Mrs. STEWART. Yes. Mrs. Walser is our U. N. observer, and was detained there because of her work at the United Nations, and called this morning to say she would not be able to come.

I am the legislative secretary of the United States section, so I am coming in her place and am just making a summary of the statement, as I realize this is more than 10 minutes in length.

Chairman GREEN. Yes. You realize that the time limit is 10 minutes?

Mrs. STEWART. That is right.

Chairman GREEN. Will you please proceed.

Mrs. STEWART. Senator Green and members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, we are glad to have this opportunity to speak on behalf of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, which was founded nearly 42 years ago by Jane Addams and about 2,000 internationally minded women, at The Hague in 1915.

I am reading or giving a summary of the statement Mrs. Walser prepared. She is our international consultant at the United Nations. We are an international, interfaith, interracial organization, and have consultative status there.

URGENCY OF RESOLUTION QUESTIONED

The recent reversal and, what the league believes to be a retrogression in United States policy in respect to the Middle East from the position held at the outset of the Middle East crisis, has caused deep anxiety to our members here and abroad as to the possible adverse effects of the President's proposal of January 5, 1957, on that sensitive and highly explosive part of the world. There is also considerable perplexity as to what sudden developments have made such a step seem urgent and necessary to the administration.

UNITED STATES INITIATIVE IN UNITED NATIONS

For a brief period at the beginning of November 1956, with the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, the United States assumed leadership on a sound basis by taking the initiative in the United Nations for ending hostilities. This won the confidence and respect and support of the majority of the 80-member world body and gained for the United States the highest prestige I have ever known it to have in the 11 years I have been observing the ebb and flow of great power influence at the United Nations.

It was the United States that asked for an immediate convening of the Security Council to consider the Middle East crisis. When Britain and France vetoed a move for a cease-fire, the United States supported the invoking of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 designed to bypass the Soviet veto during the Korean war. It was the United States that on November 2, 1956, submitted a cease-fire resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority of United Nations members and at the same time found itself in the unusual position of voting with the U. S. S. R. and anticolonial nations. It was the United States that supported the Secretary General's efforts to secure British, French, and Israeli compliance with the General Assembly resolutions, later ones having to do with withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt, the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), and clearing of the Suez Canal. In the interest of promoting United Nations efforts along the above lines the United

States did not press for action on two other resolutions it submitted on November 2 which had to do with long-range settlement of the Suez and Palestine problems.

The United States position in support of the United Nations was reinforced by the attitude taken last spring when the Secretary General was asked to go on a mission to the Middle East to relieve tensions and try to set up machinery for reinforcing the armistice agreements. On May 8, 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that—

Past efforts toward a settlement of substantive issues in the Middle East have encountered serious obstacles. The task remains complex and no real solution will easily be come by. But progress there is as necessary as it is difficult. There are grounds for hope that it may be possible to maintain the momentum now established by Mr. Hammarskjold's efforts.

These words may well have been spoken during the time the United States initiative was strengthening the United Nations after the outset of the Middle East crisis and even now when progress is being made.

The President also strengthened the United States position in the United Nations by stating the position of the Government in these words:

We believe the Anglo-French-Israeli attack to have been taken in error for we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes. The dedicated purpose of the United States Government is to do all in its power to * * * end the conflict.

Later he stated the principle that it is impossible to have one policy for one's friends and another for one's enemies.

DEFINING "AGGRESSION"

As late as November 17, the Acting Secretary of State told the Assembly during the general debate that the United Nations with full support of the United States would be obliged to take action if the U. S. S. R. sent "volunteers" into Egypt. But he left the clear implication that if the United Nations did not act the United States would not do so either. The "volunteer" threat was withdrawn when the British and French left Egyptian territory, and yet Mr. Dulles told your committee that the Eisenhower Middle East policy contemplates the use of United States armed force against any aggression by organized "volunteers" from the U. S. S. R. or China. This would happen, presumably, even though such help was requested by a nation or nations in that area. On the other hand, the United States would certainly deny any charge of aggression if it acted under the provisions of the current resolution. This is one of the confusions about the use of the word "aggression" which has never been defined under international law and therefore is open to interpretation by any nation. Some United Nations members, for instance, considered the French-British-Israeli attack on Egypt "aggression," although the United States never used that term. Who then is to decide when aggression occurs? By whom and what constitutes an act of aggression?

LOSS OF UNITED STATES PRESTIGE

The most encouraging aspect of United States action through the United Nations was that it was primarily directed toward meeting a threat to the peace as outlined in the United Nations Charter,

instead of following a former cold war policy directed against a specified enemy—the U. S. S. R. This move actually resulted in tremendous gains in United States prestige. The anticolonial countries which formerly were inclined to regard the Soviet Union as their "protector" against "Western imperialism" now eagerly supported the United States initiative and lost much of their former suspicion of Western motives. Had the United States continued to adhere to this policy, it would have consolidated the gains made. Instead, the policy of "noninvolvement" proclaimed with great satisfaction in November no longer held. Under the Eisenhower doctrine the United States could and would use force without necessarily obtaining either congressional or United Nations authorization. International cooperation, including that of the Soviet Union, without which a peaceful solution of the Middle Eastern crisis cannot be found, is more remote and there is already a loss of United States newly won prestige among the Asian-African and Arab United Nations members.

Why was this shift made? Was it because of fear of further weakening the Western Alliance or was it because what the United States thought was her leadership of the Asian-African-Arab group proved to be merely following their lead and the unwillingness of a great power to hand over its foreign policy to the General Assembly majority?

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS RAISED

Despite official explanations and extensive preparations by radio and press for the unprecedented appearance of the President before a joint session of Congress to outline his "new" Middle East policy, there are elements in the plan not clear and those that raise some fundamental questions.

The provisions of the Eisenhower doctrine resolution Senate Joint Resolution 19 ask the Congress (1) to authorize the President to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area—a very vague term—of the Middle East in the development of economic strength in the maintenance of national independence; (2) to authorize the President to undertake military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations desiring such assistance; and (3) to authorize the President to employ United States Armed Forces to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations or group of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism; provided such employment is consonant with treaty obligations and the United Nations Charter.

CONTAINMENT POLICY AND TRUMAN DOCTRINE

By the admission of the Secretary of State himself, this is not a new policy. It is merely the application to the Middle East of the past—and some would add, outworn—policy of containment and the Truman doctrine of 1947. The only thing that is new is that it revives a United States attitude toward the Middle East which was a feature of the Truman doctrine, rather than pursuing the inclination of the United States policy of a more recent date.

ARGUMENTS OF DOCTRINE PROPONENTS

Proponents of the doctrine maintain that it is a peace move on the grounds that the danger, which no one denies exists, in the Middle East situation has become acute by reason of two new factors. One is the overt exploitation of the Middle East countries by the Soviet Union and the other is the collapse of British and French influence in that area. Certainly these could not be called new factors, for as to the first the United States has been aware of the spread of Communist influence in that area for some time and as to the second was instrumental in urging the withdrawal of British troops from Suez in 1956. Supporters of the doctrine argue that this step is necessary to curb Soviet Communist expansion and to fill the power vacuum created by the elimination of French-British influence in the Middle East.

ARGUMENTS OF DOCTRINE CRITICS

Critics of the Eisenhower doctrine resolution say that at its best, it is unnecessary, uncertain, inadequate, and unwise. At its worse, it is reckless, contradictory, and dangerous. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom might well agree with these criticisms and add some more of its own. However, in so doing, the position of the league has always been that merely opposing something is negative and serves no useful purpose. Unless the criticisms can be constructive, based on what it considers sound reasons for its opposition, even such constructive criticism is insufficient. A positive alternative must be offered.

INADEQUACIES OF DOCTRINE

The league rejects the thesis that the threat or use of force can be used as a means to bring about a desired end—peace. Instead it increases tensions, suspicions, and fears, creates more problems, and solves none. Ends and means must be consistent. Therefore alternatives to the threat or use of force must be concerned with the substitution in every case of peaceful means to bring about the desired end, which is peaceful settlement of conflicts. This is not only a priority in the league's constitution but also in the United Nations Charter.

The league believes that any positive, constructive and effective United States policy must be directed toward the actual problems to be solved in the Middle East if peace and security are to be assured and the danger of the spread of conflict is to be averted. On the basis of these criteria, it is our considered opinion that the Eisenhower doctrine resolution now before the Congress fails to meet the requirements of a policy adequate to deal with the Middle East situation for the following reasons:

FAILURE TO MEET REAL DANGER

(1) The Eisenhower doctrine is not directed to meet the real danger nor to the solution of the actual problems that create that danger. Rather, it is directed toward gaining ascendancy in the power struggle.

The threat to peace in the Middle East cannot be attributed merely to Communist domination and expansion nor to the vacuum left by the retreat of former imperialist powers. Actually there is no such vacuum. It is being filled by the new nationalisms of ex-colonial na-

tions with their own conflicts, on the one hand, and on the other, by the efforts of the 2 contending blocs grouped around the 2 super-powers—the United States and the U. S. S. R.—to exploit these conflicts in their competition for the allegiance of the new nations.

It would not be true to say that the danger to peace in these contested regions arises exclusively from such attempts at great-power exploitation of local conflicts. The conflicts are there on both the political and economic level. They are most desperately explosive among young, poor nations which, having barely emerged from long periods of foreign domination and often suffering from overpopulation, feel they have nothing to lose. How to deal with these new nationalisms is the real problem.

NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

(2) The Eisenhower doctrine calls for unilateral action rather than international cooperation through the United Nations.

If the dangerous explosions of national conflict are to be prevented, if their exploitation by the great powers at the risk of an eventual worldwide conflagration is to be stopped, a comprehensive attempt must be made to deal with the problem of regional security and regional economic development as a whole. Although such an attempt will require the agreement and contributions of great powers, it cannot command the necessary confidence of Middle Eastern countries if it is advanced by any one nation, a particular group of nations, or even a "deal" between them. The only sponsorship that would be acceptable to the nations of the Middle East is that of a truly disinterested international body—the United Nations.

In view of the vital importance that the United States has recently been attaching to the United Nations, one may raise the question as to whether there is a legal basis for action without authorization of the Security Council or General Assembly. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, it is true, safeguards the right of individual national or collective defense without waiting for United Nation action. It is the basis for NATO and other mutual defense agreements involving the United States and 40-odd nations. Only in the case of the Truman Doctrine of 1947 has the United States left itself open to the charge of bypassing the United Nations. One may assume that this would again be the case in respect to the Eisenhower Doctrine that so closely follows the same pattern and since under its provisions the United States could and might use force if it could not obtain United Nations authorization.

President Eisenhower made a point of saying his doctrine was not concerned with two of the main problems of the Middle East—Suez and Arab-Israeli relations—and that he was leaving them to the United Nations, as they should be. But the chances of making progress are greatly diminished as the President's Middle East policy has put great obstacles in the way of reaching a peaceful settlement. The task is infinitely more difficult. There are already signs pointing to the dissipation of the reservoir of good will toward the United States so recently created. A Lebanese official, friendly to the West and now on a trip to the capitals of the world, warned recently that "the Eisenhower Doctrine will be so presented in this part of the world that the United States will lose all the prestige it gained by its conduct

of the Suez crisis." Thus a golden opportunity may be lost by not using this prestige to help, rather than to obstruct the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Suez Canal issue.

DANGERS INHERENT IN THREAT OR USE OF FORCE

(3) Dangers inherent in the threat or use of force.

Stern warnings, such as the United States is now giving to the Soviet Union to keep "hands off" the Middle East, it is well known, haven't much effect unless they have "teeth in them." In the case of the Eisenhower Doctrine those "teeth" are a declaration of conditions under which the United States will employ its Armed Forces and arm its Arab friends against the Soviet Union or "any nation controlled by international communism." (This is indeed a vague and dangerous term, since in Western eyes those countries in need of help which turn to the U. S. S. R., are considered under Communist influence.)

In the case of the Middle East this kind of ad hoc policy which has been devised is for limited local use and directed at one enemy. Its limitations are very great when it is considered that there is no known threat of "overt armed aggression" since the U. S. S. R. has other methods by which it extends its power. Therefore the possibility of using United States Armed Forces in the Middle East seems less likely than another use of military means to back up the warning to international communism—namely the provision that at the request of a nation or group of nations, the United States would provide military aid. Since only a limited number of Arab nations might be tempted to make such a request to strengthen their position vis-a-vis a rival Arab state, and since others might accept Soviet military assistance, the danger of a local conflict is far greater. Still more is the danger that such a policy might set off an arms race in the Middle East, nations playing off one of the great powers against another and thus bear the seeds of a more widespread conflict. This danger has already been voiced in Britain when the question was asked:

"Will not such a program [of military assistance] invite an arms race with the Soviet Union arming one or more of its friends and the United States arming others?"

It would be the better part of wisdom for the administration, the Congress, and the American people to consider the bitter lesson learned by Britain as a result of what the London Observer in an editorial on December 16, 1956, terms "the wreckage of a mistaken policy" before supporting a United States venture which might well lead to the same tragic conclusion. The editorial goes on to say:

Positive efforts of reassurance and reconstruction, and an abstention from further sabre rattling are the best immediate counter to the dangers of Communist infiltration in the Middle East. * * * We must remember that this endeavor can no longer be made in terms of a special British military and diplomatic position in the area.

What guaranty is there that the United States special military and diplomatic position which the Eisenhower doctrine envisages would not meet the same fate? Since the Bandung Conference one thing has been crystal clear concerning the new nationalism, and that is that these countries will not longer accept the domination of any out-

side foreign power. The United States in disentangling itself from the charge of colonialism will again be charged with taking over the responsibilities of the former imperialist powers.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Turning now to alternatives, it must be said that the state of mind revealed in the last sentence of a New York Times editorial of January 8 is purely defeatist.

It is difficult to oppose the Eisenhower Middle East policy since there is no possible alternative.

There is always an alternative. Many valuable new approaches to the Middle East problem have been made during the past few weeks. Space and time prevent a detailed analysis of these suggestions, but certain fundamental changes in United States policy are indicated in all of them.

NEED FOR A NEW AND BOLD POLICY

(1) A new, bold United States policy is called for:

The Middle East presents in extreme form most of the tensions and frictions characteristic of our time. It is in a ferment of rapid social, economic, and political change. No part of the world so urgently needs intelligent and disinterested help from the more developed industrial nations to solve its problems.

The West—particularly the United States—must offer what the uncommitted world seeks: independence and interdependence.

Independence can be fostered by the understanding of the aspirations of the peoples desiring freedom from foreign domination, and interdependence may be furthered by international cooperation through the United Nations programs of assistance.

Often in the past United States statesmen have deplored the complex problem of colonial associations with which United States connections with Britain and France have involved this country. These included political domination, military occupation, and economic exploitation. Today colonialism has broken away, as recent events prove, and the United States is free to make its own bold new program based on political cooperation instead of domination, on collective security under the United Nations Charter instead of military occupation, and on economic partnership through the United Nations instead of exploitation. What is desperately needed is leadership with creative diplomacy expressed in a comprehensive program for political stability and economic development.

INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

(2) The instrument for carrying out a bold new program is the United Nations.

The only sponsorship for a regional security and development plan that would be acceptable to Middle Eastern countries is that of a truly disinterested international body—the United Nations of 80 nations which make up most of the world community. The machinery exists and can be expanded to meet the requirements of a larger plan. For some time a small permanent staff of the United Nations has been sponsoring economic programs, relief, et cetera. Observers have been

sent into trouble spots. An example of this was the U. N. truce observation organization under General Burns whose duty was to patrol the Palestine armistice demarcation line to see that there was compliance with the 1948 armistice agreements.

At the time of the French-British-Israeli attack on Egypt this was expanded into a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) composed of contingents from countries with no particular stake in the Middle East. The duties and functions of UNEF were clearly specified in General Assembly resolutions. These were to see that cease-fire was carried out and supervise withdrawal of French-British troops from the Suez area. When this was accomplished the U. N. force was to move into the Sinai Peninsula to take over the withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the armistice lines and take up their position there. The UNEF's functions are those of police, not an army. They are to undertake no military operations nor act as an occupation army nor be used to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. It is up to the U. N. General Assembly to decide when these functions have been fulfilled.

The clearing of the Suez Canal is a United Nations enterprise, according to an agreement on January 8 made between the United Nations and the Egyptian Government and made public on January 11. Under the time schedule a 25-foot channel will be cleared by March and the remainder by May, according to a report by Lt. Gen. Raymond Wheeler (United States Panama Canal engineer) who was appointed by the Secretary General to oversee salvage operations.

A fleet of 32 salvage vessels with crews of several countries—Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Yugoslavia—is going ahead with the work now that Egypt has withdrawn her demand that no clearing take place until all Israeli troops had been withdrawn from Egyptian territory. The work has been facilitated by a recent United States loan of \$5 million.

Recent events have shown that the only possible way out of the Middle East crisis is through the United Nations and that if the United Nations cannot maintain peace with cooperation, especially of all the great powers, the danger of a third world war cannot long be averted.

KEYS TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE

Strategically, the key to the Middle East is the Suez Canal. Politically the key to Middle East peace is a settlement between Israel and the Arab States. Any effective help from outside for Middle East security will have to be concerned with these two points.

Recent events have shown their interrelation and have indicated a way of dealing with both together. Only the United Nations can give the peoples of the Middle East the support needed to maintain the international security of the area without intervention, control, or influence from rival great powers. Their security also means the security of all other nations including the United States.

U. N. GUARANTY OF ARAB-ISRAELI ARMISTICE LINES

It is now clear that one essential requirement for peace is a United Nations guaranty of the present Arab-Israel armistice lines and

eventually of the agreed frontiers. Only this can permit both Arabs and Jews to disarm sufficiently to attend to their urgent economic and social problems.

Such a guaranty would require possibly a police force with the same duties and functions as the United Nations Emergency Force made up of smaller, disinterested countries sufficient to protect the peace and prevent outside intervention. This same United Nations force would also help to remove the international security problems of the canal.

SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM

Of these two problems—Suez and Palestine—the former is easier of solution and much progress has already been made. The Secretary General has worked out a method of implementing the agreed six principles which form the basis for negotiations supported by the United States that while observing Egyptian sovereignty by allowing Egypt to operate the canal, international machinery would be set up to prevent any arbitrary abuse of power on Egypt's part. The user's rights would also be considered and any dispute that arose would be referred to the World Court.

PALESTINE PROBLEM

The second problem—a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question—will be slower and more difficult to solve.

On January 15 Israel's forces evacuated El Arish, the largest town in the Sinai Peninsula. A UNEF contingent of Yugoslav troops plus 400 Egyptian police took over.

Israel has also notified the Secretary-General that she will withdraw all her forces from Sinai Desert by January 22 but continue to hold the Gaza strip and strategic ground at the straits of Tiran, which formerly Egypt used to block shipping bound for the Israeli port at Elabli on the gulf of Aqaba. Israel wants a UN solution. Any just solution would have to take into consideration the right of Israeli shipping to go through the Suez Canal before forcing her to relinquish the strategic ground which gives her access to a port.

LONG-TERM SOLUTION

Any long-term solution might have to deal with the refugee problem and possible cooperation of the two rival parties in some mutually beneficial project such as development of the Jordan River. If the Arabs and Jews were willing to first cooperate on an economic level, political settlements might be easier to obtain.

MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL PROJECTS

(3) Efforts must be directed toward the needs of the peoples of the Middle East as well as to those of other countries dependent on the Middle East.

While oil may be of predominating interest to people of other areas and to those in the Arab countries who have enriched themselves, often at the expense of their own people, in general the peoples of the Middle East put more emphasis on water as a means of increasing economic development.

No underdeveloped region has so valuable an export as Middle East oil. Yet human ingenuity which enables it to drive so many million engines has so far done relatively nothing to harness its proceeds to develop the region from which it comes.

It has been suggested that a kind of Schuman plan for Middle East oil on the lines of the European Coal and Steel Community might offer a solution. This would not necessarily require a change in ownership. There could be an international governing board with supervisory powers (as has been suggested for the Suez Canal) set up consisting of oil-producing and receiving nations on a profit-sharing basis—a small percent allocated to some mutually beneficial project, as previously suggested.

A very interesting suggestion has been made for the establishment of a Middle East Development Authority, an international concern under the United Nations for extensive developments of the waters of the Nile, the Jordan, the building of dams (the other long-range projects). The costs would be high but could be met if all nations channeled all their economic aid funds through the United Nations; and if a certain percent of oil revenues was put back into building of new pipelines and transportation improvements.

It would be to the interest of all industrially developed countries to help in the financing on a generous scale such projects as would bring peace and prosperity to the Middle East instead of spending their money on defending the area militarily from a possible enemy.

IMMEDIATE NEED FOR UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP

(4) United States leadership needed now.

The time to start formulating a new, bold, and effective United States policy for the Middle East is immediately. While the Eisenhower doctrine includes a small amount (\$200 million a year for 2 years) it is but a drop in the bucket, while the United Nations efforts are progressing toward the creation of an atmosphere in which negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the two key issues—Suez and Palestine—may be pursued. For this task the United States must mobilize an able team of statesmen, engineers, economists, and lawyers with the same vigor that would be used to mobilize them in a national war emergency, for the proposed Eisenhower doctrine would seem to make this a national emergency.

Only thus can the United States discharge its obligations under the United Nations Charter, and regain and hold the prestige it deserved to have a month ago. Questions of progress on disarmament, generous support of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, reexamination of United States immigration laws in order to help solve the refugee problem are vital to United States leadership.

This is a challenge to a country with great traditions of freedom, democracy, and prosperity all of which must now be shared with others with whom we live in the community of nations. That the United States can meet this challenge is assured. That it will depends upon all of us who call ourselves loyal Americans.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you for your very thoughtful presentation and your association's point of view.

Mrs. STEWART. Thank you for the opportunity to come before your committee.

Chairman GREEN. The next witness is Mr. Leonard J. Gans, of Chillicothe, Ohio.

Mr. Gans!

STATEMENT OF LEONARD J. GANS, CHILlicothe, OHIO

Mr. GANS. Senator Green, I am appearing before this joint sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee as a voluntary witness. I am not representing any group and the opinions I express are my own and are the kind you might get from the man on the street, so to speak.

Between January and October 1942, while the north African campaign was in an active and critical stage, I had the honor to serve as United States naval liaison officer at the British Protectorate of Aden, Arabia.

I was also a member of the first United States naval mission to fly across the continent of Africa—I saw the opening of the continent of Africa by the aeroplane.

Although I made brief visits to the rubber plantation of the Firestone Rubber Co. adjacent to Monrovia, Liberia, and to the Gold Coast, French Equatorial Africa, Nigeria, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Eritrea, and Egypt, my comments will be confined principally to the Arabs and Arabia, since I spent enough time in that area to learn something about the inhabitants and the locality.

THE ARABS

The Arabs have a rather good share of natural intelligence and aside from localized intertribal skirmishes are not necessarily a warlike people.

The Arabs, by nature, are an intelligent and peaceful people, faithful workers; respect and are loyal to those by whom they are employed. They are very religious and adhere strictly to their ancient customs and their extremely simple and primitive way of life.

They resent any attempted changes in their way of life or intrusion into their established customs. I had four Arab boys working for me in our quarters, which actually was a small American legation, since it housed our offices, living quarters, and also the living quarters of our Arab servants.

Our building was located in the heart of the Arab section of Aden and we found the Arabs to be very friendly and respectful toward the Americans. The British have been very efficient and benevolent administrators of the Protectorate of Aden.

They did not interfere with the way of life nor customs of the Arabs, they built paved roads for them, a water system providing pure drinking water and schools.

The Arab children were taught English in these schools, and one of the schools in Aden administered by the British had Irish nuns as teachers; adjoining the school was a Catholic Church with a French pastor.

The material needs of the average Arab are very few and simple. Nature is kind to people in that part of the world, since the climate is continually hot or warm.

A sheet of cotton cloth draped around the body constitutes clothing; houses are one story, one room, cement or concrete huts; furni-

ture consists of low, handmade stools and sometimes a handmade table; no window glass or doors in the huts; beds are made of 4-inch square legs 2 feet high held together by four 3-inch-square stiles, and on this frame the Arab weaves a net made of one-half inch hemp, which serves as a mattress—so, no Sealy posture pedic mattresses are needed by the Arabs.

Customarily, the Arabs sleep on these cots in the open, without covers; and when he wakes up in the morning, the cot is hung on a peg on the outside wall of the hut.

The wealth of the average Arab is reckoned in the number of goats, camels he owns; the Arab women feed and tend the goats. The Arabs' diet consists principally of goat meat, some fish and beans or rice—and he lives his expected span of life on this diet.

The prosperous merchants in Aden and the wealthy Arabs live in mansions and have all the modern conveniences. Such equipment as a flushing toilet is entirely unknown to the average Arab, and he is not at all self-conscious in answering the call of nature in the streets—so, pink tiled bathrooms and noiseless toilets would find no market among the Arabs.

The cookstove in our quarters was a 5-gallon gasoline can, with the bottom cut out and one side slit for a door, then was placed on a piece of sheet metal over a charcoal fire in a 12-inch square hearth.

With this primitive cooking equipment our Arab cook prepared meals as palatable and varied as could be found in any restaurant—so, there would be no mass market for electric cookstoves among the Arabs.

One day, in the Ford station wagon that the Navy provided for us, I drove out into the Arabian desert to an oasis to see what Arabian agriculture was like.

I found lettuce, cabbage, and beans growing the same as in any American garden; the soil was being plowed with a forked stick pulled by a camel; water for the garden was drawn from a well by an Arab boy walking on a water wheel treadmill and the water was carried to the garden in 5-gallon discarded gasoline cans.

The desert will grow anything if it is given water. It would be a waste of money to send tractors, binders, combines or cornhuskers to the Arabs.

I would say that all their agriculture needs is new seed stock, ordinary hoes, rakes, and spades; and if the common type of hand plow was sent, it should be built so that a camel could be hitched to it.

The camel is the beast of burden, the ship of the desert, and a source of income for the Arab. As many as 100 camels will trek across the desert in a caravan loaded with freight; and where an American city will have parking lots and multistoried parking garages for automobiles, the Arab settlements have "camel parking lots," an open space in the business center of the settlement where the loaded camels are brought, tied to stakes, the freight unloaded. The camels are fed a bundle of dried reed by Arab women or boys, the outgoing freight is loaded on the camels' backs and the caravan begins its return trip—so, while a Ford station wagon could make its way in the Arabian desert, few of them could be sold to the Arabian camel drivers.

WISDOM OF EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC AID QUESTIONED

So, unless there has been a sudden and complete change of customs, traditions and ways of life among the Arabs and other inhabitants of the Mideast nations since 1942, I would question the wisdom or need of immediate and extensive economic aid to the nations of the Mideast area.

These people for centuries have been happy in their own way of life; and any improvement in their standard of living should be by the gradual process of evolution and natural development; rather than trying to force modern gadgets and a new way of life on them—which they do not want.

No definite commitment on economic aid should be made.

My observations, while in Aden, were that the Egyptians are neither liked nor trusted by the Arabs. It is entirely probable that Nasser, by seizing the Suez Canal, has lost a rich source of income for Egypt.

The bulk of traffic through the Suez Canal has been oil tankers; but, now in self-defense, the oil companies operating in Iran and Arabia are making plans to relocate their pipelines so that the oil will be pumped into tankers at a port on the southeastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, thereby completely bypassing the Suez Canal.

When this happens the only ships that will use the Suez Canal will be the few round-the-world cruise ships and tramp ships.

So, if Egypt would be included in an economic aid plan under the Eisenhower doctrine the ultimate result would be that United States taxpayers' dollars would build the Aswan Dam for Nasser and would also be used—for an indefinite number of years—as "poor relief" to be doled out to a bankrupt Egyptian Government.

The Egyptians are very cagey and shrewd bargainers; in fact, throughout the Mideast the saying goes, "An Arab can outsmart an Israelite; but, an Egyptian can outsmart an Arab and an Israelite."

Communism will never be destroyed nor will the spread of it even be halted by dollars. The moral and physical courage of the Hungarians displayed in their recent rebellion against their slavemasters did more to disgrace and cripple communism than the sixty-odd billion dollars that have been spent during the past 10 years trying to do this.

So, my suggestion would be that no commitment on economic aid—either implied or expressed—be included in any resolution passed by Congress on our new Mideast foreign policy.

AUTHORITY TO USE ARMED FORCES

Regarding the provision to use our Armed Forces to check the spread of communism in the Mideast, as Commander in Chief, the President already has authority to use the Armed Forces in a national emergency.

Furthermore, my understanding, and I might be wrong about this, but my understanding of this provision of the Eisenhower doctrine is that the United States would not take any action against Russia, unless it was requested by a nation being victimized by Russia, and also that the United States would only take such action against Russia with the permission of the Security Council of the U. N.

Russia is a member of the U. N.'s Security Council and as such has the power to veto. Can anyone believe that Russia will agree to have itself attacked by the United States?

During the past week, I have listened to several 30-minute radio newscasts from CBC, Toronto; these programs were composed of quotations from editorials in British newspapers and speeches by top-ranking British Government officials; quotations were also given from editorials from Canadian newspapers from Montreal to Vancouver and all these quotations, whether from British officials or British and Canadian newspapers emphatically criticized the ineffectiveness of the United Nations.

It also appears to me that in making any action of the United States against Russia subject to the decision of the Security Council of the U. N. is a surrender of our national sovereignty to a supergovernment—which the U. N. actually is—and this, the American people positively do not want.

Chairman GREEN. I am sorry to interrupt.

Mr. GANS. Yes, sir.

Chairman GREEN. You have listened to a good many other speeches and I have to remind you that 10 minutes is the limit.

Mr. GANS. Yes, sir.

Chairman GREEN. I have listened with interest and I have read ahead to what you are going to read.

Mr. GANS. Yes, sir.

Chairman GREEN. You can have it all included if you wish but if you insist on reading it all—

Mr. GANS. I only have a page and a half left, Senator, that is all.

Chairman GREEN. I read it and I think it is very well expressed.

Mr. GANS. Yes, sir. Do I have your permission to continue?

Chairman GREEN. Yes.

Mr. GANS. Yes, sir.

EVENTS RUSSIA DOES NOT WANT TO HAPPEN

Taking a realistic view, it has always appeared to me that Russia's armed strength has been overestimated. There are two events that Russia does not want to happen—one, the unification of Germany under a form of government freely chosen by the German people; the other event, a properly declared war with the United States.

The occupants of the Kremlin know very well that Russia could never win a war against the United States. However, Russia will continue to get everything it can by subversion, infiltration, bluffs, threats, and false promises.

From a practical standpoint, how can a nation like Russia that cannot properly feed, clothe, and house its own people; does not have an adequate nationwide network of railroads and paved highways over which to move troops, food, and war materiel; that does not have the highly skilled and closely integrated industrial organization necessary to keep a major war going; that cannot even trust its own armed forces—how can such a nation carry on a major war?

Furthermore, in a war against the United States, Russia would receive positively no help from the enslaved nations—note that I use the proper term "enslaved" instead of the commonly used euphemism "satellite."

My suggestion is that the provision of the Eisenhower doctrine that prevents the United States from taking any action against Russia, without the consent of the Security Council of the U. N., should be eliminated from the resolution finally approved by Congress.

RUSSIA'S ATTEMPT TO COMMUNIZE MIDDLE EAST

What then is the real reason for Russia's attempt to communize the Mideast area? It is to consummate the long-standing plan of Russia to have warm water ports on the southern perimeter of the U. S. S. R.

Having suggested that the commitment on economic aid and the hindrance of the U. N. in the United States taking any action against Russia be eliminated from the final resolution approved by Congress, what action should Congress take?

RECOMMENDED PHRASEOLOGY

My suggestion is that a resolution be passed by Congress containing the substance of the following phraseology:

"It is the concensus of the Congress or the United States, that any further expansion of communism by the U. S. S. R. throughout the Mideastern nations, would necessitate positive and decisive action by the United States."

This kind of language the occupants of the Kremlin can understand and might even respect. My belief is that the Eisenhower doctrine in its present form will not stop the spread of communism in the Mideast, since our hands would be tied by the U. N. as they were in the Korean war.

Never again do American mothers want their sons sent to wars which our Armed Forces are forbidden to win, or would be fought under the flag of a supragovernment like the United Nations.

I thank you, Senator.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you very much.

Chairman GREEN. The next witness is Mr. Salem Bader, president of the United States Arab-Asian Institute.

STATEMENT OF SALEM BADER, PRESIDENT, THE UNITED STATES ARAB-ASIAN INSTITUTE, INC.

Mr. BADER. Senator Green and nonexistent gentlemen or Senators, if I may submit my statement for being printed in the record, because I know you are tired; and if you are bored, I don't blame you, sir.

Chairman GREEN. I am listening. I have been interested. You have been waiting. That is not nearly as interesting. You may do as you like. You may read it, providing you stay within 10 minutes, or you may summarize it and it will be included in the record.

Mr. BADER. Well, I would rather just make a few remarks off the cuff, and let it be printed in the record, because I want to be considerate. I know you have had a long session.

Chairman GREEN. I will be very glad to hear your few remarks.

Mr. BADER. All right.

I am sorry that the hour is late, and if most of the Senators are gone, I don't blame them. But I had hoped and had arranged for half a dozen or more of the King's top advisers and ministers to be present here, and listening to this morning's session I found such hostility on the part of 1 or 2 Senators toward the King and Saudi Arabia that I felt I had to call them and ask them not to come.

My institute and myself have been unofficial spokesmen for the Arab world for over 15 years, I think we are closer to Arab leaders and

Arab thinking and the soul of the Arab as a whole than most Americans.

ARAB THINKING

I want to say this: That 50 million Arabs who have no voice in this country, in this critical time, they feel that we Americans are discussing their fate, planning their future, making resolutions to go in or go out of their countries, imposing states upon them they do not wish to have, perhaps making their land a prospective battleground which could result in a scorched earth for them and their children, and they believe we are very presumptuous.

As close as I have been to Arab leaders since Mr. Eisenhower's resolution, their thought is this: "You have done us enough harm by imposing upon us the state of Israel. You gave our land away that you do not own. Will you stop dividing our land and sealing our fate? We have not done you any harm. We loved and respected you for years. It is you Americans who have made enemies out of us if we are enemies. It is you who have alienated us."

"Now we 50 million Arabs control a section of the world that, as you all admit, possesses enormous resources that Europe, Africa, and Asia, and possibly later the United States, cannot get along without. We control these resources. You need them, and we can get along without you"—I am talking for the Arabs as if I were talking to Americans. "Why aren't you a little nicer to us?"

"If we are so important, and it has been proven that what we possess means life and death to western civilization, isn't it about time that you began to talk to us as equals?"

"You talk to us about Russia and communism. We are neither pro-Russian and it is impossible for us to become Communists. We understand British and French imperialism. We understand the pillaging, the raping of our children and women, the loot of our land and our homes, by renegade Zionists, collected from all over the world, which you choose to impose upon us, and took and gave them the dearest part of our land, holy places, and expelled us," as a previous speaker expressed himself.

"We have a million refugees who are destitute. Now how can you do that to people who have been your friends, who possess the most strategic part of the world, the part of the world that is practically the way, the bridge, between Asia, Africa, and Europe, without which the influence, your influence, the American influence, if expelled from that part of the world, would be disastrous to western civilization and not to us; that you can see very plainly that if Russia got it, there possibly will be a third world war which may finish up western civilization and other civilizations in the world."

And I can go on for hours, but I want to say this: Let us stop deciding for the Arabs their fate and future.

CAUSE OF MIDDLE EAST TROUBLE IS ISRAEL

In short, they say, "We can give you what you need. We have never asked for anything. Now choose, yes, which one do you want, 50 million Arab friends with all we possess and control, or a million and three-quarters Zionists who have been a liability, who will continue to be a liability, who will be a millstone and have been a millstone around

your neck, and could possibly be the reason for the third world war."

Senator Green, this subject could mean life and death to all of us. This subject is above Arab and Jew. The Middle East is the most important part of the world, and it is of great interest to the welfare of the whole world.

We just cannot permit the arrogance, the defiance, the whole position of these renegade Zionists, to be the cause of a world cataclysm. This could be and could mean the signing of the death warrants of hundreds and thousands of American boys. It could mean the expenditure of hundreds of millions or many billions of dollars, if a world war was to come.

It could wreck not only Europe and Africa and Asia, but it could wreck us economically and in other ways.

That is how important this subject is, and I wish the other Senators were here to hear me. That is how important it is, Mr. Senator.

This is nothing to take lightly. We are not getting anywhere, we are not deceiving anyone, by using international communism or Russianism or many fancy words, or finding some kind of a scapegoat to blame this on. The Arab world, if they did turn against us, we drove them to it. If they are buying arms from Russia, we drove them to it.

Now, we cannot find scapegoats all the time to blame it on. The basic cause of the Middle East trouble is the State of Israel, and unless that is eliminated, there will never be peace there, and the subject will never be, the problem will never be, solved.

We look at Mr. Eisenhower's resolution as merely shadowboxing. The way it is written, the use of troops is not going to stop Russian movements if they wish to move. Two hundred million dollars a year isn't a drop in the bucket if we really want to raise the standard of living of the Middle East.

Chairman GREEN. Your time is exhausted. You speak very eloquently—

Mr. BADER. Thank you.

Chairman GREEN (continuing). For the Arab-Asian Institute.

Mr. BADER. Don't forget the United States part.

Chairman GREEN. Are those the views of the majority of the Arab world?

Mr. BADER. Yes, indeed, sir, and I have consulted with many leaders the last few weeks.

Chairman GREEN. I am very glad to hear you express it so well. I suggest that you let your prepared statement be put in the record, and also this oral statement which you have added to it.

Mr. BADER. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you for appearing.

(Mr. Bader's prepared statement is as follows):

STATEMENT OF SALEM BADER, PRESIDENT, THE UNITED STATES ARAB-ASIAN INSTITUTE, INC.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, at this time this senatorial body is called upon to make important decisions with regard to the present emergency in the Middle East.

Our institute which is close to this subject due to years of intimate association with Arab leaders and the Arab world in our leading position in this country as opponents to Zionist ambitions in Palestine, is not so concerned with the President's request for the use of Armed Forces and economic aid as we are with other critical aspects relating to the Middle East subject as a whole.

REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST EVENTS RECOMMENDED

(1) Certain members of this committee have proposed that a searching review of the Middle East question be undertaken. This we welcome enthusiastically and it is a pity that it has come about so late.

For 3 years our Institute has been pressing and pleading with heads of our Government—from the White House, the State Department, the Vice President's Office, and a score or more Members of this Senate as well as the House, to do something constructive and effective before the Middle East is lost to the United States sphere of influence.

We have issued memorandums, reports, warnings and confidential bulletins giving top level and critical information to high placed men in our Government, the Senate, and the House to make a bulging file which we call the 11th hour file on the Middle East.

Some of you gentlemen sitting here were recipients of some of our written reports. Tragically the response to all our earnest efforts was cold indifference, a passing-the-buck attitude, or we were told the subject was untouchable. The reason for its untouchability was that it was too hot to handle.

Too hot, not because of fear of Russian infiltration, or international communism or partisan politics; but because seemingly no one dared to provoke the Zionists in America or take any measures that might "get the Jews down our neck," so to speak.

MIDDLE EAST EMERGENCY DATES BACK TO 1948

Here, let it be noted, that the Middle East emergency is not recent—it dates back to 1948. It was created when the previous administration promulgously and rashly went allout to establish the State of Israel in the heart of the Arab world, Arab culture and Arab lands.

As you know, this was spearheaded by Harry S. Truman who brushed aside all wise advice, ignored expert counsel of the State Department and gambled with evident dire consequences to this nation and the world.

History will record that never in the annals of events has a head of any Government representing a leading nation of the world undertaken such adverse action—so obviously damaging and unjust to his country's own best interests and the welfare of its people—meanwhile alienating 50 million ardent friends and converting them into potential enemies, 50 million Arabs who straddle the most strategic part of the world, the loss of which as was recently proven could bankrupt the British, the French, Western Europe, and strangle Asia and Africa with the echo of disaster reaching our own shores.

If these foregoing statements are true, then indeed every thinking American might ask the burning question: Why was this state of affairs brought about? Why should the Jews of the world, propagandized by fanatical Zionist leaders, be stampeded into spending hundreds of millions of dollars—be pushed into utilizing every means at their disposal in pressuring Government agencies and officials, burrowing into public and private institutions, the press, the radio, motion pictures and every other means of public information; monopolizing, resorting to subsidizing ministers, churches, threatening to boycott every person or business that dare oppose them, and did so in many cases—smeared reputations of leading Americans and groups of all good intentions who dared expose their manipulations, even threatening the physical safety of persons and their homes.

Radio commentators lost their sponsors, columnists had their contracts canceled, authors and writers had their manuscripts thrown back into their faces in brutal fashion—respectable American men and women had epithets thrown at them such as anti-Semites, Fascists, pro-Nazi, and other collection of words that have been in common use the past 20 years.

This story, gentlemen, of how a minority, well organized, well financed, and cohesively aggressive, were able to bend the good conscience and the righteous will of a great country, such as ours, and force it to take a stand on an issue that today may well bring about a cataclysmic world war.

All this and more, gentlemen, to secure 8,000 square miles once known as Palestine, threw out its natives and made destitute refugees of them—to create a small state called Israel.

Gentlemen, this is a high price to pay for 8,000 square miles of real estate.

Now, after 8 years of dodging, covering up an injustice or even a crime we are faced with the issue head on. The question is before us again: "Shall we again save the Jews or perish with them?"

Right now, as in 1940, we must decide whether we have to mobilize our Armed Forces, get ready to expend billions of dollars and perhaps sign the death warrant of untold thousands of American boys, bankrupt our economy and way of life to satisfy the fanatical ambitions of the Zionists in America, or, change our policy and regain the friendship and goodwill of 50 million Arabs who control essential and unlimited resources that the world needs—and without which it cannot operate and thereby with such action, have world peace.

SCOPE OF MIDDLE EAST REVIEW

This institute respectfully urges that this proposed investigation to review the subject of the Middle East will include many of the preceding statements and facts brought out by the speaker, and if it should, it may well be the salvation of our country, the Middle East and the Arab world as well as the salvation of world Jewry victimized by the fanatical aggressiveness of Zionist leaders, arrogant and made with power that has brought us all to this sad and dangerous state of affairs.

With the obvious consequences facing us it would be far cheaper—in wealth, in human life and misery—to bring this million and three quarters Jews living in Israel to the United States to live where they can have the freedom, the privileges, and the position their fellow Jews enjoy in this country.

Yes, there is ample room for them. Let us give them land we own—and that is ours to give; rather than land that is not, and never was ours to hand out, such as Arab-Palestine.

IS CRITICAL INFORMATION REACHING THE GOVERNMENT?

(2) This item is concerned with whether critical advanced information is reaching our President, the Security Council, the heads of our State Department, and other heads of key agencies.

The experience of our institute the past few months has revealed a situation that may be more harmful than is apparent on the surface. To mention 3 specific cases 2 of which have caused world repercussions and brought about this emergency, we designate A, B, and C:

A. The willingness of President Nasser to accept American aid and cooperation from the United States to build the Aswan Dam. We had this information 2 weeks before the arrival of the Egyptian Ambassador to officially announce Egypt's acceptance.

We attempted by all means at our disposal to reach heads of our State Department to give them advance notice in order to prepare them; but could not reach them—they were too busy to see us;

B. Three weeks before the nationalization of the Suez Canal Co. we attempted to contact Mr. Hoover, Mr. Allen (Mr. Dulles was away) to apprise them of the impending events but these gentlemen were too busy to see us at the time.

We wrote to Mr. Dillon Anderson, special assistant to the President, on July 18, informing him that we had very important top confidential information that could have world repercussions which must be conveyed to him in person and which shall be brought to the attention of the President and the Security Council.

Nothing happened until we received a reply from Mr. Anderson's secretary on July 25, stating that the gentleman was away on vacation.

In desperation we met with the vice president of the Arabian-American Oil Co., an ex-Ambassador to one of the Arab countries.

And at the meeting, the gentleman was so haughty, so self-sufficient, and assured us that Aramco had its agents well situated and therefore knew exactly what was going on at all times, and he did not think there was anything of importance we could tell him or his company.

I left the gentleman but told him: "Within a few days you will have a shock that will reverberate around the world." As you know, on July 26 Mr. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Co.

C. Three weeks before the British, French, and Israel invasion of Egypt we issued a confidential bulletin specifically warning of the brewing collusion but no action was taken so far as we know to avert this world-shaking event.

Complete details with reference to this bulletin was given in the speaker's testimony before the House Foreign Relations Committee (see statement, pp. 383-417) if you are further interested.

This testimony by us does not intend any reflection on the integrity and ability of our President, Secretary of State, or even his brother. It merely points out

that if these high-placed gentlemen are not receiving important and critical information submitted by strategically placed organizations such as ours, then they are surrounded by assistants who either willfully withhold information, or lack the qualification to evaluate important information and judge its source. This proposed inquiry and review of the Middle East situation might also include this aspect of the subject. Our institute is at your service to assist in any way in clearing up a situation that may be fraught with hidden peril.

Chairman GREEN. The next witness is Mrs. Agnes Waters, of Washington, D. C.

STATEMENT OF MRS. AGNES WATERS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mrs. WATERS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee—

Chairman GREEN. Mrs. Waters, I know you are no stranger here.

Mrs. WATERS. No, sir. I have been here 18 years now, I am proud to say.

Chairman GREEN. You know this rule of limiting the time of the witness has to be enforced, and there is nothing personal in your case.

Mrs. WATERS. Thank you. I understand that I am to submit for printing in the record a written statement which I have prepared, and I am offering it to the clerk right now, and that I am to be permitted to speak verbally or extemporaneously for 10 minutes, and I shall be glad if you call time on me, and I shall try to conclude in that time.

SURRENDER OF CONGRESSIONAL POWERS

This is a very solemn moment in the history of the United States. You are asked here by this resolution to give up, surrender, the powers delegated to you by the Founding Fathers, the great decisions of war or peace.

You have been besieged by Communists, to my knowledge, for over 18 years to try to switch from you this important power, a power of life and death over the American people; indeed, it means the passing of this Republic.

It sets up a dictatorship, a military dictatorship, and it could mean the end of all of Christianity upon the face of this earth.

Now, I do not appear here as a supplicant. I am here as a sovereign citizen of the United States, demanding of you, of every citizen that is a Senator who has taken an oath, of every Congressman who has taken an oath, to uphold the Constitution of the United States and to defend it with your lives; we expect that of you.

We don't expect you to surrender your powers here just on a request from the President.

Now, I have information of great importance. The President of the United States has already taken over this power and sent the Marines to Port Said today. He has not waited for you to give him this authority; he is so sure that you will.

And I want to know what is wrong with the Congress of the United States that they are even entertaining such a proposition.

Long ago, I read a book that H. G. Wells wrote, and it was the plan of the Communists, he said, to abolish all government, and he said that parliaments will abolish themselves.

Now, for 18 years I have appeared before this committee, this Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pointing out to you the wolves in sheep's clothing who have appeared as the chief witnesses and the

architects of our foreign policy... They drafted the blueprints for every step to war.

They came up here besieging the Capitol for war, and I fought them to the very death, and only almost over my dead body did you put over those bills, and you know it.

I am almost dead from the fight I made, but I am still here demanding that you keep your oath to the Constitution, that you observe your conscience and get on your knees before God and realize what your obligation is to a hundred and seventy million Americans.

Life and death is at stake here; it is not just any fun for me to come here and expend myself again, and I have told—I have held in my hand and presented to this committee, time after time, the documentary evidence put out by your own Senate and House investigating committees in which the largest, most terrific Communist front for Moscow was created in 1937 in order to promote a United States foreign policy favorable to the interests of the Soviet Union, and I stood at the doors here in April 1939, and tried to stop those Communists from getting the power to get us into war with repeal of the arms embargo.

But you haven't listened to me.

But almost over my dead body, I said I would defend this country. My ancestors didn't found this country for me to lose it or give it up, and I have a great heritage here, and I am going to preserve it.

I am the only woman candidate for President of the United States, and I represent here not only myself, but about a hundred million Americans just like me who are determined to keep this constitutional power of life and death, and not to surrender it to a dictatorship.

TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Now, 10 years ago I was here against the Truman doctrine, and I made the same charges. I said it was not to contain communism as the proponents said it was. It was to destroy the countries that it was planned to go into.

They didn't ask for the power then to declare war. If they had, I would have been just as frantic as I am today.

Now, that is the purpose of this military aid to these Middle East countries.

I thank you, sir. I hope I haven't overstepped my 10 minutes. Have I any more minutes? Have I any more time? Could I have 2 more minutes?

Chairman GREEN. You have 2 more minutes.

UNITED NATIONS

Mrs. WATERS. I will enter into the phase of this Communist revolution that is called the United Nations that I fought here in 1945. It was a mass-murder machine sold to you as a peace machine, and under this resolution here, the President has power to turn our armies, our helpless armies, over to Soviet generals in the United Nations who sold us out in the Korean catastrophe, with the result that for the first time in the history of America, America was defeated on a foreign battlefield, and our greatest generals were not allowed to win that war because they had United Nations orders to lose it.

And they were not allowed to proceed in any way, shape, or form, to win the war, and our boys died on Heartbreak Hill.

Are we going to lose our armies? Are we going to lose our American people?

My husband was in the First World War. He served on eight fronts in France. And my daughter was in the Second World War as a WAC, and I myself served during the First World War in the War Department.

Now, we are here to defend this country, not to give it away.

Thank you, sir. I demand this bill be killed. Yes, sir.

Chairman GREEN. Thank you. We understand you are opposed to the proposal.

Mrs. WATERS. I am. I hope I have said so. I should have said so in plain English.

(Mrs. Waters' prepared statement is in the files of the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

Chairman GREEN. The meeting stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 4:50 p. m., the committee adjourned, subject to call.)

X